As a historian, I've read several types of books for several reasons. Not being an expert on the Second World War, I read much of this book discovering just what happened during this century's biggest struggle. Knowing something of Ike and very little of Montgomery, I was able to fill in some of the blanks. If you are looking for a military history, a John Keegan work this is not. If you are looking for some real insight into the personal, professional, and commander/lieutenant relationship, you will be left wanting. If you are looking for a brief overview of the history of Ike's and Monty's relationship, you will enjoy this read.

This was a very readable book that presents the backgrounds and careers of Eisenhower and Montgomery. While the book does come up short in fully analyzing the clashes between the two men, he does give a good account of the pressures Eisenhower was under and how maddening it must have been for anyone to deal with "Monty" for any length of time. The ending seemed abruptly cut off, but I would recommend this book for those wanting a brief overview of these two generals.

This book not only portrays the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery but gives a vivid and complete description of the important events that transpired in Europe and Africa during World War II. Best of all, it is done in a very professional , easy to read style.

Covers IKE's life from his childhood through his Presidency

As the Reich began to disintigrate in the autumn of 1944, Himmler set up the Werewolves to spread terror and destruction behind allied lines. They are not known to have achieved much, although they did assassinate the mayor of Aachen (who surrendered to the Americans), decapitate some GIs with tripwires and pour sugar into some Russian petrol tanks. Danish born author Ib Melchior served in US army counterintelligence during world war two, and has adopted a fictional approach to telling the Werewolf story. He says, however, it is based on fact. The most sensational claim is that there was a nazi plot to asassinate Eisenhower. The book is a well paced read from both the US and the German perspective. However, given that the events are in April 1945, there is remarkably little atmosphere of Gotterdammerung. And there are some historical mistakes. His claim that the SS were gassing and burning Jews at Dachau(!)at this late stage of the war is certainly mythical. The book was originally published in 1972, but the new 2000 edition has a more recent prologue. The epilogue contains a translated account of original Werewolf inspired documents. The organization may have failed - Germany was already in chaos - but the intentions were deadly serious.

Divine's book certainly conveys the importance of Sputnik on American foreign and domestic policy during the year following the Soviet launch, however, I felt that the book lacked a strong central thesis. Divine merely shows how important Sputnik was.

Bowie and Immerman posit that "credit for shaping ... strategy (of Cold War) belongs to President Dwight D. Eisenhower." By the end of the Truman Administration, the initial confrontational phase of the Cold War was reaching a steady-state. The Truman Administration set up the basic framework for the American side, but due to crises (foreign and domestic) had not had the time to set longer-term goals. Eisenhower, a man used to a more bureaucratic, organized approach, followed Truman and institutionalized much of what the Truman Administration had begun. Bowie and Immerman continually suggest how Eisenhower personally oversaw what (rhetorically) comes across as a kind of revolutionary retooling of America's Cold War response. But their own thorough use of documentation continually shows what took place under Ike was a bureaucratic evolution, one building upon the Truman Administration's somewhat sparse initial outline. The authors' penchant for "Ike cheerleading" (and to a lesser extent, "Truman diminishing")is a continuous distraction, and is a direct outgrowth of the overblown thesis (or maybe its the other way around.) It is unfortunate that Cold War historiography often gets caught up in this sort of "partisan" behavior, particularly concerning Eisenhower. Ike was unjustly considered to be mediocre for so many years that a large number of historians felt it necessary to resurrect his image. The resurrection has succeeded; Ike certainly had a very good grasp on foreign policy issues and deserves to be ranked among the more effective Presidents ever. But there simply isn't the discontinuity between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations that is suggested here. An example: the authors go to great detail in showing how the Eisenhower Administration reexamined the goals of the Cold War struggle; they are impressed by the thoroughness and awareness of Ike and his people. What is the result? Containment, the same exact guideline devised under Truman and carried forward to the end of the struggle. NSC-68, which did temporarily occupy the Truman Administration, had mostly been abandoned by Truman by the end of his second term, as seen by the downward revisions of projected military budgets. (If Truman actually believed that 1954 would be the "time of maximum danger," would he have been more concerned with budgetary matters than defense?) The authors point out these things, and yet continue to claim extraordinary achievements under Eisenhower. Ike deserves his due as Cold Warrior (mainly for organizing the bureaucracy and pushing foreign aid), but he was not radically different than what came before him. The authors' research suggests this -- its unfortunate that they seemingly didn't realize what their own research suggested.

