This book is on the "Recommended Reading List" of Vietnam Veterans of America, Chapter 295, Indianapolis, Indiana

Michael Beschloss, long known as a fantastic presidential historian, captured a great deal of detail about the U-2 program and the subsequent crisis that erupted when Francis Gary Powers was shot down in this book.

The author begins with the development of the U-2 program and its necessity, and then the covert efforts by the CIA to evaluate what capabilities really did exist in the USSR for nuclear war. The level of involvement on the part of President Eisenhower did suprise me a little, especially the way in which the flights before the shootdown were somewhat routine, with Soviet complaints being easily dismissed. It is the shootdown, and the results both immediate and long-term, that dominate the majority of the book.

The timing could nothave been worse- it was the last scheduled flight before a summit between the two superpowers, and Khruschev was at the Moscow U.S. Embassy for an Independence Day celebration as the shootdown unfolded. The repercussions were potentially enormous, as the U.S. lost prestige, leverage, and the ability to continue to operate the program once it came to light.

Beschloss writes very well, and this early effort of his is certainly worth the time it will take to find it and read it.

Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (1986)(Michael R. Beschloss 1955-)

The major conclusion I came to was that it is probable both Eisenhower and Khrushchev wanted a period of at least limited détente. Because of their own miscalculations about each other's behavior, that moment was lost. -Michael Beschloss

In the Spring of 1960, as President Eisenhower neared the end of his successful but uneventful presidency, he devoutly wished to cap off his career with a successful summit with the Soviet Union. Having met with Khrushchev the previous year and established the "Spirit of Camp David", he envisioned forging a sort of détente and entering into some kind of arms treaty, perhaps a test ban, at a May meeting with the Soviet Premier in Paris. But on May 1, 1960--celebrated as May Day in Europe and a holiday of great import in the Soviet Union--American pilot Francis Gary Powers and his U-2 spy plane were shot down over Russian territory. The plane, on it's way from Peshawar, Pakistan to Bodo, Norway, would have been flying at an altitude of about 70,000 feet. Russian SAMs had been steadily improving their range, and the danger of a shootdown was well understood at the highest levels of American government, in fact the President had ordered that he be given the right of final approval for each flight, but in that pre satellite era the spy planes were providing nearly all U.S. intelligence on the state of Russia's military, so Ike concluded that were worth the very high risk. Moreover, the flights were done under CIA command, not the military, pilots had orders to commit suicide if shot down and neither they nor identifiable portions of the planes were expected to survive anyway, so the U.S. expected to maintain deniability. The Eisenhower Administration did in fact initially deny that the U-2 was a spy plane, claiming it was a weather flight that blew off course. In the event, Powers survived and Khrushchev, struggling to hold off "hard-liners" at home, chose to inflate the incident into a major provocation and, although the two sides went ahead with the Paris summit, it quickly degenerated into a diplomatic mess and the opportunity for a reduction in Cold War tensions was lost for a generation.

Michael Beschloss, who is a national treasure as regards study of the presidency, has done a masterful job of reconstructing the events surrounding the U-2 Affair. He really brings the period and it's tensions to life, particularly the internal functioning of the Eisenhower administration. To me, the most significant aspect of the book is Beschloss's argument that it was thanks to the spying of the U-2 that Eisenhower understood how weak the Soviets actually were and that Ike and Khrushchev basically had an implicit understanding that if the Soviet did not make a real effort to upgrade their sorry military capacity, the U.S. would act as if the Soviets posed a threat. This allowed Ike to reign in the Military-Industrial Complex and balance the Federal budget, while at the same time permitting Khrushchev to swagger around the world stage as if the Soviets were our military equals. True or not, this portrait comports with the image which has emerged in recent years of Eisenhower as a much more deft and nuanced leader than was previously understood to be the case.

