This reader looked thru oodles of travel books for information for the "remote" places of England vs. the typical visiting grounds like London & Bath. Key elements looked for were: concise transportation prices/options (especially on the railways & bus) , detailed regional maps, and alternate information places to contact (e.g. Dept. of transportation in Brighton, or Tourist info. on the Isle of Wight). This reader was not interested in finding the best place to stay -- but would respond in saying that this information was "broad" compared to a Frommers or Michelan vesions of text. This book's material filled in several holes that other travel books with pretty pictures and fluffy text could not. Bully for that!

Last summer, I made my first trip to England, and it was absolutely wonderful! Felt like I was going home to my roots.
Also to see first-hand the areas where the RAF bravely held off the Nazi air attacks, and the civilian wardens watched the skies and the shores, it made me very thankful for our friends across the Atlantic.
The Rough Guide was a critical part of this memorable vacation.
It is frank and factual, but also upbeat. You will save money, and time, reading it. but you'll also be prepared to savor the history of the place, and meet the helpful and friendly people who live there. We took our Rough Guide everywhere. It was like a trusted, and good-spirited English friend. And it will sit on the top of our day packs during our next trip there.

A year ago we went to England armed with the Rough Guide. I can't really compare it to other travel books (other than one of the Michelin Green guides, which we also used), but the Rough Guide worked for us. We particularly liked the fact that it did not only dirct us to the sights "everybody" would want to see. The writers were actually pretty up front about attractions that they considered to be overrated. The book was also really useful for the early stages planning our trip, because it provided a nice broad overview of the regions.

This book breaks down the vast amount of information related to equine anatomy. Each part is taken in sections and clearly labelled. Both the appendicular and axial skeletons are examined. Great for experienced and beginners alike!

As an Equine Massage therapist I use this book exclusively. The illustations are clear and is a great resource for my clients. I have owned this book for years and consistantly refer to it.

This books does a strong job of covering a lot of ground, from designing the course to justifying its ROI. Probably inevitably, it covers all these topics at a quite brisk pace -- on the other hand, it has a good bibliography. The book is dry and seems pretty focused on corporate market place. It is much more focused on "courseware design" than technology. So I found it quite good at what it chose to accomplish: a broad "cookbook" for courseware design.

Having developed hundreds of hours of CBT, I still find this book to be a valuable resource, not only for fundamental instructional design and development methods, but also for considering some of the many hurdles which are place in training development's way. If you have developed CBT before, you may find that this book can provide some of the guidelines you may need to avoid any stumbling blocks you may have had along the way. If you are new to CBT, or if your company is contracting out the effort, this book will provide you with many ideas to ensure effective monitoring of its development. It sits on my desk for easy reference.

I found this book to be one of the best books about command decisions and relationships between Politicians and generals during the Civil War I have ever read. It covers the battles and the leaders of the Confederacy, both great and flawed. I found it hard to believe that some Southern leaders/generals fought harder against their own side in stupid little infights and disputes. The book goes a long way in explaining Lee's strategy and that of Davis and how they were different and the results of that difference. This book concentrates on the Eastern Theatre, the author's other book 'Jefferson Davis and his Generals' covers the Western Theatre of operations and is brillant in its examination of this area. Both books are well worth reading.

It was ok but if your doing a report then it could get a little boring but it is great information!

The Gleam of Bayonets by James V. Murfin is a worthwhile read concerning the bloodiest day that the American military has ever experienced. It is not the best book I have read concerning Antietam. For that I would recommend Landscape Turned Red : The Battle of Antietam by Stephen W. Sears.

Murfin's basic premise is that Antietam was the turning point in not only the Civil War, but in American history. The Union "victory" allowed Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and turn the war from one concerning economics and unionism to that of one to end slavery. By changing the nature of the conflict, intervention by the French and British was averted. Murfin's conclusion seems to based more on his assumptions than analysis.

