After purchasing the book, I rushed home to read it, along the way quickly perusing the scores of stills the author included. I was in my glory, since Ryan was my favorite actor growing up. The book is a fully researched tome that seems to have gotten to the heart of the matter. Yes, the book depicts a man whose performances seemed to exemplify the "art" of film-making, rather than the glitz of fame. Herein one can find definitive examples of Ryan's "art". Read Jarlett's reviews of early Ryan gem performances to understand just how great he was: Act of Violence, The Woman On The Beach, Caught, Beware, My Lovely were just a few examples of film as art, and the author seems to understand the ethos that drove Ryan.
I marveled at the author's ability to write with the same sort of artistic merit that Ryan endorsed: the book contains reviews culled from scores of cinema retrospectives on Ryan's films, including Cahiers Du Cinema, Films in Review, and so on. Jarlett's sources of information were first-rate. Who can deny the opinion of John Houseman, whose preface lauds Jarlett's acumen in discerning Ryan's talents?
I agree with one amazon reviewer who noticed Ryan's subtle touches of brilliance in The Racket, a film which portrayed him as a ruthless racketeer who nevertheless garners a degree of pity. The scene where Ryan's Nick Scanlon jauntily munches on an apple while trading words with Robert Mitchum's stalwart cop was a sublime melding of actor and prop.
But The Racket is just one of countless films in which Ryan lent his talents to make good films better. I wondered why Ryan never went after the blockbuster roles that contemporaries landed. Jarlett clarifies this point: Ryan simply didn't care about them, instead searching for artistic expression. The book discusses the great Hollywood directors with whom he worked, in classics such as House of Bamboo, The Naked Spur, On Dangerous Ground, Lonelyhearts, Odds Against Tomorrow, Billy Budd, The Wild Bunch, and his last most trenchant portrait in The Iceman Cometh. Who else but Ryan could have been better as Eugene O'Neill's anarchist Larry Slade?
The book is a one-of-a-kind, definitive exposition of Ryan's life and films, and I applaud Jarlett's commitment to finally bring the actor's life to the forefront. My only regret is that Ryan was not alive to have placed his imprimatur on Jarlett's superb biography.
I read Jarlett's book with fascination after many years of waiting for someone to write a book about Ryan, who was one of the most undervalued talents in Hollywood. I always found it curious that although Ryan came up through the ranks at RKO as one of its contract players from the forties, along with Kirk Douglas, Burt Lancaster and Robert Mitchum, he never garnered the stardom that they achieved, as least with mainstream audiences. Jarlett amply elucidated the reasons for this phenomenon: Ryan simply didn't care that much about fame; he would rather appear in a film for artistic merit instead of for box office success. I only needed to look at Ryan's films from the forties, which Jarlett reviews in detail, to see what an amazing list of films there were. He obviously spent long hours researching the book, which contains behind-the-scenes stories that Jarlett elicited from Ryan's close circle of friends (John Houseman, John Frankenheimer, Lamont Johnson, Robert Wallsten, Arvin Brown and Millard Lampell).
I noted one Amazon reviewer to remark that the author captured the actor's essence in such performances as the racketeer in The Racket. I was likewise mesmerized by Ryan's quirky interpretation of the psychopathic ex-G.I. in Crossfire. I especially liked Jarlett's analyses of Ryan's other unsung gems, such as in House of Bamboo when Ryan says to his friend after killing him, "Why did you tip the cops, Griff?", or Beware, My Lovely, Act of Violence, The Naked Spur, to name a few. Another interesting fact that Jarlett brought out was that Ryan was the "film noir" king, with fourteen trenchant portraits in that genre over the years. I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to delve underneath the surface of Ryan's screen presence since in real life he was the opposite of what he portrayed on the screen.
Anyway, this was a great BASIC Access book. I did, however, have to send an email to Prentice Hall. After a week, I still have not heard from them. There are sections in the book called, "Discovery Zone Exercises". They let you figure out what to do by using "Help". Sometimes "Help" is no "Help". My advice to you is, if you can not figure out the "Zone" exercises just go on. I found one answer in the "Intermediate" book. Another at a book store.
