This is what happens when you take esotericism too far. Lampert should have better heeded Strauss' warning that textual clues must be supportable in some measure by the text itelf--or else pondered Strauss' argument that "the problem inherent in the surface of things . . . is the heart of things."

I spent some time checking out the claims of this book--which, in brief, are that the mature Strauss was a covert Nietzschean nihilist who believed in a politically significant order of rank among men--and I was totally unconvinced. If you're going to argue that a man secretly harbored beliefs directly at odds with ideas he dedicated 30 years of his life to advancing, you have to make a better case than this.

Similar things have been written about Strauss and Machiavelli, and they are similarly unbelievable. Memo to would-be esotericists: the device is almost never used directly to contradict a surface argument. Rather, it is used to conceal, while at the same pointing to, the deepest implications of that argument.

Nonetheless, I give this book two stars because it is not deviod of insight into Nietszche.

Despite the disputations of many Straussians, the connections between Strauss and Nietzsche are clear and, to the reader of both, undeniable. As Lampert points out on several occasions with a quote from Strauss in a letter to Karl Lowith, Nietzsche was to say the least indespensible to Strauss's early development. "Nietzsche so dominated and charmed me between my 22nd and 30th years that I literally believed everything I understood of him." (p 5) Thus considering the not so veiled attempt of most Straussians to distance their man from Nietzsche it is not surprising they would claim that Strauss himself should not be read esoterically (least of all by someone seeking to 'blow his cover'). A cursory review of two prominent but very different Straussians, Stanley Rosen (who is not so concerned with protecting Strauss's image) and Harvey Clafin Mansfield (who is), is enough to lend credence to Lampert's thesis. Rosen states plainly the connection between Strauss and Nietzsche in his 'Hermeneutics as Politics': "...Strauss is almost Nietzschean but not quite.." (p 125). As for Mansfield, his studies of Machiavelli are more Nietzschean than Strauss himself. Just try this on for size as a Nietzschean quote: "To us, Machiavelli contributes a clear view of politics unobstructed by abtract claims for equality and unreasonable demands for justice." 'Machiavelli's Virture,' University of Chicago Press, 1996. p. xiv

Lampert's work is a thorough and insightful reading of Strauss's essay "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'." Lampert's approach is definitely more Nietzchean than Straussian, which is to say it is not as nuanced or sufficiently ambiguous as Straussians--especially of the theistic flavor--like. But it is in a word outstanding and will hopefully embolden a few of Struass's more reticent students to step out of the shadows and into the Noon sunlight, in more Zarathustrian fashion.

"Leo Strauss and Nietzsche" is the 3rd book from the great Laurence Lampert, who is probably the greatest living Nietzsche scholar in the English speaking world. It seeks to examine the following possibility: that Strauss, himself the rediscoverer of the art of "esoteric" writing, whereby one produces philosophical works in a subtle way that masks one's real teachings so as to not arouse the fury of established ideology, may himself have been an esoteric writer, and more specifically, an advocate of Nietzscheanism. At first glance, nothing would seem to be further from the truth - Strauss is widely thought of as being a sort of Platonist, at least in political philosophy. But the question needs to be asked - would he have ignored the tool he himself rediscovered? What might be found if he was subjected to the very analysis he performed on others?

This is what Lampert does, using a 17 page essay called "Not on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil", in Strauss' "Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy". Lampert eventually accumulates a significant argument in favor of his two theses, namely, that Strauss was a covert Nietzschean who felt that he could not speak aloud what he himself believed and who therefore took cover under the traditional garb of a philosopher (which both Nietzsche and Strauss took to be the cassock of a priest); and that Strauss himself is the best interpreter of Nietzsche the world has yet seen. Anyone who is interested in either man should read this book. It will provide a powerful incentive to rethink stereotypes about both men and their works, and it gives a fine summary of what Nietzsche actually was trying to communicate.