Where the book shines is in the comparison of the generalship of McClellan and Lee. Murfin goes a fine job discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both. For McClellan, who history has justifiedly ridiculed his handling of the entire Maryland Campaign, Murfin rightfully gives him credit for reorganizing the Army after the debacle of the Second Battle of Bull Run. Murfin is also correct is in his conclusion that Antietam was the best chance, prior to Appomattox, that the Union had to end the War and that McClellan needlessly lost that opportunity. On the day after the battle McClellan had up to 25,000 fresh troops, combined with at least the same number of other troops which could have been used to crush half as many battle fatigued Confederates. The cautious McClellan chose not to fight, and Murfin may be correct, that the Union was then condemned to two more years of bloody conflict.

Murfin is deservedly more complimentary to Lee. Antietam may have been Lee's greatest tactical achievement. Outnumbered two to one, he was able to properly predict McClellan's moves and fight a battle that he should not have fought to a tactical stalemate. Any historical reviewer should have marveled at the ability of the Confederate Army to have survived the battle, without being routed, much less avert a Union victory. However, Murfin properly criticizes Lee's initial decision to invade Maryland and Lee's expectation that any tangible results could be achieved. The one point that Murfin misses is that the decision to stand and fight at Antietam needlessly sacrificed thousands of Confederate troops that Lee despritedly needed at future battles.

All in all, this is a good read. The book is well written and Murfin does a fine job of interspersing quotes from the participants with his narrative. As a result, one gets a good feel of the soldiers thoughts and feelings on that bloody field.

What started as an assignment for a newspaper's 100th anniversary edition of the battle of Antietam, The Gleam of Bayonetd is the result of six years of intensive research and consultation with regarded historians. Murfin, an editorialist for the Hagerstown, Maryland "Herald Mail" newspaper and a member of the Hagerstown Civil War Roundtagle, explains in the book's preface his opinionated style of writing. For Murfin, what started as a mere examination of the battle, eventually became an analysis of the controversial Union General George B. McClellan. Throughout the book, Murfin examines and analyzes McClellan's excessive strategic caution, his failure to initiate an offensive, and how his indecisiveness shpaed Lee's decisions. Murfin portrays McClellan as a cautious general, reacting to Lee's movements as if Lee would, in some way, make a tactical error. This tactical error if committed would somehow afford McClellan the opportunity to launch a successful military offensive. On the other hand he describes Lee as the more cunning general, who knew McClellan's weaknesses and exploited them with his reactions. Comparing the generalships of McClellan and Lee to that of a game, Murfin writes, "It was a game of chess with McClellan moving only on piece at a time as if the same rules applied to war. Lee proved to be the master chessman, however." Convinced of the significance of McClellan's and Lincoln's relationship, Murfin dedicates and entire chapter to this relationship entitled "McClellan-Lincoln's Dilemma." In this chapter he examines McClellan's selection as General in Chief, his lack of initiative during the Peninsula Campaign, and his relationship with the political power in Washington. Intriguing as well are the two chapters examining both armies' physical contion to fight, and the Union Army's delay in pursuing the Confederate invaders. Murfin provides a detailed and descriptive analysis of Lee's Maryland Campaign strategy, and his seven reasons for taking the war to the North. Likewise, he looks at McClellan's blundered attempt to pursue the Confederate Army, while having in his possession "The Lost Order," and outline of Lee's entire campaign plans. In the chapter "The Flower of Lee's Army," Murfin writes of Confederate General Hood's arrest for insubordination, the conflict between Generals A P Hill and Stonewall Jackson, and of Hill's eventual relief from command. Murfin describes in detailed written accounts the Confederate's shoeless feet, their ill health, lack of uniforms, lameness, and diarrhea. Murfin writes, "Its seems almost symbolic that the "big three" of the Confederacy -Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson-rode into Maryland in a fashion that would soon be used by hundreds of Confederates when they left; by means of ambulance." The Gleam of Bayonets is a well written and scholarly account of the events leading up to Antietam and the battle itself. The equal treatment of both armies, and the almost blow by blow manner in which Murfin describes the events, absorbs the reader. His accurate portrayal of General George B. McClellan provides a greater understanding of the Union's failure and McClellan's eventual relief from command by President Lincoln on 5 November 1862. Scholars and history buffs alike will enjoy and benefit from the historical facts, documents, and human focus of this book. Winner of the Fletcher Pratt Award, the Gleam of Bayonets 402 pages is worthy of further examination by all persons interested in this significant battle or the generalship of George B. McClellan. JAMES W. GROVE, JR. AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

awesome book...has flow charts for treatment...etc...

one big neg..no pathophys... see medicine: the true explanation by Dr. V. Shinde.

