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What is especially interesting to me is the authors' view of how multi-ethnic society works in Greek Macedonia as compared to Bulgaria or Former Yugoslavia, and how the strategy of Roma musicians is different in these different countries. In Greek Macedonia the musicians play the music of all ethnic groups in order to maximize their flexibility and income. During multi-ethnic celebrations the musicians follow a strict policy of playing everyone's requests in the order requested, so that no one feels that they have priority. There is a fascinating description of an ethnically mixed wedding where the families have to adjust their various wedding traditions to accommodate each other, making it up as they go along to some extent.
The authors compare and contrast this with the approach taken by Roma musicians in other areas of the Balkans. In Kosovo in the 1980s the Roma musicians are said to have purposely selected music from traditions from other than Serbian and Albanian in order to avoid conflicts. In Bulgaria the wedding band tradition is described as leading to a new pan-Balkan "fusion" style which borrows from many cultures but still feels Bulgarian. Ultimately the motivation behind each strategy is the need of musicians to make a living.
The book is interesting reading from a North American perspective as well. Keil contrasts the multi-ethnic consciousness of Greeks, where the same person may have several types of ethnic and national identities simultaneously, with the concept of "multiculturalism" which he describes as slices of a pizza in which there are lots of ethnicities but everyone is either one thing or another. This raise the question of what is really going on in such immigrant nations as Canada and the United States.
The accompanying CD is a potpourri of sounds, including music of various types, and there is a section of the book describing the contents of the CD. Some of the track titles are Market Day in Jumaya, Afternoon at a Mahala Café, At Home in the Mahala, New Year's Party in Serres, Taverna Party at Nikisiani. The combination of the text, the many high quality black and white photos and the soundscape are successful in putting you into the experience, as much as this is possible. There was also a nice balance between Angeliki Keil's straight-forward and very readable reporting of the lives of the musicians and Charles Keil's more theoretical musings about ethnicity, the music and the role of the musicians. My only complaint about the book is its weight - it's printed on very heavy, glossy stock, no doubt adding to the quality of photographic reproductions, but it is so big and heavy that you pretty well have to read it sitting up. An alternate title could be, "Your Big Fat Roma Music Book."
That in itself is a rich and satisfying experience. But don't stop there. Read the text!
It tells of Roma (aka Gypsy) musicians who have cornered the market on live music in polyglot Greek Macedonia. While they are at the bottom of the social order, anyone who wishes a proper wedding, festival, or party of any kind hires these musicians. The musicians generally perform in trios, one playing a bass drum while the other two play the zurna - a double-reed woodwind found throughout Eurasia and Africa. Their repertoire is drawn from the peoples who live in the area, or passed through at one time, and is sometimes more Oriental, sometimes more European - whatever the customer wants.
Keil and Keil give detailed accounts of several performances - a baptism, a wedding, and a saint's day festival - tell the life stories of a dozen or so musicians & family, and recount the broad history of the Roma in the Mediterranean as well as presenting a more focused account of their sojourn in Greek Macedonia. Blau's photographs range from intimate portraits, to dancers in full party whirl, through street scenes jumbled or measured, to serene landscapes. Some of his shots are so strikingly composed - the cover image, for example - that the effect is both subjective (Blau's aesthetic) and objective (we're looking at things, out there, in the world). Steven Feld's soundscapes give us the living flow of sound. Not only do we hear the twin zurnas flying through drum rhythms, but dancing feet, shouts of joy and exertion, motors churning, sheep braying, and Stevie Wonder piped in through a tinny sound system.
Bright Balkan Morning is a milestone. See it, hear it, read it. Take pleasure in it.
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They present a set of writing from both local and foreign contributors painting a vivid picture of the true events in Bosnia and the surrounding area, as well as international reactions and the complete peace process.
The book was completed in December 1993, and came out on the market in March 1994, so it does not include the events from 1994 and later, which are also critical to understanding the war and its outcome, but I still strongly recommend it, because it is one of the best books on Bosnia of 1990-1993.
They present a set of writings from both local and foreign contributors painting a vivid picture of the true events in Bosnia and the surrounding area, as well as international reactions and the complete peace process.
The book was completed in December 1993, and came out on the market in March 1994, so it does not include the events from 1994 and later, which are also critical to understanding the war and its outcome, but I still strongly recommend it, because it is one of the best books on Bosnia of 1990-1993.
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Yugoslavia existed as a state from 1918 to 1991. Under Tito it had a devolved and federal constitution. This gave parity representation to each of the six republics in the Yugoslav federation, even though Serbia was by far the biggest. Tito selected people for jobs by 'ethnic arithmetic' and rotated top officials annually. But these policies signally failed to unify Yugoslavia. The constitution encouraged those who wanted to split the country. They had a two-track strategy. They aimed to move from federation to confederation as a step towards independence; at the same time they formed separate institutions designed for complete independence.
Outside forces seized on these internal failings. In January 1991 the US and German Ambassadors pressed the Yugoslav National Army not to intervene to keep Croatia in Yugoslavia. In early 1991 Germany and other countries sold arms to Croatia and Slovenia. On 25 June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared their independence. The Croats were desperate for foreign intervention: "The Tudjman government believed that immediate internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis was absolutely crucial."