Julian Young points out in the first few pages of his essay that Nietzsche's aesthetics is the most ignored aspect of his thought. Unfortunately, I cannot recommend "Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art" as the needed remedy. Readers will be sorely disappointed if they approach Young's book expecting it actually to occupy itself with the area of inquiry to which its title explicitly points.

Young admits that his book, despite its title, "constitutes a kind of biography: not a biography in the usual sense but rather a philosophical biography, a record of the twists and turns taken by Nietzsche's philosophy viewed through the prism of his philosophy of art" (2). This biography has "four main periods," according to Young, and runs roughly thus: pessimistic, not-so-pessimistic, almost-optimistic, once-more-pessimistic (1). The "main purpose" of the chapter on "The Birth of Tragedy" is, for example, to answer "this question: whether [Nietzsche] also endorsed Schopenhauer's pessimism; whether, that is, he endorsed Schopenhauer's inference from the pain and purposelessness of human existence to its worthlessness" (26). In case you were wondering, Young has published previously on Schopenhauer, and the argument here goes further to cast a Schopenhauerian shadow over Nietzsche than to more generally (and perhaps fairly) probe Nietzsche's thoughts on art.

This insistence on diachrony in Young's approach to Nietzsche's thought forces some unfortunate groupings made to serve the argument's ultimate end, which is more heavily invested in the question of when and whether Nietzsche's philosophy is pessimistic or optimistic than in the question of what Nietzsche felt art was, what it could do, and how it could do it. (I think that the alternative to this evolution-of-a-writer's-thought approach is often equally unhelpful, though, as in Tracy Strong's book on Nietzsche's politics, which considers his thought as one organic totality and tends to see later statements as part and parcel of earlier ones, even when blatantly contradictory. Perhaps the real answer is to look at each of Nietzsche's works one by one. I don't know.)

Then there's the lack of real engagement with extant scholarship on the topic of Nietzsche's aesthetics (a lack probably due to the lack of real engagement with Nietzsche's aesthetics, except perhaps in the discussion of his views on naturalism). Silk and Stern's opus on Nietzsche's conception of tragedy is not given the attention it deserves, nor is Strong's work on Nietzsche's broader imagining of drama and its potential, and Sloterdijk's essay on Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy" isn't even mentioned.

All of which makes for a slightly deceptive book-buying experience. If you're interested in Nietzsche's relationship to Schopenhauer or in whether Nietzsche was a pessimist, you might have a better time reading Young's essay than I had. But if you, like me, are looking for a book on "Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art," look further.

Young's book is billed as the first comprehensive treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy of art to appear in English. This alone makes it a necessity in the library of anyone interested in Nietzsche and Nietzsche's relation to Wagner and to Schopenhauer. But furthermore, Young's evident mastery of the Nietzsche material and his clear writing, make the book not only necessary, but a pleasurable and worthwhile read. Young's "Nietzsche's philosophy of art" calls for a serious reader's engagement even if one must disagree on Young's overall thesis, which this reviewer must do.

Young is clearly prepared to write on Nietzsche's philosophy of art. He has already authored a book on Schopenhauer, called "Willing and Unwilling," and has a demonstrable sensitivity to and experience with artworks and art theory. Young begins his book with a treatment of Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer's philosophy of art -- both in terms of how Nietzsche understood them. Nietzsche's famous philosophical relationship to Schopenhauer is well explained. The brilliant and enthusiastic young Nietzsche devoured Schopenhauer and as Young writes,

"Except for the Greeks, there is no other philosopher he knew with anything like the same intimacy. His writings, all of them, are full not just of quotations and paraphrases from Schopenhauer, but of phrases, allusions, and rhythms both conscious and unconscious. Nietzsche breathed Schopenhauer and cannot be understood without him."

Nietzsche always acknowledged a debt to Schopenhauer, even in his later writings, but it is essential to an understanding of the force of Nietzsche's philosophy (and particularly his central notion of "independence of the soul") to see that after Birth of Tragedy (and somewhat within Birth of Tragedy) Nietzsche sets himself adamantly and effectively against Schopenhauer's and Wagner's romanticism, and against the "cry baby optimism" of his age in general.