An excellent reference for the physician who cares for hospitalized patients. Just enough detail to care for patients of every severity and type of illness, yet not so much that you are bogged down in unimportant trivia and esoteric controversies. The book is up to date, and the authors obviously know their stuff. Things like indications for ICU admission and indications for discharge make this book invaluable for physicians who care for hospitalized patients. Now if only someone will write a similar one for pediatrics....

I enjoyed this book very much, as it gave a good overview of the entire life of Robert E. Lee and not only the war years. It included quotes from letters that he wrote to family members, as well as things other people wrote about him at the time, and that added to the flavor of the book and gave a good sense of what kind of man he was. I especially enjoyed reading the brief biography of his father and how the book included commentary on what was happening elsewhere to give a well-roundedness to the life of Lee. However, I felt the author's commentary on reconstruction went on a bit too long. The author's tone was very "pro" Lee and, in that vein, he criticized others, which I don't think was necessary to get the point across. Altogether, I enjoyed this book and it has inspired me to want to seek out more information, not only about Robert E. Lee, but about the Civil War in general, and about other leaders during those times.

An excellent, thorough, effecting biography of a great American. There are many individuals in our nation's history who commanded armies and adulation during their lifetimes which we would be hesitant to call "Hero" - often times these individuals serve their own interests first, inspired by their own egotism (as contemporaries to Lee, Beauregard and Sheridan come to mind). R. E. Lee was of a different mold, born into a proud family humbled by the financial misfortunes of his father, Revolutionary War soldier "Light Horse" Harry Lee (who served time in prison for debts), R. E. Lee's entire life was conducted out of a primary sense of duty: Duty to his family, his God, and his country. Throughout this work, Dowdey convincingly argues that Lee's position must be interpreted within the framework of the Virginia society in which he was raised. When Virginia seceded from the Union (unwillingly, the majority voted to remain in the Union until Lincoln called for force of arms to march on Virginia's soil) Lee saw it as his duty, as a Virginian, to go with his native state and family. This despite the fact that Lee was strongly in favor of working within the framework of the Republic and in favor of an emancipation plan, even after General Scott had offered Lee command of the newly forming Union Army. This work by Dowdey is much more than a biography of one of our great historical figures - it is also a convincing commentary on the politics of the time. Lest we forget, Northern Radical Republicans shared the responsibility for committing the country to the catastrophe that was the American Civil War - in many cases, worked to achieve that end. Even at the point of firing on Fort Sumter, a reasonable, compromise approach (keeping the same objectives in mind) could have retained the key Southern and border states of Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee in the Union (or at least out of the Confederacy). However, Lincoln, acting on behalf of the Radical Republicans, committed the country to a fratricidal war that degenerated into a four-year atrocity committed on the native population. Sumner, Stevens, Stanton - these men cared nothing about preserving the Union or bettering the human condition. They cared about subjugating one section of the country to serve the interests of the Northeastern financial-industrial complex. Dowdey convincingly argues that the ACW was the end of the federated Republic envisioned by the founding fathers and the beginning of the special interest group Democracy that persists to the present day. The majority of the nation (including Lincoln and Lee) was in agreement on the slavery issue - an evil existed which had to be eliminated in a controlled manner over time. In fact, the Virginia state government was on the verge of approving an emancipation plan in 1832 - only to be foiled by fears generated by Northern abolitionists promoting violence (conveniently enough, calling for action in sections of the country far from their own families). The Radical Republicans played the slavery card to stain the South, ensuring that sectional strife would continue to divide the country for as long as possible, providing opportunities for political exploitation. This is a great read, and stands the test of time in answer to more recent works (e.g. Nolan's Lee Reconsidered) which seek to denigrate Lee's status in history in order to cast a more favorable light on Lee's opponents. Any question as to Lee's motives, especially his "decision" (in reality, there was no decision to be made) to continue fighting through the siege at Petersburg and the retreat to Appomattox, are thoroughly answered. Lee's life was consumed by his sense of duty. Lee trusted wholly to the Providence of God and his life was service for the public good - anything else was not worthy of consideration. Consider Dowdey's work on Lee well before considering later attempts at revisionism.

