In this novel, Adolf H. did not commit suicide at the end of World War II, but escaped to South-America. After he is captured, he can defend himself for his crimes. His defence contains the same items as these developed in another book of the author 'In Bluebeard's Castle'. Adolf H. took revenge by organizing the holocaust because mankind was blackmailed three times in an absolute manner: by one terrifying almighty God, by the limitless love of his son Christ and by Rabbi-Marx, who wanted to create heaven on earth.
I found the first part of the novel 'the chase of Adolf H.' rather average.
The second part 'The defence of Adolf H.' is a powerful text, but I prefer the treatment of the same themes in his book 'In Bluebeard's Castle': a bold and compelling conjecture about the subconscious motives of the holocaust.

At it most pedestrian moments, George Steiner's novel "The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H." is a "what if" story in which young Israeli Nazihunters find Hitler in the Amazonian jungle thirty years after the end of the Second World War. The genesis for the story comes from the historical disappearance of Hitler's body after his suicide as well as the apprehension, trial and execution of Adolf Eichmann. Now we know that Stalin had Hitler's remains brought to the Soviet Union to prove that the madman was indeed dead, but the idea of holding Hitler accountable for his sins is certainly compelling. While this book does not provide a formal trial, it does raise some fascinating questions.

There are a pair of chapters in Steiner's book that stand out from the mere mechanics of capturing Hitler. In the first the question on the table is what would you do with Hitler once you had him in custody? Here is a man responsible for the deaths of millions, who remains in our minds the greatest mass murderer of the past century no matter what truths come to us about Stalih's purges. How do you extract judgment? Without access to the hellish inferno of Dante's imagination, what punishment could ever hope to provide closure? The fact that a satisfactory answer cannot be found does not detract from the merit of the line of inquiry.

The second important chapter is the last, where Hitler is allowed to speak. The value of this chapter is that it gets beyond the memory of history to the heart of the evil. There is a fatal tendency in the modern world to equate Fascism with Hitler and the Nazis, which means anti-semitism and the Holocaust. The common folk on the street today would point to skinheads as being fascists. But Fascism is a dynamic built upon the Struggle for Order, a world in which the ends justify means that a democratic populace should scorn. Ultimately Steiner speaks to the ironic level on which Hitler achieved a victory of sorts, having cast the world in the image of his own ideology. Certainly the Cold War, which was still in bloom when Steiner wrote this book, is an example of the fascist ideology, where the demands of "national security" becomes a justification for blind obedience.

Reading these two chapters is well worth reading the entire volume, which is but an evening's read. Certainly you can give over one evening of your life to consider the issues raised by "The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H." and come to terms with them on your own. Hitler has become a caricature and while it is difficult to see him for what he truly was, this book definitely looks in the right direction.

This book describes the causality of Nazism (cultural), the theory, and why it failed.

"Hitler Victorious" collects 11 short stories based upon the premise that Nazi Germany won World War II. The premise alone is enough to make for compelling reading, and fortunately the stories themselves expand upon it. The highlight of the book is Brad Linaweaver's novella "Moon of Ice," which masterfully extends the famous diaries of Nzai propoganda chief Joseph Goebbles into the mid-1960s. Goebbles chronicles in the first person the death of The Fuhrer and the intrigue surrounding the foundation of Burgundy, the medieval mini-state formed by Heinrich Himmler's notorious SS. Linaweaver throws into the mix Goebbles's relationship with two of his (now adult) children, each of whom has chosen a much different path.

Other highlighs include Hilary Bailey's noir-ish tale of intrigue "The Fall of Frenchy Steiner," and Howard Goldsmiths nastly little horror tale "Do Ye Hear the Children Weeping." There's even a good Rip Van Winkle-like tale in C.M. Kornbluth's "Two Dooms." Also it must be said that, title of the book not withstanding, Hitler rarely remains victorious at the end of most of these stories.

Overall, this a juicy little short story collection for those who like alternative history tales.

I am a huge historical World War II buff. Therefore, I also like to "dabble" in some alternative history scenarios such as the eleven stories presented in this narrative. Overall, the book is "fun"...meaning that some of the stories are pretty good and based in "reality", meaning they are believable. Others are a little "hokey"...meaning they would be good for a "Tales From the Dark Side" or "Outer Limits" episode. All in all...for some fun reading at night, I enjoyed the book. Give it a shot and see for yourself.

I'm a sucker for alternate history stories, partly because of my professional background in history. I like to play "what if" myself, but writing something that succeeds both as fiction and as plusible alternate history is really tough. Among themes, having the Germans win WWII is a close second to the South winning the Civil War, and virtually all the stories in this excellent collection succeed admirably. Some I've read before, like "Weihnactsabend" by Keith Roberts and Brad Linaweaver's excellent "Moon of Ice," but others were apparently written especially for this volume, including the terrific "Thor Meets Captain America" by David Brin. A very good collection.

