I am an EMT-B instructor in West Virginia and have used this edition to teach my classes. I have found it to be a great improvement over previous editions. The text is easy to read, comprehensive and all-in-all an excellent text on EMT-B. My only gripe with the book is that it makes prehospital patient assessment somewhat confusing for new students. The book breaks patient assessment up into several chapters, giving the reader the impression that assessment is both difficult and complicated. This lack of single-chapter continuity coupled with the trepidation many new students bring to this module creates the impression that patient assessment is a disjointed, randomized activity. I have to tell my students that for patient assessment, these chapters are a good reference, but that I will tell them just how easy assessment is; TAKE NOTES!

If Brady would spend a little more time examining this module, I feel as though they can make it a little less imposing and a little more readable.

I am a student interested in becoming an EMT. I know the people at the local fire station so I asked them for a resource book and they gave me a 6th edition of this manual and it is proving to be an excellent resource. It has many pictures and at the beginning of each chapter, it gives a real life scenario for you to focus on for the chapter and explains objectives you should know by the end of the chapter. I've found it very informative and hope that the 8th edition follows in its footsteps. Well done Brady!

I have been teaching the EMT-B class for more than 10 years. I have found that this 8th Edition Brady book is the best available. This text prepares my students not only to pass the State and National exams, but also very useful for the real world!

This book is wonderful and MUST be read by anyone interested in Roman history. It's focused on emperors life, reported annedocts and facts.

Just beware: not all the facts are considered to be true.

I find this book essential not, as most readers see, a simple history of Rome, but rather as a grim example of the excesses possible when democracy fails and absolute power is contained in one human being(Rome beginning its career as a wonderfull Republic). Although most see Suetonius' vivid descriptions of lust and other deviant vices as mere gossip, I propose that is exactly what he is trying to elucidate for the ages to see. These same excesses gave rise to almost the entire fundamental ideas of the religion known as Christianity and their whole hearted opposition to orgies, torture, crucifictions, feeding to the lions and the like, all due to the whims of deranged monkeys who called themselves Caesar. Read for yourself, for example, the history behind St. Valentine's day.

In historical study there are two types of literature. Secondary sources are written based on the original writings which are known as Primary sources. If you want to lern about the earliest Roman Emperors this source is indispensable. True, some of it is not historical and Suetonius is somewhat of a gossip monger at times, seeing as he explains in detail the various sexual appetites of each Caesar as well as other deviant behaviour. Still, this is one of the foremost primary sources about those famous Romans and most of the history books written on the Caesars are standing on Suetonius' shoulders.

This sentimental favorite children's book has the moral values of E. Nesbitt, who was a famous liberal activist in England. She creates a household utopian vision of a world where people are naturally good and where parents raise their children to be helpful and honest and brave.

This provides the background charm for a really lovely tale about a family in distress who sticks together bravely and provides a shining example to all around them, while being aided by equally high-minded and kind folks around them.

A knock on the door at the idyllic middle class town home of the children ends with a tragedy that they can scarcely understand. But Mother is brave and despite rumors of terrible things, they make their way to a more modest home in the country, next to a railway line. The children become friends with the trains and the regular commuters who wave at them. Their fascination with the train results in a heroic rescue. Meanwhile, their situation is sometimes difficult, and they develop some remarkable strategies for getting aid. There is a happy ending.

The morals taught to the children are particularly British (helpful, kind, brave) but certainly apply to us as well. The goodness that the children spread is really a lovely message and contributes to the charm and longevity of this great favorite. Good for reading aloud.

I like the Railway Children a lot,especially how the author told the story. I liked Bobbie because there is something different about her,she was helpful and sweet at the same time. I am wondering where the dog James went? Other than that, the story was great!

It is a story about three children who change a little town in England. The book is very adventurous in every chapter.It is a very well writen book.

I bought this book because I was hoping it would provide me with good guidance in terms of how to use analysis techniques that would support my strategy consulting work. It has a heavy economists' leaning. This is both good and bad. It is good in that it gives some tried and true ways of understanding contemporary strategy. It is bad in that it misses out on the many ways and means by which non-economists understand contemporary strategy and is very thick in terms of its descriptions. It is not a "how to" book, that is for sure. Since competition today often seems to defy economic logic, this economic approach can only go so far. And there is still no better economist's approach than Professor Michael Porter's materials and this book certainly adds little to that great body of work.

