Meg Is offered to go and work on barrier island for the summer. while she is there she meets ken, and a life guard hank. soon she starts geting memeries about her past. Now someone is trying to kill her and her memeries solve the puzzle to her past and reveil both good things and horriable things!

Chief Judge Posner's book is an erudite and interesting one. Whilst often regarded as a conservative for his scholarly analysis of economic issues in a market economy, this book is not conservative. It appears basically supportive of the sexual revolution. Its utility is at its greatest when it applies neutral economic analysis to the social aspects of sex. It is at its weakest when in the enthusiasm for the novelty and power of its analytical insights, it at least appears to derive moral or normative conclusions that do not necessarily follow from the positive analysis. It reflects the dangers that both libertarian Austrian economists, such as Ludwig von Mises and social democratic economists have both seen in trying to apply insights derived from markets to non-market transactions - here sexual ones. Accordingly, whilst Chief Judge Posner speaks supportively of certain aspects of Swedish policy in relation to sexual matters and expressly and by inference against the traditional conservative Judeo-Christian attitudes to sex in those areas, economic analysis does not dictate that viewpoint. Values dictate that choice, but economics can illumine the consequences of those choices. In sum, an able, readable, but a very personal work, which could be read by those who are not familiar with the limits to the economic analysis of law - an area Posner has brilliantly contributed so much to - as conclusively determinative of issues which cannot be resolved by that positive analysis alone. Whilst less accessible in view of the use of math, Professor Becker's works are closer to a neutral analysis of many of these important questions.

Reading Judge Posner's book is a humbling experience. Much of what I thought I knew about sex is a tiny fraction of what this book has documented, analyzed and argued.

I have known that many early Greek luminaries, such as Plato, Socrates and Sophocles were homosexual. This book puts these mere points of interest in a wholly different light by exploring the social settings of the early Grecian (Athenian) society: that the early marriages were not companionate, that women in that society, including wives, were sequestered, that boys and girls were raised separately, and not by the mother, that pederasty was almost an accepted social institution, etc.

I have always believed that homosexuality is a rooted genetically, although it is not binary factor. This book puts homosexuality, through the use of the "Kinsey scale", into different degrees and clearly distinguishes between homosexual tendency and homosexual activity, and defines the opportunistic homosexual in economic terms. With very simple reasoning, this book explains why urbanization seems (only seems) to foster homosexuality and the emergence of homosexual enclaves such as San Francisco and New York.

This book also explains, again through an economic model, why the black men in this country seem (again, only seem!) to be sexually aggressive and promiscuous, whereas sexual abuse of off-spring children (girls) have a higher incidence in white households.

I am also enlightened on how the child birth, which in the early days often caused the death of the mother, created serial polygamy (polygyny, to be more precise) and that the widower, who were older and more economically established men, puts young bachelors at a competitive disadvantage in securing a mate, especially in the early industrial society where the cost of marriage was high.

I am enlightened to the role of the Church as the promoter of companionate marriage and how its fairly profound effect on this social institution. And also why the Church "overtly condoned prostitution and covertly condoned monastic homosexuality."

There are many other issues, such as infanticide, fornication, adultery, divorce, coercive and abusive sex, pornography, adoption, surrogate child-bearing ... to which Judge Posner gave interesting and informative treatment.

The thoroughness with which Judge Posner analyzes a problem is unmatched. Although I am not always completely convinced by his reasoning (because some of the arguments are necessarily qualitative and intuitive,) but the plausibility is striking. And I am frequently amazed by the different angles with which he looks at an issue, and the amount of facts and data he brings forth to support his views. When facts contradict what his theory predicts, he graciously points that out. In the conclusion of the book, Judge Posner, with scholarly grace and modesty, points out that his work was exploratory, a learning process for himself, and was not being presented as definitive.

Judge Posner's writing style is very good. The book is never boring, though some of the information and arguments are repeated due to the inter-relatedness of many of the issues. Throughout the book, the Judge's remarkable analytic skill can be felt. At one point, the Judge mercilessly took apart the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion of the Baby M case (Stern vs. Whitehead) and clearly showed how judges, lacking knowledge on the subject matter and often ignorant about economics, proceeded to vote their own prejudices, and substituted rhetoric and sloppy logic for judicial analysis. This one episode, which clearly illustrates the reason he wrote this book, as he stated in the introduction, is worth the price of the book.