When the Yugoslav Government deployed the National Army to hold the country together, the EC secretly threatened to cut off all aid to Yugoslavia. On 4 October 1991, the opening day of the EC Conference, its chairman Lord Carrington presented an agenda "premised on the assumption that Yugoslavia no longer existed." The EC announced that all the Yugoslav republics "are sovereign and independent with international identity". As Cohen wrote, "the EC had apparently made a political decision to dismember the Yugoslav federation." Hurd warned in December 1991 that recognising Croatia and Slovenia would escalate the war. Carrington warned that recognition would weaken diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire and a settlement, and would also spread the war to Bosnia. Despite, or because of, all these good reasons, the EC, including Britain, recognised Croatia and Slovenia in January. The UN did too, despite its "internal divisions about the propriety of intervention in a sovereign state's domestic disputes."
The war did spread to Bosnia. In July 1991 the Moslem Bosnian Organization tried to negotiate a Moslem-Serb accord to prevent war in Bosnia and to preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. Karadzic accepted this for the Bosnian Serbs, but Izetbegovic, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, rejected it. Izetbegovic is a member of the fundamentalist 'Fida'iyane Islam', which wants to turn Bosnia into an Islamic Republic, although Muslims are only a third of the population. Bosnia's Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic tried to justify the composition of his government by saying "It is a fact that Moslems make up 99% of the Bosnian defense forces so it is natural that they form the government." In so doing he gave the lie to the nonsense that Bosnia is some form of multicultural democracy. These armed forces have been "strengthened with thousands of volunteers from various Islamic countries" and by illegal arms shipments, often through Slovenia, especially from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
In his 1970 Islamic Declaration, which he reprinted in 1990, Izetbegovic wrote, "The Islamic movement must and can take power not only to destroy the non-Islamic power but to build up a new Islamic one." Cohen noted "the more militant and religiously nationalistic majority in the party led by Alija Izetbegovic (who had spent eight years in jail under the communists for his Islamic fundamentalist beliefs)." Cohen analysed "the role of traditional religions in generating ethnic conflicts" in Yugoslavia.
Again, in February 1992 Izetbegovic sabotaged the Lisbon Agreement for Moslem-Serb-Croat power-sharing. He "later conceded that Bosnia might have avoided a violent war if it had stayed together with Serbia and Montenegro in a reconfigured Yugoslavia." In early 1992 his dash for Bosnian independence was "prompted by the opportunity for quick recognition by the EC." Even the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia called his decision 'disastrous'. Cohen pointed out that "the lack of a political settlement among the major ethnic groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina actually justified postponing recognition of that republic as another new state in April 1992." But the EC and the UN went ahead with recognition. In the autumn of 1993 Bosnian Moslem government forces killed "thousands of civilian Croats in central Bosnia".
The United States has throughout the war campaigned for US intervention. As Cohen pointed out, it used hyperbolic calls of genocide to try to justify intervention. It has vilified the Serbs and whitewashed the Bosnian Moslems and the Croats. To defeat the Serbs, "the United States, though not ostensibly taking sides in the war, had effectively engineered the Moslem-Croat agreement." Cohen showed how "behind the scenes, Washington was gradually expanding its military support for the Moslems and Croats". Clinton approved the initiative of a group of former US military officers to assist Croatia's armed forces.
Cohen finished by writing hopefully, "The imperatives of economic survival and reconstruction, as well as geographic proximity and other earlier interdependencies, suggested that such cooperation would eventually resume despite the recent episodes of terrible, ethnic, religious, and political violence." But there is no chance of this vital peaceful reconstruction happening with 60,000 foreign troops in the country. Their presence will prolong the war in Yugoslavia, and also runs a high risk of spreading it to other countries. It will certainly worsen the tension between the NATO powers and Russia. Bulgaria and Greece will not appreciate the presence of so many NATO troops so near to them.
This is indeed quite valuable to students of Yugoslavia or Eastern Europe; its broader value, however, is its contribution to the larger issues of power studied by sociologists and political scientists. How is power maintained? We frequently assume that individuals will revolt if conditions are so bad they have nothing to lose. Gordy documents the ability of the powerful to actually take away this option. Most mechanisms, such as cencorship, make revolt more difficult, raising the pain level people will tolerate; however, by keeping the more politically savvy urbanites near starvation, the regime actually compromised their very ability to express dissent.
Gordy provides an academic and, to the degree it is possible in social science, empirical explanation of power that is profoundly disturbing; sometimes it may be impossible to displace the powerful. True, outside forces crippled the regime; but what does this suggest about the American line that local groups should revolt to demonstrate support for democracy and earn military support? Don't throw it out yet, but Gordy presents an important argument. It also helps explain the success of earlier brutal regimes; Haile Selassie used similar techniques far more adeptly, and therefore more brutally, in Ethiopia. This book is both an insightful analysis of the Serbian regime's tactics and a significant study of the nature of power.
thanks again to the author....deeply gratefull.
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Mozda bi trebalo dat popusta nasem svijetu u tudjini, znas poskupo je to. Eto toliko od mene.
PS. A za slike, jebaji ga, sta ja znam slike ko, slike....nisu za zida
I then found Treptow. From the very first page he avoids the tendency to sensionalize Vlad III. He avoids using documents that are suspicious, like other historians. He tells us how he came to the conclusion that they are not trustworthy. He attemps to set Vlad's action within their proper context. When I finished the book, I knew that I had read the best biography on Dracula now in existence.