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This is the real deal in terms of mystery/spy novels. It's a delightfully intelligent and engaging page turner by the author who invented the modern spy genre. The roiling, ethnically and politically complex Europe of the 1930 is nearly another character of the novel, but unlike the work of more contemporary authors, the reader never feels bludgeoned over the head with historical trivia.
This is a fun, interesting, page-turning thriller. Great beach reading, but intelligent enough not to insult the serious reader of literature.
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Instead he takes us on a romp. His journey from Vienna to Istanbul spans the period of NATO's bombardment over Kosovo last year. He snatches at images and characters along the way. He is good at it. He has an eye for eccentrics and characters and the contradictions that constantly spring out the tortured landscape around him. It is a good read. His trip into Pristina ahead of the KFOR troops is vivid stuff, though he leaves too soon to continue his journey east. He is more generous to the Serbs than most daily news reports, simply because he acknowledges a wider and longer context.
His attempt to explain WHY the Serbs responded with such (at times) unspeakable violence in Kosovo is clumsy and ill thought out. But this is not intended to be serious history, or even serious journalism. It is, for the most part, lively and engaging - a touch rushed - but also clear-sighted about a place mired in the history of wars and the consequences of wars.
The saddest man was the Sarajevo newspaper editor who put out his publication under fire throughout the city's long seige, who is so depressed by the corruption now thriving in the peace, that he is nostalgic for the days of war. If that's the legacy, what hope is there?
The book's premise is to share the author's experiences through the context of his former visit during peaceful times to the same region, historical perspective on why and how the tensions and conflicts have evolved, and on-the-ground insights from conversations with those who hate and those who do not.
The effect is not unlike what one's own experiences might have been like if a time machine brought us first into the year 1858 in South Carolina and then in the same area in the year 1865. Without more perspective, someone from Kosovo would not be able to understand what had happened between the two times. That is what the author has been trying to accomplish in this book.
Through flashbacks and narration, you will travel twice (once before the wars, and once after them) through the former Yugoslavia on a journey starting in Vienna and ending in Istanbul. You will have many unforgettable moments, like seeing thousands of displaced refugees squatting in a former alpine meadow while overwhelmed army forces try to save lives. You'll learn what a Sarajevo rose is (no, it's not what you think). And you will find how historical lessons can be used as excuses to fan current hatreds of those who are similar and different from oneself.
All of this has an incredible immediacy because this is like the worst of the Nazi era, being relived in many ways in our own times.
The author keeps asking, why? He poses some answers, but ultimately, it is unanswerable. Perhaps in time, we can make sense of this terrible tragedy.
Here are some cautions: Anyone who wants a serious history will not like this book. Anyone who wants a brilliant essay will be even less satisfied.
If you are open to a new approach to understanding an extremely complex circumstance, you will find this book to be interesting. It will expand your curiosity, and that will be good. We all need to ponder the lessons here, to help avoid their recurrence. Share this book with one other person, so the memory will expand.
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I think this book provides one with a good start to understanding the civil war in Kosovo. I think one would need more details to have a better understanding of what will need to take place for this area to live in peace. A good follow up would be to read Waging Modern War by Wesley Clark.
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Oh well...
I am Greek but my origin is Armenian. I have read this book in Greek translation. I didn't really enjoy it. It is a good history book for history students and schollars. It is a product of hard work and you will learn more about the genocide if you read it. I have read in Greeks "the crime of silence". I found it better.
Read more about Armenian genocide, dont believe the Lies of Turks. In our days Turks are not responsible for the crimes of their grand fathers. The lands of my grand father was Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish too. This land is Turkish now and I dont want to take it back. I want justice for the death people. I will be happy if the official Turkish State acknowledges the genocide. The memory must be alive for ever.
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O'Malley and Craig do a good job of this I believe. I would have liked to see a more detailed analysis of how exactly the US pushed the junta in attempting a coup to remove Makarios. Did Kissinger know Turkey would invade and the cards would play themselves out, or did Kissinger have to work more with Turkey "under the table" to broker what seems to be a playing out of the 1964 alternate plan to partition Cyprus? Two other brief criticisms are 1) the sometimes general and arbitrary footnotes to "Interview with the authors." O'Malley and Craig interviewed several people so it can be confusing just what "interview" they are refering to, and 2) the sometimes frustrating footnotes to the House sub-committee papers and other government documents, which to no fault of the authors, isn't exaclty readily available at the local library for personal reference.
