Guido Knopp's "Hitler's Henchmen" is really a multiple biography of the six men the author identifies as the German dictator's most important disciples: Herman Goering, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbles, Albert Speer, Rudolf Hess and Admiral Karl Doenitz. In Knopp's chosen lineup lies the first problem. Most students of The Third Reich would certainly place Hitler's Chief of Staff Martin Boorman and SS Security Chief Reinhard Heydrich well above the ineffectual Hess or the plodding Doenitz in terms of their importance to the Nazi regime. Ignoring those two vital figures is a serious flaw in the book.

The second problem is the book's configuartion. Not witstanding the fact that a few chapters is not nearly enough space to adequately explain the lives and roles of any of these individuals, Knopp provides pages of direct quotes from and about each one, interspersed at random throughout the narrative. He also makes the fatal mistake in such an introductory work of assuming the reader is already intimately familiar with the overall history of Nazi German, referring to larger events with attributing dates or in what sequence they occurred. All of this left me wondering exactly who was the intended audience for this work? Nazi scholars won't learn anything they didn't already know, while casual readers are likely to find themselves hopelessly confuced.

Overall, "Hitler's Henchmen" is not a well written work of history, even allowing for the fact that it was translated into English.

Guido Knopp has given us six psychologial pen portraits (not biographies) of leaders of the Third Reich - Goebbels, Goring, Himmler, Hess, Speer and Donitz. He will have no truck with the argument that Hitler was a weak, lazy or disinterested dictator. Rather, the henchmen portrayed in this book took their orders directly from the fuhrer. Knopp writes, "The Reich's murderous existence depended solely on him. Without him, it became a ship of the dead." Although the author has included some new material from British and Russian archives, the analysis of the characters does not break a lot of new ground (how could it?) although this reviewer was interested in Knopp's account that Speer may have returned to the Berlin bunker in late April 1945 to dissuade Hitler from appointing him as successor. The author's strength lies in putting these nazi leaders properly in context. He shows up very well the inconsistencies in Himmler's character which made him both a yes man and, ultimately, a traitor. Donitz by contrast was made of sterner stuff - he went on fighting for supplies and raw materials long after there was anything to distribute. If you want a summary of what made these men tick, interspersed with wry contemporary comments from their colleagues, Knopp's book is well worth studying. When Goring told Hitler in 1939, "We've got to stop going for broke," Hitler replied, "All my life I've gone for broke." Those few words aptly sum up the leadership problem of the Third Reich.

I'm only on the 3rd chapter, but from what I've read so far this book is well written. I'm only 17 and I don't know much about that era besides the war. because my history books never said anything thing about these men. It gave me an insight on what went on nazi Germany. When I started reading this book I thought that Hitler was the behind everything. I didn't even know these people existed. This book is giving me a psychology and history lesson.

Keep up the good work. Guido Knopp

Hans Baur deserves a reputation of more than just being "Hitler's pilot." He was a WWI ace and a distinguished pioneer of early European aviation. Indeed, a good part of this memoir recounts his days between wars, flying over the Alps, when the job was done literally by the seat of the pilot's pants and only the most skillful survived. Severely wounded in Berlin during the last hours of the Third Reich, Baur survived ten years incarceration in a series of Russian prisons. But it's as Hitler's pilot that Baur is best known today. Baur does give us some small insights into what it was like to have been a member of Hitler's innermost circle, but his narrative is scrupulously apolitical and while he must have known Hitler and his cronies rather well, he refrains from giving us any personal assessment of what they were really like as individuals. It is evident he admired and respected Hitler and he claims to have been a friend of Rudolph Hess, but what did he really think of these men? Even more frustrating to the historian, after serving Hitler for more than a dozen years and then, as a result of this loyal service, spending a decade in Soviet hands after the war, Baur just ends his story with a description of his homecoming. We do not know at the end of this book what Hans Baur thought about National Socialism and what it did to Germany and millions of his countrymen, much less himself (he lost a leg in the Berlin fighting). Perhaps he remained an ardent admirer of Hitler? Fine, a man like Baur is entitled to his opinions, but he doesn't say. Baur was a brave, skillful and admirable man in many ways who witnessed close up the most dramatic events of the 20th century. But in "Hitler at My Side" he emerges in the end as just "Hitler's pilot."