This book has earned the mixed reviews that it has received, both here and elsewhere. It's not the last word in Ike bios. But I found some insights here that I had not read elsewhere (and I've read most of the standard works.)

I think that the influence of Fox Conner is somewhat understated, and there's not enough here on Ike's dealings with Marshall before going to Europe. But the relationship with MacArthur was covered well. I enjoyed it. It compares well with Miller's biography, but the standard work remains S. Ambrose 2 volumes.

Someone needs to do a study on the influence of Fox Conner on WWII generals. He was a major influence on Marshall, Patton and Ike, as well as a key officer in the AEF in WWI.

Based upon sales figures, this effort by Perret is not destined to become a classic as is Ambrose's two volume (later condensed into one) standard biography of Ike. That's too bad because I believe that Perret gives great insights into the human side of Ike, such as his tremendous grief over the death of his first son, and his troubled relationship with his second son, John. Indeed, I recently saw John interviewed on television and John's uncomfortable reactions to being compared to his father, including his striking physical resemblence, show that Perret's observations are well taken. I also was fascinated by Perret's analysis of the Kay Somersby rumors. Perret carefully sifts the evidence and determines that the two were emotionally close but never had sex. Perret points out that if Kay's account is true, they would have been doing it in a common area of a house shared by others. That's highly unlikely. Most importantly, this book backs up recent historians who rate Eisenhower as a better president than did historians of a generation ago. Perret documents a great deal of achievenment in the Eisenhower administration that has previously been overlooked. Ike's seeming detachment was actually calculated and he always was in control and knew exactly what he wanted to do. I recommend this interesting biography.

From the brilliantly simple and understated cover that is backed up with a Biography of a man, much recorded, but possibly never truly discovered. As with 'Old Soldiers Never Die' Geoffrey Perret is fast establishing himself as the military historians' biographer. This is a simply a great book. Perret shows his depth of both perception and study in this volume. Ike is never portrayed as more than a man where history has done its best to lionise or in some cases cannonise him. Perret simply knows his subject and has written what I believe is the Biography of Ike that all previous have sought to be.Where most have shown the frustrated soldier come politician Perret shows the depth of the individual and portrays the great man as the sometime flawed human being that he was. BRILLIANT

This book is a very entertaining read. I have done extensive research on the CIA, particularly regarding the Bay of Pigs, and this was one of the first books I read on the subject. HOWEVER, even though I assumed that what I had read in the book was highly accurate, as I read two and three other books on the same subjects I was looking for [The CIA's Secrete Operations, Spying For America, and others] I realized that the other books seemed to agree with each other, as well as with the official, recently declassified reports on the Bay of Pigs by Colonel Hawkins-who ran the Bay of Pigs operation- yet THIS BOOK CONSISTENTLY MISLEAD ITS READER, which confused the hell out of me, since this book had been the first one I had read on the subject. There remarks such as the following: "Some two thousand Cuban rebels land at the Bay of Pigs. They are hit immediatly by Castro's armed forces. A debacle is in the making." (pg.307, opening of chapter 22) this is just one example of misleading information. What actually happened was that the 1187 cuban-exiles that landed were actually split up into three separate groups miles away from each other, none of which where "hit" by Castro's forces for hours. They did encounter a roving militia of about 40 people who promply surrendured, and a CIA scuba team that was leaving beacons for the invasion boats to navigate to were forced to open fire on a small contingent of Cuban forces (the CIA forces eliminated them). This does not, however, suggest what is reported in the above quoted statement. Other examples proliferate across the book. just a warning that this book seems to want to tell a good story more than give an accurate account of what actually happened. If all you want is an entertaining read, then the book will probably still be fine, since the fact bending tended to be restricted to small, inconsequential details. I must say, however, that Ambrose sure does know how to write an entertaining book.

