The authors examine the natures of military revolutions and RMA (a very hot topic that has arguably produced more hot air than substance) and provide a number of case studies examining the issues and testing the authors' views through history.

The case studies are;

- The English in the 14th century
- 17th century France
- The French Revolution
- The American Civil War
- The Prussian RMA, 1840-1871
- The Battlefleet Revolution
- The First World War
- Blitzkrieg 1940

The various case studies are backed up by an extremely satisfying introduction and a thorough, well argued conclusion which fires one or two shots across the bows of those residents of the Pentagon who may be suffering from technology-centric tunnel vision. The authors (very distinguished bunch, it should be said) warn against the idea that Clausewitzian truths regarding such issues as friction can be discounted thanks to the wonders of technology and indeed make clear that they are as important as ever.

The various case studies work extremely well as concise stand-alone works on their various historical periods, even if RMA is not your hot topic. Especially good are the chapters on the English in the 14th century and on the Battlefleet Revolution (and the inner workings of the Imperial German Navy and the Royal Navy during this period).

This is a well written, interesting book which should annoy all the right people.

This is the only serious book I have been able to find that addresses revolutions in military affairs with useful case studies, a specific focus on whether asymmetric advantages do or do not result, and a very satisfactory executive conclusion. This book is strongly recommended for both military professionals, and the executive and congressional authorities who persist in sharing the fiction that technology is of itself an asymmetric advantage.

It merits emphasis that the author's first conclusion, spanning a diversity of case studies, is that technology may be a catalyst but it rarely drives a revolution in military affairs--concepts are revolutionary, it is ideas that break out of the box.

Their second conclusion is both counter-intuitive (but based on case studies) and in perfect alignment with Peter Drucker's conclusions on successful entrepreneurship: the best revolutions are incremental (evolutionary) and based on solutions to actual opponents and actual conditions, rather than hypothetical and delusional scenarios of what we think the future will bring us. In this the authors mesh well with Andrew Gordon's masterpiece on the rules of the game and Jutland: we may be best drawing down on our investments in peacetime, emphasizing the education of our future warfighters, and then be prepared for massive rapid agile investments in scaling up experimental initiatives as they prove successful in actual battle.

The book is noteworthy for its assault on fictional scenarios and its emphasis on realism in planning--especially valuable is the authors' staunch insistence that only honesty, open discussion among all ranks, and the wide dissemination of lessons learned, will lead to improvements.

Finally, the authors are in whole-hearted agreement with Colin Gray, author of Modern Strategy, in stating out-right that revolutions in military affairs are not a substitute for strategy as so often assumed by utopian planners, but merely an operational or tactical means.

This is a brilliant, carefully documented work that should scare the daylights out of every taxpayer--it is nothing short of an indictment of our entire current approach to military spending and organization. As the author's quaintly note in their understated way, in the last paragraph of the book, "the present trend is far from promising, as the American government and armed forces procure enormous arsenals only distantly related to specific strategic needs and operational and tactical employment concepts, while continu[ing], in the immortal words of Kiffin Rockwell, a pilot in the legendary First World War Lafayette Escadrille, to 'fly along, blissfully ignorant, hoping for the best.'"

Lest the above be greeted with some skepticism, let us note the 26 October 2001 award of $200 billion to Lockheed for the new Joint Strike Fighter calls into serious question whether the leadership in the Pentagon understands the real world--the real world conflicts of today--all 282 of them (counting 178 internal conflicts) will require the Joint Strike Fighter only 10% of the time--the other 90% of our challenges demand capabilities and insights the Pentagon is not only not capable of fielding, it simply refuses to consider them to be "real war." Omar Bin Laden beat the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and he (and others who follow in his footsteps) will continue to do so until we find a military leadership that can lead a real-world revolution in military affairs.... rather than a continuing fantasy in which the military-industrial complex lives on regardless of how many homeland attacks we suffer.

Overall, regardless of these matters this book is very fine. I would certainly use it were I to teach a reading class on the play.

"The Eumenides" begins a few days after the end of the previous play, with Orestes seeking refuge at the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. In a most unusual move for a Greek tragedy, the action then jumps ahead several years when Orestes, after years of wandering as a tormented outcast, arrives at Athens and throws himself on the mercy of the godess Athena. The Furies arrive, hot upon his heels, and demand he be punished for his act of matricide. However, Orestes insists that since he acted according to the dictates of Apollo, he is guiltless of the crime. This is a shocking declaration, especially for someone from the accursed house of Atreus. Athena convenes a special court to hear the case against Orestes, but they are unable to reach a verdict, leaving it to the goddess to decide his fate.