With all that, the book is well written. They have you do the same thing more than once and sometimes in different ways. It earns 5 star's.
I am now starting on the "essentials Access 2000 intermediate" book. Look for that review.
List price: $29.95 (that's 30% off!)
As with many historians in their treatment of the Battle of Little Big Horn, he jumps to dogmatic conclusions fairly easily when he seeks to cast blame (as on Benteen for "dawdling") and when he attributes to Custer the wise deployment of his troop resources. See for example at page 177: "---he (Custer) was relieved to see that Reno had halted to form a skirmish line and was only lightly engaged. He should now be able to hold out until Custer's larger force could get into action". Gray does not tell us how he managed to communicate with Custer in the after life in order to ascertain these feelings of Custer. He further ignores the testimony of John Martin (the trumpeter who took the message to Benteen) to the court of inquiry that Custer exulted over catching the Indians "napping".
In reaching some of these dogmatic conclusions, Gray simply buys into the overstatement of many historians who find some thin support for their fictionalized conclusions.
However, this book is an excellent narrative of the troop and scouting maneuvers leading up to and following the battle. He also writes at the beginning of the book an excellent summary of the cultural conflicts that led to this tragedy for all involved----the soldiers and the Indians.
We spent the entire afternoon talking about his book. There was one question that I was anxious to get answered. Why did he write less than a page about the Custer fight itself? Gray didn't really know what happened during that battle, so there really wasn't much to say. I laughed but it made sense.
This book is not about the Custer fight, but about the entire campaign of the Sioux War of 1876 and it is filled with new revelations about the causes and events of this war. Most interesting is Gray's narrative about the White House meeting between Grant and his aides concerning how they should deal with the Sioux problem and why they started a war.
The book is filled with detailed maps of the Indian movements during the campaign, where and when they camped and for how long. The same is done for soldier column movements.
There is an excellent analysis of the size of the warrior force at the Little Bighorn that historians accept to this day. The numbers will surprise you.
If you have not read much on the Sioux war, then I highly recommend this book. You'll learn that the Custer fight was just one of many events of a long brutal, bloody war.
The sequencing of this book is well thought out. Each chapter focuses on a different kind of tactic (such as discovered check, double attacks, zugzwang, removing the defender, and so on), and the problems often are paired so that once you've solved one problem in 2 moves, the next one is a related problem in 3 moves that might have seemed insoluble before. A final chapter combines all the tactics and asks students to figure out what approach is the best for a given position.
It only took me about a week to pass through this book, but I enjoyed filling it in. The enclosed Answer Key was easy to use, as it reproduces the move sequences in their entirety, rather than just providing the answers to the blanks. Worth the money for beginners of any age.
After finishing this book, I immediately played a game where I was able to move a knight into a royal fork that was simultaneously a discovered check. I don't think I would have "seen" this possibility before reading this book.
Having said that, this book is a great way to start to practice seeing tactical motiffs (mostly forms of a double attack: pins, forks, skewers, and so on). It is divided into chapters with each chapter focused on a different kind of tactic. After a very brief explanation about what the tactic is, there are a number of exercises in which you have to find the tactic for yourself. There are also hints if you are stuck. I found it helpful to make a little cut-out from some paper to cover the hints and only show the board instead. It is too easy to inadvertently see the hints and ruin the challenge.
The book has some very useful advice about how to study: do the first few exercises of each chapter to get an overview of all the tactical motiffs. This will help you start to use and see them in your games. Later, go back and do each chapter thoroughly. Also, chapters are arranged in order of importance; motiffs that occur most frequently are handled first.
This book has a couple of limitations. Although it helps you see a tactic, the very nature of an exercise book is that you know one is there. How do you find them in a real game? You have to know when to look for them. There are certain board factors where you are likely to find tactics (an exposed enemy king often means there are great tactical opportunities). This book does nothing to help you realize this. Look at Silman's "Reassess Your Chess" for a very short, but extremely useful discussion of this issue.
Also, most of the exercises fall under one of the categories, so you know what kind of tactic to look for, making it easier than a real game situation. The last chapter helps because it is a mix of all tactical motiffs, but there are relatively few of these. Reinfeld's book of 1001 problems is probably a nice supplement in this regard.