Since this book was written before the fall of the Soviet Union, it is likely that someone taking a fresh look at the affair, particularly someone with access to Soviet archives, will have much detail to add to the Russian side of the story. But it is hard to imagine someone producing any more readable an account of the whole incident. If I have one reservation with the book, it is that Beschloss does not consider the broader question of whether detente was a good idea in and of itself. Few would any longer argue that the final demise of the Evil Empire came only after they had stretched themselves to the limit. A fuller discussion of what detente might have meant for the internal situation in Russia would have been helpful. I'd be interested to know whether Beschloss thinks it would have weakened Communist control, which I doubt, or enabled them to devote more resources to productive domestic industries and thereby strenthened the regime's long term prospects.

At any rate, it's an excellent book and a really fascinating look at the Eisenhower presidency. This one is most recommended. Unfortunately, it's also out of print, so by all means take advantage of the out of print service above or try your your library, but it's worth tracking down.

GRADE: A

Well written and detailed information about what could have sent us into war.

While I can certainly appreciate the political problems Dwight David Eisenhower had to deal with while executing the liberation of Europe, I find this, his own description of D-DAY to VE-DAY quite wanting in the historical perspective.

There is little doubt that being between FDR, Marshall and Churchill was quite a daunting assignment. What is most intriguing about Ike's account of the lengths The US War Department went to help Bataan is just how many pages Ike devotes to apologizing for virtually abandoning it. Is there a new study on why the US Defense Department abandoned Bataan here?
Are the facts as Ike spelled them out, a coverup?

Much of this book has been repeatedly cited in the numerous WWII
European war studies that have come out since its initial publication. Ike's prose is elegant and witty. It is a good read if you are interested in Ike's opinions on his military staff and his personal war experiences. But as a study on the European and African theatres of WWII it lacks scholarship.

But, if you were going to run as a candidate for President of the United States(or was being drafted by the Republicans and Democrats at the time), this is sure a nice book to base a Presidential campaign on.

General Eisenhower, contrary to press reports and revisionist historians, was a man of great intelligence, strength, and discipline. He wrote this book in 1948 without ghost-writers, and his wit and wisdom are stunning. Everyone needs to read this to understand the issues that face us in Iraq and elsewhere today. The general explains how the real work of the military is developing strategy, drawing up plans, building relationships with governments and civilians, and quickly implementing and changing the plans as required. Only criticism is his tencency to dismiss the inappropriate behavior of Patton, but keep in mind that Patton was already dead when this book was written and Eisenhower would not criticize those who were not positioned to defend themselves. He is critical of others, especially Montgomery for his foolish proposal of launching a blitz on Berlin to bring the war to an early end. Another lesson for our time is the treachery of the French troops both in Vichy and Algeria, who fight the Allied invasion and put personal objectives above military and political goals. Unbelievable candor throughout such as when Eisenhower reports that an obviously overwhelmed Truman offers to help Eisenhower in any way that he can, including supporting him for the Presidency in 1948. Important career lesson: Eisenhower did not receive any significant promotions in the 20 years after WWI and was doing staff work under McArthur for 5 years, building up the Filipino military, yet became the highest rank allied commander, through hard work, dedication, and leadership.

Eisenhower, contrary to many beliefs, was one of the greatest conquerors of all time. He was a warrior and a national leader. Books about him, like the Ambrose ones, are very interesting and present a good view of the war, yet I have always believed that seeing the war through the eyes of the warrior is the best way. Personally, I don't believe that Ike wanted this book to show emotion, it was meant as a book on the broad picture of the war in Europe. He did a fabulous job of presenting it from the perspective, as he did a fabulous job making decisions during the course of the war. This book is as good, if not better, than Ambrose's works.

told by Ike himself. He demonstrates a personal touch in this book. It is very different from "Crusade in Europe" & "Eisen-
hower at War" in that he treads very lightly on World War II. It is told the way he wanted to thru mostly humorous stories. It is told without pomposity or the self-serving justifications you find in many autobiographies. Documentation not required here. He covers events in his life that Stephen Ambrose choose to edit in his fine one volume version of Ike's life.
There are stories told in "At Ease" that may not ever be told elsewhere that Ike himself enjoyed. This is an old man talking about events from his youth. Nobody can gaurantee they are 100% accurate & Ike admits as much in the book's preface. It is still an enjoyable book by a great man.

