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Art is a language shared by social actors. Artworks can't be read without shared code to interpret the meaning of the text. They call it as convention. Convention is established through the power relationship in the market among producer (artists), intermediary (critics) and consumer (audience).
In this regard, art is just another medium like mass media. The author questions when the mass media dominates the culture, what is the status of pure art? In this vein, following questions, which have haunted the field of artistic production since the 19th century, gains renewed significance. Could art secure its autonomy as modernists dreamt of? What is the social role of art?
To answer those questions, the author probes into the language and market of visual art from pop art to postmodernism. Various avant-garde movements since pop art has borrowed and exploited material, subject and strategy of mass media. In turn, mass culture has utilized the art as high culture. But the position of pure art is still restricted to institutionalized sanctuary like museum, university. It's no more than high culture protected from below. It's utilized to distinguish from others by high society. It's not clear whether artwork is different from luxury goods in its utility. Adorno's word still reverberates in the circle of artists: "Today, it goes without saying that nothing concerning art goes without saying, not much without thinking. Everything about art has become problematic: its inner life, its relation to society, even its right to exist".
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"Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy" did not have to be an interesting book, but it is one because Moore's writing style is assured, easy, understated. He has a keen eye for the pithiest quotes from his sources. And he knows his Latin. His Southerners regarded their battlefield victories with sincere "gratulation," and Moore cannot bring himself to write "conscripted" when he knows Cicero would only have approved "conscribed."
Moore's book is still valued by historians for both parts of its title. The 1996 introduction to the University of South Carolina edition rightly praises the book as still the fundamental introduction to Confederate conscription, as well as a groundbreaking exploration of internal divisions in the CSA. That was a topic which had been given short shrift by the Lost Cause version of the Civil War which prevailed in America at that time.
Moore views Southern conscription as a flawed, but ultimately successful system that kept the Confederacy's will to fight for independence focused in an effective military effort for four hard years. He finds no inherent shame to the Confederate cause in the mere fact of conscription. "President Davis told the Mississippi legislature that there was no more reason to expect voluntary service in the army than voluntary labor upon the public roads or the voluntary payment of taxes," he writes.
Yet he appreciates the challenge of applying a system of compulsory service "among a proud and free people." He writes that the South's general public was "gradually reconciled" to the idea, though "strong opposition" remained.
His assumption that secession was principally about states' rights is no longer shared by most historians. But because Moore felt the South's cause was states' rights, the "conflict" in the book's title is largely that between Davis' central government and state authorities, notably the states'-rights governors Brown and Vance.
The book avoids statistics as much as possible, and the author always alerts his reader, if he delves into numbers, that all the figures are estimates at best, that they are often in dispute, and that surviving Confederate records are very incomplete.
Moore does not compare Southern conscription with the North's parallel messy venture in it, and he makes no attempt to place the CSA's experience in the flow of military history. This is, to me, a serious oversight.
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I missed the landmark exhibition for which this book served as the catalog, but I purchased it after vacationing in Morocco. Matisse's view of the country emphasizes the colors of Moroccan cities and landscapes -- intense orange-reds and azure bluesz. It is also informed and inspired by Moroccan design, which combines Mediterranean and Islamic elements to beautiful effect.
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That said, I can go on to the ideas in the book, which are very good and long overdue. First, simplicity. Dunlap says it several times: business is simple. Contrary to what the gurus and B-school touts would have you believe, business is not rocket science. Business is the part that comes after rocket science, when you try to make rockets as cheap as you can and sell as many as you can at the highest possible price. In Dunlap's case, paper had already been invented. It just needed to be marketed and sold at a profit. An opulent headquarters and an elitist bureaucracy did nothing to attain that goal. So Dunlap fired most of the managerial class and sold the headquarters. Simple. He then sold all of the companies in the Scott conglomerate that didn't have any relation to tissue paper. Then he dumped most of the consultants because, he reasoned, why would a high-priced so-and-so know more about running a paper company than a person who'd spent years working in a paper company?
One of Dunlap's greatest strengths is his common sense. He was able to see, and had the nerve to say, that Scott's consultants were too brainy and pricey for the tissue paper business, and that Scott executives could work in less luxurious offices. He was able to see that a power plant was not a sensible part of a paper products company. Most important, he was able to see that Scott was not serving the people who owned it. None of these things are profound insights, they're just common sense.
It is the core of Dunlap's philosophy that I find most agreeable. The job of the employee, whether great or small, is to enhance the value of the shares of the company. Dunlap blasts away at the fashionable notions that one by one have replaced the idea that the goal of a company is to make a buck for the people who invest in it. Many of his critics believe the object of a company is to provide a steady income and benefits package to its employees. Not so, says Dunlap. Those things are secondary to a company's mission. They only make their income and benefits because the owners put up their money in the first place. The owners deserve priority. Others believe a company is a vehicle for social change, something akin to a legislature or philanthropic foundation. In this view, an executive is a mere conduit for the money which must flow from consumers to company and eventually to the institutionalized panhandlers known as fund-raisers. This class, which includes everything from college presidents and grant "writers" to fundamentalist preachers and social activists, has come to believe that they are the proper beneficiaries of corporate profit. Incredible to relate, so do some CEOs! Dunlap went into Scott with his chainsaw, and severed the link between them and his company. It's not that greed is good and charity is for suckers, as Hollywood would have us believe is the credo of business. It's that charity is the responsibility of the individual.
Dunlap doesn't mind executives doling out largesse to charity, as long as it happens after shareholders have been served.
The logical thing to do is to make sure your executives are shareholders. In this, Dunlap put his money where his mouth was. Upon becoming CEO of Scott, he invested $4 million of his own money in Scott stock. Then he summoned all the executives who hadn't been fired, and ordered them to invest heavily in Scott. By making sure his executives were shareholders, he assured himself that they would keep the shareholders interests foremost.
After these drastic steps were taken, the rest appears to have been easy. Whether it really was easy, and whether the drastic steps were easy, we may never know. Mean Business makes it sound like going into a corporation and changing deeply-rooted habits is like George Patton going in and whipping the US Army into shape. The book makes no mention of any opposition to Chainsaw Al that lasted any longer than a few minutes. Employees and directors were dismissed by the hundred, assets were sold, habits were changed, and never once did Dunlap receive a setback of any kind. It is marvelous if true. But I suspect some has gone untold in the interest of creating a legend.
It may be that the story of Sunbeam and Dunlap, if ever told, will be more interesting than Scott and Dunlap. For as Bill Clinton illustrates, an egomaniac is far more interesting when squirming than when trumpeting.