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In discussing the technological selection process, the author Robert Pool makes much of the power of incumbency. A new technology does not arise form nothing but is developed in a co-evolution between scientific progress and societal capabilities. It is developed by human beings who live in a particular point in history and thus have their values and practices shaped in a specific manner. Any technology that is developed will have to be compatible with the social and technical attitudes prevailing at that time. Pool shows in his discussion of the development of the Watt steam engine that the engine was developed taking into full account the attitudes of the people who would have to implement and manufacture it. Watt could scientifically demonstrate the need for tight tolerances to maximize efficiency but his engine was being developed in an era of craft workman who could not see the necessity of such tolerance. Watt was compelled to set up controlled manufacturing sites where he could build machines to the required tolerances. It would have been more efficient to manufacture the engines in place with local labour but that could not be done in the ethos of that time.
Mistakes once made in the development of technology will propagate themselves in the social and technical attitudes of the people involved in its continuing development. Pool shows how nuclear power developed within the technological attitudes of military propulsion and civilian power generation. Pool shows how attitudes in these domains shaped the technological choices and how these choices were not the best either technically or commercially. Pool's analysis of the power of incumbency and the multi-armed bandit is excellent here.
The second part of the book talks of central place of technology in our society. Technology has moved far from the time of Watt. Now, technology is so complex that no one human being can be aware of all that factors that go into the development and operation of a major new invention. The implication of this is that no one can understand and predict the operation of a major invention in all circumstances. Technological risk cannot be obviated by the building of entirely predictable systems. Rather risk has become probabilistic with designs being created to hopefully prevent failures causing major loss of life or economic loss rare.
Society must decide if the risks inherent in a technology are acceptable given the benefits tha can be derived from it. Since no complex technology is predictable this acceptance must in some manner be built around a faith in our societies ability to cope with uncertainty. Since no technology can be proved safe in all circumstances, society must be shaped in such a way that it can rapidly cope with unexpected serious failures.
This analysis shows the basic disagreement between the neo-Luddites or technological pessimists and the technological optimists. Pool discusses the work of a Yale sociologist named Charles Perrow who argues that complex technologies cannot be so maintained. They are rife with un-understood emergent properties that render them unmanageable. They are so complex that they cannot be understood by any one person and therefore must be managed centrally and hierarchically by enforcing detailed operation procedures that are the result of long term research by multiple specialists. On the other hand they are prone to unexpected failures and so must be managed locally by workers who can respond to serious contingencies. According to Perrow this is a contradiction that shows that some technologies cannot be managed so as to prevent losses due to accidents. Perrow calls these 'normal accidents'. This is a statement of technological pessimism and is one that calls foe the aggressive use of the 'precautionary principle' in rejecting technologies that cannot be proved safe. Since this is true of most modern technologies it seems as if society must give up the benefits of modern technology in order to remain safe.
However there are many large complex technological systems that function safely. Pool uses the research of Berkeley political science professor Todd a Porte to show this. La Porte discovered may organizations that were managing large scale technologies in a very safe and efficient manner. The characteristic of these organizations is that they combine the properties that Perrow said wee incompatible. The combine a centralized hierarchical control of best practices with distributed local control able to cope with contingencies. La Porte shows how these function in the operation or the US air traffic control systems, military organizations such as aircraft carriers, large chemical manufacturing companies such as Dupont. These overlay a central concern with best practices with an educated workforce who are expected to montitor their own activities, communicate and learn.
This insight demonstrates the technological pessimism inherent in analyses like Perrow's can be overcome. Society can shape itself to be able to benefit from modern technology. Since this benefit will derive from the actions of an educated, self-initiating, learning middle class, technology can also indirectly create social good.
This is book well worth reading. One fault in the book is that Pool does not outline his argument anywhere. In no one pace does he give a clear summery of his ideas. An introduction and a final summary would have improved the book. Nevertheless this is a book this it found to be full of insight. It one that is well worth reading.
Indeed, Mr.Pool began his book as a history of the US Nuclear Power Industry, but changed his topic as several other authors beat him to it ("Nuclear Choices" by R. Wolfson and "Nuclear Renewal" by R. Rhodes). It is a good thing they did, otherwise he would not have looked at this as merely a case study, in which to frame socio-technological interaction. The eight areas that are covered; momentum, idea creation, business, complexity, choices, risk, control and trade-offs are very quickly paced and liberally sprinkled with very poignant references. His thematic review of the subject matter is similar to the author Lisa Jardine's histories of the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution. The most frequently referred to text is Kuhn's classic "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions." This book could be viewed as the technological adaptation of Kuhn's scientific applications.
There are no ways in which the text disappoints, and it would be difficult to endorse it any more enthusiastically than I am. This book will be of benefit to anyone that works in technology, has a general interest in that area, is curious about nuclear power, or is simply looking for a good book.