I read this book a few years ago and a lot of it came back to me when I watched the T.V. movie on CBS recently. These "missing years" (i.e. the early years before Hitler came to power) aren't really "missing" (there is plenty of information out there on Hitler's ascent to power) but are told from an insider's perspective. As Hitler biographer John Toland states in the inside jacket of this book, "Ernst Hanfstaengl and his family were in my opinion closer to Hitler than any other family during those crucial [early] years." Hanfstaengl met Hitler in 1921 when he was drawn to the ambitious politician during a speech in a Munich beer hall. He befriended Hitler and became his foreign press secretary only to become disillusioned by Hitler's increasingly fanatic and anti-Semitic rhetoric accompanying and following the release of Mein Kampf.

In the Missing Years, the reader gets insight into the early organization of the NSDAP and the emergence of Hitler's mass appeal. Hanfstaengl explains the way Hitler could express the thoughts of his audience: "Many a time I have seen him face a hall plentifully sprinkled with opponents ready to heckle and interject, and in his search for the first body of support, make a remark about food shortages and domestic difficulties or the sound instinct of his women listeners which would produce the first bravos" (68). As to Hitler's political strategy, Hanfstaengl states, "He did not make a revolution to acquire power, but acquired power in order to make a revolution" (172)." As to the Jewish question, Hitler, at one point, told Hanfstaengl "I need the Jews as hostages" (211).

Hanfstaengl was close to Hitler, so much so that he received the jealous wrath of the other members of Hitler's inner circle. Hitler enjoyed listening to Hanfstaengl play the piano, so Hitler's other disciples played the radio full blast when he arrived or, as in the case of Goebbels, play recordings of Wagner or Hitler's own speeches for Hitler to prevent any influence Hanfstaengl might have (192).

The most intriguing part of the book is the gossip on Hitler's bizarre behavior around women, including Hanfstaengl's wife. This seedy information includes Geli Raubal and Hitler's pornographic drawings (163). Readers may be skeptical over some of the accounts (he admits to hearing some of the accounts third hand) but I, for one, would not be surprised if they were all true. This book does not have an index, which is a little irritating when one is trying to look up information, but the chapters are fairly short (16 chapters, 308 pages).

It is common to dismiss Hanfstaengl's account of his years with Hitler as a biased story written by a Nazi who had fallen out with his leader. However, almost all those who remained close to Hitler and survived (Strasser, Ludecke and various servants and so on) tell very similar stories. There is, in fact, an entire literature on Hitler which deals with his relationship, for instance, with Geli Raubal, the story of the pornographic pictures for which he was blackmailed. This material is almost always dismissed (by Kershaw, for instance, who has done an excellent biography) as being suspect or irrelevant whereas other material which has similar provenance is used quite happily. Why this should be, I don't really know. The picture drawn by Hanfstaengl in this book is far more 'human'. He promotes the notion that Hitler changed radically after Geli's violent death and this is intelligently countered by Ron Rosenbaum in Explaining Hitler -- however, Hitler's terror of the power that was suddenly to become reality (and therefore a responsibility) is more likely to have 'changed' him. Whatever the reasons for the change, books like this provide an insight where the political intersects with the personal and for me much of Hitler's 'mysterious' behaviour later (including his bad military decisions) can be explained through studying books like this. None of the others appear to be in print and the Ludecke, which I think is the best, is scarcely mentioned (not at all in Explaining Hitler). It certainly contradicts the more or less agreed story which Kershaw, in the tradition of other excellent biographies, repeats. It could be that novelists and writers like Primo Levi have more to tell us now than historians. If your idea of Hitler is of a powerful superman leading a great nation into a massive war, then you probably will be disappointed by this book and the others like it. If you see him as a lucky, psychopathic nerd, as I do, then this book will help you understand a bit more about the personality of the man whose carefully manufactured myth somehow touched the soul of Germany, debased the myth and stained the soul. Five stars for being unusual, but, of course, it must be taken with a certain scepticism, so four stars... Highly recommended, however, to anyone seriously interested in understanding how a civilised nation can find itself voting a monster into power. I think it could happen to any of us. To some of us it has already happened. It can happen in America. It can happen in Britain. Germany, Russia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Roumania and other European countries with a record of humane political progress until 'everything changed' into rule by a dictator and a police state. It comes upon us suddenly, if we aren't watchful democrats. The constitutions of many of those countries were not so different to those of America or Britain, say, and we should never congratulate ourselves that such things could not happen to us. The subtle ways in which such events occur is shown in this book. It is a lesson we all need to remember.

This book from Ernst Hanfstaengl was very insightful. He was in close contact with Hitler and his innercircle for sometime. He discusses Hitler's behavior and personality. Hanfstaengl has much to tell since he was in close proximity to Hitler during the early years of the Nazi Party. Anyone that's interested in Hitler should read this highly informative and readable account. I learned quite a bit from reading it. I recommend this book.

This book is especially valued by Hitler apologists, for its rose-coloured portrait of the young Führer as an intelligent aesthete and visionary, a patriot who showed unusual leadership qualities from adolescence. But actually it's just another of the many Hitler hoaxes.