Young understands correctly, I think, that Nietzsche turned against Schopenhauer early and Wagner too. But after a series of slight misinterpretations, particularly of Nietzsche's treatment of science, his metaphysics or understanding of the natural world, and his ideas of art in "Human, All to Human," Young's over-arching claim is that Nietzsche fails in his anti-Romantic endeavor to live without metaphysics and redemption, and in the end returns to a Schopenhauerian pessimistic philosophy.

For those who see Nietzsche as accomplishing a systematic rebuttal to Romanticism and transcendental philosophies, Young's conclusion that Nietzsche's philosophy is circular or returns to the foil against which it first defined itself, will be unsatisfactory.

Young's book is billed as the first comprehensive treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy of art to appear in English. This alone makes it a necessity in the library of anyone interested in Nietzsche and Nietzsche's relation to Wagner and to Schopenhauer. But furthermore, Young's evident mastery of the Nietzsche material and his clear writing, make the book not only necessary, but a pleasurable and worthwhile read. Young's "Nietzsche's philosophy of art" calls for a serious reader's engagement even if one must disagree on Young's overall thesis, which this reviewer must do.

Young is clearly prepared to write on Nietzsche's philosophy of art. He has already authored a book on Schopenhauer, called "Willing and Unwilling," and has a demonstrable sensitivity to and experience with artworks and art theory. Young begins his book with a treatment of Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer's philosophy of art -- both in terms of how Nietzsche understood them. Nietzsche's famous philosophical relationship to Schopenhauer is well explained. The brilliant and enthusiastic young Nietzsche devoured Schopenhauer and as Young writes,

"Except for the Greeks, there is no other philosopher he knew with anything like the same intimacy. His writings, all of them, are full not just of quotations and paraphrases from Schopenhauer, but of phrases, allusions, and rhythms both conscious and unconscious. Nietzsche breathed Schopenhauer and cannot be understood without him."

Nietzsche always acknowledged a debt to Schopenhauer, even in his later writings, but it is essential to an understanding of the force of Nietzsche's philosophy (and particularly his central notion of "independence of the soul") to see that after Birth of Tragedy (and somewhat within Birth of Tragedy) Nietzsche sets himself adamantly and effectively against Schopenhauer's and Wagner's romanticism, and against the "cry baby optimism" of his age in general.

Young understands correctly, I think, that Nietzsche turned against Schopenhauer early and Wagner too. But after a series of slight misinterpretations, particularly of Nietzsche's treatment of science, his metaphysics or understanding of the natural world, and his ideas of art in "Human, All to Human," Young's over-arching claim is that Nietzsche fails in his anti-Romantic endeavor to live without metaphysics and redemption, and in the end returns to a Schopenhauerian pessimistic philosophy.

For those who see Nietzsche as accomplishing a systematic rebuttal to Romanticism and transcendental philosophies, Young's conclusion that Nietzsche's philosophy is circular or returns to the foil against which it first defined itself, will be unsatisfactory.

There's a blurb by Athur Danto on the back cover of this book that says that this is the only book that Nietzsche himself would have endorsed. I think Danto may be right. Allison gets past all the landmines in Nietzsche's writings, and doesn't fall for the overly simple right-wing reading of Nietzsche that's so popular with the Ayn Rand types. Instead, he gives us a subtle interpretation of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge (yes, Nietzsche did believe in knowledge, he was just very careful about making an absolute claims) and morality (and yes, Nietzsche did believe in morality...he's just very critical of what has passed for morals in the western world). It's impossible to summarize Allison's conclusions, but they're incredibly well supported by the texts, and Allison's writing is crystal clear. A real pleasure to read, especially if you're a Nietzsche fan who's been disturbed by all the misreadings of Nietzsche. I think this would also make a good intro book for someone just beginning to explore Nietzsche's thought.

