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Vladimir Andrle's book, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Russia covers roughly the period from the regime of Tsar Alexander III to the beginning of Gorbachev's leadership. Andrle seeks to present the social context of Russian history. He incorporates peasant customs, family life, and folktales in his historical narrative. As he states in his preface, most Russian history texts have focused primarily on political leaders, doctrines, affairs of state, and economic policies. According to Andrle, the field lacks an introductory text on Russian social history mainly because "in Russia developments over the past hundred years have been more obviously politically driven than in the major countries of the West." The Russian people have lived under state regimes that did not permit much room for social movements independent of the state. Thus Andrle's goal is to "offer a synthesis of recent specialist studies written on "social" or "from-below" themes. He believes that the early 1900s, the 1930s, and the 1960s constitute the historical landmarks of social change in Russia. Rather than focusing exclusively on social history, however, the author explores the linkages between Russian society and government policies, and examines the ways in which society shaped the outcomes of those policies. In his first chapter, Andrle explains the "social estates" (soslovie) system, which consisted of the nobility, the merchantry, the intelligentsia, clergy, and peasantry. According to Andrle, the merchantry "had an image problem in Russian culture;" the merchant was at the bottom of the rung. The merchant (kupets) was seen as greedy, materialistic, dishonest, and most often Jewish or "semi-Asiatic." Russian peasants, workers, and intellectuals were naturally suspicious of anyone who had too much material abundance--as if abundance in itself was somehow immoral. There was a pervasive belief among Russian peasants and workers that if someone had more possessions than his neighbors, he had acquired these things illegally, and that he was unconcerned for the welfare of his neighbors. The intelligentsia in particular despised the merchantry for being too conservative and immoral. Andrle claims that "the intelligentsia, rather than an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, defined the values of progress" in the society that began to put tsarist autocracy under pressure. Moreover, the intelligentsia did not think the merchants challenged the autocracy enough. Thus it was up to the intelligentsia to be the moral voice and check the autocracy. Andrle cogently argues that the intelligentsia, both Westernizers and Slavophiles, expressed strongly anti-business views, and that the intelligentsia, perhaps because of this persuasion, had more influence over the tsarist government than the merchantry did. "After 1905," he states, "such views gained their articulate proponents, but they remained on the margins of mainstream social opinion." In this respect there was an affinity between the state bureaucracy and its usual critics (the intelligentsia). The tsarist state consequently never believed it should promote free capitalist enterprise. Drawing on Andrle's ideas, one might suggest that this same negative attitude toward the business class may still lurk beneath the surface in Russian society today. It may also have played a role in the failure of glasnost and perestroika under Gorbachev. Just as the "kupets" was perceived as corrupt, so also perhaps is the new Russian capitalist. Ordinary Russian citizens, hearing in the press (thanks to glasnost), about prosperous fellow citizens may have resented these more fortunate compatriots, especially if they themselves had tried but failed to succeed in Gorbachev's economy. Others were not interested in getting ahead. They simply viewed prosperity (monetary wealth) as fostering materialism, hence lack of spirituality. And glasnost allowed more expression of this negative attitude toward rich Russian quasi-capitalists and the new social ills that appeared to accompany them. The increased exposure of faults in Russian society may also have inspired in some a fear of taking risks and thus discouraged entrepreneurship. The more citizens read about corruption, theft, and murder (especially of bank managers), the more these citizens began to believe that their society was in a state of moral crisis. Poverty may have seemed a safer alternative to wealth and burglary. Andrle devotes a chapter to the role of the peasantry, first in sociological theory, and then specifically in Russian literature and historiography. The Russian intelligentsia for the most part perceived the peasantry as poverty-stricken, culturally backward, and in need of enlightened leadership. This general view was maintained later by Russian Marxist intellectuals like Georgy Plekhanov, Pavel Axelrod, and Vladimir Lenin, who eventually formed a radical movement exhorting the peasants (and workers) to overthrow their oppressors. The chapter also provides an intriguing investigation of the commune, family household, rites of passage, magic, religion, schools, literacy, and folktales. Another chapter deals with Stalinism and society (1929-1953) and identifies Andrle as a revisionist. He believes that the relationship between the Stalinist state and society was "not one simply of oppressor and victim." Andrle refutes the thesis that the Stalinist regime so effectively controlled its population that the outcomes of the regime's policies corresponded closely to their original goals. As he writes: "The people may have had good reasons to fear the repressive machinery of the state, but the fear did not stop them from participating in the public as well as private spheres of life as individuals with their own interests." Andrle assures the reader, however, that, in making this assertion, he does not intend to "sanitize the Stalinist regime" by glossing over the "atrocities committed on countless innocent victims" and highlighting only what some may consider the "trivial" elements of everyday life and government social policy. Indeed, in the process of modernization, Stalin may have broken a few omelettes to make an egg. One shortcoming of this work is the author's apparent failure to consult primary sources, including archival documents. Andrle merely gives a list of suggested (secondary) sources--mostly books without page numbers--at the end of each chapter. His sparse footnotes are also often presented without page numbers. In addition, the book could have been edited more thoroughly, since there are several typographical errors. For the most part, however, this is an absorbing book that would be useful in general graduate and undergraduate courses on Russian history.
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