Having read the unabridged version I approached this abridgement. My experience can be described as comparing the painting of the Mona Lisa with a pencil rendition. The absence of the appendices and the explanatory footnotes together with the gouged text made less traumatic with artificial bridging (abridgement) results in nothing more than a mere pencil sketch of a true masterpiece. There is no substitute for the full version.

Puller carried a copy of these works with him throughout WWII and Korea. Enough said.

My uncle had read the three volume series of Mr. Freeman's work on Robert E. Lee's generals and wanted me to do the same. If I start something I like to finish it and I just didn't want to conquer the couple thousand pages in the three volumes so I opted for the one volume abridgement. It is well written, a classic of Civil War history, and gave great insight into the minds and actions of the Confederate military leadership. From reading the introduction this abridgement was made possible not by excising the main text, but by eliminating a majority of the voluminous notes and addendum material present in the three volume series. I don't know what I missed, but what remained was fascinating, extremely readable, and well recommended. At this point I would be very interested in acquiring and reading the three volume set.

A star-studded cast, but not a lot of topical or scholarly innovation in this collection of essays. Many of the essays seem to be simple narratives of battles that whole books have been published about elsewhere. There are some interesting bits -- Griffith's article on tactics is a bright spot, as is Trudeau on entrenchment. In this sort of work, though, I'm really looking for more innovative, new scholarship, and that's not what I see here.

I'm unable to refrain from mentioning that I feel the concept of Jackson having a "learning disability" is poppycock. I recommend Robertson's biography of the general.

I am greatly torn over whether to give With My Face to the Enemy three or four stars. Four stars ultimately prevails because it seems to me that just about any book about the Civil War is almost by definition worth reading, and there is much in With My Face to the Enemy that will please both Civil War aficionados and those with but a passing interest. Of particular moment are two articles about the Confederate pirate ships (and let's be honest, they *were* pirate ships sans the physical violence) Alabama and Shenandoah, which reveal the genuinely global reach of the conflict. Every article has something to recommend it, even if, like Stephen Sears' essay on Chancellorsville, you've read it all before.

But there are some flaws, too. Most glaring and annoying is the lack of an index. Is there any Civil War student who does not rush to the index first to find references to his (or her) favorite general or battle? No such luck here; you'll have to read the entire book for those brief references to Howard, Hancock, McPherson, et al. Second, the articles lack two of the major selling points of military history magazines - color maps and illustrations. Now, I'm a big boy and I don't *need* pictures with my text, but often the art that accompanies an MHQ article is more powerful than the text. Third, there is a fault that lies with far too many Civil War pieces: biographies of important figures devolving into hagiographies. For too many Civil War biographers their subject can do, and did no, wrong. Crowley himself uses the word "hagiography" in one of his introductions. Whether it's Stonewall or Lee, or Admiral Porter or Sheridan, the lavish praise becomes tiring. And the final gripe to be made is toward Crowley's introductions, which borrow too liberally from the essays, adding nothing yet stealing the thunder of the contributors. (The same complaint can be made of Crowley's introductions to the What If? series.)

These are not much more than petty gripes, however. The Civil War remains a fascinating topic, and With My Face to the Enemy provides a wide range of essays covering many areas of the war. The collection deserves a spot on the bookshelf.

This collection of essays, compiled by Donald and Cowley, is a real treat. It offers a nice mix of storylines from both Union and Confederate perspectives. Maps abound to assist the text pertaining to various battles/troop movements. A word of caution, however - these essays have been collected from past issues of Military History Quarterly. This may explain why no notes or bibliographies are offered. Many of these offerings present novel twists on Civil War subjects - Lincoln's genius with the English language, Charles Stone's ordeal with the Federal legislature and Nathan Bedford Forrest's role at Ft. Pillow are just three of 30+ topics brought to bear. Finally, on a structural note, this book is 500+ pages of somewhat small print.

I picked up this biography after reading Sears' "To the Gates of Richmond" which fascinated me with it's portrait of McClellan. Always suspecting he was being conspired against or being faced with overwhelming enemy forces, General McClellan has got to be one of America's most paranoid military figures. I hoped that a book devoted to his life would add some insight regarding this failing in a supposed military genius. Unfortunately, although the book reinforces the charcter of McCLellan with further incident, I finished without getting the feeling that I understood the sources of his fears. I've loved Mr Sears' other books on the Civil War and its various campaigns. The high quality of his other histories left me a little disappointed with this outing.

I had profound understanding of George McClellan after reading this book. Stephen Sears, I thought did a fantastic job in bring the truth about this historical character. Some readers may be slightly turned off by this biography since Sears proves to be totally unforgiving toward McClellan. His mistakes, personality and his delusions are presented here starkly, honestly and without mercy. But before anyone think this is a hack job on poor McClellan, think again. Sears presented his facts clearly, logically and with candor. Of course, McClellan wasn't a total dunderhead. He created the famous Army of the Potomac, organized it, reformed it and gave it life which lasted until the end of the war. For that, he deserves the thanks of the Union and a honor place among the heroes of the North. But what curse McClellan was his abilities as a combat leader. McClellan simply didn't know how to used this terrible swift sword, acting as if it was made of glass instead. Sears made it plain that his ineptness as the battle commander doomed McClellan's reputation forever. By far, this book will be considered as a definitive biography on George McClellan for some times to come. When you read it, you will discovered why Robert E. Lee loved him so much as his opposing commander. I would too if I was Lee!!