"At Ease" is a great compliment to Ike's "Crusade in Europe." In "At Ease", Ike describes his pre-WW2 years in the Army adding many colorful stories. My favorite stories were of the years George Patton and Ike spent in the 1920's researching the tank's future in war. Eisenhower had a interesting career as a mid-level officer including many assignments to football teams as a coach. Most interesting are his tales of his assignment in Panama, which were to have a significant affect on his career.

Ike leaves most of his WW2 stories to be told in "Crusade in Europe." In "At Ease" he covers in depth his career after WW2 and the plans Maime and Ike had for life after the Army. This work goes right up until the key role Ike played in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Orginization defense force. Although Ike doesn't say much about the Presidency, he describes many of the reasons why he would end up later accepting the nomination in 1952.

"At Ease" is a very enjoyable collection of stories for anyone wishing to know more about the famous 5-star General and President, as well as his contemporaries.

This is the second of a two-volume biography of Dwight Eisenhower, the great World War II military administrator who was elected president in 1952 without any experience in elective office and served two full terms, one of only five presidents in this century to do so. Author Stephen Ambrose, whose Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad 1863-1869 became a bestseller just days after it was published last August, writes authoritatively here about a president whom he clearly admires. This is a comprehensive study of an eight-year period which is sometimes portrayed as a mid-20th century era of good feelings. As Ambrose ably demonstrates, it was, in fact, a period marked by frequent international crises, as well as by strong undercurrents of change in American life, most notably in the area of civil rights.

The Cold War was at its height in the 1950s, and Ambrose devotes a great detail of space to diplomatic and military affairs. According to Ambrose, Eisenhower intended to "continue the policies of containment, foreign aid, and Europe first," but opposition to Eisenhower's program came most frequently from within his own party, beginning with battles over Eisenhower's appointees to key State Department positions at the beginning of his first term. Some of the most interesting passages in this book involve Ambrose's presentation of the frequent conflicts between the moderate Eisenhower Republicans and the "Old Guard," which was practically hysterical in its opposition to the threat posed by international Communism, real and supposed. Ambrose's discussion of Eisenhower's consistent opposition to increased military spending is fascinating. This is one area in which Eisenhower displayed real leadership, even when the president's position was not popular. By1960, one important issue was whether Richard Nixon and John Kennedy would spend more on national defense. (Ambrose makes clear Eisenhower's disappointment with the choice the American people were offered in that election: Eisenhower, one of the giants of World War II, would have to turn over executive power at the height of the Cold War to a former junior officer, either Nixon or Kennedy.) In his Farewell Address, Eisenhower warned of the dangers posed by the creation of a military-industrial complex. Only a president with Eisenhower's impeccable military credentials could credibly have said that. Ambrose leaves no doubt about Eisenhower's determination to decrease international tensions, especially in Europe, and most especially the threat of nuclear war. For the most part, Eisenhower's management of the frequent international crises during his administration was deft.

One Republican with whom Eisenhower publicly refused to dispute was Sen. Joseph McCarthy. According to Ambrose, one of Eisenhower's reasons for avoiding conflict with the notorious witch-hunter was personal: "I just won't get into a pissing contest with that skunk." But Ambrose also writes: "Eisenhower was more on McCarthy's side than not on the issue of Communism in government. It was McCarthy's methods he disapproved of, not his goals or his analysis." Ambrose concludes: "Eisenhower's cautious, hesitant approach - or nonapproach - to the McCarthy issue did the President's reputation no good, and much harm."