I used this book during my MBA in City University Business School, London and found it extremely helpful. It covers most of ground and guides the reader through different approaches showing them their pros and cons. It takes the magic out of many complicated concepts and make them accessiable. In some few parts it lacks detail but if taken as an introductry book to business strategy, it serves that purpose well. As a strategy consultant, I always keep it on my self with my favorite "The Mind Of The Strategist".

Great book by someone who is serious about the subject! No "The Art of Strategy according to Lord Nelson" or the like. After reading the book, the reader will be able to think about strategy and judge strategic thinking as applied to real cases. But, better still, it will make the reader curious about strategy and willing to look further into some of the many good references given in the book.

An intriguing interlude in the Overland Campaign of 1864 between the battles of Spotsylvania Courthouse and Cold Harbor, Gordon Rhea continues his impressive study of this period with "To the North Anna River". Manuever, as opposed to carnage, dominate this work and shows Rhea's continued evolvement as a writer as well as an historian.

We start where "The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse" left off with both armies entrenched before the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. Rhea discusses the thinking of both Generals Lee and Grant as each labors to decide what to do next. Another unsuccessful attack at the salient is orchestrated by Grant before he makes the first move by deciding to disengage and manuever Lee out of his trenches. He advances Winfield Hancock to the southeast with the idea of using him as bait to get Lee to follow. This strategy works as Lee starts his army southward toward the North Anna river. Troop movements and lost opportunities dominate this portion of the book as Grant and Lee engage on the next portion of the campaign. Cavalry battles also are covered at this point as Union General Philip Sheridan drives the Federal cavalry on a threatening movement towards the Confederate capital at Richmond. Rhea then discusses how this movement, although somewhat successful, ultimately hurt the Union cause.

Lee then wins the race to the North Anna by taking advantage of Grant's lack of intelligence that Sheridan's cavalry would have provided. He (Lee) then entrenches south of the river as he waits to see what Grant will do. The battles at Henagan's Redoubt and Jericho Mills (both Union victories in the maneuver to the North Anna) set the stage for the highlight of the book which is the defensive posture that Lee now incorporates. Rhea shows how Confederate chief field engineer Martin Smith "proposes an ingenious solution" that results in the famous inverted "V" entrenchment below the river. This fortification has the added advantage of splitting Grant's army below the river and (if Grant attacks) would give Lee a stunning victory. Grant initiates offensive probes and becomes increasingly concerned that his troops are trapped. The little known battle at Ox Ford on the North Anna is the final proof that he needs. Lee meanwhile becomes ill and fails to delegate to his subordinates his instinctive thought to attack and the opportunity is lost. Rhea ties all this together with some of his best writing to date: "Lee had slept little in the twenty harrowing days since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. He often worked after midnight and was generally awake by 3:00 A.M. Dysentery was endemic in the Army of Norhtern Virginia, and Lee had contracted the illness by the time he had reached the North Anna. Normally even-tempered and robust, he was now irritable and rode in a carriage. On the afternoon of May 24 Lee was seized with violent intestinal distress and his aide pronounced him 'quite unwell'. The Confederate commander lay confined to his tent, 'prostrated by his sickness' with a single thought dominating his mind 'We must strike a blow'. But the Army of Northern Virginia could not strike a blow. It required a firm hand to coordinate so complex an undertaking. In better times, when Jackson and Longstreet commanded the wings of the Confederate army, Lee had liberally delegated responsibility. But Jackson was dead and Longstreet disabled and Lee lacked confidence in their successors." Grant then realizes the danger of his position and extricates his forces to the Northern side of the river. His decision to maneuver again "by the left flank" to the southeast closes out the text portion of the book.

Rhea then ends the book with an excellent Epilogue section in which he discusses the heretofore unknown battle at Wilson's Wharf on the James River showing for the first time the fighting tenacity of the Federal's black troops and also whereby he draws conclusions that differ somewhat with the contemporary standard: "Historians have considered Lee's inability to attack on the afternoon of May 24 a lost opportunity of major proportions. In retrospect, it is doubtful that even a healthy Lee could have dealt a decisive blow. He would most certainly have wrecked much of Hancock's corps, but he would have lacked the strength and time to exploit the localized victory. Nightfall would likely have prevented him from crossing the North Anna. Grant could take severe casualties in stride. Terrible subtractions in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House did not deter him, nor did severe losses at Cold Harbor in the coming weeks. It is difficult to imagine Hancock's defeat inducing him to abandon his campaign. Sickness doubtless cost Lee a superb opportunity to damage an isolated portion of Grant's army at the North Anna River, but the lost opportunity should not be exaggerated. Judging from Grant's reaction to earlier and later setbacks, he likely would have treated defeat at the North Anna as a tactical reverse and gone on with his campaign."