This book is a collection of Gallagher's essays published elsewhere. In this format however, they take on an added dimension and explaination of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and its commander, Robert E Lee.
Gallagher begins by examining Lee's Maryland campaign, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg and the army's campaigns in 1864. His conclusions on the Battle of Gettysburg and its effects on the Confederate home front are particularly interesting. He concludes that the battle was not the overwhelming defeat to the Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederate home front that it would later be portayed as by historians. He makes the argument that the loss of Vicksburg was seen as a vastly bigger loss and Gettysburg was more seen as a small defeat or even a victory because of Meade's failure to chase the Confederates in retreat.
Gallagher also includes an interesting essay evaluating the claims of some historians that Lee was not fighting a modern war with modern tactics and if he had done so, the Confederacy would have been better off. He ably demonstrates that indeed Lee did understand the difference in technology such as the minie ball and its impact on strategy and tactics.
However, the best essay is Gallagher's essay on the Lost Cause "myth". Gallagher explains that many of the claims that were later associated only with Lost Cause historians such as Jubal Early or Douglass Southall Freeman, were actually developed during the war and immediately following the war prior to any claims made by Early and others. Thus some of the "myths" such as the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Union as part of the central cause of the Confederacy's defeat, is actually true. He draws the wonderful and correct conclusion that to dismiss the Lost Cause myths in their entirety does a major disservice to the historical profession and that discussing those Lost Cause claims that do have a basis in fact is not in fact giving any legitimacy to any neo-Confederate point of view concerning the centrality of slavery to the origin of the Civil War.
The one quibble, and the reason I gave this book four stars instead of five concerns Gallagher's essay "Fighting the Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church." I really couldn't find a point as to why this essay was included in the book, unless it was to demonstrate a hard and fast friendship link between Early and Lee that Gallagher does build upon in his essay on the Lost Cause. However, I still think the essay about Fredericksburg really doesn't belong in this format.