Hans Baur was Hitler's pilot from 1932 until his death in 1945. He had unique personal access to Hitler and spent many hours in his presence. Unfortunately, Baur is not a particularly gifted storyteller and his personal characterizations of Hitler and other leading Nazi figures leaves something to be desired. Baur's memory is also highly suspect, as his years in Russian captivity proved conclusively. Baur continually changed his story, mis-remembered salient points in history and just plain forgot the gist of many historical moments.

Still, the memoirs are are interesting read. Baur gives his reflections and opinions on such diverse people in Hitler's entourage as Eva Braun, Goebbels, Himmler, Goering and Hess. He narrates the story of when he begs Hitler to flee Berlin in April, 1945 and allow Baur to fly him to safety. Hitler says wearily, "I will die here in Berlin."

Unfortunately, Baur doesn't tell much about losing his leg and spending 11 torturous years in Russian captivity. Now that would have been fascinating! Another missed opportunity, but there's enough interesting material elsewhere to justify the purchase of his recollections.

This book was a poorly compiled regurgitation of Allied World War II propaganda. The author had an incredible bias against Adolf Hitler and it gushes out in every chapter. According to this book, anything that Hitler did was the most evil, demented or terrible thing in all of history. When Hitler did ordinary things, or showed kindness, the author criticizes these as well.

Unless you want to read a book that is dedicated to Hitler bashing, I would stay away from this one. You will learn absolutely nothing, except disproven lies, from it. I am not quite sure how people can get away with publishing such discredited information and call it history.

The author of this book set out to write about a subject he apparantly didn't understand. I don't know what his sources were, but if his readers actually believe most of the things he has written here as "facts", then they are as naive as he is. It is a small book full of hearsay and fabrications, making Fuchs's so-called "Concise Biography" anything but. This book is sad proof that anything can be published nowadays. This is definitely one to avoid.

Any book with the name of Adolph Hitler in the title is bound to catch the eye of all Germanophiles - serious and semi-serious - and those people will grab this book off the shelf, automatically. It is only 195 pages, and so, is not really a serious biography of Hitler - but it is, nevertheless, a very readable book , especially for those who are already somewhat familiar with Hitler and German history - which means, I guess, sadly, mainly for just those people over 60.
Nevertheless, there are many people with a sense of history who will remember that Hitler was an Austrian-born megalomaniac with mesmerizing oratorical skills, who after fighting in the trenches in World War I gravitated to politics and eventually - in 1933 - rose to become the leader (eventually the dictator) - the "Fuehrer" - of Germany. Hitler was determined to right all the wrongs he thought Germany had been subjected to following the Treaty of Versailles, to restore the German economy, to establish Germany as the leading country of the world, to establish the German Third Reich (Empire)which was to endure one thousand years (it lasted 12) and to purify the German Aryan race - which, for various reasons, required the elimination of the Jewish population - wherever and whenever the opportunity permitted. While this book contains bits and pieces of that unbelievable saga, it deals with none of those issues in any great detail.
What author Fuchs does focus upon in his little book is certain trivia, personal ideosyncracies and eccentricities of Hitler that he judges will be of interest to fans of Hitler
and German history. Fuchs divides his book into 35 short chapters (5-10 pages per), which makes for easy reading. A sample of some of the chapter headings will illustrate the variety of subjects that Fuchs deals with: Hitler's mustache, his dog, his book ("Mein Kampf" ("My Struggle"), Nazi party stuff ( songs, flags, uniforms, greetings, titles, etc.), the "People's Car" (Volkswagen), Hitler, the orator, Hitler's women friends, Hitler, the hypochondriac, Hitler's diet, his dentist, his wardrobe, his reading habits, his tastes in movies, his artistic passions, his money, his anti-Semitism, his relationships with Goering, Goebbles, and Himmler - and more.
The book also contains some 38 pages of notes (but no foot notes), 8 pages of bibliography (containing titles of some more serious biographies of Hitler) and a 26-page chronology of the major events that transpired during Hitler's life - private and
political. The book is in its way entertaining - and reading this book might prompt the reader to move on to other, more serious, more comprehensive books on these matters.