That said I think the book is an excellent study into the rather unfortunate methods the United States implements its foreign policy in order to protect military interests at all costs. Lets hope that in the future the Cypriots (both Greek and Turkish) can decide their own fate rather than Ankara, Athens, London, and especially Washington at their necks. A unified, peaceful Cyprus is attainable, especially in the EU. Let's not lower our hopes and aspirations in saying that partition is the only solution.
Cyprus has suffered for its strategically important position in the eastern Mediterranean. Colonized by the Greeks in the second millennium BC, it was tossed from Persian, Roman, Byzantine, and finally to Ottoman empire. The Turks retained possession of the island until it was annexed by Great Britain in 1914. From the 1930s onward Greek Cypriots agitated vociferously--and after 1955 militarily--for independence from Britain and union with Greece. Reeling under the pressure for independence the British sought a way to accommodate and still retain control by dividing the two communities and giving them a constitution. In 1960, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed on a constitution for an independent Cyprus, with the Greek Archbishop Makarios III as its first president and Kutchuk as its Vice President. This agreement came into being with the Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance and the 1960 constitution and Britain as the guarantor of unified Cyprus. This setup was fatally flawed, as it established a system of government envisioned by outside powers neglecting to address the deep rooted divisions within the Greeks and the Turk Cypriots. In late 1963, after Makarios made 13 constitutional changes that would abolish the Turkish power of veto over legislation on defense, security, foreign affairs, elections, municipalities and taxation lead the Turks withdrew from the government. A decade of internecine warfare and assassinations followed between the two communities that were mediated or, more precisely, "observed" by the United Nations.
Ultimately--and some would argue, inevitably--the two most interested powers were drawn toward direct intervention: first Greece, which attempted to unite the island under its own form of benign military dictatorship on July 15, 1974; and then Turkey, which responded far more effectively and invaded the place five days later. Cyprus constitutes one of the great unresolved conflicts of the late 20th century.
The Greek Cypriots feeling betrayed by the Western began to look towards the Soviets for help. With this realization and a long-standing plan to save its strategic assets on the island from what U.S. officials feared might be a left-wing takeover if the crisis in Cyprus were not resolved. Cyprus, became invaluable to Washington for monitoring both Soviet nuclear missile activity in Central Asia and potential military threats in the Middle East. Ongoing instability threatened these assets. By mounting an invasion, Turkey saved them. The Americans had judged that to let Greece and Turkey fight it out would be disastrous for the Western interests, would destroy the NATO's southern wing and leave the entire eastern Mediterranean vulnerable to Soviet take-over. According to McNally the Turks had threatened that if there was any military intervention against their invasion, they would leave NATO. Since the Americans badly needed an insurance policy against the Soviets; Kissinger put "no credible pressure" on Turkey "not to go ahead with an invasion." He then did "everything" he could "to help the Turks make up their mind that intervention was the only way they could get satisfaction." And having quietly encouraged the Turks to invade, while systematically "ignoring the advice of his own experts," he played what even the Turks called a "constructive and helpful role" by not protesting the invasion and the subsequent division of the island.
The Greeks have suspected that there was a conspiracy and insist that Turkey could not have acted alone. The Greek sentiment was described by Makarios after the Turkish attack: "The United States is the only country which could have exerted pressure on Turkey and prevented the invasion.". The charge itself is perhaps based on circumstantial events by observing that the United States tilted toward the more powerful and stabler Turkey over Greece for their interests; and that Kissinger not only knew about Turkish plans to invade Cyprus but may have tacitly approved it. Kissinger's main concern was to control the invasion and force Turkey to assume defensive postures in order not to flare up a direct confrontation Greece and Turkey two key NATO allies. United Kingdom being the guarantor of Cyprus unity considered placing their between Cyprus and Turkey to deter the Turks; but was vetoed by U.S. However U.K decided against such an action to prevent a confrontation with a NATO ally (Turkey) and create a rift with U.S.