Finally, a reading of Nietzsche that understands his principle doctrines and the subtleties and nuances that make them so much more, and so much richer, than the common understanding of Nietzsche would allow. That Allison can do this and still write clearly and engagingly places him far above the realm of the ordinary academic writer. This is a book that anyone can read, and yet it captures the complexity of such Nietzschean notions as will to power, the Overman, and the death of God, ideas which badly stand in need of clarification. Allison's Nietzsche is neither the proponent of fascism, nor the muddle-headed post-modernist that he is often caricatured as. Rather, his is a Nietzsche with a complex and well developed theory of world, knowledge and self, and, more importantly, a Nietzsche who sees philosophy as a vital part of life. Thank you, Dr. Allison, for finally getting Nietzsche right.

Like a good friend who knows and understands you and your moods, Dr. Allison has an informal, conversation tone that enables him to relay an uncommon combination of scholarly material with passion. He is comfortable with his writing and it was a pleasure to read the formulations that appear astoundingly obvious with his guidance. Most of Nietzsche's work requires many readings, cross-referencing and an intense commitment to grasp the essentials and comprehend the concepts being presented. Dr. Allison's book makes these difficult journeys so enjoyable. I experienced an empathy with Nietzsche's work within Dr. Allison's framework. Anyone who has read Nietzsche will truly appreciate this wonderful book and for those who haven't, this is an outstanding introduction which allows you to "feel" the journey to some great ideas! I envy those people who get to discover "Reading the New Nietzsche" by David B. Allison for the first time!

As always it is amazing to experience C.G.Jung's depth of knowledge of religious systems. Searching for symbols of individuation in his patient's dreams while interacting with these patients might be acceptable, but doing the same thing based on a work of poetic philosophy is a completely different thing. However, here they are treated as being identical- Zarathustra is reduced to an unconscious byproduct of "Nietzsche's revolt against god".
While I am impressed by C.G. Jung's pattern matching abilities, this is also what makes this book ridiculous- Jung's seeing hints and references that are not at all obvious in the analyzed text and even contrary to the author's opinion & stated intent.
This book is useful for getting some inspiration on how to reinterpret Zarathustra- but for a more reliable interpretation, based on the actual text and Nietzsche's other works you should turn to a philsophical book instead.

Unfortunately analytical psychology & psychoanalysis are non-scientific systems making any attempts of discussion futile. This book is very helpful in showing this fact, as you can read how seminar attendants offer equally (im-)plausible interpretations that are simply ignored by Jung without much of a refutation.

Wonderful analysis, completely devoid of logical gaps or special requests from the reader: everything said, every assertation, is capable of hitting home and clarifying what was before a quirky throw-back of Nietzsche's. And *interesting* to boot -- this book is no long-winded scrutiny of Zarathustra, but rather the transcription of a private group analysis led by Jung, so it never loses itself in the lofty kingdoms of thought that are the bane of so much criticism.

There's a definite sense of total respect for Nietzsche from Jung . . . almost as though Jung himself (one of the more exceptional intellects of our species) was struggling with the great, monstrous geist of Nietzsche for understanding. Which is a nice touch, having so often seen the man debunked as a megalomaniac, or, worse, a run-of-the-mill madman. This book is a must have for any Nietzsche scholar (no matter what the age or education) and, I imagine, quite useful in understanding Jung as well.

...was simply incredible, as you see it applied here to Nietzsche and his most famous work. Jung goes step by step through it, explaining and amplifying. To his diagnosis of Nietzsche as an inflated and ungrounded intuitive, a slow death by syphillis should perhaps be added. Anyway, a remarkable two-volume exposition.

No one can reasonably expect to sum up Nietzche's views and philosophy in under 100 pages. The reader should not go into this work expecting to come out understanding Nietzsche, but maybe make him a little less obscure or receive a slight bit more context in which to read Nietzsche's books. For those who have already read some Nietzsche and are left nonplussed, this tiny book may help you out as well (it did me).