With the skill of a surgeon, Gary W. Gallagher dissects the myths and legends surrounding Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia, past and current, to reveal a fascinating new look at the "marble man". Positioning himself squarely between the Lost Cause proponents and the current pack of revisionists, Gallagher relies on primary sources (newspapers, diaries and letters of civilians and soldiers, official correspondence) and careful, well-reasoned analysis to discover the real truth surrounding Robert E. Lee, and in the process lands an effective blow worthy of the general himself upon both sides. Gallagher's claims that Robert E. Lee was indeed an able proponent of modern warfare (though I would dispute the term modern) and also a capable administrator fully capable of being as strict or lenient with his subordinates as the case required breathes new life into the continuing quest to discover this fascinating man and effectively destroys the myths held by both sides (ironically enough, both sides often seem to wind up arguing both sides of the same coin) that Lee was first of all a member of the landed Virginia gentry far too short-sighted and stuck in the past for command of the Confederacy's main eastern army as well as being far too gentlemanly to deal strictly with subordinates. In fact, Gallagher presents Lee, through his own words and letters, as a man fully aware of the forces arrayed against him and as one who from the beginning knew full well that the Confederacy needed to marshall all of its resources in order to win the war and gain independence and that tough decisions and hard sacrifices would be required, and that a strong government would be required to take charge in order to ensure this was done and coordinate everyone's effort. Also, the idea that Lee "bled" his army to death (the fact that Lee's army at the beginning of the 1864 Overland Campaign was basically the same size as it ever was seems to have escaped the notice of many) also comes across as rather weak thanks to Gallagher's fine research. The weakest argument Gallagher refutes is that Lee's myth was wholly created after the war, and he does this by proving most emphatically that Lee and his army were indeed the primary source Confederates looked to for hope as well as the national symbol of the Confederacy (much like Washington's Continentals) worldwide. The fact that the main part of Grant's thrust against the South hit here against Lee proves this as well. However, do not mistake Gallagher as a Lost Cause proponent in disguise; though he defends the points Lost Cause proponents make that are actually rooted in fact, he spares them not his swift, sharp sword in pointing out the concerted effort to preserve and protect the memory of the Confederate armies, and Lee in particular, by shaping history through their own eyes. Also, he cuts like a knife through as many of their arguments as those of the revisionists, who, in their zeal to cut through the myth of the Lost Cause (and rightfully so, since we must be as objective as possible) often go too far and wind up rejecting legitimate conclusions and research in favor of their own modern myth. In conclusion, Gallagher, the good professor has taught us all a valuable lesson; look not through the lens of your own eyes to view history, but search ever more diligently for the real facts and take nothing for granted. Though I'm sure we all carry our own biases (I fully admit my admiration for Lee, and I fail to see how anyone can remain truly and completely aloof), we can all separate ourselves, at least partially, from our opinions in order to get at the facts and reach reasonable conclusions, as Gallagher has so beautifully done. Good job, Professor Gallagher.

An interesting book to read,but very negative in parts. The best thing to do is see Marvin's films then read about it in the book, so you've already made your own mind up. The book brings across the authors own likes and dislikes about Marvin's films and career,i felt that it was a bit to influenced by his own likes and dislikes. At the end of the day you either like Lee Marvin and his film's or you don't. Personally i love the bloke and enjoy his film's and the many characters that he played. Marvin maybe dead but he'll never be forgotten with the work he left behind for us all to enjoy.

Robert Lentz has done an outstanding job in profiling the film and television career of one of America's most beloved tough guys. This insightful look into Marvin's tenure as an actor is a must read for anyone interested in films from the 1950s through the 1980s.

The detail used to describe each of Marvin's movies and television programs is excellent and the author deserves to be commended for his thorough research and love of the subject. In the fickle world of Hollywood stardom, it is refreshing to seem a tribute paid to some of the movie world's older names.

This book is a must for any fan of Lee Marvin. It contains dozens of great photos from Lee's career. Lee's growth from a young handsome actor to a legendary star is traced by the photos and the reviews in this book. The book tells the story of each film by Lee Marvin and also contains much information about Lee Marvin's television and documentary work as well.

The film reviews have detailed information about the films' plot and theme; and information about the producers, directors and other actors in the film. The reviews are set in chronological order so the progress of Lee Marvin's career may be easily followed.

This book only minimally describe Lee Marvin's personal life outside the movies. It takes the view of a student and fan of Lee Marvin - a fan who has all the best photos and has compiled all the details about Lee Marvin's films and his acting career. This book will be a reference for movie buffs and film students and teachers.

This is a serviceable account of the 1862 Peninsular campaign. Despite all the huge amont of literature on the Civil War (a lot of it redundant), there is surprisingly little on this pivotal aspect of the conflict. Mr. Dowdey writes in the talkative style of the old school historian. The supposed strength of this book is its attention to geographical detail. At times I found that the authors attention to roads and trails did not match the attention that should have been payed to the battles described. Like most Civil War historians Dowdey does not get into much detail about the tactics employed by either side. We never learn in what formations (or lack thereof) any of the troops were fighting in. The battles themselves are frequently described in rather muddled fashion. Dowdey frequently digresses in his descriptions, which further confuses the narrative flow. As a Southener Dowdey pays most attention to Southern activities. Thus we get all sorts of mini-bios on Confederate generals, but little on their Union counterparts. The chronology of events is also a bit confused. What Dowdey does well is provide a good overall description of the campaign, and he provides good insight into MacClellan's vague plans for his capture of Richmond. Dowdey is a bit hard on Joe Johnston's style of command before Lee takes over. Also the book points out well the complete lack of staff work on the part of Civil War armies in this period. European observers oftern laughed at the slip-shod attempts to provide this esstential service. None of the so-called great Civil War commanders ever appreciated this vital aspect of command. Hence the reason why armies often blundered into each other, and why the battles of the 7 Days lacked any decisive results. Dowdey's work is perhaps a bit dated, but is well written, and worth a casual read.