This was a strange little story set in Liverpool, England before the outbreak of the Great War when young Adolf was 23 years old. It is based on the little-known "fact" that Hitler visited his half brother in England from November 1912 to April 1913. The book was definitely imaginative but too fictitious to be taken seriously. Don't expect to learn much about the young Hitler from this book.

William Patrick Hitler was born in Liverpool where he lived with his Parents. One indeed was Alois Hitler the half brother of Adolph. With this book Ms. Beryl Bainbridge stepped into what could have been controversial ground. Historically based fiction is a familiar foundation for her work, and this one is excellent.

In, "Young Adolph", the Author imagines a trip he might have taken to visit his brother in Liverpool when he was 23 years of age. To the extent there is humor in the work it is at the expense of her subject who on his best day does not rise above pathetic, and when drunk becomes a raging lunatic. If this sounds familiar it should, as the Hitler of History was so painfully ordinary it is almost beyond belief he did not die on the street during one of his homeless periods.

The Author brings about several events that are not earth shattering until you place them in the context of the Evil that was to be Hitler. Some are relatively minor as when we learn how his ridiculous hairstyle came about. However Ms. Bainbridge also hypothesizes where some of the events and practices that later would shake the world and resonate to today, may have started.

The book is as interesting as many Historical Works I have read about this genocidal maniac, and in some ways it carries with it more impact than scholarly studies of the creature. When portrayed as he has been presented here, the horror he becomes and unleashes on a good portion of the world, is either amazing or terrifying and probably both. An evil genius would be an understandable character, however such an unlikely character that History elevated to one of the great mass murderers of the 20th Century is as far from genius as language allows. And this is what Ms. Bainbridge illustrates so well in this work.

This book probably will not appeal to the ardently politically correct. They would recoil at the concept of not only a novel with Adolf Hitler as the central character, but also the fact that this book is very funny indeed.

I laughed out loud a number of times reading this novel. Bainbridge's humour is devastatingly ironic. The novel follows a twenty three year old Adolf Hitler as he blunders his way through a stay in Liverpool in 1912 with his brother Alois and his Irish wife Bridget. Because of the humour, the reader can at times find themselves with a degree of sympathy for the rather hapless and paranoid Adolf. Whenever that happens, however, Bainbridge hits you again with a subtle turn of irony that lets you feel justifiable contempt for him. In short, this Hitler is a loser -- a future powerful figure cut down to size. Without wanting to give anything away, Bainbridge also explains why Hitler had that odd moustache -- "He [Adolf] resolved to grow a moustache. Never again would he be mistaken for a woman." Very funny, believe me!

This is a wonderful read that will certainly be appreciated by those with an interest in history and a sense of humour about it all.

"How Hitler Could Have Won the War" takes as its basis Hitler had basically won the war in 1941, and through poor strategic decision making, lost it by 1943. Churchill's famous comment about "the terrible if's" not withstanding, the author does some excellent political-economic analysis, basically concluding that not "finishing off" Britain before turning on the USSR doomed him to defeat. In the author's estimation, pursuing the war in North Africa would have brought Britain to its knees, thus freeing up German forces to concentrate on obtaining "Lebensraum" in the East.

Such analysis was fairly commonplace in the West in the mid-1980s, especially from British historians. With the opening of archives in former East Germany and the USSR though, a different proposition for German victory is apparent-and this author doesn't discuss it. One needs to look at the strategic situation in 1941, not through Anglo-American but German eyes. Most of Europe is directly allied, occupied or politically associated with Nazi Germany. Britain has NO military forces that may directly threaten either German operations in theater, or the homeland (British strategic bombing killed more aircrews than civilians and did negligible damage to German industry in 1940-42). The only continental threat remaining IS the USSR. A war with the Soviets, before the US could enter in strength, would achieve German aims for European (not World despite Allied agitprop) domination. As far as the 1941 campaign in Russia, it DID in fact achieve its aims: Stalin tried to negotiate a "Brest-Litovsk" in 1941, and offered to cede territory conquered in the Winter War back to Finland. Only Hitler's strategic intransigence and obsession with Aryan racial supremacy prevented a settlement.