As outlined in Frederic Spotts' _Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics_ (2002), available from Amazon.com, in 1938 the Nazis commissioned August Kubizek to write about his youth with Hitler. However Kubizek eventually reported to a party official that "writing is a horrible burden; it is not something I can do." In 1943 Hitler himself gave Kubizek a one-off payment and a monthly stipend to try to get him to produce at least something. By 1944 or 1945 Kubizek had managed to produce two short booklets, jointly called the "Reminiscences". But by then it was too late for the "Reminiscences" to be published by the Nazis; he hid them until after the war.

In 1948 Kubizek complained that his booklets should really be in the hands of a "real writer". Clearly he found his "real writer" because in 1953 this book was published. Though published under Kubizek's name it is clearly not by Kubizek, both on style grounds (this professionally written book of 350 pages is not by the Kubizek who took six-seven years to produce two crudely written booklets) and because of discrepancies between this book and Kubizek's "Reminiscences".

For example Kubizek's "Reminiscences" gave just two direct quotes from Hitler, both brief. But the published book is full of long Hitlerian speeches. The Hitler speeches had always struck me as literary creations: they are not the sort of thing that people, even crazed adolescents, actually say. However I had assumed that at least the speeches were invented by someone who really had known Hitler. Since it is now clear that the words put into Hitler's mouth were not written by Kubizek but by a ghostwriter, they don't even have that approximate kind of verisimilitude.

In Kubizek's "Reminiscences" Hitler was already viciously antisemitic in 1907. In this ghostwritten book Hitler was hardly antisemitic at all. Kubizek wrote while the Third Reich's racial policies were still in force, so it would flatter Hitler to say that he had already acquired his antisemitism as a youth. But the ghostwriter was presenting Hitler for a post-war audience, so Hitler's antisemitism had to be toned down to make him more palatable.

The ghostwriter gives Hitler a romance with a girl called "Stefanie", presumably to counter rumours about Hitler's sexuality. "Stefanie" isn't in Kubizek's "Reminiscences."

The ghostwriter's identity is unknown. The original publishers denied that they fabricated the book (after an accusation by historian Brigit Hamann). I suspect a Nazi loyalist who knew Kubizek from the old days, perhaps a writer from the old Reichspropaganda-Ministerium. Emery Reeves, who ghostwrote Rauschning's _Hitler Speaks_ hoax and at least one other such "memoir", was arguably a rascal but certainly an anti-Nazi, and would not have touched this book.

Moving to the arts, the ghostwriter (unlike Kubizek) has Hitler adore Mendelssohn's violin concerto. Hitler as Mendelssohn fan? And the ghostwriter has Kubizek and Hitler attending _Parsifal_ together at Vienna in 1907. Trevor Ravenscroft made the same mistake in his Hitler hoax _The Spear of Destiny_. Ravenscroft, like Kubizek's ghostwriter, forgot that Bayreuth still had exclusive rights to _Parsifal_, which was not actually performed in Vienna until 1914, by which time Kubizek had long since lost contact with Hitler.

The book has Hitler avidly reading Dante, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Goethe, etc, also Wagner's essays, something often cited by people claiming Hitler was interested in Wagner's ideas instead of just his music. But Kubizek's "Reminiscences" contradict this: Kubizek states that Hitler read _nothing_ serious or intellectual at this time (not that he'd have liked Wagner's essays if he'd read them, but that's another issue). Similarly, the book has an elaborate chapter about Hitler writing a Wagnerian opera: so do the _Reminiscences_, but in 1938 Kubizek told a party official that Hitler had attempted a _play_, not an _opera_.

The famous anecdote about Hitler seeing a performance of _Rienzi_ and being inspired to lead Germany, and 30 years later dramatically intoning, "In that hour it began" is a great story, which no-one has been able to resist. No-one except Kubizek himself, who oddly mentions no such thing in his "Reminiscences". (Kubizek referred to a memorable night after the 17-year old Hitler was deeply stirred by a performance of _Rienzi_; the ghostwriter contributed the rest. _Rienzi_ really did impress the adolescent Hitler: but discussion of the significance of this, if any, must be based on Speer's less melodramatic remarks on the topic. In reality Hitler's involvement in politics began more than a decade later, in the aftermath not of an opera performance but of World War I and an economic depression.)

Basically, Kubizek's real "Reminiscences" have some historical value, though even they must be treated with caution: Kubizek wanted to present a favourable picture of Hitler, also himself, and punched up his stories for publication (though not as much as his ghostwriter did). But this book does not follow the "Reminiscences" and was not written by Kubizek: therefore it has no value except as reasonably well-written fiction, thus earning the compulsory one star. It's true that Kubizek didn't disown the ghostwritten book, but why would he? It gave him fame and money, and helped re-polish his hero Hitler's reputation. It's clear, from the way that the book repeatedly contradicts Kubizek's own written account without protest from Kubizek, that Kubizek was not concerned with its "truth".