The book follows Nietzsche's publications more or less in chronological order. The longest and most difficult chapter is the one on "The Birth of Tragedy." This work gets the most attention of all of Nietzsche's works, presumably because it is easier to "sum up" or encapsulate than any of his other works. For instance, the section on "The Genealogy of Morals" will leave you wondering what the book is about (in fact, reading the book itself may also have this effect - it's a tad difficult).

"Morality and its Discontents" is one of the most illuminating chapters, and will shed some light on Nietzsche's proclamation that "God is dead" which is probably his most infamous and misunderstood concept (there's also a lot more meat to it than the eternal recurrence and the Ubermensch, which Tanner points out).

Overall I agree with Tanner's assessment of Nietzsche's "Thus Spake Zarathustra." It was the first book of his I read, and I came out of the experience energized, but I had no idea why. "Zarathustra" is a passionate but potentially misleading read. It's nothing like his other works, and introduces concepts that never come up again, though they seem to be of utmost importance in the context of the book (i.e., the eternal recurrence, Ubermensch, and the will to power - at least in his published works).

The pace of Tanner's book quickens and the delineation of Nietzsche's texts becomes more and more sparse towards the final few chapters. There is very little information about Nietzsche's insanity, or Lou Salomé or even the details of his life. The book is almost completely dedicated to Nietzsche's philosophy. In fact, the book ends as abruptly as Nietzsche's own sane life must have. There's a slight feeling of "so what's next?!?" at the end of the last and shortest chapter that discusses the works of 1888 in a flash.

Nietzsche is a huge subject, and his books are thick conceptually if not physically. He was a thinker that wanted to teach us to think differently, which makes him a valuable read no matter what your stance on the views he covers. This minute book will help you peek through the keyhole of this enormous and overwhelming subject.

Lastly, Richard Wagner figures hugely in Nietzsche's work. Knowing more about Wagner will only elucidate some of Nietzsche's works and concepts. Tanner also supports this view.

Tanner's NIETZSCHE provides as plain-spoken an account as can be managed of what the philosopher was all about, taking the reader through Nietzsche's life and work step by step. There are a few things about the book I do not like -- for instance, insufficient discussion of the abuses of Nietzsche by others, too short shrift to THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, and an unhelpful final chapter of assessment -- but its merits outweigh these several flaws. I would definitely recommend that others read this book before tackling Nietzsche's works directly.

Tanner here provides a wonderful overview of Nietzsche's philosophy--not an easy task, since Nietzsche had no "philosophy" in the usual sense. He is an anti-philosopher philosopher. Tanner concentrates on what Nietzsche said in his published works, considering the "Will to Power" fragments suspect. He distrusts the French poststructuralist interpretations of Nietzsche, which emphasize his perspectivism. To get a good idea of this side of Nietzsche, read Alex Nehamas's "Nietzsche: Life as Literature." There is no better introduction to Nietzsche than Nietzsche himself, perhaps in "Beyond Good and Evil," but he is among the most complex of modern "philosphers," and Tanner's book is quite helpful for the novice.

Refreshingly different from a standard biographical work, it reads more like a series of interviews with the individuals that actually spent time with Nietzsche the social being, in contrast to a scholarly work of academia. Not a "classic" by any means, but indeed a nice addition to any Nietzsche library. Compares favorably to Middleton's *Selected Letters*.

Book is about Nietsche as told by his friends. Friends that are family friends and his childhood friends and not professionals so you get more of their impression as him as a person rather than as a philosopher.

Due to the political affiliation of Martin Heidegger and his place in history, it is perhaps difficult to analyze his works objectively. The temptation might be then to lift him from history, with the imagined goal of perhaps cleansing him from the troubling influences he chose to be in. But however Heidegger is read, whether in historical context, or from a "modern standpoint", he does have some interesting and original things to say about Friedrich Nietzsche. His politics was destructive, as history has shown, and that is a fact that can be discussed completely outside the context of this book.