In North Africa, staff studies commissioned in 1940 showed that to maintain a mechanized operations tempo and achieve a strategically viable result, i.e. seizing the Suez Canal, would require at least 4 Panzer/Panzer Grenadier divisions plus Corps-level assets. The study further revealed that existing supply infrastructure could not adequately sustain such a force for any length of time. The harsh reality of geography and British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean made such a campaign unlikely at best.
"How Hitler Could Have Won the War", is well-written with some very good analysis of Hitler's political objectives, but ultimately falls into a familiar "Hitler fought a two-front war" theme, and doesn't examine contemporary evidence to the contrary. Recommended for anyone looking for background in counter-factual WW2 subjects.

The most convincing part of this book is the claim that the way to deal with the Soviet Union was not a frontal assault in 1941 but a Mediterranean campaign to drive the British out of Egypt and occupy all the Middle East with their huge oil reserves. Hitler's strategic mistake is dated as April 21 1941 as the Balkans campaigns were winding down. He had decided to attack Crete rather than Malta which meant that the Mediterranean theater was doomed to be a sideshow as he prepared to attack Russia directly. Once Hitler had decided on a two front war with Britain still defiant and with America in the wings, the author says, the war was irrevocably lost. The book also covers Hitler's other blunders, although there is a lot of straightforward military narrative - particularly on the Eastern Front - which could perhaps have been pruned. There is some analysis in the book which was new to this reviewer, including Hitler's nonsensical interest in capturing the Azores, the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands whose strategic value he greatly overestimated. Bevin Alexander's interpretation of his theme is an interesting contrast with Richard Ovary's book on why the allies won.

Alexander has produced a solid military history of World War II from the perspective of Hitler's strategic mistakes that led to German defeat. This book is a refreshingly objective look at the war, providing some interesting character and detail to not only the Allied commanders but the German commanders as well. Alexander's basic thesis is that Hitler missed his best chance to win an overwhelming victory when, in 1941, he elected to go forward with the invasion of Russia rather than taking Cairo and the Suez Cannal and opening the door to capturing the oil-rich middle east. All in all, this an excellent history for the casual or novice World War II historian who is interested in learning more. Probably not a good pick for someone with a more informed interest.

To begin with, academically speaking, I totally agree with the lengthy review from Alberta, Canada. Anyone wanting to read this book should first read and digest that review. It's hard for most academics to write across disciplinary lines, and a lone historian just isn't qualified to tackle a subject that encompasses sociology, gender studies, gay studies, queer theory, cultural anthropology, psychology, et al. At least in my humble opinion...

What I'd like to comment on isn't the validity of Hitler's homo or hetero-sexuality. The idea that Hitler might have been homosexual or bisexual is not new, and while nothing in this book convinces me, I don't dispute the possibility that Hitler was homosexual, certainly not for fear of what it "says" about gay folks today. (With the heterosexuality of such monsters as Stalin, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Pinochet, Hussein, and bin Laden well documented, anyone who equates evil with gayness based on this book needs to go back to the third grade and retrieve their critical thinking skills.)

The issue I would like to raise is this -- simply, "the gaze." Did the author of this book consider the environment he released this book into? Did he stop to think about the audience, and how his words might be perceived, interpreted, and used? Some would say it isn't the job of a historian to be concerned about such matters. Just tell the story and let the chips fall where they may. So why doesn't he tell the whole story?

One can read "Hidden Hitler" cover to cover and gain virtually no understanding of the Nazi persecution of homosexuals, nor any understanding of homophobia in Nazi/Germanic culture. Without this context, the book comes across at times as superficial and sensationalistic. And sometimes I just had to wonder if these glaring omissions didn't indicate the presence of a hidden agenda operating somewhere in the author's mind.