As with Rauschning/Reeves' _Hitler Speaks_ hoax, some things in the book attributed to Kubizek may be true, but the only things that can be accepted are those that are independently confirmed from other sources that appear to be reliable. It's like having a demagnetised compass that sometimes happens to point north, but you can only know when it is reading true if you compare it with another compass: ie, it's useless. File under crypto-Nazi fraud.

Cheers!

Laon

A chronicle of the adolescent friendship between the author, August Kubizek, and Adolph Hitler before he was "Hitler", this is one of the most interesting and unique books you will ever read. Included in this amazing work are pictures of letters and postcards sent the author from Hitler during the period of their friendship, which adds a very personal dimension to what you are reading.

This book was written almost 50 years after the events occurred, so it is no surprise the author probably got some details mixed up, especially as pertain to plays, operas, etc. that the two frequently attended.

There is a simple reason for Kubizek's exclusion of the Stephanie story from a propaganda pamphlet he wrote for the Nazis in the late 1930's: by showing that Hitler was a social misfit and extremely intimidated by women as a youth, the story could have drastically dimished his image as the "man with the iron will", not to mention the effect it could have had on his appeal to women (on which he heavily relied). There is a known portrait Hitler drew of Stephanie.

The underlying credibility of this book is not questioned by any serious Hitler scholar, and it is considered to be the best source of information on Hitler's early life. You will be glad you read it.

So much of what is taken and accepted as "FACT" about Hitler is full of inconsistencies and assumption. It has been my experience that the public will readily swallow whatever they are fed about "The Great Dictator" without giving so much as a second thought as to whether or not it is correct. I wish I could be indifferent to this and take a neutral stance, but I cannot. I have dedicated six years of my life to studying that of Hitler, and it pains me to witness the widespread ignorance displayed by the majority whenever Hitler's name is mentioned. Which is why this book is so important to me. It is by far the best ever written about his young adulthood and, in short, who he really was as a person. For, in order to understand who Hitler was, one must look into his past.
During the years the two spent together in Linz and later in Vienna, young Hitler was already developing into what he would later become. For getting a deeper perspective of the true nature of Adolf Hitler, August Kubizek is, in my humble opinion, the most reliable source for insight into this complicated human being. No one knew Hitler more intimately than he did. He was also reunited with his old friend three decades after their ways parted in Vienna, and thus gives valuable insight regarding "Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer". And, as Kubizek remarked, "Hitler didn't change."
The words Kubizek uses to describe his young friend convey the image of a deep, passionate, gifted and serious young man who, due to his great obsession with changing the world around him, did not enjoy his youth in any traditional sense. Kubizek did his friend a great service by writing this book. It is required reading for all serious students of Hitler's incredible life, for it is an honest, first-hand account of the young starving artist, open and unbiased, (unlike any other book ever to tackle the subject.)
Kubizek was, I am convinced, a good man who had nothing to gain and everything to lose by publishing the truth about Adolf Hitler's character and showing the world his "human" side. The world after the war (and today still) was not interested in the truth. So many were then and still are content to make Hitler into the embodiment of all evil, to reject his humanity. But therein lies the danger.

Author Rusch has done a fine job of pricking "Id chords" in HITLER'S ANGEL. The book could have been written by Michael Moorcock (BEHOLD THE MAN) or Philip K. Dick (THE MAN in the HIGH CASTLE)both of whom specialized in science fiction stories dealing with alternate or parallel plane "history". The plot concerns possible murder of Adolf Hitler's neice...Angela (Geli)Raubal...by soon-to-be Fuhrer in "blood and water-sports" midst of an incestuous, sado-mascochistic...relationship.

The latter,however,is not the focus of the story. Munich Kriminalpolizei Chief Inspector Fritz Stecher is. He is...in Rusch's quick-fire paced "police procedural"...the man who could have prevented Hitler's horrific assault on humanity by arresting him for murder. The fact this never happened makes the novel's character study of an honest man and former soldier...brutalized by violence of WWI, in a "lost nation" swarming and starving as LOST GENERATION refugees...pursuing Justice an exploration of complex, damning questions rather than reassuring or edifying answers. Cinematic technique of Alfred Hitchcock...where criminal & victims are known, and viewers share terror and voyeuristic complicity(or helplessness)in sin and crime...is evoked with marvelous effectiveness. Rusch employs the reader's OWN KNOWLEGE of history to vicariously "question" him the way secondary character Annie Pohlman(American academic working on a dissertation)questions Stecher. When the Final Question is asked..."Knowing what you, Herr Stecher,knew about Hitler THEN: why didn't you arrest him?"...this truly becomes a fearful QUESTION: Knowing what YOU(the reader)know about Hitler NOW...would you have had courage to arrest him?

It's a scary story with ambience of perhaps the most monstrous man who ever lived--to massacre millions--looming over unexplained, melodramatically colored death that may have been, as Nazis contended, "tragic suicide" not murder. Author Rusch plucks "Id chords". Her thriller thrills because your own knowledge makes you a Character. You hear the tale of HITLER'S ANGEL; you KNOW The Devil who killed her...The rest is silence.