My greatgrandfather lost his leg the morning after "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded at Chancellorsville and within a few hundred yards of the site. Therefore, over the years, I have read everything I could find on the battle, including Bigelow's classic account and the more recent accounts by Furgurson and Sears. Theodore A. Dodge (1842-1909) describes what it was like to be surprised and routed by Jackson's troops at the end of the historic "Flank March" and how his Eleventh Corps of the Union Army participated in the fierce and costly fight. Although it was first published in 1881, we can thank Da Capo for reprinting Dodge's book with an Introduction by Stephen Sears. The correspondence between Hooker, Lee and Lincoln that is printed at the end of the book furnishes insight into the aftermath of a horrendous battle. Recommended.

When I look at the flood of books published on the Battle of Gettysburg, I always ask, "What does this book add to the existing body of knowledge?" That's my benchmark for measuring the worth of one of these books.

The answer, in this case, is, unfortunately, "absolutely nothing". Mr. Sears writes majestically, which is the saving grace. However, the scope of his research pales by comparison to Noah Andre Trudeau's fine work of 2002.

It's also well-known that Mr. Sears does not walk the ground of the battles he writes about, and that becomes obvious as you read this book. Compare his work with Gordon Rhea's, and this quickly becomes evident. It's very clear that Rhea spends many hours on the ground and has an intimate knowledge of how the terrain played into the battle's development. His detailed descriptions of the terrain and the role of the terrain in the development of battle are some of the best features of Rhea's work. Such intimate knowledge of the ground is clearly lacking in Mr. Sears' work, and it soon becomes painfully obvious here. How an accomplished historian such as Mr. Sears can write about these actions without having an intimate knowledge of the terrain really is a mystery to me.

Mr. Sears always seems to have a theme to his works. His Antietam book and his book on the Richmond Campaign both revolve around the "bash McClellan" theme. His Chancellorsville book is a strident defense of the indefensible, Joe Hooker. This book stanuchly defends the actions of James Longstreet. I happen to be a Longstreet supporter, but my biggest problem with Mr. Sears' approach is that it starts with the presumptions of his themes, and then the entire story is woven to support these themes. Accordingly, objective history is not the result--instead, each book is "spun" to put the slant on the battle that Mr. Sears has selected as the theme for each book. I think that's unfortunate.

In short, if you just want a good, easy read that provides no real insight into the Battle of Gettysburg, read this book. If you want a detailed, exceptionally well-researched critical analysis, spend your money on Noah Andre Trudeau's excellent _Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage_.

This reviewer agrees with the reviewer from Washington, D.C. that the book is a great read, but in the end--so what? It is well written, well organized, and an outstanding production job. Lift the book and you know it is a B-O-O-K. Certainly it is not White Mane trash.

I have been purchasing Sears's books since his "Landscape Turned Red" on Antietam (Murfin's book is still better, but Sears's is better written), but have become increasingly turned off by three things.

First, his manuscript and field research can be chartitably described as "light." When I heard he was about to release his Richmond Campaign book in the early 1990s, our Roundtable was doing a tour there and one of the rangers or historians at the site was shocked to learn a book on HIS park was coming out and he had not heard a thing about it. Sears had not visited, walked the ground or, apparently, sat and purused the manuscript sources at the park. A friend of mine who really knows the campaign had folder after folder of readily available manuscript sources from a variety of institutions--only about 20% of which ever saw the light of day in the book. As a serious student, that stuck with me. In the new Gettysburg book, I did not see any sources I have not previously seen in many other books. There may be a couple, but not much original research to turn over other stones seems to have been done. I am sure he has visited the field many times, though.

The second thing that drives me nuts is that he globs his end notes together in bunches, so that it is often difficult, and occasionally impossible, to determine what source goes with what factual tidbit, quote, or observation. This does not bother some of my CW reading friends, and it is fashionable in some circles to do so. Serious historians avoid that cheesy method. But with the high quality of research being conducted today, it is a lazy way to work, period. That, too, might be a charitable description.

Last, I have tried hard to see Sears on the Civil War circuit--to no avail. I can not find a single person who has seen him at a Round Table meeting. Our Round Table, a sizeable organization, invited him a few years ago and he declined. Gallagher, Krick, Rhea, Robertson, Jack Davis, et. al, happily appear, defend their work, and mingle with the little people. Not Sears, apparently. Why not?

Sears's book on "Chancellorsville" is the best single volume on that campaign, but Coddington is still the king of the single volume Gettysburg study. That, together with about six others (Pfanz, Hess, Bowden, and Stewart), together with the "Gettysburg Magazine" from Morningside and "The Bacheldor Papers" is money better spent.

