value.
List price: $18.50 (that's 30% off!)
Jose Promis (Profesor de Literatura Latinoamericana)
So argues Pete Daniel in his book "Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950's". Daniel's thesis is that the South offered ripe opportunities for change during the immediate post-World War II era but these opportunities were overlooked by the fact that warring factions between African-Americans and whites prevented to make important cultural revolutions make a difference in the political spectrum. These important cultural revolutions consisted of: the importance of rhythm and blues in forging feelings of appreciation between blacks and white country and western singers, the rise of NASCAR as a unifying factor among lower-class whites to challeng the hegemony of the white middle and upper-classes, and, finally, the rebeliousness exhibited by both white and black youth to forge a new consensus for political change. Daniel's book does an excellent job of explaining both why there were contradictions in Southern society and how these contradictions contributed to a painfully fought battle for integration and equal rights. This is a battle which is still being fought today but more on a state's rights and regionalistic front than a racial front.
Daniel's book is a true lesson in primary source research and his endnotes clearly demonstrate this. Interviews, 4 pages of manuscript collection sources, and numerous prominent secondary sources fully back up a thought-provoking thesis. This book is a welcome addition to southern historiography.
A case in point: In April 1981 a semi-official Egyptian weekly pronounced Ibn Taymiya, the renowned Syrian theologian who lived from 1268 to 1328, the most harmful influence on Egypt's youth. A few months later, Ibn Taymiya became the basis for the actions of 3 of Anwar Sadat's 4 assassins, who had read him extensively.
Pipes divided the book into 5 sections, each including 4 or 5 articles. He groups them somewhat loosely and the articles run the gamut.
Islam and Public Life first discusses fundamentalist views of America and Russia, also touching on how the secular, traditional and reform branches of Islam relate to public life. It next examines religious similarities between Judaism and Islam--both of which stress correct action, compared with Christianity's focus on faith. Pipes shows the far-reaching extent of Muslim anti-Semitism, which stemmed from a patronizing view of other religions that became virulently anti-Jewish in the 20th century--and found welcome among Western Protestants, human rights activists, reporters, academic committees and even liberals seeking a "respectable forum in which to vent their own views about Jews." Pipes also covers the Muslims of Central Asia--which border Taliban Afghanistan's fundamentalist hotbed.
A section on the Persian Gulf attributes the origins of the Iraq-Iran war not to religious differences, but to economic and geographic factors--including the Shatt al-'Arab River and its vast water resources. Pipes also discusses the dangers that oil wealth poses to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya. The oil windfall made these desert sheikdoms dependent on a continued oil boom, unless new sources of income could be found. So far, none have emerged. Pipes praised Kuwait in 1986 when its government refused to buckle under US pressure to release imprisoned terrorists, and later toured the oil state as the guest of Minister of Information, Sheik Nasir. He found the Bedouin descendants' grand hospitality and intellect reflective of the Arabian Nights. Next, he considered the Saudi Arabian kingdom formed by Wahhabi leader Abd al-Aziz, dissecting various histories, including Peter Mansfield's The New Arabians, funded by the Bechtel Corporation.
Pipes' prescient take on the Arab-Israeli conflict also still holds value. The conflict is fueled, he believes, not by Israel but by the conflicting claims of Palestinian separatists, Arab nationalists and the Jordanian and Syrian governments, among others, over Palestine and its boundaries. The latters' perpetual incapacity to unify stems from irreconcilable goals. An Arab government's sponsorship of the PLO grows, he wrote, proportionate to its distance from Israel. Pipes considered no Arab nation eager to end the conflict. By implication, he believed that nothing Israel could do unilaterally would improve the conflict's complexion. Were the PLO, fundamentalists or Syria to inherit the Arab claim, he predicted that the conflict would last longer--which is precisely what happened with Arafat's violent rejection of Oslo in 2000. Pan-Arabism spawned the PLO, prompting Saudi Arabia to give Arafat's organization $250 million a year by the late 1970s, and other oil states, smaller sums. But this funding dictated that PLO behavior would reflect weighted-Arab demands for Israel's destruction, more than Palestinian needs. Meanwhile, the PLO dictatorship brutalizes its own people, as evidenced during its reign of terror in Southern Lebanon from 1975 through 1982.
Another real gem is the section on terrorism. Pipes provides background for suicide terrorism, which is not rooted so much in Islam as in state-sponsorship. The first major instance of suicide terror was the 1981 destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, which killed 27 and wounded over 100. The phenomenon picked up political steam with the 1982 murder of Lebanon's Bashir Jumayyil and went international with the 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, which killed 63. Later the same year, a truck bomb killed 241 US servicemen, also in Lebanon. State sponsorship, he shows, was behind most suicidal actions. Many suicides were recruited via blackmail or under other duress. The way to combat it, he wrote, is to punish states that sponsor this violence.
And finally, for the finale, we learn pointedly what is wrong with media coverage of the Middle East. "Put simply, American journalists are interested in only two topics in the Middle East: Israel and the United States. Whatever takes place that is related to these countries is amplified...;whatever does not is ignored." From 1972 to 1980, for example, ABC, CBS and NBC devoted an average of 98.4 minutes annually to Israel, only 54.7 minutes to Egypt, 42.4 minutes to the PLO, 25.7 minutes to Syria, 18.4 minutes to Lebanon, 12.7 minutes to Saudi Arabia, 8.5 to Jordan and 7.2 to Iraq. But the US and the Middle East won an average of 153 minutes of coverage annually. "Israel is imagined to be more powerful than it really is because it is watched so closely," Pipes writes. Similarly, attention given to Palestinian refugees far is out of proportion to their suffering, which in any case is caused by their own leaders' refusal to accept peace. During the same era far greater numbers of Vietnamese, Cambodian, Afghan, Somali and other refugees , whose ranks now include some 2 million Sudanese, suffered far worse tribulations, which shamefully got far less press attention. Being overexposed, Pipes rightly concludes, means that Israel is "held to impossible moral standards." Israel is measured "not in relation to [its enemies] or other states, but in relation to abstract ideals."
Pipes offers 10 times the wisdom of many other volumes, despite the book's age. Alyssa A. Lappen