Judiciously written and masterfully researched (Rhea discloses in the Introduction that little of any substance has been written on this period due to the confusing state of exisiting material), Gordon Rhea has created (in my opinion) another masterpiece, further fortifying his standing as one of the outstanding contemporary Civil War historians. I give this book a very high recommendation.

Gordon Rhea continues his study of Ulysses S. Grant's grinding Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third volume continues where his the first two volumes left off. Like the first two books, the tone is lively and interesting. Rhea does an excellent job conveying the thought process and difficulties involved in the major decisions made by both Lee and Grant. Rhea makes clear the reasons Lee was losing faith in Hill and Ewell. He continues an excellent analysis of the fractured Union command structure from the first two volumes expanding on the rift between Meade and Grant and the lack of talent among the corps commanders.

Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.

For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.

Gordon C. Rhea's account of the Civil War in Northern Virginia covering the period after the Wilderness Battle through the fighting south of the North Anna River in late May 1864 is well written. During this period, Lee and Grant took measure of each other. Grant had only experienced Confederate generals in the West and probably had limited respect for Lee's generalship. The general officers of the Army of the Potomac, having fought Lee since June 1862, had few reservations regarding Lee's ability prompting Grant to remark to his staff on May 6 to "Think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." Lee lacked direct experience with Grant but there is no indication that he questioned Grant's ability. Lee's problem was he didn't know how Grant thinks, reacts, etc. In many respects this book is an account of how Grant and Lee got to know each others abilities.

Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.

The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.

The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."

Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.

This is a very thin tiny book and doesn't contain much information. This book is for people who just want to know something about auras. Though Edgar Cayce can see auras, he's not really good in interpreting them. He has limited knowledge in this area.

Perhaps why Edgar Cayce took so long to write a book on auras is that reading and interpreting auras is something very intuitive rather than something systematic that can be easily learned. Although I can sense an energy about people, I have never been able to see colours there. Once I was at a dinner party and I couldn't fathom why something seemed very different about one of the other guests. He died a couple of months later. It was only after reading this book that I understood that I had picked up on his lack of aura. Edgar Cayce encourages us to look at all the other little clues surrounding people, including the colours they choose to wear, in order to get an impression of the colour of their aura and offers some interpretation of various colours. While some people may feel this book lacks substance and depth, the real message is that we each need to develop our own ability to read and interpret auras through our own intuitive faculties.

Mr. Cayce revealed to his friend, during a beautiful evening sunset over the west coast of Florida, that he could see auras. Nature itself was manifesting yet another glorius splendor of color through the atmospheric convulsions of earth's rotation. Since I began using this guide as a sole-basis for interpreting the aura's that I myself have seen for over eight years, my interpretations have hit in the 95% to 98% correct range. I anguish at the loss mankind suffered when Mr. cacye died later that year. For to have a compendium of more exact interpretations would be invaluable to both the seer of the aura, and to those whose physical and/or emotional well-being would have benefited from such a record. This small tome suffices as an ispiration for those of us left to continue his teachings!
For those who can see auras, a MUST!

Gene Smith's Lee And Grant was a well-written documentation of the lives of these Civil War generals. The way the book was set up kept it interesting and almost fun to read. The format was such that consecutive chapters paralleled each man's life. For instance the first chapter pertained to Lee's father and his childhood while the second chapter was about Grant's Father and childhood. One warning I have to potential readers: this is a great book for those interested in the Civil War and these two men. If one doesn't have any interest in the topic, then this book is not for them. There aren't and underlying driving plots or surprises that make the book suspenseful. This is a historical piece highlighting two great men in our country's history. It's a great book for those who want to read specifically about these two men, not for a reader just looking for a book to read.

I enjoyed this book very much. The contrast between Grant (who led a hard scrabble life, even resorting to selling firewood by the side of the road to make a living) and Lee (perhaps the greatest man of the South) and Grant's triumph was a great story. You get a great introduction to the Civil War, even though there is a focus on the Virginia campaign because this is a biography of these two men, not an overall history of the Civil War. Highly recommended.