These are limitations of the book, but not really criticisms. The book does a very good job doing what it is meant to do. The reader should simply realize that there is a bigger picture to look at and supplement accordingly.
The portrait he gives of the different negotiating abilities of French's Clemenceau, United States' president Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George is a devastating picture of the different motives each one of them had at the time: the aim of Clemenceau was to exact revenge to French's traditional enemy and to debilitate Germany as much as possible, thus postponing her return to prosperity and to menace again France. WIlson's, portrayed as a good man but lacking any negotiating feature a man of his stature should have, was a frail man only to save his face in the moral stances he took in his preliminary 14 points Armistice proposal, which led to the initial surrender of the Germans to the Allied forces. The British Lloyd George was only worried about upcoming elections in his country and was playing all the cards (good or bad) he had to save himself from an humiliating defeat to the Liberals.
The outcome of it all was a Peace Treaty who despised each and every point of reality, representing a burden Germany would not be able to pay, thus leading to the dismantling of an economic European system that led famine, social disturbance and finally to the World War II.
The book is a best-seller ever since and very easy to read and should be also recommended to every one interested in the power broker skills one has to have to succeed (Clemenceau) or fail (Wilson) in negotiation as hard as this one.
Keynes starts with providing a dazzling psychological analysis on how the treaty came to be.
"When President Wilson left Washinghton he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history ... Never had a philosopher help such weapons wherewith to bind the princes of this world. How the crowds of the European capitals presses about the carriage of the President! With what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the features and bearing of the man of destiny who, coming from the West, was to bring healing to the wounds of the ancient parent of this civilization and lay for us the foundations and the future"
Alas, this was not to be. American idealism, French quest for security and British distaste for alliances and hypocrisy created an unworkable solution. Soul of the treaty was sacrificed to placate domestic political process, and as the result put Germany in the position of defiance and economic insolvency; the position which at the bottom drew sympathy from the former Allies and as the result contributed to brutality of the second conflict.
Keynes draws a picture of pan-European economy which was destroyed by the treaty and rightfully predicted that not only Germany will not be able to pay, but will be obligated to pursue the expansionist policy at the expense of her weak Eastern neighbors. Treaty did not contain any positive economic programme for rehabilitation of the economic life of Central powers and Russia. One just could not disrupt the economic position of the greatest European land power, at the same time strengthening it geo-politically and suffer no horrible retribution. ""The Peace Treaty of Versailles: This is not Peace. It is an Armistice
for twenty years." - said Foch about such a agreement.
Return of the Badmen also featured Ryan's grim portrait of a cold-blooded bank robber that elevates an otherwise pedestrian horse opera to something nearly sublime. Other choice Ryan vignettes can be found in such early Ryan enterprises like Marine Raiders. Made in 1944 when America was fighting the Japanese, Ryan gives a stout performance that achieves real range, again raising a programmer to cult status. The author provides detailed film critiques from major publications (Time, The New York Times, Variety, etc.), providing readers with a glimpse at what critics of those time periods said about Ryan. I was pleased to note upon reading critical reviews of Ryan's character in Marine Raiders that film critic Manny Farber of Nation magazine compared Ryan with Gary Cooper, though in all honesty, Ryan easily outclassed Cooper as an actor. Perhaps Farber was referring to Ryan's quiet magnetism.
Jarlett addresses the question of Ryan's status as the cinema's epitome of the "noir" protagonist, noting his contributions in such "noir" gems as The Racket, Act of Violence, The Woman on the Beach, Beware, My Lovely, Caught, On Dangerous Ground (John Houseman lauded his portrayal of a disillusioned cop as a "disturbing mixture of anger and sadness"). I cannot think of another actor who deserved a book devoted to his life and works besides Ryan. Kudos to Franklin Jarlett for giving us his gift.
Jarlett illuminates the off-screen actor's life, noting that the actor and his wife founded the Oakwood School in California, which stills remains viable today as a solid, academically oriented institution of higher learning.
Besides the fifty or so movie stills, Jarlett's book features interviews with those closest to Ryan, and a glowing preface by John Houseman, who worked closely with Ryan on various stage productions before they became a fad.