This book is very helpful in understanding the challenges of today's world. Intelligence is a vital requirement for three objectives: Knowing what your opponents are doing; deceiving your opponents about what you are doing; and using covert means to change or replace your opponents.

As Ambrose makes clear, Eisenhower was introduced to the world of intelligence by Winston Churchill and rapidly became fascinated with it. His chief intelligence officer Kenneth Strong, a British General, kept him remarkably informed throughout the Second World War. Ambrose argues, and he is almost certainly right, that only the combination of great intelligence about the Germans and the most successful deception plan in history made the invasion of France possible in 1944. He also notes that deception had also been brilliantly used in 1943 to convince the Germans that the allies were going to invade Sardinia or Greece rather than Sicily. The result was a reallocation of German forces to the wrong places, which weakened their forces in Sicily.

There are a lot of lessons in this book for our generation. Eisenhower valued technology and took risks to develop it. He knew how to undertake successful covert operations. For anyone who would understand the uses of intelligence in the modern world, this is a useful book.

I have read all of the books in the "American Presidents" series published thus far, and this is a very disappointing entry in an otherwise great series. Tom Wicker is a journalist, not a historian, and it shows. He merely presents a narrative chronology of Eisenhower's presidency, devoting only a few paragraphs to his life before he entered the Oval Office. In what is essentially a long magazine article, you never learn a thing about Eisenhower as a person, and Eisenhower emerges as a two-dimensional figure, not the fascinating man that he was. Worst of all, Wicker is so one-sided in his coverage, he tries to find fault in even Eisenhower's unmitigated successes. This ends up simply a book-length critique. It is blinkered and one-sided, with no sense of perspective or context. There are many better biogrpahies of Eisenhower available. Skip this one.

I thought I'd present an alternative viewpoint to the obviously irate folks who have written so far. While Wicker's book is far from a complete biography (this series -- and I have read all but the TR volume -- was never intended to be THE definitive account, only an introduction of sorts), it does present Eisenhower's presidency in relatively comprehensive terms. I was left wanting more, but one can take this book, armed with a general outline, and pursue the subject further.

As for the negative tone, I am not offended, nor am I disappointed. There have been plenty of fawning biographies written about Ike (check out any Ambrose volume), so it is only fair that we get a different take. Ike's presidency, like so many, had its shining moments, but also its shame. Wicker correctly identifies Ike's weaknesses, including a tendency to overdelegate and of course, a reluctant, weak-willed enforcement of civil rights laws. It is also important to note that Ike failed to take on that era's most poisonous demagogue, Joseph McCarthy.

Writing a hagiography would be easy given our country's worship of military figures, but this is a political biography. The years from 1953 to 1961 were not perfect, and Wicker understands that the leadership must be held accountable for some of that decade's less admirable turns.

Tom Wicker spent thirty years writing on politics for the New York Times. Having worked as a young reporter in the 1950s, he combines memories of actual events with secondary sources to produce a short, lively monograph on Eisenhower's presidency.

Older readers can remember the media Ike: the winning smile, the bumbling answers at press conferences, the incessant golf. The electorate loved him, but contemporary observers were not impressed. They looked on him as a career soldier who despised politics, leaving handling of foreign policy to the slightly frightening John Foster Dulles and domestic policy to no one at all.

Wicker admits that this was once his view but no longer. However, he adds that Eisenhower's growing reputation owes nothing to domestic affairs. Perhaps his major success in this area was the Interstate Highway Bill of 1955, which is still financing our interstate roads. Trivia buffs note: this was the last major Republican program that required new taxes.

Wicker joins two generations of historians in condemning Eisenhower's refusal to speak out against McCarthy or in favor of civil rights. All agree this was politically astute but morally deplorable.