I was enthralled by the unique view that this book afforded. I have read many histories of the Civil War from many perspectives. This is the first time that I was introduced to these two pivotal historical figures from the human side. The juxtaposition of each of them to the other was very helpful to put the time and sequences of the war into perspective and give true scale to all that happened.

Bert Grant tells his story, in "The Ale Master", about his love of beer and how he helped to open the eyes of the world to the forgotten industry known as craft brewing. Prior to the 1980's, beer was pretty much a boring product with nearly all beer made in a similar fashion, using some grains and hops, but too many adjuncts resulting in products that are nearly identical in appearance and taste. Grant helped change all of that when he opened the first brewpub in Yakima Washington.

This book is a little too short, but it is an easy read. There are also very lenghty footnotes on nearly every page. It would have been better if, instead of using all of the footnotes, the information would have been integrated into the regular reading.

By reviving the microbrewing industry, Bert Grant has performed a great service to all Americans. Never again will we be forced to choose between bland, bland, and more bland when we face the beer isle.

Despite the title sounding like something a barfly might slobber at you before he pitches into the details of his acrimonious divorce, this is a facinating and thought-provoking autobiography.

What Robert Mondavi is to wine, Bert Grant is to beer! This was a fun way to trace the career of one of America's microbrew pioneers while learning a lot about the history of beer in America. Grant's seen it, and brewed it all. Two steins up!

The letters included in this collection are noteworthy for their content and relative completeness. Rarely does one get to read both sides of a Civil War correspondance. Usually letters from home were lost or destroyed during troop movements and only the soldier's letters remain. Grant Taylor, however, managed to hold on to many of his wife's letters and the perspective this gives on the dynamics between husband and wife is fascinating. Anyone who doubts the impact of homefront hardships on the frontline soldier need only follow Grant Taylor's growing frustration as he slips from uneasy acceptance of his military service in 1862 to depressed introspection and resignation toward his own death in 1865.

Editorially, this book suffers from a military slant that avoids discussing the very things that make these letter important: the soldier's concern for family and home and the impact that concern had on his mental and emotional condition. Footnoting is haphazard at best and wavers between military history and endlessly repetitive genealogy. I can appreciate the work that went into identifying each person mentioned either by given or nicknames, but by page 30 we are already familiar with who the cousins and brothers are and don't need to be reminded.

Read the book for its appeal as a primary source but skip the notes.

This book is a collection of 160 letters between soldier-husband and homefront-wife from 1862-1865. The remarkable quality about this collection is the interaction between Grant relating his military experiences and Malinda keeping him informed about their children, the farm, and friends and relatives in their community. Very readable book!

Many hard hours have been put into this book. First the letters had to be transcribed from a handwriting to a typed print. You feel everything from this aspect...especially when you know lineage. The reader appreciates the finest detail. A movie could come from these letters so easily...this was the time!

Study the Overland/Petersburg campaign and you'll note that Lee whipped Grant three times (the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, and various assaults on Petersburg), fought him to a bloody draw once (Spotsylvania), and only lost when the Army of Northern Virginia was crumbling from starvation and attrition. Stuck in an impossible situation, Lee forced Grant to take nearly a year longer than he had planned to take Richmond, despite Grant having all the advantages (better supplies, far more men, not having Richmond to defend, etc.). I doubt Grant would have done as well in such a position.

Grant was by no means an incompetant general, but his main attribute was tenacity; he won through stubborness more times than anything else. He nearly let the garrison of Ft. Donaldson get away (and would have if anyone had listened to Forrest), he came within a hair's breadth of losing his entire army at Shiloh, he was frustrated time and again at Vicksburg by an inferior general, his plan to defeat Bragg at Chattanooga was convoluted and shouldn't have worked, and Lee out-generaled him on multiple occasions. What made Grant superior to any other Union general (save perhaps Thomas) was his refusal to give up. Grant understood the advantages he worked with and knew how to use them to win. Put him on equal footing with Lee and the story may well have been different.