Eisenhower also was often criticized for presiding over a British-style cabinet government in which he purportedly delegated too much responsibility to his department heads. Ambrose makes clear that Eisenhower was keenly interested in the big issues facing the State, Defense, and Treasury departments, but the record presented here indicates that Eisenhower had much less interest in domestic affairs. The creation of the interstate highway system probably was the principal domestic achievement of the Eisenhower administration.

Civil rights was an issue which begged for presidential leadership. Eisenhower rightly deserves credit for appointing Earl Warren Chief Justice of the United States, and Warren, of course, presided over the unanimous 1954 decision declaring separate-but-equal public education systems to be unconstitutional. But Ambrose makes clear that, except on the issue of voting rights, Eisenhower refused to be pushed into the forefront in civil rights. Eisenhower was a product of the late-19th century (he was born in 1890), and this is one area in which he failed to grow as president. On occasion, according to Ambrose, Eisenhower could be "bumbling" and "ineffective." With regard to civil rights, Eisenhower simply failed to lead. According to Ambrose: "In the field of civil rights, [Eisenhower] felt he had done as well as could be done." The judgment of history disagrees.

Ambrose makes very effective use of primary sources, including Eisenhower's diaries. The text includes numerous references to Eisenhower's assessments of colleagues and subordinates, political rivals, other public figures international leaders, and some of them are cutting. Although Nixon loyally served as Eisenhower's vice president for eight years, they never were close, and Eisenhower was not enthusiastic about Nixon's candidacy in 1960. During that campaign, when Nixon was trying to make the most of his experience as vice president, Eisenhower told a reporter it would take him a week to think of a major contribution Nixon had made to the administration. But if Nixon had followed Eisenhower's advice and had refused to debate Kennedy, he might well have been elected in 1960.

Ambrose may admire his subject too much. To cite just one example, although Ambrose writes that "friends as well as critics worried about how unprepared [Eisenhower] was for the presidency," the author, himself, asserts that, in foreign affairs, Eisenhower "was undoubtedly the best prepared man ever elected to the Presidency." But I believe Ambrose is correct when he observes at the beginning of his chapter assessing the Eisenhower presidency: "To say that Eisenhower was right about this or wrong about that is to do little more than announce one's own political position." That is Ambrose's justification for examining Eisenhower's years in the White House "in his own terms."

When this book was published in 1984, Ambrose predicted: Eisenhower's "reputation is likely to continue to rise, perhaps to the point that he will be ranked just below Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt." I am skeptical that history ever will be that kind to Eisenhower. Ambrose writes that, by November 1952, Eisenhower had come to actively dislike Harry Truman" because "in Eisenhower's view Truman had diminished the prestige of the office of the President of the United States." Even Eisenhower's critics, and there remain plenty of them, must concede, based upon the record presented by authors such as Ambrose, that he conducted the duties of the presidency with great dignity. And that places him far above some of his successors. The two-volume Ambrose biography of Eisenhower is now out of print, having been superceded by this author's Eisenhower: Soldier and President and more recent works of scholarship. But Eisenhower, Volume Two, The President, continues to have value as a highly-detailed account of the administration of a president who may, indeed, have been under-appreciated. Ambrose is partial to his subject, but he generally allows Eisenhower's actions to speak for themselves, and I do not believe that a reader may ask much more from a biographer.

In this book, Ambrose follows up on his biography of Dwight Eisenhower. The first book dealt with the sixty-two years of Eisenhower's life before he became president. This volume deals with the last seventeen years of his life, focusing particularly on his eight years as President.

It is clear that Ambrose likes Eisenhower, but he nonetheless is critical of Eisenhower when it is appropriate. If one of the lessons of the first book is how politics can have a negative effect on a principled man, the main lesson in this one is how moderation is both a virtue and a vice.

For Eisenhower, it is a virtue when he besieged by extremists within his own party who are all too willing to use nuclear weapons and it is he who stays a middle course. As moderation's negative image, hesitancy, however, it is a vice as he fails to take on McCarthy or segregation. As one of the most continuously popular presidents in history, Ike could have done more in these areas.