I found in this novel parellels with today. How a man with panegyric political skills can get friends to cover up crimes. How lying in high places is sometime sanctioned if you agree with his political aims. The novel will entertain you and enlighten you; why even the pope could not have stopped Hitler.

This is a very thought provoking novel about something that has been losts in the mists of time - and had the potential to change history and save millions of lives. The character Fritz is very well done. He's "real" and "flawed" - but evokes the reader's sympathy. The use of flashbacks to tell the story of his investigation of the death of Hitler's niece works very well. I couldn't put this novel down. At times it was almost lyrical. I am deeply impressed by Krish Rusch's writing. She is a very, very good writer. This novel will spur me to read more of her novels. Do yourself and read Hitler's Angel!!

It's rather easy to show, as Anderson does, that some of Ravenscroft's claims are simply incredible. But it's also easy to show, as do several other books much more credible than Ravenscroft's Spear, that Hitler was certainly interested in theory of the occult, while not himself being a committed occultist in practice. This is not uncommon among highly intelligent but somewhat emotionally deranged persons. It's also rather hard to deny, when one reads the words of the man himself, in Mein Kampf and in Rauschning's non verbatim record of conversations, that Hitler was fascinated and influenced by concepts and beliefs which are identifiable with occult theory of history and race, and which can be traced from Blavatsky to Gurdjieff to Crowley. But he was not a follower, but a leader, not a theorist but a pragmatist, and his use and abuse of such ideas was peculiarly his own. No one however can claim that he was original in inspiration.

I have read a number of books on Hitler's supposed fascination with, mastery of, and belief in various occult doctrines. In Hitler and the Occult, Ken Anderson delivers a chapter-by-chapter debunking of many of the theories surrounding Hitler's occultic leanings and gives what appear to be logical explanations for some of his actions which have been taken by some to prove his involvement in the occult. Most of the book is spent deconstructing the theories of Trevor Ravenscroft and reinforcing this deconstruction by attempting to discredit Ravenscroft himself. I have read the main target of Anderson's scorn, The Spear of Destiny, and have to admit that some of Ravenscroft's assertions in that volume seem quite far-fetched and incredible. But between his wilder claims, Ravenscroft does offer the reader food for thought. Anderson dissects his more plausible assertions with the aplomb of an undertaker preparing his umpteenth corpse. The Spear of Longinus, Lanz von Lebenfels, and the Thule Society are all given short shrift. Although it is true that many top Nazis were involved in secret societies and occultic fantasies, that was not uncommon at the time so there is nothing particularly significant about it. Hitler was more of a realist and seems to have had little time for or little patience with such notions. Though one might be tempted to believe that Hitler was controlled by otherworldly forces with which he had made a Faustian bargain, I tend toward Anderson's view that that is all nonsense. Reading this book will help interested persons sort out contradictions in theories of an occultic Hitler and bring them back to earth with a more prosaic view of Hitler's actions and motivations.

I purchased this book this last spring and was to busy to read it, so it sat on my shelf till this weekend. I was in the mood for a good read, I remembered this book, picked it up and didn't put it down till finished. When I bought it, I thought it would be a book that detailed the Nazi involvement with the Occult. As I read it, I began to realize that the book in large part takes issue with a single man's (Ravenscroft) work on the Nazi's and the occult. Ken Anderson does a nice, precise, point-by-point review of Ravenscroft, and his "evidence" about the Nazi involvement with the occult. Anderson points out that Ravenscroft details about his own personal involvement in a raid to kill Rommel in the Second World War were fictitious. From that Anderson builds a case against Ravenscroft's allegations that Hitler was driven by his contact with the "spear of destiny" - a spear that was used to make sure Christ had died. When I finished the book, I was amazed to find that with the substantial evidence in this book, I believe that Hitler was not "driven" by the occult. He was simply evil. Something his young niece realized when she was 17, and shot herself with his .32 Walther.

I have more than a working knowledge of WW2, the events and the history. Last summer I spent two weeks riding around Germany on a BMW motorcycle seeing the WW2 sites. I very much appreciate this book for detailing information I had not known before, and linking it with information that I am quite familiar with. The end result was my belief that Anderson's information is accurate and well told. If you're into the history, you'll love this book.

This book is Manstein's version of WWII. Manstein obeyed Hitler during the war but later was critical unlike Rommel. Manstein, after supervising over the death of millions of his countrymen and others, himself went into comfortable retirement.

Quite simply, in late November 1942, the situation did not seem potentially disastrous to the Germans, from Hitler downwards. Their intelligence agencies had completely failed to discover the buildup of the Soviet Armies poised to surround the Sixth Army. They simply could not believe that the Soviets still had such strong armies left.

Hitler and his generals all believed that the losses they had inflicted on the Soviets had to be crippling. Their underestimation of Soviet strength was what led to Stalingrad, no matter what Manstein may claim he would have done otherwise, the Soviets would still have been victorious.