How many judges are as good as Judge Posner? Since he has published so much, chances of his ever being nominated and confirmed to be a justice of the High Court must be pretty slim, considering the infamous borking effect. This is just as well. I wishfully think his publications probably has a greater influence on the society, especially the legal community, than if he were appointed a justice.

Having read several of Judge Posner's books, I mark him down as one of a handful of top-notch intellectuals in my estimation.

In this book Richard Posner manages to singlehandedly turn legal scholarship on its head. He examines human sexuality from a myriad of perspectives--literature, sociology, evolutionary biology, morality, and history. He does so with impeccable scholarship, demonstrating not only that he is widely read in these diverse areas, but that he has something to say. The book is worth reading for just that.

But Posner's more impressive accomplishment is his singular approach to the regulation of human sexual behavior. His rational choice, economics of law approach is compelling. Even if you are not entirely convinced, Posner builds a powerful case for both academic and policy debate.

Posner's approach contrasts with most legal scholarship, which is lifeless and rarely bothers to consider the social sciences. Posner's book shows the intergal link between law, politics, and economics. It is also approachable and direct. You can't read Sex and Reason and not feel your deeply held beliefs directly challenged by a kind and discerning intellect. He is passionate, articulate, and eminently readable.

Posner's book has become a lightening rod in legal circles and is a must read for any serious reader in the area.

Posner's "Economics of Justice" is still a fascinating read, almost two decades after its first publication. In particular, the first half of the book, which attempts (I think quite successfully) to carve out a middle ground of "ethical wealth maximization" between the 'poles' of Kantian ethics and utilitarian thought, is quite good. I am not always convinced that wealth maximization as a juridical norm in fact escapes the strictures and failures of utilitatarian thought, but Posner's philosophy and economics approach to the law demonstrates quite conclusively that economic thought has much to say about issues of justice. More broadly, Posner's lucid arguments dispel some of the many myths and critiques (some by people who do not understand economics) which contend that economics either oversimplifies or commodifies too much of human experience. What is needed is an update to this work, and more generally, a stronger outpouring of philosophical explanation from other economics-minded scholars such as Posner, to respond to the many socio-cultural legal critiques of law and economics. Overall, though, an excellent read; and although one need not agree with all of Posner's conclusions, the ideas are well worth examining.

Although denied by the author in his book 'Problems of Jurisprudence,' Richard Posner was an integral early pioneer in the movement known as 'Economics and Law.' Picking up where George Stigler and Gary Becker left off, Posner argues that not only human behavior, but law can be understood by the theory of wealth-maximization. This is the philosophy that individuals act in a way that will maximize their benefit (the results of their action) while minimizing cost (energy, time etc. expended in action.) While my review is necessarily simplified, Posners audience is in for a well-made case.

After his case is made, he moves on to offer a hypothesis of how law may have developed in primitive societies against this backdrop of wealth-maximization. I've read several authors attempts to 'create' a state (Rousseau, Locke, Nozick) and to my eyes, Posners is the most convincing. Let's see what you think!

The third section applies wealth-maximization to privacy and discrimination laws. It is here that Posner is the most likely to disturb. For example, he distinguishes between privacy as seclusion and privacy as secrecy. Privacy as secrecy, Posner argues, is not only inconsistent with constitutional text but is not much more than the right to be able to distort information (whether by omission or declaration) to present and future transactors. This, in turn, distorts the 'market-place' of information and is inconsistent (a slippery slope) with the wealth-maximization of society.

Whether you agree or disagree with Posner, his intellect is undeniable, his thesis, original and his writing, first rate. Should be read by anyone interested in jurisprudence, politics, economics and psychology.

