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son trigonometry and it is fantastic.
It has so many clear examples to illustrate
the concepts.
You can't go wrong with this book.
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But, I have problems with this book. This book is over polished, over "published", & is more geared as a marketing brochure than a discriptive portfolio of thought and design. First, we all know these guys have done some really great stuff, but do we need to see ALL of it! Some of the less remarkable(i.e.,older, more traditional, more restrained) projects take valuable pages away from some of their more enlightened works. There's no heirachy about their design - everything gets 3 spreads, two token drawings, 500 words of static text, and some nice photos. You should not be able to learn more about a building from a magazine article than you can from the monograph. I want more! How do they think? What do early sketches and ideas look like? Models - I'm sure they've produced some great models! Where are they? This paperback book is a gem at it's current ...price. ... Ounce per ounce:dollar per dollar, the Ten Houses book is a better deal because it provides greater insight to the projects covered. But if you're looking for a blanket covering of Miller|Hull projects with nice photos, this is the way to go.
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I also take issue with the book's narrow focus: According to Miller, "central Europe best symbolizes what went on during the Cold War and is the most likely place for the fighting to have started." That assertion will come as a surprise to men and women who served in the American armed forces in Korea and Vietnam, as well as to their Soviet counterparts who served in Afghanistan. Miller's approach probably works for most of the period called the "high Cold War," which lasted from the first Berlin crisis in 1948 until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. But from that point in time until the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989, I would suggest that the Cold War in central Europe was relatively stable. In contrast, during the last three decades of the Cold War, there were serious and lengthy Cold War conflicts "by proxy" in Vietnam and Afghanistan, as well as "hot spot" crises elsewhere in Asia, as well as in Africa and central America. Any book purporting to be a general military history of the Cold War which focuses exclusively on central Europe is going to mislead, and that is precisely what I consider one of this book's most serious shortcomings. Miller's emphasis on events in central Europe also is of limited value because he devotes too much space to the possibility of conventional war. During the formative period of the Cold War, from the end of the Second World War in Europe until the first Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union maintained huge tank armies and infantry forces in eastern Europe. Precisely in order to deter conventional war, first the United States and, later, Great Britain and France, developed atomic weapons. We will never know, of course, what would have happened if the Soviet Union's tanks and infantry had invaded western Europe, but I believe it is virtually certain that the United States would have responded with strategic and/or tactical atomic weapons. Indeed, according to Miller, "at least in public, NATO regarded battlefield nuclear weapons either as a reasonable response to Soviet first strike or as a last resort in the face of imminent conventional defeat." Nevertheless, Miller deserves credit for making this significant point: "The perceived threat from the Soviet Union caused the European nations and those of North America to draw together through NATO in a way which had never previously proved possible, even in the face of war." Miller writes: "In the mass of documents released since the end of the Cold War, no evidence has been found of any Warsaw Pact defensive plans, except for a few formulated in the three final years, after President Gorbachev had insisted that the General Staff prepare them. Instead, all plans concentrated on a series of massive attacks, which were aimed at securing Soviet control of the entire west-European land mass." That is interesting! However, this next point demonstrates Miller's discussion of protracted conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations is superfluous. Miller writes: "According to Soviet and East German planning documents, the major plan for the Central Front aimed at reaching the German-French border in between thirteen and fifteen days, and then of overrunning France so that the leading troops arrived at the Atlantic coast and the Franco-Spanish border by the thirty-fifth day." Does anyone believe that the United States would have permitted the Soviet Union's tanks to race across Germany and then on to the Atlantic without using every weapon in its nuclear arsenal to prevent? When Miller decided to concentrate on weapons and weapons systems, in my opinion, he also should have decided to provide more information about their awesome expense because continuously developing and upgrading equipment was the key feature of the political economy of the Cold War. Only in his final chapter does Miller address "The Financial Cost," which may, in the long run, prove to be the most important aspect of the entire Cold War. But he provides virtually no details, except to state: "The true costs of defence equipment were virtually impossible to calculate." Miller concludes: "What was certain...as judged by the eventual collapse of the U.S.S.R., was that the cost proved to be unaffordable." I believe that will be one of the great historiographical debates of the coming century: Whether Soviet Communism was simply an ideology whose time came and went or whether the economic demands of the Cold War simply proved too much for the Soviet state to sustain? Furthermore, I believe Miller might have offered some comments about the nearly-indiscriminate distribution of weapons by the Cold War antagonists to Third World countries because I believe that is going to prove to be one of the most serious legacies of the Cold War.
I would recommend David Miller's The Cold War to novices and students who want some basic information about weapons, weapons systems, and their impact on certain issues of strategy. But, the title notwithstanding, this book is far from the final word on the Cold War's military history.
What the book does give you is a very detailed and interesting review of the U.S., NATO and Warsaw Pact equipment, base structure and high level battle strategies for a war in Europe. The author has done a good amount of research on these topics and presents a very readable rundown of this information. If you are interested in these topics, especially the details on the equipment used then this book can almost act as a reference book. Overall it is a good book, good level of detail and written in a readable fashion.
Miller does provide comprehensive coverage of the topic and provides a lot of interesting details. There are also many useful tables and appendices at the back of the book.
Despite this wide-ranging coverage, however, Miller almost completely ignores the role of satellites during the Cold War. Although highly classified, they played significant roles in treaty verification and also improved stability. For instance, the "missile gap" of the early 1960s was eliminated by the first American reconnaissance satellites and as a result, the United States did not build thousands more ICBMs.
One thing that bothered me was the limited references provided for the information. He has only a handful of references for each chapter, despite the fact that the chapters are packed with information. This makes it impossible to look up further information (or check the information in the book). Where, for instance, does Miller get the reliability rates for the Navy's Polaris missiles? That's a fascinating detail, but I wanted to read more about it. Yet he has only two footnotes for the entire chapter.
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Inside Director tries to teach general multimedia rather than the fundamentals of Director. The book attempts to teach you how to create sound and digital movies in other programs(Which has nothing to do with learning Director), yet it severely lacks in explaining how to handle sound and movies in Director. The book also teaches you more about how to write HTML(Which also has nothing to do with learning Director), then how to create streaming shockwave movies with net Lingo.
Save your money and buy a different book.
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It's a short book and not terribly bad, but it's not altogether satisfying either.
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