List price: $10.95 (that's 20% off!)
In short, if you are already familiar with the feminist movement, then this book makes a nice pocket guide and reminder. If you are new to the concepts, I would start somewhere else rather than here.
Despite its proven finesse as a text, the series sometimes cries out for deconstruction, which is itself instructive to my students. The music on the accompanying tapes seems cheesy and repetitive, the characters in the conversation unrealistically squeaky (of the Donna Reed / Beaver Cleaver variety), and the text seems annoyingly politically correct on one hand and, on the other, particularly ethno- and geocentric in that peculiarly North American manner. It seems a little strange explaining in South America what a "tan" is or why college-aged youth are in such a hurry to leave their parents' home. It's as if the book assumes every college graduate secures his own apartment with his first paycheck and spends all his weekends at the beach.
Yet it is clear that the book works well and presents concepts from the foundation upward so that students master English conceptually rapidly and well. I recommend the New Interchange series as a textual foundation for any extended (a year or more) program in English.
List price: $15.95 (that's 30% off!)
Despite the all-star cast of endorsements (Dennet and Dawkins) this book will mostly just succeed in making money for Blackmore, and perhaps spreading the idea of memes to new audiences that happen to think that Zen Buddhism is really groovey. In the mean time it may succeed in turning the idea of memes into the next new age fad - complete with prescriptions to free ourselves of the "tyranny" of the self - or as Blackmore the Zen guru might put it the "illusion of self".
The book gets off to a poor start by miscasting its basic philosophical questioning not in terms of memes, memetics, culture, or evolution, but by asking what is it that makes humans different from animals? Predictably asking poorly framed questions leads to conclusions that have even less to do with memes or memetics. Here I am referring to her incredible declarations which she makes central in the end of the book. We do not have selves, according to Blackmore. It's all a lie. Our memes have "tricked" us into thinking that we do - pesky li'l things. We should all become Zen Buddhists to save our non-selves from the memes!
I should hasten to add that along the way she makes many much less ridiculous and very good points. She provides some good behaviorist insight into true imitation, makes some interesting distinctions between that and social learning, and the roles that they play for memes. She provides some fertile ground for more applications of the genetic metaphor in her insightful distinctions between copying instructions vs. copying a product. She even makes some good cases for the role that such ideas like Platonic idealism play in memetic replication. All rich and worthwhile insights.
On the whole, I found her book to be very intelligent and entertaining, if deeply flawed in some fundamental respects. There were some useful insights definitely worth taking home, but there were other incredible flights of fantasy that I would have rather left behind. If you don't have your mind set on reading something in particular, this is an intriguingly good book - but it is far from being a seminal landmark in any scientific sense. If you are waiting for the book that will actually serve to make the case for the scientific legitimacy of memetics, save your money.
If you are interested in higher-quality peer-reviewed attempts at memetic theory without this irrelevant new-age fluff, I suggest you seek out a publication like the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transfer. There is better stuff out there even on the web other than the sources mentioned by Dawkins in his forward.
If you are interested in a good treatment of cultural evolution that does not deal in still- being-questioned words like "memes", and steers clear of new age fluff, I would recommend Gary Taylor's book "Cultural Selection" to balance Blackmore's more hype-ish approach.
-Jake
Her central thesis is that what makes humans unique is their ability to imitate, and she takes the 'imitation is where it's at' thesis very seriously. The idea is: once humans became able to imitate, ideas could be transmitted, and cultural evolution took off. Unfortunately, there are deep problems with this proposal. First, the claim that animals don't imitate is highly controversial, and current consensus seems to sway in the opposite direction. (An article by Byrne & Russon in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 1998, and accompanying commentary, provide an insightful review.) Second, Blackmore correctly notes that the archeological record reveals a sudden INCREASE in tool variety. However, if imitation were the bottleneck, then prior to the origin of culture there would have been variation everywhere, and the onset of imitation would have funneled this variation in the most useful directions, i.e. variety would have DECREASED. The evidence is, in fact, consistent with the thesis that creativity, rather than imitation, was the bottleneck to culture.