This book's analysis of the problems that confront judges when they decide cases is cogent, persuasive, and (without a dictionary) difficult to understand. However, if you can master the blended vocabulary of psychology, epistimology, and hermeneutics it is a brilliant tour de force that raises troubling questions about how to read foundational legal documents. A must read for legal scholars.-Kelly Whiting

What is law? How exactly do judges reason out it's kinks? Does it operate on presumtions of behaviourism or free-will? Why aren't lawyers or judges puzzled by these quandries? Posner seeks answers and ends up in a not-so-comforting place.

This book starts small and ends big. From epistemology (how we gain legal knowledge) through ontology up through his concluding 'Pragmatist Manifesto' the book is quite philosophical and this may be offputting to some in the legal profession. As usual though, Posner tackles his subjects in a clear, fast-paced and exciting way. The task that Posner sets for himself is to forge a place in legal theory (or lack of?) between two radical extremes: On one hand, there is the view that law is a completely isolated profession and legal reasoning is completely internal to it. The other sees law as a clever guise for politics- it's 'methods' being a subterfuge for the judge to justify her political views.

Through pragmatism, Posner sees both theories as gross exageration- the first, falsley denying law's susceptibility to outside non-legal techniques and the second's refusal to acknowledge the judiciary's independence from the legislature.

As Posner acknowledges in the intro, Posner's view here is middle of the road and to many, it will be boring. He doesn't take sides, rather he creates a side: that of legal pragmatism. No matter what your persuasion philosophtical, political or jurisprudential persuasion, there's nothing like a little Posner to get you thinking!!

In The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Judge Richard Posner asks a critical question: can moral philosophy ever help the practice of law? Posner answers this question with a resounding no.

Take a simple example. Suppose that a robber is shot dead at the scene of the crime and, the shooter is charged with murder. Should he be convicted? A pacifist might say yes, since killing is always wrong. Others would say no, since he acted in self defense (killing is not always wrong). Others would say that it depends on whether he was threatened.

If you were the judge or the jury, who should you believe? Posner argues that you will believe the person who most closely approximates your preconceived beliefs. In other words, a pacifist prosecutor will have a hard time convincing anyone who believes in self-defense, since each and every moral philosophy can be countered by another moral philosophy.

Posner goes on to argue that moral philosophy can help us with things that we all agree on, like "democracy is good" and "freedom should be protected." The problem is that no case before a court ever deals with such broad disputes. Instead, each side lines up its moral arguments, and the judge basically ignores them all. Posner also shows that moral philosophy is of some use in changing what people agree is right, as with Martin Luther King, Jr.

In the down and dirty disputes before a judge, though, Posner says that we have to rely more on our gut reaction, economics, and sociology than moral theory. The judge must ask, "If I did X, would society be better off?" Posner calls this legal pragmatism, the hope that the law can be rationalized along empirical grounds. He is careful to distinguish this stance from philosophical pragmatism and moral relativism. The former worries only about ends, while Posner explicitly worries about means, and the latter would not allow anyone to ever say that "murder is wrong." Posner has no problem with moral precepts that everyone agrees with.

The downside of this book is that it is way too long. The first few chapters outline most of his argument, and the rest of the book deals with legal history and particular examples from supreme court cases. Law students might find these parts worthwhile. Those who are interested in philosophy and law should read this book, as should those who want a look at how judges think and work. Whether you agree with him or not, his exploration of the topic is cool and complete.

Posner is always enjoyable to read and this book is no exception. Readers who are not current on discussions about moral philosophy and law will find Posner a lucid and accessible point of entry. However, my first reaction is Posner assumes
pragmatis is morally neutral and an adequate framework for the law.
First, values already underscores "pragmatism;" thus, any attempt to apply pragmatics to the law has already been contaminated by values that can probably only be properly analyzed and understood through moral philosophy. Hence, moral philosophy is an indispensible tool for critical analysis of the law.
Second, "pragmatism" is inadequate in forming an analytical framework for the law, particularly with the most difficult questions of the law. Questions about euthanasia, abortion, equal rights, etc. are densely moral and political which pragmatism will contribute little.
Overall an enjoyable book but a flawed idea. It will influence many readers but "The Problematics of Moral and Legal Philosphy" should be read with skepticism. Everyone reading this book should also read "Modern and the Holocaust" by Zymunt Bauman for a counter point to why moral philsophy, which probably raises more questions than it answers, should always be central to any discussion about the law.