If you want a really good read (with odd gaps in the personal stories department, as noted in another review on this page), buy this book. If you are hoping for something new, you will be disappointed.

There are two Civil War writers who concentrate on the Eastern Theater of the war, and are prominent enough to garner attention outside their field. One is Stephen W. Sears, the other is Noah Andre Trudeau. Sears has concentrated on the first half of the war, mostly writing about the campaigns of George McClellan, while Trudeau has worked in the last half of the war, making a name for himself as the best-known chronicler of Grant's Overland Campaign in 1864. Last year, Trudeau presented us with Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, a long and very good account of the battle and its consequences. It seems these two historians have met in the middle of the war, because we are now presented with Stephen W. Sears' simply titled Gettysburg.

Sears is a different writer than Trudeau, and he presents the battle in a different fashion, the book in a different manner. While Trudeau's book is long and dense (no illustrations, ca. 600 pages of text), Sears' book is considerably shorter, and more accessible. It has illustrations, either photographs of the participants or artwork done by participants or witnesses. Since they take up space on the page, and I would judge the font to be a point or two larger, my guess is this book is a good 25% shorter than Trudeau's. That makes it more accessible (as does the inclusion of illustrations, one shortcoming of Trudeau's book) and easier to read. It's not, however, a book for beginners.

Sears is of course interested in the battle and why it came out the way it did, not just recounting what happened during the fighting. He echoes many of Trudeau's judgements, differs with some others, but makes some of his own. Most of his verdict on the battle and the performance of the generals involved is nothing new to Civil War buffs, and won't make fans of R.E. Lee happy. Each of the generals who were active on the battlefield gets some treatment of his effect on the battle.

One illuminating section was on the Military Intelligence branch Hooker had set up, which Meade kept, called the Bureau of Military Information. The officers in charge of this kept track of intelligence, assimilated, evaluated, and sorted it, and presented it to Meade regularly during the campaign. Lee had no such organization, and of course Stuart, who performed some of the duties involved, was away riding around the Union army. This provided Meade with a considerable advantage: he knew which Confederate troops were on the battlefield, and was aware he would be facing an attack led by Pickett's division on the third day, because the B.M.I. hadn't interrogated any prisoners from that division yet. Lee, by contrast, fought the battle under the impression that only part of the Union army was on the battlefield, because the Confederates didn't do the same thing.

In direct comparison with Trudeau, Sears is perhaps a bit of a better writer, but Trudeau provides more detail. Sears' narrative is sorted conventionally, with the fighting on a particular part of the battlefield being dealt with before he moves on to the next portion. The author even puts the cavalry action to the east of Gettysburg, and Farnsworth's charge, into an after-the-battle chapter, recounting them after telling the story of Pickett's charge, even though the cavalry fight took place before. Trudeau spends a lot of time dealing with individual regimental colonels, and their fights: Sears largely confines himself to brigade commanders. Both books try to place the battle in the larger context of the Civil War and American history. Both books discuss, briefly, the Gettysburg Address.

So, which book do you buy? I would think buffs of the battle or the war will want both. If you're a general reader who wishes to read something on the battle itself, Sears' book is more accessible than Trudeau's because of length and illustrations, but that's the only real difference between the two.

I feel that Mr. Sears book is just another example of what historians can do with selected facts. In brief, to write, in his comments between chapters, such rubish, shows whatkind of a historian he is. The bottom line is that either McClellan was right,(the only General R.E. Lee's daughter said he ever feared, and R.E. Lee when asked who was the greatest Union General, he said McClellan by a longshot,) and he could have ended the Civil War in its first year (with some well deserved help from Lincoln) or else Lincoln the subject of so many myths was right. But then, how many remember that he did the same to the General who won at Gettysburgh, fired him. Yet Gettysburgh is part of our heritage. I am hoping to write a book to set the record straight, not depending on todays' revisionist historiaans but original texts, books articles written by those who survived to tell it as it was.

This may be one of the most exceptional pieces of writing of his time as well as of today. You can't find this anywhere I know except here, so snatch it up as quickly as you came

Gets low marks for editing. The editor has excised parts he thinks are repetitive or boring, but in some cases these clearly dealt with the technical details of handling artillery, and would have been of great use to the reader.

The colonel of the 1st NY Artillery, Wainwright is interesting as an anti-abolitionist and a fan of McClellan up to the very end. His comment that he wouldn't trust Massachusetts or Pennsylvania not to secede if conditions were reversed (p. 207) is interesting, reflecting the strong allegiance to state in the North as well as the South. His views on the cynicism of abolitionists are intriguing as well; he believed that the radicals were deliberately prolonging the war to gain political power. His account of the fighting on Culp's Hill at Gettysburg is quite detailed.

Not a great deal of new insight here. I did learn a bit more than I knew, however, about Meade's failure to pursue at Gettysburg. Mr. Boritt is the editor and author of one essay; other essays are by four historians: Stephen W. Sears, Mark E. Neely, Jr., Michael Fellman, and John Y. Simon. (Alan J. Jacobs