Overall, however, Eisenhower comes off as a President whose accomplishments are generally underrated. Ike himself generally comes off as a good person, honest and intelligent, with a vision of a better America that many would agree with, one without the threat of nuclear war.

There are a couple little errors in the book and its predecessor, but that doesn't take away from this volume's high caliber. This is a great biography, well written, detailed and always interesting.

Ike is a good role model for Mr. Ambrose, or anyone else. Until recently there hasn't been a lot of good, unbiased information on the Eisenhower the man. Although this tape is informative & entertaining it doesn't give you that. He talks in glowing terms on the inner Ike, his integrity, respect for subordinates, sense of humor & decency. Ambrose says Ike was no paragon of virtue but he doesn't believe that. Ike was a segregationist & women's rights were foreign to him. These faults & others are passed over lightly. If your only source of information on Eisenhower was Steve Ambrose then you would think Eisenhower was a good & great man. By the way I think so too.

Ambrose edited the Eisenhower Papers project for many years and finally turned his talents on writing a large-scale biography of Ike. In this project Ambrose lectures for one hour on his favorite hstorical topic. The result are mixed.

Ambrose has always been blatantly biased in Ike's favor and makes no bones about it. His first words are, 'Dwight Eisenhower was a great and a good man," which is undoubtedly true, but a biographer should take more pains to disguise their own feelings. There is very little criticism of Ike in Ambrose's work, which borders on the hagiography. Perhaps a bit more of Harry Truman's invective towards Eisenhower could have infused this tape.

Still, Ambrose is a wonderful writer and his works are always fun to read and informative. This is interesting listening even if it is a completely uncritical examination.

This one hour lecture by Ambrose is excellent. It provides a brief overview of Eisenhower's outstanding character. Ambrose also deals effectively with some of Eisenhower's lapses in character and leadership. I would recommend it to anyone interested in Eisenhower.

Ambrose doesn't manage to totally bore me to death, but I find him highly overrated, judging from this work. He manages to turn the life of a great man into your typical boring biography. It really doesn't compare with the biographies written by Remini or the other top historians. Still, it does a fairly good job of covering Eisenhower's life and times, based very much on Ike's own writings. Moderately recommended.

After reading Ambrose's so-so history of the transcontinental railroad, I was admittedly looking at reading this book with low expectations. Fortunately, this book is far superior to Ambrose's more recent work.

Ambrose does a great job at showing what Eisenhower was like prior to his election as President. Although a generally affectionate work, Ambrose also points out the flaws in the man. The book shows the value of hard work and intelligence, as Ike was essentially a self-made man who got where he was without any special family or friend connections.

This book also depicts the dangers of politics. As Eisenhower gets more involved in the political arena, he becomes a less admirable person, succumbing to the hypocrisy that seems inherent in that field.

This is a well-written portrait of one of the more significant people of the last century. I look forward to reading the second volume and learning more about Eisenhower the President.

Stephen Ambrose, America's most dynamic, truthful and objective historian, has given us the clearest picture of one of the most incredible personalities of the 20th Century. From General Eisenhower's birth to the the election of 1952, Ambrose covers the life of this man in such detail, and with such clear objectivity, that one can hardly put it down. As a former teacher, I believe it, along with Volumne II, should be required reading of all students, from the 12th grade on into the college ranks.

Ambrose edited the Eisenhower Papers project for many years and finally turned his talents on writing a military biography of Ike. The Ike opus is infinitely superior to Ambrose's earlier biography on Henry Halleck and his research and knowledge about his subject is obvious throughout.

The only "criticism" I have is that Ambrose is blatantly biased in Ike's favor and makes no bones about it. The first words in his introduction are, 'Dwight Eisenhower was a great and a good man," which is undoubtedly true, but a biographer should take more pains to disguise their own feelings. There is very little criticism of Ike in Ambrose's work, which borders on the hagiography. Perhaps a bit more of Harry Truman's invective towards Eisenhower could have infused these pages.