Clifford Dowdey's work, "The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee," is a well-written, detailed and informative record of the series of clashes between Union and Confederate forces known as the Seven Days Battles that occurred near the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia in late June 1862.

Dowdey describes, in rich detail, the initial Union planning and preparations for the amphibious landing on the York Peninsula (between the James and York Rivers). He details the Union Army of the Potomac's successful landing on the York Peninsula in May 1862 and its methodical advance up the peninsula towards Richmond led by its commanding officer, Major General George B. McClellan. The Confederate forces, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, are seen by Dowdey as ill-led as they continually retreated in successive fashion towards the outskirts of the Confederate capital and prepared themselves for a siege. Finally, with the Union Army divided north and south of the Chickahominy River, Dowdey chronicles Johnston's decision to turn on the Union forces at Seven Pines on May 31, only to fight an inconclusive battle. Johnston himself was wounded in the late hours of the battle, and his replacement was General Robert E. Lee, until that moment the military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Upon assuming command, Lee immediately devised a series of offensive strikes against the still-divided Union forces, but Dowdey argues that Lee's ultimate failure to crush the Union Army was due to a combination of many factors. Poor Confederate staff planning was in clear evidence from the beginning to the end of the Seven Days Battles. General Lee failed time and again to assume direct operational control of ever-changing battle situations where his subordinates failed to drive forward against the enemy (for example, "Stonewall" Jackson's failure to push forward his drive on the Confederate northern and left flank at the Battle of Mechaniscville). Lee was also hampered by the uneven quality of his subordinate commanders, particularly the deaf and old Theophilus Holmes, the inept Benjamin Huger and the mentally exhausted Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson (who suffered, according to Dowdey, from stress fatigue). Last, but certainly not least, the surprisingly well disciplined, hard-fighting and well-led (at the brigade, divisional and corps levels) Union troops frustrated Lee's strategic and tactical battle plans at virtually every turn.

Dowdey's work provides wonderfully detailed descriptions of all of the major battles: Seven Pines, Fair Oaks Station, Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Savage's Station and Malvern Hill. In addition, he also aids the reader by providing a series of detailed maps and descriptions of the complex web of major and minor roads and country lanes that were fundamental to the movement of the armies - Union and Confederate - during the Seven Days Battles. I found, however, one very annoying aspect about the work. I strongly disagreed with Dowdey's one-sided and dismissive view of Confederate General Joseph Johnston as a defeatist general who possessed no redeeming personal or military abilities. Johnston was clearly one of the most effective of all the Confederate generals, one whose primary concern was the care and welfare of the men under his command. He never took unnecessary risks in battle, for he knew that the Confederacy had a limited pool of available manpower with which to fight the Union.

Despite this one point of disagreement, I found Dowdey's work to be an excellent study of the Seven Days Battles. His insistence on "visual history" - that a historian must visit the battlefield that he is studying in order to more effectively understand the movements of the opposing armies, thereby aiding him in writing a work that the reader will follow clearly - is very much in evidence in this book.

A wonderful break from the usual, with Dowdey displaying an absolute mastery of the material. McClellan (heroically) dominates the early parts, with Johnston and Magruder as fools and Lincoln and Stanton as MacBeth's witches. The author's appreciation of the North's and South's politics is outstanding and adds a livid dimension to this oft-told tale. His single failure is in the matter of comparative (numerical) strengths. Don't miss it.