The oft-repeated view, especially from Confederate defenders, is that Grant won though he was a drunken butcher indifferent to high casualties whose triumph was inevitable because of superior manpower and supplies. John Frederick Charles Fuller, the British Major General, and along with Liddel Hart one of the top military strategists of the 20th century, provides overwhelming evidence to lay this view to rest. Grant practiced maneuver warfare when he could, and his Vicksburg campaign (not just a siege, rather a series of five battles), along with Jackson's valley campaign, are the two greatest campaigns of the war. In his final Overland campaign, Grant could not maneuver much because Lincoln required that he keep substantial forces between Lee's army and Washington. By a thorough analysis of Grant's and Lee's battles throughout the war, Fuller makes the case that Grant was among the best generals ever, and greater than Lee, who was also great but had his limitations (after Order 191 was lost and recovered by McClellan's troops before Antietam, Lee would only issue oral orders, and his subordinates were often confused by them; Grant was known for crystal clear written orders, following the example of Zachary Taylor under whom Grant (and Lee) had served in the Mexican War). Rating Grant so highly will of course be heresy for neo-Confederates, but there is no question Grant has received unfair treatment even among historians. Another Fuller book, "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" adds more details to the defense of the claim that Grant was an excellent general. In assessing the relative greatness of Grant and Lee, one should keep in mind their age difference and the difference in upward mobility on the two sides during the war. Lee was 14 years older than Grant, Lee was already a Colonel when the war started and still serving on active duty, whereas Grant had left the army as a captain after the Mexican War. At the start of the war, Winfield Scott, who had served in the War of 1812 and masterminded in the Mexican War the amazing defeat of a country of 20 million people with 12,000 invading troops, was the greatest soldier on either side. However he was old and so fat he could no longer ride a horse; his campaigning days were over. After Scott, Lee was the best soldier on either side at the start of the war--and Lee was offered command of the Union army but turned it down. However Grant rose through the ranks because he learned quickly from his mistakes at Belmont, Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Holly Springs. By the end of the war Fuller's analysis shows Grant was clearly the superior general, and not just because he had superior numbers. Even the oft-cited mistake at Cold Harbor, according to Fuller, is exagerrated. Fuller summarizes the overall casualy numbers during the war: the ratio of killed and wounded to total forces engaged for Grant was 10%; for the whole Federal army it was 11%; for the whole Confederate army it was 12%; and for Lee, it was 16%. One must be fair to Lee and not lose sight of the fact that he was an exemplary, even a saintly individual who must always be acknowledged as among the great American generals. But the simplistic, grossly unfair judgment of Ulysses S. Grant is revealed here as a sham which must stop. Under the razor-sharp and penetrating analysis of Fuller, one of the greatest military historians of all time, the conventional, common opinion of Grant is shown to be balderdash. Ulysses S. Grant was one of the greatest generals the U.S. has ever produced. Though written many years ago, Fuller's book is still relevant to this ongoing national discussion, and is a must read for anyone who wants to compare Union and Confederate generalship. Regarding Grant's drinking, Fuller doesn't discuss this, but this too is greatly exaggerated. He was indeed a binge drinker. When I asked the renowned Civil War historian Ed Bearss about this, he said Grant got drunk about four to six times during the war, always when he was away from his wife (she was with or lived near him during some campaigns and he was always lonely without her). Moreover, in the Civil War one could usually tell when battle was near, and there was usually inactivity during the winter months. The circumstances are not comparable to a modern general's always being on call in the nuclear age. Grant's occasional binge drinking never once affected his generalship, in public functions he usually would not drink at all, being a semi-recovered alcoholic except for the occasional binge. The stereotype is that Grant was constantly drunk during the war. This too is an unfair assessment not based on historical fact. Read this book and will see just how wrong the stereotype of Grant's generalship is, and how good a general he was.

I have to disagree totally with the previous reviewer. While the relative merits of both generals have been argued since the conclusion of the war and will be into the future, the interesting point about this book is that General Fuller began with the assumption that Grant was the butcher of legend who bludgeoned with numbers and that Lee was the battlefield genius. His studies lead him to conclude otherwise (in an intersting appendix he shows that througout their respective careers, Lee lost a higher proportion of his men than Grant).

The main point Fuller makes is that Grant was the first general to understand the totality of warfare in the modern age, including the role of political expectations. He also was a superior strategist and campaigner to Lee, although Lee was probably the better battlefield tactitian. Lee had the advantage in the Overland campaign of fighting on the defensive, and Grant was aware of the approaching elections and the need to produce a result, rather than the traditional Army of the Potomac stalemate, or worse. He additionally had responsibilities for overseeing the Western and Valley battlefronts.

The main point to remember when considering the careers of the two men is that, if my memory is correct, of the three armies that surrendered during the War, Grant received two of them.