In a report submitted by the MP's of British parliament it was stated that Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation and military capacity to intervene, but choose not to do so. Britain had considerable forces at hand, and could have intervened with or without Turkey, to reverse the coup and had little doubt that either alone or as part of the U.N force, Britain could have forestalled the first Turkish invasion. The chairman declared that Cyprus crises had been a true test of Britain's standing in the world, which should be measured not by its military might or economic wealth, but by its standard of justice, integrity and humanity, and by the way it protects the weak, On all these counts Britain had failed Cyprus for reasons which the Government refused to give.
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I picked up a few themes from his book. One was that Ottomon Empire and the some of the Communist regimes papered over the ethnic differences. At the same time, the ethnic differences were not a big deal for most of the time in the Balkans. Neither were the religious differences, as the population tended to chose what parts of the various practices to follow.
For me, this was not a particularly interesting read. At slighty over a hundred pages, one would assume you could breeze through this book. But the writing and the words used, resulted in me taking six and a half hours to read this book. There are more interesting books out there including Misha Glenny with his The Balkans. I would probably consult that book if I wanted information.
Erika B. (erikab93)
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Milosevic knew that too and betrayed Stambolic, his political mentor, to become president of Serbia. The important things here are the parallels and dissimilarities between Tito and Milosevic. Tito, a communist, wanted a united Yugoslavia, a nation of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, and Kosovars. Milosevic, a nationalist, wanted a united Serbia, but only for the Serbs. And he wanted to be leader of all Serbs, meaning the Montenegrins, Serbs in Serbia, Bosnian Serbs, and the Krajina Serbs. He even told Milan Panic, Yugoslavia's prime minister, that he was the "Ayatollah Khomeini of Serbia. The Serbs will follow me no matter what."
The trouble with that was, the Serbs in those other areas already had their own leaders, such as Radovan Karadzic, so he had to discredit them or put them down under his thumb, which ultimately didn't work.
Some things that have come to light is the back door deal between Milosevic and then-Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, on dividing Bosnia between them. Milosevic didn't care if he lost the Serb-populated Krajina and Eastern Slavonia, both in Croatia, saying that he would repopulate Kosovo with the Serbs from those regions.
But when the chips fall down, Milosevic used nationalism to get power for himself. The beginning of the end came in the middle of the war in Bosnia, when he was beset by UN sanctions and the Western economic blockade. His own position eroding so he endorsed the Vance-Owen plan to divide Bosnia into ten cantons--3 Serb, 3 Muslim, 2 Croat, 1 (Muslim-Croat), with Sarajevo organized like Washington D.C. Karadzic was vehemently against it and split with Milosevic.
Milosevic was the "man of the hour" at the Dayton talks, in which he agreed to give Sarajevo, the holy grail to Bosnian Serbs, to Muslims, as well as division of Republika Srpska by the Posovina corridor. It was not his to give, but he did it to make himself the good Serb to the West and to cut the Bosnian Serbs down to size. However, this move alienated him from true nationalists such as Karadzic and militia leader Vojislav Sesejl.
Milosevic seems no better than a schoolyard bully. He torments the weak but upon facing someone stronger, backs down, as he did in Kosovo. It took the non-violent student group OTPOR to oust him, but that's another book, which I hope is well-researched and documented like this book.
One would expect a biographer to adopt the former, 'Great Man Theory of History' position, and a historian to adopt the latter position, with its emphasis on longer-term historical processes. The authors strike an appropriate mix between these two explanations. As the title suggests, they pull no punches in depicting Milosevic as the epitome of Machiavellian evil, but they are also sensitive to the details of the social and political environment which allowed him to rise to the top. As such, the book reads less like a biography than an in-depth political history of Yugoslavia between the late-1980s and the present, and is therefore of interest to students of political science.
Milosevic met his future wife Mirjana Markovic at high school in Pozarevac. They also studied together at Belgrade University. Mira studied sociology and was by all accounts an outspoken firebrand; Sloba studied law and was by all accounts a dull spirit and unoriginal thinker - perfect, it would seem, for a career in the Communist Party. Slobodan's political instincts were finely tuned to the times. He knew that to climb up the Communist Party hierarchy, he had to have a mentor. Ivan Stambolic, a friend from Belgrade University, played this role for Milosevic. Articulate and well-connected, he moved up the hierarchy, and by 1975, he was Prime Minister of Serbia. Crucially, he never forgot about Milosevic. Slobodan followed him nearly every step of the way, until the late 1980s, when he started scheming to replace his former friend in the top job.