The 1954 Supreme Court decision on segregation came as an unpleasant shock to Eisenhower, but he was in good company. Most northern officials were lukewarm (an admirable exception was attorney general, Herbert Brownell). Holding racial views similar to Lincoln's, Eisenhower disapproved of mistreating Negroes but believed their capacities did not measure up to those of the white race. Wicker's discussion spends more time on Chief Justice Warren than the president, but it's an eye-opener. Legend gives Warren credit for the decision, but this is wrong. He didn't join the court until the case was nearing its end. On his arrival, it was already 5-4 in favor of desegregation. His accomplishment was convincing opponents to switch their votes. Such a controversial decision required unanimity, Warren pointed out. A split Court would encourage southern resistance, bringing disorder to the country and casting doubt on the Court's legitimacy. Good patriots all, they switched, including the hidebound southern racist, Stanley Reed. Does anyone believe this could happen today?

Among America's long line of political scoundrels, Joseph McCarthy stands out for sheer vulgarity. Many supporters in the Senate including Richard Nixon thought he was slightly creepy. That his wild accusations of rampant communist subversion ruined many careers without turning up any new spies was public knowledge. The New York Times and Washington Post pointed this out. Conservative Time Magazine heaped ridicule on him.

But no elected official dared cross McCarthy. Contemptuous in private, Eisenhower took care never to make his feelings public although newspapers regularly found hints between the lines. The Senate censure in 1954 happened only because of McCarthy's increasingly insulting behavior and a modest decline of anticommunist hysteria. It was a slap on the wrist, and McCarthy remained in charge of his committee, so no one can explain why he suddenly fell silent. Wicker has no explanation, and he concludes with the usual regret that Eisenhower failed to take a courageous moral position.

Historians always attack politicians for refusing to take courageous moral positions, forgetting that doing so is invariably disastrous. Perhaps the greatest example is Lincoln's emancipation proclamation in September 1862. Although a feeble antislavery gesture, it was unpopular in the north. Democrats happily pointed out that Lincoln had converted a war for the union into a war for the Negro, and they crushed Republicans in the election two months later.

Foreign policy is almost entirely responsible for Eisenhower's improving reputation. Even those of us who remember the 1950s forget how close World War III seemed. Many national leaders and several of the Joint Chiefs wanted to get on with it as soon as possible. America's foreign policy seemed in the hands of elderly secretary of state John Foster Dulles, a pugnacious, evangelical who had been lecturing foreigners on American virtues since the Wilson administration. He made almost everyone nervous with enthusiastic talk of liberating eastern Europe, regaining China, and using atomic weapons if provoked excessively. It turns out Dulles was firmly under Eisenhower's thumb, and this rhetoric mellowed as years passed. The president himself was far more peaceable than anyone thought at the time. He gets enough credit for ending the Korean war but too little for refusing to strike back at China's threats to Formosa (his military advisors were raring to go). When he aborted the English-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, he was not reading opinion polls. Americans generally approved the invasion.

Most impressive of all, he kept the military firmly under his thumb. Despite the usual 1952 campaign rhetoric about defeating communism, Eisenhower held the defense budget level when he wasn't reducing it. His finest hour (although no one thought so at the time) came after Russia launched Sputnik in 1957. His announcement that orbiting a satellite was not a big deal produced universal dismay. Editorials denounced his short-sightedness; cartoons pictured him with his head in the sand. His poll ratings dropped to their lowest. Despite additional Russian space spectaculars, he did not change his mind, quashing all efforts to launch crash military programs. John F. Kennedy spent much of the 1960 campaign denouncing the administration for underestimating the communist threat, cruelly starving the armed forces, allowing the Russians to achieve military superiority. JFK was a far more aggressive cold warrior than his predecessor.

Like all volumes in the excellent American Presidents series, Wicker's is a quick read: 140 pages. Unlike the others, it's not really a biography. Eisenhower's greatest accomplishment was his meteoric rise to command in WWII after twenty years of obscurity. Winning the presidency was easy by comparison; after all he was the most popular man in the country. Wicker admits this, but he skips over the early life. As an account of his presidency, it breaks no ground but the author's anecdotes and outspoken opinions make it a lively addition to the definitive biographies.