Don't believe any criticisms of this book that it advocates moral relativism or insensitive pragmatism. What Posner is driving at is the removal of moral theory from the practice of law. Translated: the removal of the politicization of law whether of the left variety [egalitarianism, redistributionism] or the right variety [natural law]. This sounds like anti-moralism, but it is not. Posner wants law to return to its role as the blind judge balancing the scales of justice rather than the judicial usurper of democracy. Posner wants a rational approach to law as opposed to the current masking of its role as a dispenser of goods for the "interest group state." Highly recommended. Wayne Lusvardi, Pasadena, California

Another reviewer noted that this is the best intro to Posner. It probably is. The essays here touch on legal reasoning, economics, philosophy of law, sexuality and many other topics, giving the reader a 'survey' view of Posner. Most books of essays, though, have a cohesiveness that I did not detect here, which is fine, so long as the intention is ONLY to get a sampling.

I can not stress enough how phenomenal a writer Judge Posner is. The essays are both challenging and readable; contraversial yet objective. In one, Posner defends his book 'Sex and Reason' against radical feminism. In another he examines Richard Rorty and the impact that modern philosophy has on law. Perhaps the best essay is on pragmatic legal reasoning, entitled "What am I? A potted plant?'.

Besides the lack of cohesion, the biggest reason for the subtracted star is that, while Posner discusses economics, legal method and gender issues, his full length books on the subjects are better. Respectively, they are "The Economics of Justice", "The Problems of Jurisprudence" and "Sex and Reason." For the student of any one of these areas, read those first, read this after. Everyone else, start here!

Judge Posner is in the news these days because he has served as a mediator in the Microsoft trial. He is both a public intellectual and a judge, as well as one of the leading philosophers of the movement in legal theory called "Law and Economics."

This is an admirable record, and one way the judge has built his reputation is by being a prolific and readable writer on law. Overcoming Law is one of the best summaries of his work because as a series of essays, the reader is at liberty to dip into the most interesting topics.

Understanding law and economics is a prerequisite. This is Posner's (and Ronald Coase's) idea that descriptively, judges try to maximize social wealth by allocating to claimants the results that those claimants are most willing to pay for. Prescriptively, to Posner, this is a Good Thing.

Solomon in the Bible acted in a Posnerian fashion because the "good" mother valued her child's life over her possession of the child whereas the bad mother valued her possession over the kid's life. Posner would not say that Solomon saw the abstract good and made a decision according to his conception of the abstract good (which Posner feels can be flawed.) Instead Posner would say that Solomon found a decision procedure which revealed the true values of the claimants.

This makes sense. What makes less sense is that Posner turns Marx's theories on their head, and this is rather dizzying, since Marx turned Hegel on his head. In Posner's ideal world, any atomic business transaction reveals that actor A values product or service P more than B does if B transfers that product or service at price R.

Better critics than I have pointed out that economic actors who are acting close to the bone, such that they must work or trade, or die, may not value their mininum wage more than the service they render. They may value the time highly but sacrifice it anyway as a precondition for their existence. As Kant would say, existence is not a predicate, but a precondition to having predicates. Translated to the economic sphere, existence is not a Yuppie luxury, like an SUV, nor is it a necessity like bread. It is a precondition for having either.

Posner writes, I believe, from the standpoint of the lucky American who has never had to face extinction as a consequence of the economy and this gives his thought a certain lack of heart which is also a failure to think things through.

This is most on display in Posner's essay "Hegel and Employment at Will." Here, Posner speaks directly to legal philosophers including Drucilla Cornell who have made a case, based on the thought of Hegel, for property rights to jobs. Posner's defense of employment at will (which was thought, as recently as 1980, to be an out of date theory) is based on nothing more than an empirical, and questionable, economic claim: that we enjoy higher economic growth in America as a consequence of employment at will.

