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Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: the USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 267 pp. trans from French by Keith Martin.
Although Jacques Levesque's book The Enigma of 1989 contains few startling revelations, it highlights succinctly the larger ironies of Gorbachev's foreign policy in the last years of the Soviet empire. This highly readable book consists of three parts: one dealing with "the place of Eastern Europe in Gorbachev's political project; another examining individual East European countries; and the third part focusing on German reunification and the end of the Warsaw Pact. Since the book seems to be more about Gorbachev and the USSR than Eastern Europe, the original French title, La Fin d'un Empire, captures the book's essence a bit better than the one provided for the English translation: [The End of an Empire]. One irony that Levesque articulates to some degree concerns Gorbachev's motives for perestroika, and novoe myshlenie [new thinking]. Was Gorbachev truly inspired by these new ideas, or was he merely making a virtue out of a necessity? In the beginning of his book, Levesque points out how the USSR was lagging behind economically, despite its success in projecting military power in the 1970s. The war in Afghanistan in particular was draining Soviet resources. NATO officials had decided to place Pershing II missiles in Europe, and Reagan initiated the Star Wars project, with which Soviet leaders knew they could not compete. By withdrawing from Afghanistan, initiating bold disarmament proposals, disavowing the use of military force to solve conflicts, praising and paying dues to the United Nations, Gorbachev could score great public relations successes and put Reagan on the defensive for dubbing the USSR the "Evil Empire." Gorbachev was saavy, probably the most highly educated Soviet General Secretary. He was no doubt conscious of the practical advantages of his ideas. Yet later events indicate that Gorbachev may have begun to believe his own ideas too intensely, to the point of naivety .For example, in a 1997 speech at Rice University in Texas, when former Secretary of State James Baker awarded him the Enron Prize for Public Service, Gorbachev explained that perhaps the Soviet Union actually "won" the Cold War because it first understood that 21st century problems require global efforts and that the superpowers' arms race was suicidal. As Levesque points out, from 1985 to 1987, Gorbachev focused most on improving Soviet-American relations, by building the United States' trust in the USSR, by initiating arms control proposals, and other measures. He spoke repeatedly about "replacing the balance of power" with a "balance of interests." But in focusing on the United States-Levesque argues-Gorbachev "neglected" Eastern Europe, the traditional Soviet sphere of influence (p. 90). By claiming repeatedly that the Soviet Union would no longer "interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states" and no longer use military force to settle conflicts, Gorbachev won the admiration of many Americans, but also undercut the authority of the communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. How could Gorbachev genuinely have believed that after forty-odd years of maintaining hegemony over Eastern Europe by the use or threat of military force, that Moscow could retain that power without such pressure? Did he really believe, to quote Levesque, that "perestroika could co-opt a significant part of the opposition through its progression," so that "the [communist parties in each of the Warsaw Pact countries], acting through the Popular Fronts, could become their own opposition?" (p. 82). At other times, Gorbachev behaved contradictorily: sometimes pressing for more reform, at other times temporizing (p. 84). Levesque also reminds his readers that Gorbachev and some of his colleagues may have already decided to relieve themselves of Eastern Europe, which had become a financial burden-costing the USSR perhaps $18 billion per year since the early 1980s (p. 88). END
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In 1750, the Academy of Dijon held an essay contest. The question, 'Has the restoration of the sciences & arts tended to purify morals?' The First Discourse (Discourse on the Sciences and Arts) was the winning essay. Rousseau's powerful critique of the enlightenment in modern Europe spit in the faces of the very people that were judging his work. However, Rousseau's arguments and assessment of the enlightenment were so profound that even the elite scholars of the Academy could not deny Rousseau his just recognition for superior writing and understanding of the nature of the sciences and arts and their effects on modern life.
Rousseau's Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequity) was a follow up to the first. In it, Rousseau delves deeper into the issue of human origins (i.e. the state of nature) and the cause and effects of human inequality.
No other philosopher has be praised and condemned, celebrated and written-off as much as Rousseau. His countless effects on modern life go relatively unknown. Anyone who has read Marx, must ask themselves, what history book was Marx reading. Upon reading Rousseau's Discourses, it become obvious, Marx read Rousseau. However, "Rousseau can still overpower where Marx falls flat." (Allan Bloom, 'The Closing of The American Mind,' 217.)
Rousseau is a must read for anyone who is a student of, or interested in, philosophy, political philosophy, Marxism, or simply has a longing to return to the state of nature and thinks that life would be best if we would all just "go and work in our garden." (Voltaire, 'Candide,' 144.)