Still, Ambrose is a wonderful writer and his works are always fun to read and informative. This is an excellent look at Eisenhower in World War II, even if it is a completely uncritical examination.

I was not aware of the fine writing of Ambrose until I read "Citizen Soldiers" and in "Supreme Commander" he does yet another job of putting the reader right there besides Ike as he learns, commands and most importantly earns the trust of all who comes in contact with him.

Many of Ike's compatriots questions his skills as a soldier but all are certainly of his positive human skills at bonding a diverse group to attain the goal of defeating the enemy, in this Ambrose describes well. And from this experience at war time an outstanding president is groomed. I think Ambroses' "Eisenhower: A soldier and President" will have to be my next purchase.

One point I'm a bit disappointed is the fact that Ambrose does not spend much time dealing with Ike's rols in the debacle of Hurtgen Forest, the problems with Repple Depple, and the problems with the problems caused by Segragation in the Army, several of the areas that Ambrose had detailed discussions on in "Citizen Soldiers". But all in all, an excellent read.

Stephen Ambrose skillfully tells how Eisenhower developed into one of the greatest military leaders in history. Eisenhower was able to lead the Allies to victory WWII because of his ablitiy to keep the alliance together. Eisenhower understood that the only way to achieve success was to build a consensus among differing viewpoints on how to conduct the war. He had to understand British strategies, goals, traditions, and hardships and meld them together with American objectives. He realized that the British have all ready been punished thru years of war, where as the Americans had justed entered the war and had not endured the hardships in the degree in which Britain had. Eisnehower was faced with many strong-willed military and political figures like Roosevelt, Churchill, Montgomery, Bradley, de Gaulle, and Patton, each of whom had their own views on how to conduct the war. Eisenhower was able to work with this men, which was no small feat. It is diffcult to see how another person would be able to lead such a diverse group of people.

Carlo D'Este's new book on Eisenhower immediately seized my interest. I know quite a bit about the War, but I didn't really know much about Ike. I found out plenty about Eisenhower's career, too much to easily compress into a short review. Even so,
here are a few main points:

1. Eisenhower's spectacular elevation to supreme commander was fantastic luck for Ike and a terrible risk for the Allies. At the time he took command, he had never held a combat assignment.
He simply was not prepared for the job.

2. Eisenhower had to deal with a nasty, egotistical, and scheming group of ambitious subordinates. They all distrusted his abilities; Clark, Bradley, Patton, Alexander, Montgomery, etc. Nor were these prima donnas very good soldiers, except for Patton. Depressing.

3. Eisenhower and the allies botched many operations: Darlan, Sicily, Anzio, Salerno, Omaha Beach, Arnhem, Berlin, etc.

4. D'Este insists on writing about Mamie, John SD, and Kay Summersby, even though they had no effect on Eisenhower's commands.

5. Ike was often sick. He suffered from dozens of afflictions.

6. Eisenhower endured a level of conflict and pressure that few men could endure without cracking up.

7. Eisehnower wanted to become a real fighting commander. He disliked staff and bureaucracy. Ironically he build a huge bureaucratic staff and he never commanded troops in battle.

8. Ike never cared a whit for material possessions, money, women, or fame. As soldiers and politicans run, he was a Saint.

9. The World class act was Marshall, standing aside so Ike could command in Europe. But Marshall was much better prepared! I find it difficult to understand Marshall's motivations.

This is a strange book. D'Este is a better military writer than a biographer. I can't see why his book is better than Ambrose. Nor is it particularly strong on operations, compared to say,
Perrett's book. In particular, the book really ought to end with a chapter summing up the many contradictions and ironies of Ike's sudden rise and his troubled command. D'Este has many harsh judgments to make, but they are left scattered.