This is to be misled by the numbers, for many observers of European societies (with their social welfare programs and longer vacations) have pointed out that qualitatively, the consequent higher unemployment in Europe does NOT seem to lead to a high level of misery. In Japan, during the last ten years, that country has been in deep recession, with high unemployment, but qualitative commentators have noticed that the Japanese react differently than Americans have done.

Posner tends to accept high levels of employment which result from churning in the employment market as a good thing. As a sitting judge with probable lifetime tenure, Posner does not see the disruption that results from employment at will...even to businesses themselves.

In general, Posner is a clever and readable ideologue and apologist for Reagan-era ideology. No matter what your views on these changes it is a very good idea to read Judge Posner...if only to be able to spot arguments which use his thought, and to show (as does philosopher Martha Nussbaum) that by their lack of qualitative, and even ethical, reflection, they lack the rationality they claim.

One of the few works that lives up to expectations! Provides Judge Posner's wonderful insights into almost all subjects touching upon the law while avoiding the rambling style which marred his The Problems of Jurisprudence. Posner once again shows that he does not fear taking controversial positions or picking fights. One of the few books that delivers intellectual meat without losing a sense of humor. Accessible and frank style make it a joy to read. Highly recommended for anyone with even a passing interest in the law, the workings of the judicial system, philosophy, or economics

If I had to suggest the purchase of this book I would recommend it. There is almost everything in the book about US antitrust. But some warnings are necessary. It's not for students. It's not for lawyers. Maybe scholars and judges can be interested. The author highlights what is not coherent in the body of untistrust legislation. He provides some solution but that solution turns out to be simple: stay put. On that we can debate, but for sure it's a useful check in the bugs of the system. Given the approach I would have given 5 stars if the author had provided some hints or quantitative analysis to the reader on the effects of some of the Supreme Court decisions on lower Courts and on the current management of antitrust law.

This is a touching book, based on the life of a teenager, who has always had it all, except the right boyfriend. Casey is a track star, has a close group of friends, and a family that loves her. Then Paul Vanhorn walks into Casey's life. He was the outcast at school. years back before he dropped out. Despite what Casey's friends say, she decides to give Paul a chance. Their first few dates were great. Casey can't help but fall in love with his sence of adventure. Soon her paradise comes to an abrupt hault, Paul hits her. It isn't until Casey ends up in critical condition in the hospital that she realizes she needs to get out, but getting out isn't as easy as getting in. "This is a great book, inspiring, and educational." I highly recommend it.

Judge Posner promises a far-reaching analysis of the impeachment and trial of President Clinton. In his introduction, he notes that the "ordeal" presented numerous axes of analysis: issues of law, issues of jurisprudence, issues of morality, theories of conflict, issues of political and cultural sociology. (p. 3)

In applying these analytical perspectives to the particular issues raised within the context of President Clinton's impeachment, I think Judge Posner does an excellent job at cutting through the political spin and identifying the essential points. He deftly exposes "it's all about sex" as the dishonest mantra that Clinton supporters, such as James Carville, used to divert the public's attention away from the basic legal issues. His discussion of the relevant legal charges--obstruction of justice and perjury--is clear and accessible. Once the political spin is redacted, the conclusion is inescapable--Clinton committed perjury and thus violated the law.

Yet Judge Posner's book is ultimately dissatisfying. His book promises more than it delivers, and what I think is a significant issue--the nature of impeachment as it has been understood and used within the American constitutional order--remains relatively untouched by Posner's book. This is frustrating.

Beyond passing references to Samuel Chase and Andrew Johnson, Judge Posner never discusses their impeachment or their resulting trials. He notes the distinction between impeachment standards for judges versus the President, but he never discusses in any detail the impeachment and conviction of any judges. (The only discussion is Judge Posner's reference to Judge Nixon's impeachment and conviction for perjury in 1989, but this is made in a single-sentence footnote on page 103.) In his discussion of censure, Judge Posner writes that "Congress has used censure sparingly" (p. 191), but beyond a couple references to President Jackson, he never discusses any of the situations in which Congress has censured a government official and what this meant for Congress in 1998/1999.