This is a lengthy book, and concentrates on Nietzsche's work "The Will to Power". Space therefore prohibits a detailed review, but some of the more interesting discussions by the author include: 1. The classifying of Nietzsche as being the "last metaphysician" of the West. The author believes that his thought was a consummation of Western philosophy, and that the will to power is an appreciation of the decision that must be made as to whether the this final age is the conclusion of Western history or a prelude to another beginning. Nietzsche wanted philosophy to not shy away from the predicament it found itself in. Therefore the author encourages philosophers to not merely "toy" with philosophical thoughts, as this will place them merely at the boundary of the set of important philosophical issues. The will to power is a sign of courage that consists of shedding one's reservations, and in recognizing the stakes in the issues at hand. 2. The reading of Nietzsche as someone who believed that the essence of life is in "self-transcending enhancement", and not in Darwinian struggle. Value is to be equated with the enhancement of life. 3. The author's overview and explanation, and deduction of what "truth" meant for Nietzsche. Truth can become a "de-realization" and a hindrance to life, and therefore not be condition of life, and thus not a value. But for the author, Nietzsche wants to overcome nihilism, and this implies therefore that there must be a value greater than truth. And what is this value? It is art, says Nietzsche, which is "worth more than truth". 4. The author's discussion of the alleged biologism of Nietzsche. A reading of Nietzsche might tempt one to conclude that he was, but the author cautions that such a characterization of his writings would be unfounded. One must not base an understanding on mere impressions, and "unlearn" the abuse that has been leveled against the "catchword" called "biologism". The author therefore suggests that we must learn to "read". 5. The description of Nietzsche's epistemology as "schematizing a chaos". For Nietzsche, this schematizing is an act of imposing upon chaos as much regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require. This is an interesting move, for is the characterization of something as chaotic itself subject to the imposition of this regularity? But the author is certainly aware of this problem, for he discusses in detail the Nietzschean concept of chaos. His reading of Nietzsche in this regard is that chaos does not mean confusion or the removal of all order. It rather means that order is concealed, and is not understood immediately. Most eloquently, the author describes the Nietzschean epistemology as a "stream that in its flow first creates the banks and turns them toward each other in a more original way than a bridge ever would." Such a concept of knowledge may seem poetic and too ephemeral to support what is needed for activities such as science and technology, and this is correct. 6. The discussion of Nietzsche's stand on the law of contradiction. Heidegger reads Nietzsche as holding to (without an explicit admission on Nietzsche's part) an Aristotelian notion of this law, saying in effect that taking the position that the law of contradiction is the highest of all principles demands an answer to the question of what sorts of assertions it already fundamentally presupposes. Again following Aristotle, Heidegger uses 'Being" in his most powerful sense here, as it is 'Being' that has its presence and in permanence. This means that beings represented as such will take into account these two requirements via being "at the same time" and "in the same respect". But this permanence is disregarded when an individual makes a contradiction. It is a loss of memory about what is to be grasped in a "yes" and "no". Such an activity will not be harmless, says Heidegger, as one day its catastrophic consequences will be manifested. Heidegger sums up the law of noncontraction as that the "essence of beings consists in the constant absence of contradiction". Further, Heidegger says, Nietzsche's interpretation of the law of contraction is one of an "imperative". This means that its use is a declaration of "what is to count" and follows Nietzsche's conception of truth as a "holding-to-be-true". Nietzsche therefore says that "not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not of a 'truth.'"

