Hegel of course was (and still is) considered quite obscure by many, but taken to be philosophically formidable and rigorous. The French philosopher that initiated contemporary interest of Hegel in France, Kojeve, managed to put together a few positive concepts on Hegel's philosophy of negativity. Nancy does not. He is content to remain, despite his own best deconstructive efforts, in the world of Nietzsche's last man--endlessly searching in vain for an answer to the demise of the Enlightenment and taking the search itself to now be the best option available. Such nihilistic gamesmanship is appealing to disaffected lefties because they, like Nancy, will not move beyond the liberal naivetes no longer tenable in a post-Nietzschean world. They wish to promote a Kantian style ethical practice by invoking an unstated catergorical imperative of unconditional equality and toleration. The fact that there is no ground or reason for their political project is taken to be somehow supportive of "radical" equality; their hope being that by supporting epistemic skepticism they can institute a paralysis of the bildung that make the hierarchies of social systems possible. Of course what they have actually done is given themselves a way to advance an extreme version of the Enlightenment project of political emancipation while rhetorically denying the other positive claims of the Enlightenment. Hegel himself did his best to put a good face on the aporias exposed by Kant's reaction to Hume's skepticism but was not, in the end, successful. Herein lies the problem for Nancy and his ilk. They would be better served to strike a more truly Hegelian pose rather than languish in the death throws of a long since faded Enlightenment. Such political tactics are philosophically transparent. If you are looking for an actual philosophic treatment and explanation of Hegel's thought I would suggest Stanley Rosen's book on Hegel.

But be forewarned: the floppy disk containing source code is fairly worthless. It does not correspond to the source in the text, it seems to be a much more advanced version of the system he developed on an SGI Iris running Unix. If you happen to have such a machine, perhaps you can get it to compile. But even if you did, you would have a "black box" consisting of a lot of code that is difficult to understand (and with very few comments). I decided instead to type in sections by hand, coming to understand everything I put in, fixing some glaring errors even before compiling, and bringing up sections incrementally. I also had to provide a good bit of my own code to actually make a functioning system. For me this was a good learning experience. The book is valuable but it would benefit by a second edition.

The worst part of the book is the license for the software on the disk, which states that you may have no more than one copy and that "Springer-Verlag has the right to audit your computer". Since I didn't wind up using anything from the disk I take it that the license doesn't apply to me, but who knows? A new addition with an "open source" style license and a reworking of the organization would be very welcome.

This is does not have to be read before Bardon.

Bardon disagrees with some of the core principles in this book e.g. Sexual abstinence.

I would reccommend this work for the sincere student who has the time to commit to it and who accepts all it's principles etc. and who will stick to it to the end.

If you want this book, get it for what it's worth not because you like Bardon. It does have a few similar practices but it also has contraditions. And the theory part is not that solid either.

1. The translation from the German is sometimes awkward and not always clear as to meaning (I have read the book in German as well);

2. The book makes reference to chemicals which cannot be obtained by private individuals in the US. Some chemical references are also no longer available: "wood vinegar", given by Dr. Stehli as a constituent of Pfeiffer's Fixative for algae, does not exist anywhere on this side of the Atlantic. Wood vinegar is actually a literal translation of the German "Holzessig" and is apparently an impure form of glatial acetic acid (which is available, but again not to individuals).

Students who have access to a college laboratory or who can order chemicals through a third party will be very happy with this book. The information on basic setup of a microscope, hand-cutting sections and preparation of fresh (as opposed to fixed) specimens is excellent.

[Note that this is a review of the hardcover, seventh printing in 1969 distributed by Sterling Pub. Co., not the Dover edition that Amazon is selling -- to me! Rated at 8 only because I don't know whether more current information is available. Otherwise, call it a 10.]

This is the only serious book on microscope technique that I could find in the Fairfax County VA public library system which is probably one of the best in the country. All the other books are superficial and aimed at kids.

This one covers apparatus care and use, simple (temporary) preparations of various kinds of specimens, microphotography (though superficially), but the best part is the appendix on microtome technique which presents a full procedure for fixing, dehydration, and paraffin infiltration.

Here are the chapter titles:

1. The Microscope and Essential Tools
2. How to Use the Microscope
3. Examining Simple Preparations
4. Insect Preparations
5. Exploring a Drop of Water
6. The Structure of Plants
7. The Structure of Animals
8. Bacteria
9. Microphotography
Appendix. Microtome Technique
with Index.

Thank God for Dover Press and their willingness to keep these oldies but goodies available. With libraries catering to the bestseller crowd, our technical know-how would otherwise perish.

The question of Hamann's relation to the Enlightenment turns on the conception of reason. I have maintained that Hamann employed a mode of reason distinct from that of the rationalistic Enlighteners as well as from that of his friendly adversary,Kant. In order to designate that mode, I adopted a term once used by Kant in referring to Hamann's thought,i.e., "intuitive reason," or, in the original German, "anschauende Vernunft." I accepted the term as an apt one for Hamann's mode of thought, however Kant felt about it. Further, I have demonstrated how it can be linguistically distinguished from the traditional logico-mathematical mode of thought in my book "The Quarrel of Reason with Itself"(1988),and elsewhere. It is one which Berlin rightly sees as akin to Dilthey's "verstehen," which Berlin also rejects. He lists a group of philosophers whose conception of reason matches his own: Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, Franz von Brentano, William James, Bertrand Russell and the "Vienna Circle." Most of these thinkers are about as far removed from any kind of "verstehen" as possible. Who then, besides Hamann, may be said to have employed what I have called "intuitive reason"? The prime examples are the great epistemological heirs of Hamann: Goethe and Nietzsche. Goethe belongs here because of his refusal to analyze the "Urphaenomen." Hence, his anti-Newtonian stance. Nietzsche, especially in "Zarathustra," which I have analyzed closely from the standpoint of intuitive reason in "Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition"(1985).

Having stated my reservations concerning Berlin's interpretation of Hamann, I must say, however, that we can be grateful that he has helped mightily to rescue that German philosopher from the obscurity to which he has been unjustly relegated by those who remain under the spell of the strictly rationalistic wing of the Enlightenment. Berlin, in spite of his basic lack of empathy with Hamann, not only recognized his importance, but was always fascinated by him. He was an early and enthusiastic subscriber to "The Hamann News-Letter," which I edited and published in the early 195O's and 196O's. Further, his correspondence with me regarding Hamann over a period of three and a half decades shows an unflagging interest in the man who both attracted and repelled him. In a letter to me of June 25,1972, he wrote: "My passion for Hamann is undiminished." Not too surprisingly, there are certain passages in the present book in which Berlin seems, unwittingly, to move toward a certain degree of empathy,hence to a kind of "verstehen." But such passages are few, and many others are unjustly harsh. Nevertheless, for all its shortcomings, Berlin's study of Hamann is valuable for introducing the reader, especially the anglophone reader, to the historically important pre-Romantic figure, known as "The Magus of the North," without whom the development of German Romanticism would be unthinkable, and whose insights increasingly bear fruit today, especially in theology and philosophy. As Berlin has said: "Hamann repays study."