Maybe I had unrealistic expectations, but with a chapter entitled "The History, Scope and Form of Impeachment," I was really hoping for some substantial scholarship on the constitutional issue of impeachment as it has been used against many judges and two Presidents in our nation's history. Unfortunately, I was left with the sense that Judge Posner should have spent a few extra months doing additional research to produce a true scholarly exegesis, rather than join the rush to publish in the wake of the impeachment media frenzy.

I have read Professor Dworkin's review of this book in the New York Review of Books, and Dworkin, while critical of the book, hardly exposes it as a "sham" and a "joke," as one reviewer below suggested. Indeed, Dworkin suggests that the book "has many virtues," and describes it as being "clear, brisk, often amusing, and decorated with an impressive array of quotations and historical excursions, many of which are illuminating." Dworkin expresses his belief that Posner is not a "Clinton hater," and points out that Posner actually regards the Clinton presidency as a "success" in policy terms because it has helped solidify the Reagan Revolution.

Upon analysis, Dworkin's differences with Posner on the key question of the President's liability for criminal offenses are revealed to be rather narrow. Dworkin concedes that "one or more" of the accusations of perjury and obstruction of justice against Clinton may have presented jury questions, and that a jury might have concluded that Clinton was guilty of "one or more of them" beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the charge of perjury before the federal judge in the Jones case, Dworkin acknowledges Clinton's "deposition lies," and only disagrees with Posner's contention that these lies were "material" to the Jones litigation. With respect to the charges that Clinton committed perjury before the grand jury, Dworkin does not challenge Posner's view that the testimony in question was "material," and he even acknowledges that Posner "may be right" to believe that Clinton lied in his grand jury testimony. What Dworkin mainly objects to is Posner's use of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" to describe his degree of confidence that the President committed perjury and obstructed justice. But since Dworkin is not asserting that the President was actually innocent of these charges (as many defenders of the President have), his criticism of Posner's expression of certitude (or near certitude) regarding Clinton's guilt is not exactly earthshaking.

As for Dworkin's claim that Posner may have violated the canons of judicial ethics by writing this book, the canon in question only prohibits public commentary by a judge regarding a "pending" or "impending" case. While it is possible that the President will be prosecuted, the word "impending" normally does not denote something which is merely possible. Nevertheless, Dworkin simply asserts (without any citation to authority) that the term "impending" should be construed to cover "any possible future prosecution that has been publicly debated among politicians and officials and often mentioned in the press, particularly when the judge is prominent and his statements are likely to receive wide circulation." The rule Dworkin has devised is an interesting one, but it is not the rule set forth in the canons, and it is therefore unfair to accuse Posner of a violation of those rules.

This book is not partisan as some reviewers have claimed. Itis pragmatic.

It also seems strange to judge the book solely bythe highly debatable point of whether or not Posner violated the Canonof Judicial Ethics in writing it.

Should Clinton have been impeached, and if impeached, convicted? Richard Posner says the question is unanswerable. So why read this book?

This book shows how an outstanding mind thinks through important legal and moral issues where existing law and precedent are unclear or inconclusive. It is highly critical of almost everyone involved, including Republicans, the Supreme Court, Clinton's defenders, William Bennett, the TV pundits and 'intellectuals' who commented on the case. The four hours I spent reading this book were far more interesting, clarifying and valuable by far than the many hours I spent in front of the TV during the year or so of the crisis. Too bad this book wasn't available in the early months of the crisis. A lot of misleading and inaccurate information and thought could have been sorted through much more easily.

Here are a few of the many interesting points made by Posner, with which I agree:

1. It is on the ground of disrespect for his office and for decency in the conduct of government that the most powerful case for impeachment and conviction could have been pitched.

2. A President has a duty to avoid becoming enmeshed in a scandal that is likely to weaken his effectiveness. In running that risk, for wholly personal rewards, the Clinton exhibited a high degree of personal irresponsibility. That was a personal failing. But the avoidance of scandal is also a public duty - a precondition to the effective discharge of the President's other public duties.