I rather expected a biography of Eisenhower to be a bit plodding in comparison to ones on Patton and Rommel, but D'Este really does a great job of holding the reader's attention. I take no issue with his decision to halt the story at the end of WWII because I had no interest in Ike's presidency. Other reviewers are far more learned in comparing this rendition of Eisenhower's life with others in the field, but from my perspective as the occasional "dabbler" in the area of WWII non-fiction, I thought this book was a good overview of the personalities behind the major SNAFU's -- and victories -- of the allied forces in North Africa and Europe.

Ike is a fascinating person to me. His life is a truly American story of rising from a hardscrabble Kansas upbringing to the heights of American military and political leadership. I've read 4-5 excellent books covering different facets of Ike's career, but this masterpiece is the best at focusing strictly on Ike's military career. It was certainly an extraordinary career, though the first 20 years of it included many setbacks and heartbreaks before Ike's rise to everlasting distinction beginning in late 1941 following Pearl Harbor.

While I love Stephen Ambrose's books, he comes perilously close to hagiography, for he makes no bones of his belief in Ike as hero. D'Este, by contrast, is brutally honest and sometimes very critical in spots. I think he covers the full spectrum of this very extraordinary and veru complex man - charisma, charm, cunning, determination, times of decisive leadership as well as periods of indecisive dithering. Ike comes across as very human, but for all his inherently human shortcomings, he also emerges as a truly great man.

This book handles the military campaigns of WWII - the setbacks and the glories - in a very readable format. Ike is shown as an uncertain leader in North Africa, but by the epic Ardennes Campaign (Battle of the Bulge) he has asserted himself as a decisive leader. The book also shows the complexity of Ike's job in managing a fractious Allied coalition - no easy task!

I had hoped this would be an in-depth exploration of
the inner workings and motivations of Presidents Truman
and "Ike" -what I discovered was a poorly researched, boring
book. It's almost as if Mr. Neal assumed putting both
names on the book's cover would make it a seller. Buyer
beware. You can find more in-depth material on these
men and their times right here on the internet. Also,
it turns out, Mr. Neal received monies from a Truman
Foundation, which is a poor ethical choice on his part, in
presenting a history that the reader assumes is unbiased.
If you like to see pictures of "Harry & Ike" -many which
have been printed elsewhere, you may enjoy "Harry & Ike"
the book. Quite a letdown as to what I expected.

Hitler, Hitler & Stalin, FDR & Stalin, FDR & Truman among others.
Some with no connection. Obviously Naploeon didn't know Hitler. I'm kinder that most reviewers. But this was cooperation, not a partnership. The author strains for similarities. They were both poor boys growing up at the same time in mid-America 200 miles apart.
Childish & paranoid come to mind in decribing their relationship after Ike decides to run in 1952. Truman's problem was he idolized generals such as Pershing, Marshall, MacArthur & Eisenhower. He would have stepped aside for MacArthur or Ike if either had wanted to run as a Democrat in 1948. Then he became paranoid that Ike might take him up on it. Ike said he wouldn't run & Truman thought that meant forever. When Ike did run as a Republican to deny Robert Taft the nomination Truman felt betrayed, even though Ike was doing him a favor. He attacked Ike & his character viciously. Of course Ike responded in kind. There were other issues mostly personal. Their foreign policy was seamless from one administration to the next. They basically ignored each other until Kennedy's funeral when they had to sit next to each other. Good history of two great Americans leaders 1945-52 & slightly tarnishing their image after that.

Harry was wild about Ike, until Ike gave him hell, sending Harry on a crusade in Illinois. I have read a dozen or so books by and about Harry and Ike, none of which adequately explained the root causes of their falling out or their eventual reconciliation. This book fills that gap. Ike was politically naive, as Harry feared. I agree with the author that Ike would have been a better President if he had followed the advice of more of his friends, including HST, and less advice from his political handlers. This is an excellent book.