This book was a very good read, but I wouldn't believe everything he says either. However, if you're interested in
the Russian Front Campaign and the events surrounding the disaster the Germans never recovered from at Stalingrad, this book will put a lot of those events into perspective.

Upon reading this book it would appear Manstein not only had a talent with the sword but also the pen. Manstein's book is a very readable account of his war time experiences. Included in his book is the demise of the OKH ( General Staff of the Army) through its lack of decisiveness in making a military decision.The formulation, acceptance and implementation of the "Mainstein Plan" which was adopted for the offensive in the West as other plans would NOT acheive total victory. Mainstein shares his simplistic but interesting views on how the Battle of Britain should have been fought.

He then takes us through his brillant victories in the Crimea which were acheived againsnt overwhelming numbers and where his successes were largely acheived through having a free hand and no interference from Hitler. Mainstein devotes a chapter on Hitler as Supreme Commander and analyses Hitlers strengths and many weaknesses.

There is a fascinating detailed account of the German tragedy at Stalingrad and how the beleaguered Sixth Army had the opportunity to break out towards Mainstein's relief forces. However the opportunity was lost due to the Army's hesitation and Hitlers insistence Stalingrad must be held. The sacrifice of the Sixth Army however gave time for other Army Groups to leap frog back to safety and deal a counter blow at Kharkov.

One diappointing feature of the book is the short chapter devoted to operation "Citadel" ( or the battle of Kursk). This is because the translators of the book have taken a much shorter translation than what was orginally contributed by the author. I would be most interested in obtaining the orginal full length translation.

Mainsteins views on how operations should be fought subsequent to Kursk were constantly at odds with Hitlers views on holding onto everything. This along with some other top Nazi Party members insistence that Manstein was a defeatist guaranteed his dimissal in April 1944.

This book is a MUST READ and indispensable to anyone with an interest in the Second World War.

This book is about as dry as three day old non-buttered toast. Ok so the author is a leader in his field in Austria, that does not necessarily mean he can write. The book is a review of the key German strategic decisions in the period of 1940-1944 and takes those decisions apart to see if be changing a few items, could Germany have won WW 2. There are some very good reviews here on the substance of the book so I will forgo yet one more. My issues with the book are two: first the items he brings up are really not that new, I think even many of the participants of the battles themselves could see the errors of their (or their leaders) ways while they were implementing them. I guess I wanted a book to tell me what could have been done once the major decisions had been put into action. Could the push for Stalingrad when completed?

Secondly I just wanted a little more lively writing style. I know that the book was translated, and there are no glaring errors, but it seamed to me that it also produced a text that was wooden. I wanted more punch. We are talking here of the greatest, most wide ranging war that has ever been fought, give me a little drama. I was not looking for a graduate level test book and that is what I think I received. Overall it is another review of the major errors of WW 2, if you have not read a book on this topic then this will provide you that back ground.

Heinz Magenheimer, an Austrian historian, has attempted to write an analysis of Hitler's key strategic decisions in the period 1940-1944 and asks if Germany could have "won" the Second World War. Ostensibly, Magenheimer's methodology is to focus on a specific period which required a strategic decision, then outline what facts the German leadership had available, what alternatives they had and to ask if there was a better potential outcome. This is a good methodology but unfortunately, Magenheimer does not stick to it very well.

Organizationally, the book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the Battle of Britain and the coming confrontation with the Soviet Union. The second deals with the turn of the war in the autumn on 1941. The third covers the final loss of the strategic initiative in 1942, the fourth with the failure to defend the peripheries of Fortress Europe in 1943 and the final chapter with the collapse in 1944. There are several decent maps and charts, but no appendices. The bibliography, which covers many German language sources, is extensive and quite good.

There is nothing particularly new in Magenheimer's analysis, although much of what he says appears quite true fifty years after the fact. Yes, if Hitler had been less ambitious or fanatical perhaps the 6th Army wouldn't have been lost at Stalingrad. Yes, if Hitler had been more flexible on retreats, the Wehrmacht might have done a better job on mobile defense. Yes, if the Luftwaffe had focused more on fighter production and stepped up the Me-262 program then it would have been more difficult for the Allies to gain air superiority over Europe. All these issues represent common sense - hence they are not contentious - but they actually offer no new insight. There is no doubt that with better decisions and choices, the Third Reich might have done better in the war but in most cases, "doing better" means surviving longer than May 1945. Even with jets and a stronger, mobile defense, Germany was waging war against the three strongest industrial powers on earth and no tactical magic was going to alter that fact. What Magenheimer offers is a common sense alternative to Hitler's quixotic strategic direction, but common sense is not a strategy (it essentially says, 'we shall do nothing foolish or extreme,' without saying what will in fact be done).