Ultimately, the Orestia is a celebration of the Athenian civilization that had created a democratic government and a system of trial by jury. That such a system could be perverted might be true, as the case of Socrates strongly suggests, but Aeschylus is comparing the system to the past to draw a strong distinction between vengeance and justice. The Orestia has great importance because of this theme, and not simply because it is the only surviving example of a Greek tragic trilogy. The climax of "The Eumenides" is rather strange for a Greek tragedy, since it ends on an exalted note of reconciliation and optimism. This is symbolized most by the transformation of the Furies into the Eumenides ("kindly ones"). But ultimately it is the Athenian legal system, where a new type of justice is tempered by mercy, that is being glorified in this triology. The tragic story of Orestes is simply the tale Aeschylus chooses to teach his lesson.

In the introduction to this book Steven Jay Gould laments this problem by saying "In one particularly distressing example... scholars often look down their noses at large format books filled with attractive photographs "coffee table books" in the dismissive jargon." Mr. Gould goes on to say, however "I love this book because it embodies such a fine marriage of these tow m odes of our central vision - palpable photographs of matrials things with a distinctive text of life's history."

I couldn't say it better. Frankly, most books like this aren't very good, this one is perfect for someone with my background: a high school eduction, no chance of ever going back to college, and a overbearing curiosity for all things ancient.

Since starting to collect fossils in the Nebraska road side a year ago, my curiosity of fossils has grown tremendously. Thanks to an effort by a few scientists willling to speak of these things in lay terms, I am able to learn more about the collecting and the science of fossils every day. Books like this are useful to maintain the support scholars need to keep their science alive, and I for one am very happy to see this inexpensive effort from a scientist published and available to the general pubic.

For me it is priceless bcuz I use it as a desktop reference. Of course I cannot be searching the Net for information on a small command or system call and that's where I consult the book.

This book also contains a few unpublished pieces. The best is Rothbard's analysis of the 1994 elections. As usual, Rothbard gets to the crux of the issues involved, dealing with the characters whose actions (often behind the scenes) were decisive. Reading this piece reminded me of how much we lost in Murray's death - not just a brilliant theoretician, but a man whose comments on the events of the day were a constant source of illumination. Make sure you also get THE IRREPRESABLE ROTHBARD, his collection of essays from the Rothbard-Rockwell report.

As has been stated, the essays span a considerable time period, though there is perhaps (definitely in fact) a weighting towards 20th century strategy. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing is probably dependant upon the reader's personal taste but I didn't have a problem with it.

The quality of the essays is invariably of a very high quality and the contributors are leaders in the field of Strategic Studies (Colin Gray, Donald Kagan, Eliot Cohen, the late Michael Handel, Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox etc). Standout chapters include Holger Herwig's withering analysis of Imperial German strategy in the post-Bismarck period and (by virtue both of quality and of the fact that it tackles a relatively obscure and much neglected power's policy) Brian Sullivan's chapter on Italian grand strategy in the build-up to the First World War.

The chapters (excluding the excellent and extensive introduction and conclusion) cover the following periods;

- Athenian Strategy in The Peloponnesian Wars
- Roman Strategy against Carthage
- Chinese Strategy from the 14th to the 17th centuries
- Spanish Strategy under Philip II
- English Strategy, 1558-1713
- French Strategy under Louis XIV
- The United States, 1783-1865
- Prussia-Germany 1871-1918
- British Strategy, 1890-1918
- Italian Strategy, 1882-1922
- Germany, 1918-1945
- British Strategy, 1918-1945
- U.S. Strategy, 1920-1945
- French Strategy in the inter-war period
- Soviet Strategy, 1917-1945
- Israeli Strategy
- U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Aside from the fact that the quality of the chapters is of a very high standard, the great virtue of this book is the way in which it looks into the way nations have made strategy, rather than dealing with specific strategic theories or trying to provide a guide on how strategy should be made (lessons drawn from history aside). It illustrates clearly the frustrations, the balancing of interests, the difficulty in seeing the big picture, the weighing up of ends and means and the FRICTION that plagues policymakers when they put the books away and actually have to make the magic happen.

This book should be read by anybody with a serious interest in Strategic/War Studies. It's a little gem. At over 600 pages, you get your money's worth too.