Admittedly some aspects of Machtan's thesis are tentative and in need of verification. But it's a subject that hitherto has received little treatment and that only in a sensationalistic manner. Machtan brings to his study a serious and dispassionate tone. The homosexual aspect of Nazism, especially in the Stormtroops, is well known, but little else has been said of it in regards to the party as a whole. Having read about Hitler and Nazism for two decades I can say that Machtan's study fills in a lot of gaps. The Roehm putsch and Night of the Long Knives makes much more sense. Liberals will not be happy with the fact that Machtan reveals that the Nazis did not target homosexuals per se (as many high ranking party members were homosexual so long as they were discrete). Rather the Nazi's anti-homosexual campaign was a hypocritical excuse to further clamp down on political opponents rather than combat immorality. Even if Machtan's argument for Hitler's homosexuality is not absolutely conclusive (he was certainly dysfunctional and a misogynist ), there can be little doubt that the future German fuehrer came from a bohemian background, and that ideologically the Nazis grew out of the pro-homosexual Wandervogel movement which emulated the Spartan ideal in more ways than one. Many of Hitler's close friends and mentors were undoubtedly homosexual. It is a very readable and thought-provoking study.

With the literally thousands of books and articles about Hitler that have appeared over the last half century, it is nothing short of remarkable that no one has ever thought to examine the wealth of documentary evidence suggesting that Hitler was homosexual, or to analyze the impact his sexuality may have had on some of his actions. Machtan's well-researched book should open a whole arena in the Hitler studies.
Obviously this book has upset many. It's thesis seems particularly offensive to many gay people, afraid that the revelation of Hitler's possible homosexuality will lead to a simple equation that Hitler was evil because he was gay.
But Machtan is careful not only to avoid such simplistic reductionism, but to point out instead the immense damage Hitler did to gay people in Germany in his apparent attempts to cover up his history of homosexuality and destroy those who knew about it. As a result, Machtan throws a whole new light on the homophobia of the Nazis, the destruction of the SA, the persecution of Magnus Hirschfeld and the roundup of gay Germans.
This book is a bit dry at times, and loaded with footnotes. But that's no vice in a work of such a potentially sensational nature. Machten avoids prurient sensationalism and outrageous or unsubstantiated claims, preferring to quietly focus on the conclusions that can be culled from the admittedly murky sources.
All told, a major contribution, well researched and thoughtfully rendered.

I love to read nearly anything and everything I can find about WW2 history. This was one of those rare instances, however, where I picked up a book, read about half of it, then put it back down never to finish it. I just couldn't force myself to read any more.

Although the Battle of the Bulge is without a doubt one of the more interesting episodes of the war, and Dupuy provides a detailed account, in my opinion he's just a little too detailed. This book is written for someone who has a little more serious interest in mind than just an amateur historian such as myself. It is dry and choppy in its presentation. The thing that I found most distracting was the frequent digressions into mini-biographies every time a new general or other major figure was introduced to the narrative.

For example, a division commander is mentioned for the first time, and immediately the author cuts to a two page synopsis of the man's life and military career. He then abruptly shifts back to the main narrative after having led the reader on a merry rabbit chase. And he does this over and over and over again. Very hard to read unless you're a person who likes that sort of thing. I'm not one of those, and would not recommend this to anyone who is not a bit more serious student of WW2.