After reading Citizen Soldiers, D-Day, and Band of Brothers, I came to one conclusion. Ambrose is great at interviewing veterans and taking those interviews and making pretty good books out of them. However, he should not attempt to analyze the strategy of several generals in World War 2. Ambrose is ignorant to the fact that even though our allies in the east were communists, they still bled alot more than the Western Allies did and suffered far more from the wrath of the Third Reich. Ambrose is a fool for criticizing Cornelius Ryan's The Last Battle. Ryan was able to interview hundreds from BOTH sides of the war. While Ambrose just interviews Americans, Ryan interviewed Americans, British, Russians, and Germans. Also don't forget that Ryan was able to interview all the key players of the Battle of Berlin; Ike, Bradley, Chuikov, Rokossovskii, Heinrici, and too many more for me to list here. If you want a great account of the Battle of Berlin and the decision of the West not to attack the capital, read Ryan's The Last Battle. Take it from a guy who was with our troops and interviewed ALL of the major players in the battle.

This is a short book about why Ike did not use the opportunity to capture Berlin in 1945. This is an earlier book before Ambrose became widely known, and to be honest more scholorly and less reader friendly. It is a short read.

Ike did not sanction the capture of Berlin for a number of reasons. First, Berlin was in the Soviet sphere in Germany, and second because his troops were not in as good a position as the Russians of taking the Nazi capital. The cost in human lives would also be great, especially if the city would have to be handed back to the Russians. For these reasons, Ike decided that Berlin was not worth the risk, and sent his forces toward Leipzig. Ike made a sound military decision.

I am a hugh fan of Stephen Ambrose. However, this very small book was a great disappointment. First of all its only about 100 pages plus appendices. It is more like reading a college history report. Stephen Ambrose is my favorite history author but, he seems to have a blind spot when it comes to Eisenhower. In Ambroses eyes he can do no wrong. If you want a much more detailed viewpoint of the battle for Berlin read The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan.

For someone looking for very light reading on Ike and Churchill, this may be an appropriate choice. I could envision a high school history teacher assigning this to 16-18 year old students. It is generally enjoyable but it certainly isn't thorough or definitive. It can't be compared to masterpiece works of history,... This, indeed, is "history lite."

But what is supremely disappointing about this book is its factual errors. For instance, at one point in the book Mr. Humes writes of Ike and Churchill meeting in '59, apparently AFTER their respective political tenures were completed, with Ike lamenting JFK's handling of the Bay of Pigs and Berlin Wall crises, and Churchill disparaging Anthny Eden's tenure as PM of Great Britain. But they certainly DID NOT have this discussion in '59. Ike's Presidency lasted until January '61 and our setbacks in Cuba and Berlin didn't happen until later in 1961-62. How could Humes, or more importantly the editor, get this wrong? At another point in the book, he dates the Suez Crisis to 1959 - it happened in October 1956! Earlier he writes of the tragic death of Ike's son at age 3. Hume identifies the baby as Dwight David. His actual name was Doud Dwight, his first name being Mamie's maiden name. He dates Wilson's entry into WWI in 1916. It was 1917, after the 1916 election wherein Wilson campaigned on the "He Kept Us Out Of War" slogan.

If it weren't for these inexcusable factual errors, I could endorse this as light summertime reading for the casual historian... I'm also surprised that David Eisenhower wrote a forward to the book (well done) and that Bill Buckley provided a jacket-cover recommendation. These guys obviously didn't read it - they surely would have noticed the aggravating factual errors I found.

Finally, while I'm an Ike fan and believe he's one of America's finest leaders of the 20th century - both as General and President - I think Humes gives too much credit with the suggestion that he "saved the world" along with Churchill... Professor Humes would be advised to remember,... that other heroes ... deserve lots of credit...