It was at this point that Milosevic made his infamous conversion from communism to nationalism, with typical Machiavellian poise. In April 1987, Kosovo was about to erupt into civil unrest, with the minority Serb population complaining about their treatment by the majority Albanian population and threatening a mass exodus. Prime Minister Stambolic ordered Milosevic to visit the province in order to calm both sides down. To put it succinctly, he disobeyed orders. Instead of calming them, Milosevic declared to an angry Serbian crowd that "No one will defeat you again". The ecstatic response of the crowd must have seared into Milosevic's mind the importance of the nationalist card. Over the next months and years he assembled a coalition with the aim of protecting Serbian rights from being trampled by her neighbours.
The Serbian nationalist mindset seems to be a curious mixture of glorification of military defeat (the 14th century Battle of Kosovo was an enormous defeat for the Serbs) and a belief that her neighbours are unjustly benefitting from the bravery of the Serbs in defending their freedom. Of course, there is some merit in the idea that the Serbs have received the rough end of the stick for centuries and should not be subjugated simply to preserve some delicate balance of power, as Tito evidently intended. However Serbia, with Milosevic at its helm, was surely the central player in the collapse and civil war that took place in the 1990s. When it was clear that the country was disintegrating, Milosevic made a secret deal with Slovenia, to allow it to secede. After the unilateral secession of Croatia in 1991, Milosevic planned to incorporate large swathes of Croatia in which there were Serb majorities. Infamously, he united with Croatia's Franjo Tudjman to invade Bosnia-Herzegovina and divide the spoils.
Doder and Branson also alert us to the wider international context in which the civil war was played out. The United Nations, and the various peace envoys sent to negotiate truces, assumed that self-determination for the various 'parts' of Yugoslavia was not only the answer, but the right thing to do. In the process, the beliefs of the substantial minority of people who saw themselves as first and foremost 'Yugoslavian' (but were perhaps not as vocal as the extreme nationalists) were disregarded. One is reminded of the current centripetal forces in Indonesia, and whether the United Nations would support its break-up.
The authors also point to the significant support of Milosevic by the United States, perhaps an extension of the tradition in American foreign policy of supporting dictatorships if they bring stability to the region. Milosevic was depicted as a peacemaker at the Dayton Peace Accords - requests to America by the Serbian opposition parties for assistance in deposing him were rebuffed. Four years later, however, following the collapse of the Rambouillet talks over Kosovo, Milosevic was depicted as a warmonger and the full force of NATO was brought against his nation.
Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant is valuable book for students interested in Yugoslavia's post-war political history, particularly since the 1980s. Written in 2000, it obviously excludes the war crimes indictment and trial. This process alone will require another Eichmann in Jerusalem, although given his recent performance, the focus ought to be the farce, rather than the banality, of evil.
Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, therefore, have written the first definitive biography of Slobodan Milosevic. Although their work appeared some time before he was overthrown in October 2000 and later brought to justice in The Hague (obviously the biography is now in need of a little bit of revision in order for it to be up-to-date), it helped to place the Kosovo war into its proper context by focusing on Milosevic, who to all intended purposes, ignited the ethnic question in the Serbian province to his own advantage and did not balk at violating human rights toward transforming Kosovo into a province dominated by Serbs.
His early years, through his birth in Pozarevac, Serbia, on August 22, 1941, to his time at Belgrade University where he became a Communist Party member that played an important role in his development, are detailed in this biography. Emphasis is placed on Milosevic's two-faced diplomacy abroad and at home, where friends one day became enemies to be 'removed,' just like the people under his rule, seen through the wars in (respectively) Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
The biography is written and reads like a fast-paced novel, filled with all the almost unreal espionage and seedy characters to be ideally found in fiction. A study of Yugoslavia's demise is incomplete without Doder and Branson's magnificent and revealing biography; to date, there are other works coming out, and surely more will appear, but it remains to be seen if they surpass the current.
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The books clear strength lies in the author's lucid, fluid and descriptive writing style - it truly makes the book, from the literary point of view, a joy to read. The reader is given a vivid picture of the Balkan lands Kaplan visits in a sort of 'travelogue from hell' or 'anti-travelogue' regarding places that most readers will not yet have visited. Added to this is a good deal of insight and reportage, interviews with locals, and so forth, that lend the book much readability and depth.