In their preface, the authors recount how this book initially came about from a research project for the US Army. Seeking a way to validate a computer combat simulation model, the authors focused on the Battle of the Bulge (which they go on to point out was really more a campaign than a single battle), as it was the only modern combined arms engagement on which they had sufficient detailed statistical and historical data available.
As a result the book reads as just that, a research project. The various movements, dispositions, strengths, weaknesses and so on of each unit are painstakingly recorded. Blow by blow accounts of every engagement, action and battle during the campaign are presented, almost down to platoon and squad level in some cases. The odd combat anecdote or portrait of a commanding general are thrown in here and there. The latter are interesting enough to make you wish the authors had spent more time on the personalities involved in the battle. SS General Sepp Dietrich's misgivings beforehand (which only appear as a footnote here) certainly hint at unexplored possibilities.
In spite of all that, the wealth of detail somehow weaves together and at the end you'll come away with a far greater understanding of the battle than when you started. As it stays away from cliche or from spending inordinate attention on the more well known events of the battle (i.e. the "Nuts" incident) the sober, impartial and objective narrative is certainly effective in dispelling any "illusions" or misconceptions you may have had. At the same time, possibly the most obvious preconception is reinforced, i.e. that the Germans had almost no hope of succeeding.
3 stars I think is justified, in that the book succeeds in what it sets out to do in presenting a scholarly, academic analysis of the Battle of the Bulge. For that reason, it will appeal to those with a serious interest in military history and the Second World War and is a worthy addition to the existing body of work on the Battle of the Bulge. However, a little more detail on the background of the campaign and, as mentioned above, on those involved could have only improved this book. Those seeking a page-turner should approach with caution.

Research is the strength of this work, not the telling of a major battle. It is difficult for the reader to grasp the overall view of this clash as it is layered over with detail upon detail. From mass movements to small skirmishes, it is told in the driest of writing style. The usual complaint levied against military books, inadequate maps, can not be claimed here. The maps are numerous and like the work itself, detailed. As a reference tool the book is invaluable and for this it merits the rating given. An interesting read it is not but it does belongs on the shelf of those with a serious interest in the Bulge.

Norman Goda would have us believe that Hitler was on the verge of launching an attack on the America mainland. Certainly, Hitler had grandiose war aims, and certainly conquering America was one of them. But then again, given the chance, Hitler would have turned all non-German lands into some mixture of an Aryan Disneyland and penal colony.

Any decent tactician, which Hitler was, would plan for wartime eventualities, such as a conflict with the US. Goda presents a lot of "what if's" for armchair historians to consider, but given that Hitler only ever landed a dozen or so saboteurs on American soil, one cannot say with any precision how workable Hitler's long-range plans were.

Tomorrow the World is an odd book. The title and the inside flap explain that Germany had designs on the United States, and intended to conquer said nation, eventually. The proof, supposedly, is in this book. What you get, instead, is an in-depth analysis of German diplomatic and military initiatives in Spain and northwest Africa 1940-2. This is OK, but given that it doesn't live up to what it promises, frankly it's a bit disappointing.

The proof of the author's contention is embedded in various obscure diplomatic and military maneuvers that the Germans made, often supposedly at Hitler's behest directly, which according to the author show that Hitler was intending to confront the U.S. someday. Unfortunately most of these maneuvers involved either islands in the Atlantic (the Canaries or Azores, for instance) or French North Africa. None of this certainly shows Germany preparing for war with the U.S., because all of the actions could have been taken for other reasons, equally plausible ones. So all you're left with is a recounting of German diplomatic initiatives with regards to these locations, and that, while interesting, is at best a footnote to WW2.

One further note: this book is based on the author's doctoral thesis, and it reads like it. Paragraphs run to more than a page, sentences are interminable, and often it's hard to get the point. This is not for the faint of heart, or someone who isn't interested in the subject at a very detailed level.

Norman Goda's book is interesting, however there is except for a chapter or two, very scant information about Hitler's intentions toward the United States. The book loses its focus in Hitler's convoluted aims toward Northwest Africa and just what he planned to do with those bases if he ever got them, is really never discussed. However, a previous reviewer is wrong, Hitler was never a decent military tactician, he was a horrible tactician. If his generals had always listened to what Hitler ordered, Germany would have lost the war a lot faster than it did, this wasn't a case of Hitler planning just for an eventuality. Goda is very persuasive in his contention that Hitler did have a goal to attack and eliminate the United States at least since 1927-28. Unfortunately, Goda only discusses the H Class ships and the Amerika bomber in passing and never provides any evidence of just what Hitler planned to do with the bases he wanted in any attack toward America.

If you are looking for something new and interesting on this subject, this is not the book for you. The author has cobbled together a great deal of previously published material from which he endeavors to garner the 'Truth' by the simple process of the vote system. Ergo, if two witnesses say one thing and a third says otherwise, then the two witness statement must be right! Always assuming that the two witnesses are in accordance with his ;feeling; on the subject.