By avoiding 1939 in his book, Magenheimer avoids the whole issue of Hitler embarking upon a major war with an inadequate military-industrial base. Magenheimer blames Hitler for seeking only militaristic solutions to all his problems and neglecting potential political solutions, like a separate peace with the Soviet Union. However Hitler had pretty much used up his political cards prior to the war and even Stalin was unlikely to consider seriously negotiating with the man who broke the 1939 Non-aggression Pact only two years later. Once the war was rolling, Hitler was left with only military solutions; the weak enemies like France were quickly knocked out of the war and the survivors, like Britain and the USSR, also wanted military solutions. Magenheimer avoids the question of whether Germany should ever have attacked France and the Low Countries in 1940 at all; had Hitler not widened the war and brought Churchill into power, the Chamberlain and Daladier governments had little motivation to invade Germany or initiate a strategic bombing campaign. Quite possibly, the "Phoney War" might have dragged on for a year or two and then fizzled, with eventual peace negotiations. Hitler might have gotten to keep all or part of Poland and that would have been a "victory". However no German historian is likely to criticize the "easy success" of the French campaign.

Magenheimer implies that Hitler's attacked on the Soviet Union was in the nature of pre-emptive strike, based upon post-war revelations of Soviet war plans supposedly set for the autumn of 1941. Readers should treat this discussion of Operation Barbarossa with caution, since Magenheimer greatly exaggerates the likelihood of a Soviet attack upon Germany in 1941 (see David Glanz' recent Stumbling Colossus, which points out how ill-prepared the Red Army was for offensive combat in 1941). The author then adds insult to misconception by claiming that it was primarily the Soviets who were responsible for initiating the many atrocities on the eastern front.

While Magenheimer rejects the idea that Germany's defeat was inevitable, this is probably not far from the truth. After all, Germany waged war against virtually the same coalition in the First World War and lost it without any help from Adolph Hitler. The fact is that it is very difficult for even a well-led continental power with limited resources to challenge two or more great powers for global hegemony. It didn't work for Napoleon, or Kaiser Wilhelm or Hitler. Even in the best-case world, such as Napoleon faced at Tilsit in 1807, the aggressor gained only a breathing space before new coalitions were raised against him. Thus, more common sense in Berlin might have changed some of the dates, but baring a total collapse of the Allied will to resist, it was unlikely to have altered the final result.