This is heavy reading, as only philosophy would dare to be. It involves internal hysteria about matters which ordinary people are supposed to avoid in a way which Heidegger called the "often practiced procedure" of taking Nietzsche's revelations "as the harbinger of erupting madness." (p. 3) What Heidegger contributes to the psychotic multiplicity is the recognition that Nietzsche's thought illustrates a particular philosophy. As the first paragraph of this book puts it, "Nietzsche is that thinker who trod the path of thought to 'the will to power.'" By the next page, Heidegger turns away from individual matters to what he feels, in the agony of our times, to be really philosophical issues. "Neither the person of Nietzsche nor even his work concern us when we make both in their connection the object of a historiological and psychological report." (p. 4) This is not simple reporting: people tend to think most deeply about whatever they find most troubling. Nietzsche could relate this kind of thing to the bite of a dog on a stone. Nothing is yielding here. Objections which suggest themselves to anyone who tries to observe this effort might best be directed elsewhere, but in the realm of philosophy, this is the best example of the notion that science is a sacred cow. A full understanding of the mental effort involved in this exercise might be closer to stripping away any individual's defenses than to the kind of herd instinct of those parties whose imperviousness to thought is typical of what a political philosophy would normally represent. This is not an effort to produce a sacred cow. This is an attempt to penetrate the heart of secret sacred cowsville.

The first sentence of the introduction reads,"..I question,problematize,overturn,revalue,announce,renounce,advocate,interrogate,affirm,deny,celebrate,critique,the 'tranhuman condition'..". Yes,however I was confused by Mr.Pearson writing style and couldn't always tell when the overturning ends and the celebrating begins,etc. Perhaps it's just me though. I'm no trained philosopher and the books depth may be a bit too scholarly. But struggling through, I was frequently rewarded with sentences that gave me new insights into Nietzschean thought. And it's for those insights that I recommend this book. Hey, for just $5.00, you can't lose.

In a breezy fashion, full barage of paper airplanes overhead this book, one need not agree a whit, usefully connects Nietzsche, Darwin, artificial life, and 'species evolution', past, present, future, in the process setting the record straight on Nietzsche and Darwin. One had thought the virulent extremes twixt the deeper chords of the great postmodern peer were an indication of the confusing Social Darwinist influence of Darwin on philosophers. In fact, one's suspicious are confirmed, that Nietzsche was too sharp to fall for Darwin, and saw the problem with Darwin's theory of natural selection almost at once, albeit mixing his cockeyed briliance with his own confusions about overmen. As everything is turned into a philosophic sausage of late, it might behoove the wielder of average opinions to decide to be a non-Darwinian, if he is a Nietzschean, or else vice versa, or else do so hard thinking about fundamentals. Nietzsche's views are complex, and one need not accept them, to see his point that natural selection can't be the resolution of evolutionary progression. In any case the discussion here was a curious sort of counterpoint to what I was thinking, and quite refreshing, read without conversion, and mindful one can misplace cultural history all too easily in the ceaseless revisionisms of the social phantom. Perhaps the only route to overman is via the Caves of Almora, but at least Nietzsche's wildman mien as Conaan the barbarian is at least topically to the point of the next Big Jump in the evolution of the 'schlemiel'.

This book provides an interesting survey of the ideas of Stirner, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky, asserting that they advocate individualist anarchism on psychological grounds. This is certainly true of Stirner, and probably true of Nietzsche (though he can be interpreted in other ways), but rather odd for Dostoevsky. In any case it makes good reading for anyone interested in psychology and anarchism. Also present are some brief comparisons with later psychologists of freedom.

This book is a must read for anyone who wishes to consider the "religious life" in a "non-traditional/post-foundationalist" sense. Roberts argues, and rightly so, that Nietzsche raises profound questions regarding the nature of religion and the uses of traditional religious language/metaphor. Further, in his discussion Roberts brings to light the significance of Nietzsche's (unexpectedly) ascetic life style. My only hesitancy is that Roberts seems to stop short of arguing that Nietzsche was indeed a deeply religious thinker. I believe this stronger argument could have been made, though the author limits himself with the less ambitious aim of using Nietzsche to raise questions about what we mean by "religion." My rating = 4.5 stars.