The author spends many pages on the subject of the exact thickness of the bunker roof which, whilst mildly interesting, is of no great historical import.

Perhaps the only 'new' material which he introduces in the closing chapter is his hypothesis on the subject the love affair between Eva Braun-Hitler and Hermann Fegelein. Any credence which might be given to this is somewhat marred by the fact that his 'evidence' is mainly attributed to statements by Hitler's youngest secretary Frau Junge. Throughout the main body of his book the author has discounted all statements by Frau Jung as being 'unreliable'. Yet, suddenly, the reader is being asked to accept statements by the same witness as gospel.

There is nothing new here. Buy O'Donnell's The Bunker or Trevor Ropers The Last Days of Adolf Hitler. The former for entertainment and a host of fact. The latter for pure fact written very shortly after the events.

With many details in Hitler's life and death, there are scores of myths, half-truths, and surmises. His death has its share of all three. Joachimsthaler does the best job I've seen in presenting and analyzing the evidence of personal testimonies of those involved with Hitler in his last days. However, he totally writes off the archival evidence from Moscow. To discover the full truth about Hitler's death, one must, at the very least, compare this book and the one by Ada Petrova and Peter Watson.

Anton Joachimsthaler is clearly one of the most knowlegeable authors on this subject! The depth of his research is evident in his foot notes. All of his information and facts are backed- up by documentation. This is just one of his many books on WWII Germany.

In reading this kind of book one would expect many revelations. Instead one gets increasingly confused to the point of unreadability. While it starts off well, it soon degenerates into mass specualtion and intellectual mumbo jumbo. Both Hitler and Wittgenstein would have disliked this book. It is a pity as this could have been a potentially intereasting and important story.

Pursuing some foundational history of analytic philosophy, I thought a biographical window into Wittgenstein might help, and read this book which was like a sock in the jaw. I was left staring at the wall, are the author's theses true, verifiable, falsifiable? A somewhat ironic question since the toughest of analytical standards suddenly lands itself in both historical and occult deep water. I must then withdraw endorsement whatsoever of the conclusions, yet note, what an interesting book for reasons the author didn't quite intend. Beyond the question of Wittgenstein and Hitler, and Wittgenstein and Communism, the author braves the most dangerous (epistemologically and otherwise) of questions, the occult stench surrounding Hitler, a factor frequently noted, and as frequently factored out as crackpot. The account here is borderline, but not crackpot, and in fact one of the few accounts able to state some facts. My point is that to state them in the context of the toughest epistemological critics is an interesting exercise beside the wild books in this genre. Wittgenstein is not quite the man we thought, with the heritage of Schopenhauer lurking in the background. And the book reminds us that Schopenhauer had a viable, almost unknown, consideration of the occult, a lost thread of modern philosophy he alone had the epistemology to handle, distinguishing spiritual magic and superstition from so-called 'idealist magic' (almost as bad to think about), that is, the unknown fringe psychology of the noumenal, where scientific psychology also simply fumbles the ball. This can be useful for entering this dangerous field of the unknown Hitler without the suggestible hallucinations that corrupt most accounts, or the absolute skepticism that also misses the point. The real crooks here never got caught, and it is finally hopeless to try occult analysis of Hitler. Nothing ever succeeds here. It is a question that noone has ever clarified, and where a host of shadowy figures pursue their dementias. One can simply file away the author's theories and find this account of Wittgenstein and his milieu as an exotic glimpse of an enigmatic philosopher.

Cornish examines the realschule in Linz with unprecedented thoroughness and concludes quite convincingly that the Jew Hitler refers to in Mein Kampf is indeed Wittgenstein. While it is true that much of the book is conjecture, each step is a logical progression from the previous one. Why did the Russians offer Wittgenstein a "noncommunist" a very prestigious post heading the philosophy dept. of a major university in communist Russia if he did not render some major assistance to them? He was positioned to recruit the Cambridge spies. It may be conjecture, but it seems rather logical. A fascinating read.