Magenheimer, member of the editorial staff of der Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) presents a readable, up-to-date and lucid survey of the strategic options available to the German leadership in the various phases of World War II. The dust jacket question »Could Germany have won World War II?« has been raised earlier for instance by Max Klüver (»Den Sieg verspielt?«), a book curiously not mentioned in the bibliography. Magenheimer carefully revises many seemingly established notions of key strategic decisions, for instance the »Haltebefehl« of the Dunkirk encirclement commonly but according to Magenheimer (and convincingly) wrongly attributed to Hitler's alleged anglophile penchant. In German (that means »BRD«-) political correct terminology Magenheimer's book in some passages approaches much loathed »revisionism« but exactly this in turn may qualify the treatise as a realistic and sober analysis of Hitler's strategic options not obstructed by ideological preconceptions. Remarkably up till now the book is not reviewed in the »Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen« edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam. In my view it is a surprising fact that despite the huge literature on World War II it is still an unsettled question which motives underly Hitler's political and military actions for instance in the decision to stage »Unternehmen Barbarossa«. Magenheimer rightly opposes the communis opinio that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union was the apogee of a »Drang nach Osten«- and »Lebensraum«-ideology allegedly conceived in »Mein Kampf«. Hitler's decision-making was guided by the immediate political circumstances and by much improvisation, not by an ideological plan of the twenties invariably carried through in the fourties . Magenheimer consequently dismisses the usage of the term »Vernichtungskrieg« (war of annihilation) with respect to the »Ostfront«. In my view it is a term of propaganda, since any full-scale war is an attempt at the destruction of the bases of livelihood of the opponent and might be -- but is not -- applied with the same justification to the Anglo-American strategic bomb offensive against German cities. In the light of new documents discovered in Russia during the last decade Magenheimer discusses and summarizes the much disputed thesis of »Barbarossa« as a preventive strike designed within a very short time span as a contingency plan and which he concurs in the framework of geopolitics and grand strategy, but not on the strictly military level of the Eastern theatre (p. 56-7) since the Germans only learned very late of the real magnitude of the Soviet build-up. There can be no longer any doubt that in June 1941 the Soviet army was nearing completion of an overtly offensive deployment and that Stalin was not really surprised by the German attack (actually he seems to have learnt of German preparations as early as December 1940), perhaps only by its short-term timing. The German term »Überfall« therefore is not appropriate in this context. The first turning point of the war was already reached with the failure of the »Battle of England« which among many other factors can be attributed to leaving intact the coastal radar stations and the robust and underestimated British air defence. »Barbarossa« was a subsequent indirect strategy by eliminating the continental »sword« of England in a very short time before Germany again could deal from a strengthened continental basis with the Anglo-Americans. Magenheimer states that the USA was a constant and by no means underestimated factor in Hitler's strategic thinking. Since the timing of »Barbarossa« was very tight the US had to be kept out of the war as long as possible. The viciousness of warfare in the East was not primarily, as one often can read today, the result of high-level orders but the consequence of »the direct experience of the soldiers on both sides« (p. 101). One of the main German failures in the East was -- besides notoriously overtaxing of the troops and overstretching of the frontlines -- the gross underestimation of the Soviet reserves which led to the disastrous belief of the General Staff in July and August 1941 that the war was nearly won. Hitler's much criticized »Weisungen« No. 33, 33a, 34 tried to redress the strategic focus which apparently was lost in the OKH (p. 88) and therefore cannot »be described as blunders« (p.89). Hitler's insistence on the North (Leningrad) and South (Ukraine, Donez, Kaukasus) prongs was right not only from the military-economic standpoint (see also now Bernhard Zürner, »Der verschenkte Sieg« Berg: VGB Berg 2000), which is often described as Hitler's steckenpferd. One of the more grave German mistakes was the failure to adapt the armaments programs to defensive operations in time due to the changing situation in the East and later to the increasing air warfare of the Anglo-Americans in the West. The Mediterranean theatre was essentially lost due to the fact that Malta was not taken. This can be attributed to Hitler's neglect or hesitation, although Hitler was conscious of the importance of the Middle East as is also shown by the attempt of Heeresgruppe A to cross the Kaukasus. In sum the book leaves one with the impression of a high degree of inevitability in the course of the war from the very beginning. The strategic options realistically available to Hitler were rather limited given the the uncompromising and essentially germanophobe (not only anti-«Nazi«) attitude of the Anglo-Americans on the one hand and Stalin's imperial claims disguised as the attempt at a communist world revolution on the other (for Great Britain's attitude see Sir Robert Vansittart's revealing statement, 6.9.1940, p. 26). Germany's European allies were weak and a real coalition warfare with Japan against the Soviet Union never substantiated. However, Magenheimer convincingly brings home to the reader that until the first half of 1943 there were numerous 'virtual' turns in the course of the war which would have changed or improved the strategic situation of Germany. Therefore it is simply not true that the war was lost from the very beginning. Magenheimer also points to the fact that from hindsight Soviet victory turned out as a pyrrhic one which caused Russian historians to question even the term »victory« (pp. 271-4). While clearly describing various strategic and operational mistakes, for instance the division of forces in the attack on the Stalingrad area and simultaneously on the Caucasus, Magenheimer refrains from cheap criticism of German leadership. The main fault of German strategy was the reliance on purely military means while completely neglecting political options especially in dealing with the occupied Russian territories and with Stalin's tentative peace feelers in 1942. Magenheimer's »Final Considerations« (pp.277-89) should deserve thoughtful reading especially by contemporary politicians but one suspects that the current western political class, one shouldn't be surprised, is not really susceptible to military-strategic thinking. The book contains informative notes and an extensive bibliography with the German book titles also translated into English. There are very few misprints: the author »Frieser« ist not printed in the bibliography (p. 320 infra); p. 285 »Bagdolio« means Badoglio.

I have to concede that at first I was highly skeptical that Fest, not just any German, but a German from the Nazi generation, would write an honest account of the German Resistance (I admit to harboring prejudices against Germans; my parents are survivors of the Nazi death camps). I expected Fest to exaggerate the motives of the Resistance, asserting that they were purely on humanitarian and moral grounds. After I read the book, however, I realized that I allowed my prejudices towards Germans get in the way. Fest makes no pretenses about their motives. They were wide-ranging, a few on humanitarian grounds, some because they saw they were losing the war, and for some it was the combination of several factors. It was an interesting and informative read. One criticism I do have is that there is a serious omission. Fest fails to tell us that many in the Resistance, even such notables as von Stauffenberg, Carl Goerdeler and Martin Niemoller sympathized with the Nazi view that there was a "Jewish problem" -- a problem that required a "solution." True, they were horrified when they learned that the Nazi "solution" to the "Jewish problem" was extermination; nonetheless they did harbor a fair amount of anti-semitism. As the brother of Claus von Stauffenberg testified: "In the sphere of internal politics, we had welcomed the basic tenets of National Socialism for the most part. . .The concept of race seemed sound and very promising. . ."; their objection was merely that its "implementation was exaggerated and carried too far." [the quote is taken from Goldhagen's book "Hitler's Willing Executioners."]

Joachim Fest's book should be required reading of all military and political leaders. All leaders must realize that the danger of losing one's morality often happens imperceptibly slow. "Plotting Hitler's Death" is a gripping account of how the German elite attempted on numerous occasions to topple Hitler. The irony of the assasination attempts is that the German Army,never trustful of Hitler, is the institution that comes closest to killing Hitler. At the same time, Mr. Fest protrays in exacting detail the internal conflict that these men experienced: loyalty due to the oath they swore but the realization that Hitler's regime was criminal.

This book is very well-written with a lot of interesting information about major and minor members of the German resistance. In addition to good story-telling, Fest provides interesting analyses of the reasons for their failures. It is a sad story, but the moral courage of many of those in the German resistance is inspiring.