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The book was not comfortable to read. War is never very pretty, and certainly depressing. However, the book offers insights on how people behave during war, good and bad. I felt that the best chapter was the conclusion, where it was pointed out that there is a difference between a violent population and a population that is subjected to continued disruptive violent incursions. Rebecca West's Black Lamb Gray Falcon covers the history of the region in depth. This book is more of an analysis of recent events, with just enough history to set the scene.
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1. It is ironic that Greeks now "love Macedonia" when they tried to eradicate its very existence.
2. If Macedonia has always been Greek, why did the Greek government deny its existence until the 1980's?
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Professor George F. Kennan has written the Introduction only for this book -date unavailable.
Quite a long time ago, almost twenty years before CEIP president, Morton Abramowitz, has brushed this book from the shelf, I have had the original in my hands, and this with the greatest care. My father, as a volunteer telegraphist was in the midst of the first book's subject.
Giving an opinion of the first and the second edition in English -I have no knowledge of any translation- is a task of the utmost seriousness. Let Good Lord help me to condense my view in less then a thousand words. At that point I will more than gladly respond to your kind offer and continue along this lines.
Sincerely, DJGB Popadich
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Davis admits that, before undertaking this project, he "had scant knowledge of the cultural and political history of Eastern Europe, much less of the Balkans" (viii). Davis assumed the role of a student in preparation for this enterprise by consulting such works as Fred Singleton's "A Short History of the Yugoslav People" and Barbara Jelavich's two-volume history on the Balkans. Two convictions on the part of Davis enters into this work--a distrust of nationalism, and an insistence that the West (particularly, the United States) should intervene militarily to end the hostilities against the Bosnian Muslims.
Michael Sells' contribution to the study, "Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina," is a critical account on Western views towards the Balkans. First, Sells establishes that war tactics on the part of the Bosnian Serbs is, in fact, genocide. The "unjust" intent of the Bosnian Serbs is to destroy the cultural memory of the Bosnian Muslims (26). Second, Sells analyzes the prevailing attitude of the West towards the war in Bosnia. Sells cites an appearance by then president Bill Clinton on Larry King Live during which Clinton referred to the hostilities in Bosnia as "age-old antagonisms" which "go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years" (23).
Robert Kaplan's "Balkan Ghosts" is criticized for repopularizing the idea that the Balkan peoples and cultures are "unamenable to civilized standards of behavior and locked in unchanging, perpetual tribal hatreds" (40). This belief that the Balkan peoples will always be involved in warfare is coupled with the idea that "there are no angels in the conflict" (41). According to Sells, the denial that civilized society is possible in the Balkans, and the prevailing conclusion that all sides in the Bosnian conflict are guilty causes the West to ignore the practices of cultural genocide against Muslim populations.
In "Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Bosnian Tragedy," Jean Bethke Elshtain explains another reason for the lack of direct action by the West to stop atrocities in Bosnia. The problem is that the United Nations, for a time, did not recognize Bosnia as a sovereign nation. According to Elshtain, "the United Nations Charter [only] makes provision for response to violation of the territory of a sovereign state" (46). To Elshtain, this stand is unacceptable. He also criticizes the West for regarding international conflicts with "national security interests, first and foremost, in mind" (47). Using the "just war" theory, both principles and interests would be considered in assessing whether intervention in a given conflict is or is not warranted. As Elshtain maintains, "if our [United States] policy makers had been guided by just war principles, my hunch is that, under the Nuremberg precedent, genocidal political aggression cannot be permitted to stand" (49). Like Davis, Elshtain notes the problem of nationalism in Bosnia and recommends a "middle way" between multicultural absolutists, who insist that different identities cannot mix, and civic pluralists, who preach universal solidarity (50-3). Elshtain, however, does not explain the ways in which this "middle way" can be achieved.
James Turner Johnson, in "War for Cities and Noncombatant Immunity in the Bosnian Conflict," describes the element of "double effect" in the "just war" theory. The idea of "double effect" asserts that, although deliberate and direct attacks on noncombatants is considered unjust, noncombatants can be legitimately harmed or killed if they are the unintentional victims during an assault on a military target. Considering the war in Bosnia, Johnson uses an important example to illustrate the weakness of the "double effect" idea in protecting noncombatants from unjust harm. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serbs would cut off the water supplies to the civilian Muslim populations. As the inhabitants left their homes to attain water from a limited number of public taps (most likely, near military institutions), the Bosnian Serbs would fire upon them. According to Johnson: "If the besiegers employ means of attack that are by nature indiscriminate or disproportionate in their effects, then I am less willing to grant the double effect excuse, and if these means are chosen so as to increase the burden of possible harm on the noncombatants present and may be judged so because they are likely to have their primary effect against these and not the combatant defenders, then double effect reasoning emphatically does not apply" (84). Johnson maintains that international law, which establishes civilized war tactics, does not sufficiently address the problems associated with siege warfare.
Unlike the other essays, which condemn the West for its lack of response to the Bosnian conflict, G. Scott Davis' contribution includes a criticism of the actions employed by the West. In "Bosnia, the United States, and the Just War Tradition," Davis charges the United States and the European Community with violating the "just war" theory through their arms embargo. The purpose of the embargo imposed in September 1991 was to minimize the violence and contain the war in Croatia. The embargo, however, shifted the balance in favor of the Serbs, who inherited munitions and material from the Yugoslav National Army. Davis maintains that the embargo, which favored Serbia, "should have been particularly offensive given the conduct of the Serbs, who had already displayed a willingness to attack civilian targets and to condone atrocities" (113). Davis concluded that the proper response of the West would have been to lift the embargo and supply aid directly to the Bosnian government (114).
In the final essay, John Kelsay condemns the Western media for portraying the Muslim culture as barbarian and hostile to modernizing influences. In "Bosnia and the Muslim Critique of Modernity," Kelsay compares the Bosnian Muslims' situation to that of the Jews during the Second World War. Kelsay uses the observations of Richard L. Rubenstein to explain that, by disregarding the Muslim community as being incapable of modernization, the West defines the Bosnian Muslims as "outside the universe of moral obligation" (125). Thus "the United Nations, the European Community, and NATO all function as 'silent partners' in the efforts of the Serbians to create an 'ethically pure' region for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (125).
By using the "just war" theory to analyze the conflict in Bosnia, this compilation is an important work. It is critical to have a criterion whereby "just" or "unjust" war practices can be clearly defined. Terms, such as "genocide" and "unjust," are often used so loosely that their meanings become ambiguous and less useful. Zachery T. Irwin, who reviewed the book for Library Journal (November 15, 1996, p. 75), criticized the analogy for a lack of a conclusion. This reviewer disagrees. The conclusion of this work is that, through an understanding of the "just war" theory, the West should become more directly involved in stopping the atrocities committed in Bosnia. The argument itself, however, is weak. All contributors have little regard for nationalist feelings in the Balkans and elsewhere. Nationalism is important for producing a healthy identity for a people and instilling in them a sense of dignity and self-worth which can prompt an oppressed people to fight for their place in the world. Certainly, there are negative aspects of nationalism, however, Elshtain's insistence on retooling nationalist feelings to find a "middle way" seems very naïve. The contributors consider the Bosnian conflict as would many international journalists. Such journalists often take a global stand on many issues. Such a stand, however, underestimates the power and importance of nationalist aspirations which can determine whether a conflict, no matter how morally "unjust," warrants the risk of Western lives.