Unfortunately, however, the book is marred by the author's own Western prejudices and biases. What we have here is a critique, in many ways, of the 'backwards East' and a not-so-subtle head-shaking that the region is not more 'Western' in outlook.
The problems surface on two levels: First, Kaplan's descriptions of the local cultural life are off the mark, due in many cases to his lack of understanding of Orthodox Christianity. Many ignorant comments are notable regarding Orthodox religious art, piety, liturgical life, church organization, etc. Kaplan is right that the Orthodox tradition has had a profound influence on the region, but his conclusions as to the nature of this impact are nothing more than a perpetuation of the common and long-held Western stereotypes about the Eastern Orthodox part of Europe - in particular, the myth that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is a dangerous brew of mysticism, austerity and nationalism. Not only is this an incorrect summary, but the impressionistic conclusion is false -- the reality of the impact of the Orthodox Church on these countries in the twentieth century is much more complex and nuanced than Mr. Kaplan leads the reader to believe. Kaplan would have been better served to study more about Orthodox Christianity before repeating so many tired stereotypes about it in this book. But, alas, many Western readers are not in a position to correct Mr. Kaplan, and will accept what he writes as true, thereby experiencing a convenient confirmation of their existing stereotypes.
Second, Kaplan's 'program' for the region is unabashedly biased towards the 'enlightened' Western approach. According to Kaplan, the post-Enlightenment West is the paradigm that the world (or at least this part of it) must follow, and he accords much of the problems of these countries to their non-Western, Byzantine, Slavic, Eastern Orthodox Christian background - in a vast, vast overstatement and oversimplification of the real situation in the Balkans and in Europe in general. The fact that the Enlightenment itself led to the drastic decline of ethical life in the 'West', and the development of the political ideologies that are the real cause of the tragedies of the Twentieth Century seems lost on Kaplan, who would solve the problems of the Balkan region by imposing the full-blown developments of Western Enlightenment ideology on these Southeastern Europeans.
The story of the Balkans is simple enough - it is a region that has been 'put upon' by outsiders for centuries, each with their own designs for the region - the Venetians, the Byzantines, the Ottomans, the Austrians, the Nazis, etc. In the act of being downtrodden, rivalries developed and these have in some cases developed into ethnic hatreds. These hatreds are easily manipulable by local political powers to engage the population in one or another act of internal or external agression (read: scapegoating). The influence of outsiders on the region has been profoundly negative historically, and in my opinion, Kaplan is mistaken to assume that yet another 'design' for the region would meet with any greater success than the previous ones have.
Read 'Balkan Ghosts' for a great travelogue and an excellent portrayal of the present Western stereotypical view of the Balkans. But don't take his strereotypes to heart - the truth is much more complex and nuanced, and the region needs to be understood from the 'inside out' rather than the view from the 'outside in' that Kaplan presents here.
Criticisms:
1) His approach is fairly egotistical since he believes that few Western reporters actually capture the complexity of the region, and none, except a rare few (of which he is one), ever understand the people or their real motivations. Although his assessment of Western reporters may have elements of truth, he seems to make the point numerous times throughout the book as if to create his own air of superiority.
2) Kaplan's assessment of Greece seems to carry the most weight since he lived there for seven years, whereas he sometimes only spends days in other regions. Nevertheless, he feels obliged to draw the same broad generalizations from those areas where he spoke to relatively few people, as he does from places where he met many people and spent much time. His underlying assumption throughout the book is that only a thorough understanding of history can engender a comprehension for the present state of affairs. Thus, in the countries he frequented little, he feels a fair amount of research in history allows him to make the same prognostications as he makes in areas where he has gotten to know many people.
Barring the above critiques, I enjoyed the book and found myself coming back to it until complete. He complements a firm grip of historical facts with a wonderful ability to depict people and places through metaphor and descriptive writing. Here is an example, "Greeks are married to the East. The West is our mistress only. Like any mistress, the West excites and fascinates us, but our relationship with it is episodic and superficial." His ability to characterize relationships, people and places with words is refreshing. I will definitely read more Kaplan.
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Glenny argues there is no historical basis for national hatreds visible today. During the Ottoman period Serb and Croat, Muslim and Christian lived side by side with little hostile interaction. Religion and culture superseded political identities in defining Balkan society. Glenny does not dispute the theory that the Ottoman Empire was the "sick man of Europe" but the Ottomans did provide a stabilizing presence in the area, even after the Serb rebellion of 1804.
