When not caught up in the details the book is very good. The chapters on the background, leaders and the armies are good examples of why Osprey is so sucessful. That made the discussion of the battle all the more disappointing.

This volume follows the standard Osprey campaign format, with sections on the origins of the campaign, the opposing armies, opposing commanders and opposing plans. There are three 3-D "bird's eye view" maps that depict Colonel Driant's Last Stand (22 February 1916), the French attack on Fort Douamont (22 May 1916) and the Battle for Fleury (11 July 1916). Although there are several excellent 2-D maps that depict the layout and action around Fort Douamont and Fort Vaux, there is only one 2-D maps that depicts the entire Verdun battle area. While the maps provided are interesting, they still do not depict the entire Verdun battle area (e.g. Mort Homme). In addition to many interesting photographs, there are three battle scenes: Colonel Driant's Last Stand, the "Sacred Way" and underground fighting in Fort Vaux. Overall, I would rate the graphic appeal of this volume as very high, which is one of the reasons to use this volume as a supplement to Horne.

The author, a retired British sailor, presents an adequate - if not original - summary of the Verdun campaign from February to October 1916. For those readers who have read Horne's Price of Glory, they will notice many similarities in this account, although the author does use some French sources to enhance the narrative. Essentially, the bulk of the narrative focuses on the initial German attack, the surprise capture of Fort Douamont, then the bitter struggle for Fort Vaux, followed by the German loss of initiative and the final French counterattacks. Although there is some discussion of the fighting on the west bank of the Meuse River, around Mort Homme and the surrounding hills, it is quick and has no supporting maps of photographs. This is probably the greatest weakness of this account: the author focused primarily on the area around the two forts because they are the nexus of the battle's mythology and also easy to visit. When I visited Verdun this year, I certainly found Vaux and Douamont much more accessible than other parts of the battlefield. However, the fighting on the west bank was very important to the overall campaign and this tends to be downplayed in favor of the more dramatic struggles for the forts.

A few minor glitches appear in the author's apparent lack of sufficient research on contemporary army tactics and doctrines. The author asserts that 1916 was a watershed year in military history and that armies had evolved into very different formations from 1914, which is a half-truth at best. After two years of bloody stalemate the armies of both sides were still in the process of seeking solutions to conducting a breakthrough attack against entrenched machineguns, but they had yet to arrive at the solution. Neither tanks, "Hutier" infiltration tactics or close air support were in evidence at Verdun in 1916. While the armies had indeed added more specialist troops like engineers and abandoned some of the sillier pre-war tactics, the bulk of the infantry fought using evolutionary, not revolutionary tactics. Infantry platoons were not "all arms formations" as the author asserts (nor are modern infantry platoons), and the handful of the new infantry support weapons were concentrated at company, battalion or regimental level. Certainly the dreaded German Minenwerfer was too heavy to be carried around by assault infantry platoons. Also, the author notes that the German 21st Infantry Division attacked with four full-strength regiments with a total of 12 battalions of infantry, but a "square" division only had 8 infantry battalions.

Nor does the author make any real effort to assess the battle or its aftermath, other than to recount the casualty estimates. Could the German strategy have worked? Were the French skillful or lucky? How did the Verdun Campaign influence combat in 1917-1918? No effort is made to address such questions, but the author does waste effort - as Horne did - in recounting the Second World War celebrities who fought at Verdun as junior officers. Is it really relevant that Wilhelm Keitel was a staff officer at Verdun (anymore than he was a staff officer in other First World campaigns)?

Verdun 1916 should be appreciated for the fact that there are so few English-language books on this subject and for its graphic value. The other main reason for buying this book is the excellent six pages of order of battle data, which lists all infantry units down to regiment or separate battalion level, as well as artillery and engineer units. The lack of order of battle data was one of the biggest weaknesses in Horne's otherwise excellent book, but Verdun 1916 redresses that omission.

The Complete Illustrated Shakespeare, edition of 1979, edited by Howard Staunton, and containing over 800 magnificently beautiful steel engraving illustrations by Sir John Gilbert and Ray Abel, is treasure which belongs in the library of any true lover of the bard. The physical size alone, 8 3/4" x 11 1/4" x 3", is impressive, with every play preceded by a short historical introduction, and followed by several pages of illustrative comments and diverse critical opinions.

This book is worth a high price and a long wait.

The main problem is the text layout. Text is split on each page into two ragged edge columns, leading to visual break up of sentences and lots of hyphens! This is distracting to the eye and tiring to read. A large margin for captions compounds the problem, making the text columns even narrower. A single column of fully justified text would make the pages less fussy visually and thus easier to read.

A secondary problem, occasioned by the sheer weight of informatin, is that this book will always be (to me, at least) a reference book. There is just too much information, and the book is too heavy and cumbersome, to make it one to actually sit down and read for the pleasure of doing to.

The final two chapters are entitled: 6) Firm responses in a changing industry, 7) Forces in competition: past, present and future. The sixth chapter is awful, here the authors, both of them management researchers from different business colleges (neither with a background in science or medicine) analyzed nearly 20 years of inadequate data in a ridiculous way that was poorly presented. The seventh and final chapter was also disappointing. Someone should take the good material in this book as a template and write another book, especially in speculating about the future impact of biotechnology on the pharmaceutical industry. If I were you, I would get a good book on the history of the pharmaceutical industry, and make your own inferences about competitive forces.

My son was required to read this book for his history studies at school, but I can't help but wonder if there is any good American history book that plainly tells the facts.