The 'imitation drives culture' hypothesis leads Blackmore to restrict the definition of a meme to something that can be transmitted from one human to another by imitation. So, for example, if a child learns to peal a banana by watching her mother, a meme has replicated. But if the child learns this skill from a cartoon character on tv, no replication has taken place. By the end of the book (particularly in the chapter on the internet) she eases up on this a bit. Human-made artifacts now seem to play a role in her vision, though elements of the natural world still don't. Thus if a child gets the idea for how to peal a banana by watching the petals of a flower unfold, her flower-inspired 'how to peal a banana' meme is NOT transmittable. In the blink of an eye, Blackmore discards the possibility that any experience can be food for thought and thus food for culture, on the grounds that it is "extremely confusing" (p. 45). The worldview impled by the Shroedinger equation is extremely confusing too, but its batting average as a predictor of experimental outcomes is unsurpassed. 'Confusing' is not synonymous with 'wrong'.
Blackmore also claims that "perceptions and emotions are not memes because they are ours alone and we may never pass them on" (p. 15). It follows that the feeling evoked by a painting of a stormy night at sea has no relationship to what the artist was feeling at the time... that a teacher's attitude of compassion has no impact on the cultural dynamics of the classroom. Thus it is not clear how Blackmore's narrow definition of meme clears up the confusion.
Readers should be aware that, despite the Oxford label, the book the book does not reflect the current level of sophistocation in the field. It presents many ideas without referencing where they were first introduced, or mentioning influencial work in the area (e.g. memetic altruism, memetic explanations of the origin of culture, memes & language, memes & the internet, etc.). Blackmore does not delve deep into evolutionary theory, on the grounds that borrowing concepts from biology could lead cultural theorists astray. To my mind, this is like ignoring what we already know about snow skis when developing the first prototype for waterskis. In fact there is some disparity between the 'science rules' attitude and the lack of theory or data. If the title leads you to expect material on computer models, cognitive science, complexity, information theory, etc. you will be disappointed. There isn't much on the workings of the memetic machinery. But if you like examples of manipulative memes, you will find it interesting. And the potential significance of memetics should not be underestimated. It is not inconceivable that the next century will usher forth more books on cultural evolution than this century has on biological evolution.
The term "memetics" sounds a lot like "genetics," and the similarity is not accidental. Working off ideas championed by Richard Dawkins in THE SELFISH GENE, memetics looks at the way ideas can spread and replicate in ways much like -- but not exactly like -- biological evolution. Dawkins urged readers to take a "gene's-eye view," where evolution is driven by genes competing to be copied. This theory will be familiar to anyone who has read Dawkins, or his contemporaries like Pinker or Gould. Blackmore skillfully summarizes the basic ideas, and Dawkins himself writes an introduction.
Just as genetics focuses on the gene, memetics centers around the "meme," which can be thought of as a unit of information. Examples of memes can include stone tool-making, language, the song "Happy Birthday," democracy, or last year's out-of-nowhere "all your base are belong to us." What matters is not the content of the meme per se, but how effectively the meme can get itself copied. Just like a gene can only survive by putting itself into a new generation, a meme can only prosper by squeezing itself in new brains. In that way, memes are like mental viruses, but without necessarily negative effects.
The exact means by which memes spread from brain to brain can vary: speech, writing, art, etc. The common thread is imitation, a uniquely human skill Blackmore and others argue can explain why humans have progressed so far beyond what could be expected through biological evolution alone. In fact, Blackmore asserts that memes can help answer one of the nagging questions in human development: how did our brains get to be so big? Her answer is that bigger brains can store more memes, which in turn allowed bigger-brained humans to outcompete their smaller-brained kin.
After setting up the basic theories of memetics, and addressing recurring criticisms, Blackmore investigates some of the common touchstones of sociobiology: sex, altruism, religion and consciousness. In every instance, her meme's-eye view provides a lot of insight, and her sense of humor makes the whole process more enjoyable.
Like a professor cramming too much into the final class of the semester, Blackmore stretches too far in the last chapter, aiming for closure and a sense of what-it-all-means that isn't really supported by the rest of the book. But by that point we're already mad about her, and ready to sign up for any other class she teaches.