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Barrrie Martyn's book is definitive in delving into these three lives particularly the section on the composer. All of Rachmaninoff's works are discussed in great detail with musical examples. The appendix contains his entire discography as well as all the works conducted and concerts given. No Rachmaninoff fan or music historian should be without this book.
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Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC
Michael Urban's book, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia contains such a wealth of important ideas that a reviewer is challenged to summarize them adequately in a mere 750 words. This excellent book deals with contemporary Russian politics from 1989 to the present, seeking in particular "to explain the rebirth of politics amid the collapse of the USSR." It lends great insight into the question of why the "democratic experiment" in Russia has not been more successful thus far. The book starts with a model of "politics," in which the authors attempt to "articulate the concept across three spheres (state, political society, and civil society) and along two dimensions (organization and communication)." In this reviewer's opinion, this first chapter is rather dry and abstruse. The remaining chapters, however, are more concrete and interesting. Chapter two turns to the so-called "pre-political period," i.e. the period before the appearance of the Gorbachev-era "informals" and the formation (in 1990) of bona fide political parties. It describes the various strategies employed by the dissident movement---launched in about 1965 with the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel--to gain political influence, These included stressing legality and using the Soviet Constitution as a weapon against the communist authorities; organizing demonstrations; appealing to the West regarding human rights violations; and documenting such abuses in publications such as the Chronicle of Current Events. The authors claim that the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s had two major weaknesses. The first was their failure to address the Russian people directly, instead focusing primarily on the communist authorities. This hindered their ability to build grassroots support. The second shortcoming--which continues to inhibit the pro-reform political parties in Russia today--was the dissidents' "abstemious attitude" toward politics and unwillingness to cooperate with the party-state. These dissident intellectuals preferred to philosophize than to compromise their ideals in the nitty-gritty organizational work. Chapters three, four, and five examine Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glasnost and the resulting mushrooming of informal organizations (neformaly). Here the authors point to an interesting paradox. Very few dissidents from the pre-political period participated in the informals, despite the fact that many of Gorbachev's ideas emerged from dissident "samizdat" publications or even official but liberal publications from the 1960s (like Novy Mir). This can be explained in part by the dissidents' traditional "abstemious attitude" toward politics mentioned above. In addition, as the authors note perceptively, after decades of basing their identity in opposition to the party-state system, the older dissidents either refused or hesitated to work within that system, in the officially sanctioned informals. Chapter six discusses the positive and negative aspects of the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. Candidates fielded by the informal groups faced tremendous difficulties, from finding a public hall in which to hold the nominating sessions, making themselves heard above the jeers of communist hecklers, and even defending themselves from physical attacks. Moreover, no organizations independent of communist tutelage had the legal right to nominate candidates.(119) Urban and his colleagues also point out that the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) could not be considered a real legislative body because it had no budgeting ("power of the purse") or lawmaking powers; all power resided in the CPSU and its executive agencies. Without a free market in the USSR there could be no genuine legislature. Moreover, given the barriers confronting the informals, most of the deputies elected to the CPD in 1989 were party apparatchiks. Ultimately the deputies owed their appointments to the Communist party, not to any constitutents in their home districts. On the positive side, however, the 1989 elections and the CPD sessions--televised live--played a vital role in mass politicization. Chapters seven, eight, and nine deal with the elections of 1990 and the formation of political parties at the close of the Soviet period. These elections, more meaningful than those the previous year, transformed the organizational dimension of Russian politics, remaking the internal constitution of the three principal forces then present on the political field (the CPSU, nationalists and neo-Stalinists, and democrats.) These political forces grew even stronger after the constitutional ban on political parties was lifted (March 1990), and the Law on the Press was passed, abolishing censorship (June 1990). Unfortunately, since the authorities had not removed the prohibition on parties until after the 1990 elections, "all the new parties were latecomers, arriving on the scene only after the ball had ended." (p. 201) With neither identifiable constituencies to represent nor upcoming elections to prepare for, the development of Russia's political parties was ingrown. The final chapters discuss the growth of "restoration" forces, which were determined to protect the CPSU against Russian nationalists, the "war of laws," and the failed coup d'etat of August 1991. Urban and his colleagues also observe Yeltsin's autocratic behavior after the failed coup and his missed opportunities which greatly hindered his economic reform program and impeded the growth of strong democratic parties. The October 1993 skirmish between the executive and legislative branches resulted from Yeltsin's failure to call for new elections immediately after the coup. In addition, the fractiousness of the democratic parties and groups in Russia today stem from Yeltsin's reluctance to support them. In 1990 Yeltsin suspended his membership in DemRossiya (a large amorphous bloc of democratic groups), following his election to the post of chairperson of Russia's Supreme Soviet. To make matters worse, in April, 1991--when DemRossiya was mounting protests and political strikes nationwide in hope of bringing down the communist order there and then--Yeltsin "pulled the rug from under DemRossiya by cutting a deal with Gorbachev" that commenced negotiations with eight other republics (the nine-plus-one process) to rescue the federal union and restore civil peace. (p.242) Thus Yeltsin has exhibited a tendency to detach himself from his supporters as soon as his immediate objectives had been reached. Urban and his colleague claim that Yeltsin's avoidance of responsibility to his base, along with the latter's reluctance to demand it, can be counted as a major missed opportunity to provide structure to Russian political society. It directly contributed to DemRossiya's disintegration, to the power struggle between the executive and legislature in communism's aftermath, and to the fall of the first Russian republic. In short this is an excellent book for anyone who wishes to understand the growth of Russian political society in the 1989-1997 period.
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This is virtually the only manual I have ever used which I would recommend. I have had very bad luck with instruction manuals (for just about every computer product) before, most of them are only useful as doorstops. But if you want complete information presented step-by-step, very clearly, this is a great book.
Since using this book, I have actually begun to do some freelance work as a database programmer. I know it sounds corny, but it is TRUE...