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After describing the background to the battle, he presents an edited version of a contemporary account (that of William the Breton). This is followed by a general commentary on the ideology of peace, war, and battle in the twelfth century. Duby then analyses the evolution of the legends that sprang from Bouvines - in the centuries following the battle and, after its 18th century revival, in modern French historiography. Some of the sources for the battle are included as an appendix.
The Legend of Bouvines has a rare gem. Duby writes in the present tense, with a polished but effective prose, and brings alive both the ideals and the realities of warfare in high medieval France.
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bloody feud unresolved since 1947. "Cursed is the Peacemaker" is
the go-to book for the historical drama of what it took to
negotiate that brief shining moment when there was-- as close as
it gets-- to a cease-fire between Israelis vs. Palestinians and
others in the Arab world.
Author John Boykin (a former editor at Stanford Magazine)
recounts the gripping story through the eyes and viewpoint of
Philip Habib, Reagan's Special Envoy charged with the enormous
task of staunching the bloodshed and destruction in Beirut in
1982...in 1947 and left with an unfulfilled United Nations mandate that
was to have been, like Israel, the provision for their homeland,
some Palestinians relocated to West Beirut where Palestinian
leaders carried on the battle against Israel, which retaliated.
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut to
destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) once and
for all. The PLO is the umbrella of organizations that leads the
Palestinian diaspora.
President Reagan gave Habib, the Brooklyn-born son of Lebanese
immigrants, the task of talking to the warring sides and
persuading them to make some changes. Everything from vitally
important matters down to the price of Israeli pickles was thrown
on the table and it was up to Habib to sort it out. He convinced
the Israelis to stop shooting long enough for thousands of
Palestinian guerrillas to sail from the Mediterranean port city
under the watchful eyes of a multi-national force of 800 U.S.
Marines, 900 French and 500 Italian soldiers. This was no easy
feat. Habib persuaded the Palestinians to leave their families
behind in the West Beirut refugee areas of Sabra and Shatila with
their safety guaranteed by the multi-national force and the word
of Ariel Sharon.
This very readable story explains how imperfectly Habib
accomplished his task and yet how Habib's work stands as the
blueprint for the diplomacy that a person of iron will and
stature will need if ever there is to be a negotiated end to
this war that rips at the heartland of Christian, Jewish and
Muslim civilizations.
Boykin recounts the history in an engaging way and he's careful
not to assert his own opinions. The viewpoints he presses are
those that he documents were those of Habib, the talented, hard-
working, often gruff U.S. negotiator.
The book's completeness is a tribute to Boykin's persistence in
using, among other resources, the Freedom Of Information Act,
archives at Georgetown University's Foreign Affairs Oral History
Program, and extensive interviews with Habib's peers, his bosses
and underlings to piece together this important story about a
critical juncture in the life of an historical figure who
steadfastly refused to talk to reporters during negotiations.
Boykin provides the listening post for readers to "overhear" the
blunt conversations between Habib and the Marine Colonel James
Mead whom Habib came to rely upon to keep warring parties apart.
But Mead was no patsy. While he came to grudgingly respect Habib,
he was protective of those in his command. Boykin lays out the
negotiating positions of the various sides, noting that the
intransigence, the absolutist positions by Israel and Syria were
non starters.
Boykin conducted interviews with dozens of well-known diplomatic
players who knew Habib well-- everyone from Nobel Laureate Oscar
Sanchez Arias to Henry Kissinger (who knew Habib from his days
negotiating an end to the U.S. war in Viet Nam).
It can safely be said that there can be no peace in the Middle
East until there is a measure of justice for the massacre at
Sabra and Shatila, refugee camps that resemble acres of the
crowded tenement buildings that dot working class areas of New
York City. In these camps, Christian Phalangists went door to
door wantonly murdering more than 800 Palestinians while Israeli
soldiers stood guard seeing to it that no Palestinian could
escape. Details of what led to the massacre, for which even the
Israelis hold Ariel Sharon culpable, are of historical
importance.
Boykin describes what went on behind the scenes just before the
massacre of Palestinians on September 16-18, 1982. It was the
tragedy Habib had labored all summer to prevent and in the end,
he didn't, in part because Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
withdrew the Marines who were charged with keeping the warring
parties apart. When the Marines left, the French and Italians
also left Beirut. That their families would be protected was the
key to persuading the Palestinians to lay down their guns and
leave Beirut. That Ariel Sharon broke his word and allowed his
soldiers to stand guard while mass murder was committed can not
be glossed over, especially since two decades later, Sharon
became Israel's elected leader.
This story is a microcosm for what has gone wrong in the Middle
East. If peace is to come to the region, this story may contain
kernels of the reconstructed blueprint for what, along with iron will, is needed to find a peaceful solution.
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Note to editorial Reviewers: India entered the nuclear club in May 1974 and not in May 1998 as suggested by some of your reviews.
Some highlights of the book.
* The term nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" was coined by Homi Bhabha initially and used by others and till date has been central to putting forth our country's opposition to NPT and CTBT.
* University of Chicago's late Prof. Chandrasekhar's refusal to head the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) after the death of patriot Dr. Homi Bhabha.
* One of my disappointment is the author's avoidance in the discussion of the cause of the death of Dr. Homi Bhabha, even though such an incident is beyond the scope of this book. Since Bhabha provided the impetus and leadership during the nuclear program's infancy, I expected the author to throw some light on this issue.
* Vikram Sarabhai's hatred for Nuclear tests is news, especially since he was heading the Atomic Energy commision. As a spaceman it is surprising that he headed the organization in the first place.
* Indira Gandhi's refusal to allow more nuclear tests after 1974 stemmed from her abhorence for anything nuclear after her post-Pokhran I experiences. This is contrary to the popular belief - international pressure.
* Most sections of the book has an objective view of the Indian nuclear scenario except the last few chapters where the author seems to bend towards India signing the CTBT and the NPT. Or atleast implying that India's moral stand on nuclear issue was defeated after the May 98 tests.
* BJP (and its predecessor Jana Sangh) has been the only political party to openly campaign for Nuclear power.