However, Balkan history is far from benign. War has always been a determinant in the political landscape. Unfortunately, brutal murder, rape, and carnage were characteristics that survived modernizing efforts. Throughout the 19th century, individual Balkan groups took on the Ottomans (Serbia in 1804, Greece from 1821-30, Croatia in 1848) with varying outcomes, but it was not until 1885 that two Balkan nations first fought one another. Beginning in 1878, but particularly after 1885, the storm that eventually became World War One began to take shape. Soon the whole world was impacted by Balkan history. But the Balkans were not solely responsible for any of the world's conflicts, and they certainly do not have a monopoly on war-related atrocities.
Yet this does not mean present Serb-Croat and/or Bosnian tensions were inevitable. In fact, Glenny writes of specific dates when Serbs and Croats came to blows (as in World War Two, 1967, or after 1991) but implies the interim there was relatively calm. Bosnia is specifically discussed at certain points (1908, 1914, 1992) but it is not a scene of nonstop bloodletting.
Glenny's work reflects a masterful understanding of his subject. Many readers may learn of events for the first time. The Greek-Turkish War of 1921-3, or the several pre1999 incidents of conflicts over Kosovo are examples. A Serb bias is noticeable, and his portrayal of Stalin as cooperative with the West detracts somewhat from the book, but the overall effort is excellent. The Balkans should be considered by anyone interested in southeast Europe.
Misha Glenny is no newcomer to the Balkans, and some readers may be familiar with his "The Fall of Yugoslavia" which recounted the principal events leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, here Glenny is focussed on surveying the major events of Balkan history over the past 200 years, drawing together the similar threads that play through various countries, while pointing out the important differences that led to different outcomes in various parts of the region. In particular, Glenny focuses on the relationship between the Balkan region and the countries outside that region, and the impact that this relationship has had in the past and continues to have on the region today. In this sense, the book is very timely and sheds much light on the present situation.
Unlike the extremely popular "Balkan Ghosts", Glenny simply doesn't buy the notion that the recent conflicts in the Balkans are principally the result of ancient ethno-religious hatreds and stubborn intractibility, but instead forcefully and convincingly argues that the carnage that we see today is the product of relatively recent Balkan history, which itself has been greatly influenced by powers beyond the Balkans. The book is convincing in its thesis, breathtakingly broad in its scope (it covers the entire region, including the former Yugolavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece), and yet fascinating in its attention to detail and the individual events and personages who have shaped the history of this corner of Europe.
This is simply a great history book, hands down. Anyone who wants to understand the Balkan region would be well-advised to purchase and read this remarkable book.
Glenny's extensive discussion of the history of the non-Yugoslav nations is also appreciated, as the history of these nations has often been forgotten, despite their historical involvement with the Yugoslav state.
Having lived and travelled in the Balkans, I can say from personal experiences and encounters that Glenny conveys an accurate, and relatively unbiased account of the region's rich history. This book is a MUST for anyone interested in understanding the past, present, and future of this most interesting region. It is a shame that most of the policy makers, and journalists involved with the region have not read this book -- a fact made plain by their often skewed coverage.
Written before the outbreak of the 2nd World War, A Coffin for Dimitrios is an interesting tale about an author who by chance manages to see the body of a dead criminal named Dimitrios. Intrigued by this, the narrator decides to put off writing his next book and instead pursue the murky history of this dead criminal.
The Good: the work manages to bring to life much of Eastern Europe, a fascinating land that is often overlooked in thrillers. The inquest into Dimitrios past is quite interesting and hints at the turmoil the region was facing during the interwar years. The writing is crisp and Ambler manages to move the action along with few dull moments.
The Bad: While the excitement of finding out who Dimitrios is great, the climax is severely lacking and not very surprising. Also, the narrator is quite lucky on more than one occasion about meeting the right contacts and hearing the right stories. Some of the work seems like a cliche, but then since it was written so long ago, it would not surprise me to find out many have borrowed from Ambler since then.
Overall: While the book wont be ever mentioned in the same breath as some of the great thrillers and ruminations on the life of man, it is an enjoyable enough thriller and better than much of what is written today. I look forward to reading more of Ambler's work when time permits it.