3. A pragmatic decision-maker wants decisions to be based on an assessment of their probable consequences. In legal cases, and a fortiori in impeachment, which is only quasi-legal, this is a legitimate or at least common approach when the conventional materials of legal decision-making, such as precedent or a clear statutory or consittutional text, yield no direction. Since it is unknowable whether the good consequences of impeaching and removing Clinton outweigh the bad, the pragmatist would lean against impoeachment.

4. Those who claim that the failure to impeach Clinton makes what he did OK, or puts him 'above the law' are just wrong. He remains subject to the ordinary processes of the law, whether during or after his term.

5. To keep on lying after no one believes you does not mislead, but it shows contempt for truth and truthfulness.

6. Clinton made a travesty of the religious rite of atonement by asking for forgiveness and absolution without offering to incur any cost.

This is another Posnerian tour de force in which he carefully analyzes both Florida and US election laws and demonstrates that, far from being a lawless body that stole an election, the US Supreme Court decision was right -- and that in any event Bush was better positioned to win any fight that would have ensued in Florida, Congress and elsewhere had the Supreme Court decision gone the other way.

But, readers may find his review of the performance of the so-called "experts" the most entertaining feature of this book. After you read how he takes apart Alan Dershowitz and others, you'll be sure to put less stock in their outlandish "expert" commentary in the future.

I highly recommend this book for those looking for a non-partisan, dispassionate analysis of the events in Florida.

The definitive book on the 2000 election crisis. Posner eviscerates the specious arguments of those extreme partisans like Bugliosi, Dershowitz and the FL "Supreme" Court. It is no wonder that they wither under his criticism.

The only problem Posner's book has is that it is apparently too cerebral for many of his critics to understand. So they rant about irrelevancies, like Gore allegedly winning the popular vote nationally. But do we really know that? One must wonder whether with all the Dem vote fraud, i.e., getting non-citizens to vote et al, that if only legal votes were counted, that Bush may have actually won the national popular vote too. Recent polls suggest that something like only 40% say they voted for the loser, Gore. (That also suggest that Gore has little chance to change his status in 2004).

As for Posner and the inability of his critics to penetrate his arguments, it's not for nothing that Posner is the most frequently cited federal judge. The late Supreme Court Justice William Brennan called Posner one of only two geniuses he had ever met. This book is the product of that genius.

As for the malcontents, George Bush was and is accepted as President by all but the 5% of the most partisan and ignorant Dems that are as vocal as they are stupid. And contrary to their imflamed assertions, the Supreme Court is held in higher esteem now than it was before they stopped the rogue Fl court and Gore from stealing the election.

Judges, as a class of humanity, have always seemed to me to embody the worst aspects of lawyer, priest, and politician, all rolled into one self-important package. One of the few judges who have ever seemed worth much is Richard A. Posner, author of this fine and devastating book. Millions of gallons of ink have been spilled over the 2000 election, but Judge Posner may be the only author who brings both a dispassionate eye and an almost unmatched legal mind to the vexed constitutional and legal issues involved.

The result, as a whole, doesn't do much for the reputation of Judge Posner's legal brethren, especially the members of the appropriately nicknamed SCOFLA, or Supreme Court of Florida. As Judge Posner deconstructs the logic -- for lack of a better term -- employed by the Court in Bush v. Gore, you'll be left wondering what in the world they were thinking.

If this book makes anything clear, it's that the Left is correct to call the U.S. Constitution a 'living document.' It lives in the same way the Frankenstein monster 'lived,' as a monster formed by two centuries -- or at the minimum 70 years -- of 'progressive' jurisprudence. The crowning glory of this, as Judge Posner makes clear, may well be the performance turned in by SCOFLA in 2000.

This book wrestles with important issues, but it is well written and extremely readable. The final two chapters -- 'Critiquing the Participants' and 'Consequences and Reforms' -- lift this book beyond the many 'instant histories' we've seen of the 2000 election and make it something well worth studying by people on every (or no) side of the question. The legend of the 'stolen election' has already entered the Left's mythology, up there with 'Reagan's massive budget cuts' and 'impeachment was all about sex.' It would be nice if this excellent book could help us get beyond the partisan grousing so we could address more important issues. But I don't think it's gonna happen.