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DZ
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Moltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.
According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.
Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and 'central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that 'interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III intended to implement a similar maneuver to cut Prussia off from south Germany. First, he hoped to defeat Prussia, alone, which would entice Austria and Italy into forming a triumvirate with him. Then he hoped the triumvirate would attack the south German Confederation.
During the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia was victorious in battle, but as Moltke says, 'at what a cost'. It seems to me that Prussia's losses were rather high, primarily because of their reluctance to change plans and to break off any engagement once it began. Then the 'peoples army' arose like a phoenix in the midst of the vanquished French field armies, which made the consummation of Moltke's final victory elusive. He could not pursue all the remaining military targets; therefore, he just focused on one-Paris. He surrounded the French capital with the preponderance of his remaining forces (150,000) because it was the only strategic option left open to him.
The commander should position himself with his uncommitted reserves to ensure that they are committed where and when they may be of greatest service; he should not be at the front with units already committed. He should send reserves to those areas where the forward units are already nearly winning, thereby, overcoming these areas of resistance faster, with fewer losses by their timely intervention. Secondly, he should endeavor to bolster tenuous positions or those that are in danger of being lost.
The attack has the advantage of dictating the course of events to the defender who must conform to them. The advantages are greater morale and confidence gained through the knowledge of the time and place of the attack. The best method of attack is to envelope the opponent with two forces. First, one must attack the opponent frontally with one force to pin down as much of their main force as possible. Then the second force must attack the opponent's flank. Moltke believed that both the frontal and flank attacks should be performed simultaneously, however, if I were attacking the flank, I would wait until it has been sufficiently denuded, since the opponent will be drawing forces from it to counter the frontal attack (i.e., feint). The flank attack is usually the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt), but the frontal attack may be the center of gravity as well. There should be a reserve element to cover the force attacking the opponent's flank. An example of precisely this method took place during the battle of Koniginhof (Austria, 1866).
This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. Many of these methods are just as valid today as they were in 1860. Moltke writes very lucidly with great candor, which is precisely what one would expect of a Prussian Officer.
Moltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial envelopment. This worked well in 1866 against the Austrians and in 1870 against the French. His system seemed to promise victory in any war. He had taken the gift of fire from Prometheus and changed its very nature, or so his followers thought. Moltke himself grew more cautious in his later years, suggesting that only a partial success could be achieved in a war against both France and Russia, a political solution would have to be found for the strategic dilemma instead. During the period up to and following the First World War, most German military thinkers followed Moltke's earlier views while giving lip service to Clausewitz. Moltke was the more modern man, the technician of war for the machine age, while Clausewitz was a philosopher, belonging to another time and mode of thinking, or so it seemed.
Professor Hughes' book provides translations of various examples of Moltke's writings. I found Moltke's views on the training and duties of General Staff officers particularly interesting. The editor includes excellent commentary on various German military terms and the ways that they have been translated into English in the past, some rather confusing.
In all I find this book well worth the money and would recommend it to those interested in German military history, 19th Century military history, and military strategy and tactics in general, particularly the evolution of military thought. What seems to be missing is an edition of the works of Sigismund von Schlichting, who as Hughes points out provides the key link between Moltke's theories and modern theory.
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(but the maximum is 5), so if you happen to come accross this book buy it, or read it. I bought it used becuase it seems that the this book is not available anymore
Thank you,
Amr
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He is:
Woody Allen without the self-indulgent complaining
Dave Barry but not so manic
David Sedaris but things you can relate to
I love this book; you will too!
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I STILL OWN ONE COPY AND WISH I COULD FIND FIVE MORE FOR MY CHILDREN'S CHILDREN.
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Like most thoughtful Americans, my opinions, feeling and prejudices about the Vietnam War have morphed a lot over the past 36 years. Presently, this book catches me right in the middle. The War provided much to be angry over but even more to be sad about. Truly, good intentions in the hands of fools (aren't we all) can be the cobblestones for the road to Hell. I hope this book will serve the folks who take George Santayanas famous comment to heart. However, I have seen in my lifetime the "best and the brightest" can be the biggest fools of all.
Very good job.
Good photographs too. I would recommend this to anyone with an interest in how the Vietnam war came to be.
-- Bonnie
Ford's Vietnam isn't the one you generally read about. He loves the country and admires the Americans he meets in his travels. They in turn love their work, at least the men in the field do. But between the lines you can see that things will go terribly wrong with America's adventure in South Vietnam.
Belongs on the shelf of every student of the Vietnam War.
Carleton Ross
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The book's title was derived from Marx's famous quote "Religion is the opium of the people". Marx's belief was that religion diverted people's attention from misery on earth by promising a glorious afterlife. Aron explains communism served this role for radical intellectuals who eloquently rationalized and apologized for communism's barbarism because its promise to deliver utopia on earth. In a nutshell, communism replaced Christianity and other established religions as a new faith, but one grounded in the secular world, not in the heavens. As in all religions, faith is paramount, not reason. Communism's monstrous crimes and wholesale destruction of the individual did not bother these radicals because they believed in the ultimate "means / ends" justification. Since only communism could deliver humanity to the promised-land, it was privileged by its goal, thus any crime could be rationalized as the part of the twisted path to salvation.
This masterpiece illustrates the dangers of radical intellectuals who take a wild leap into political fantasy for the sake of an idea. Fredrich Hayek, the famous Austrian economist, summarized it best 50 years ago when he stated "The distance between a single-minded idealist and a fanatic is just one step".
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This author recognizes that we do have the power to help others be their best and that self-limiting habits need to be conquered. The reader is given a series of steps to take to overcome these habits. Try them!
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The text has been provided by noted travel writer Jan Morris. The book is largely structured by starting with Italy and proceeding clockwise through the entire European continent, ending with Greece, Romania, and Turkey.
I really can whole heartedly recommend this book to anyone except those who don't like to look at anything. But if you have any interest in the world, in traveling, in Europe, in history, in photography, or in just having fun looking at awesome photos, this book will prove to be an utter delight.
The photos are designed to provoke a sense of wonder and awe in the reader/viewer, and they succeed aesthetically, emotionally, and psychologically. From the rock of Gilbralter to a dense set of "potato row" houses in Copenhagen; from snowfields near the Arctic circle to Turkey--it's all here, images snapped from blimps, airplanes, helicopters, almost any method by which one might be "over" Europe.
One will not be able to glimpse most of these sites from comparable vantage points on a typical trek across the continent unless one plans to do so in a biplane. The images here are unusual in their breadth and majesty. ... The text is literate and fun. Buy it and marvel.