Cambridge historian Christopher Clark's 2000 study of the Kaiser is, despite its brevity, a concise and balanced account of Wilhelm's life into which he incorporates much recent historiography of Wilhelmine Germany. Clark paints a picture of an emperor whose power and influence gradually weakened over time. By the late 1890s, he argues, Wilhelm had 'emerged as a significant factor in high politics, launching ambitious (if often doomed) legislative schemes, intriguing with individual ministers, and gradually hollowing out the authority of the chancellor.' (117) In the realm of foreign policy, however, Clark argues that Wilhelm became increasingly 'marginal'to the real centers of policy making,' particularly after several notable blunders including the Zabern incident and the Daily Telegraph affair, both of which witnessed his impetuous and 'undiplomatic' style, to the horror of professional diplomats.
With regard to the outbreak of war in 1914, however, Clark argues that while Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the German General Staff, 'pressed his sovereign'at crucial moments' in the months leading to war, at no point did the monarch 'surrender the power of decision to the military.' (215) Far from being a warmonger, Clark asserts, Wilhelm was 'reluctant to entangle Germany in a continental war,' (214) and maintained 'his own outlook on policy [that] differed in crucial ways from that of the military leadership.' (216) He never supported the 'preventive war' strategy espoused by top army officials, nor did he regard mobilization as irreversible. Clark points to Wilhelm's attempts to mediate between Serbia and Austria-Hungary as evidence of his 'reluctance to allow Germany to be sucked into a Balkan engagement' in 1914. (218) This initiative was 'overridden by the chancellor,' Clark notes, which provides further proof of the Kaiser's declining stature in affairs of the state'affairs he could 'influence'but did not control.' (218)
What of Wilhelm's involvement in the prosecution of and involvement in the Great War? Clark concludes that the Kaiser's 'capacity to exercise a command function was narrowly circumscribed,' which considerably diluted his influence among Germany's military leaders. Furthermore, he 'lacked an overview of strategic planning' leading up to and including the early stages of the war because, Clark maintains, the general staff regarded him as a security risk and refused to take him in to their confidence. As a result, he was displaced from the center of military affairs, shielded from much bad news from the front, and 'was excluded from the sphere of operational command of the land forces'though he did exercise a more direct'influence on the wartime operations of the German navy.' (227) Clark warns that one should not push the argument that the Kaiser was marginal too far. 'By virtue of his position,' he writes, Wilhelm was a 'figure of crucial importance,' namely for his authority to 'appoint and dismiss 'his' officers and officials.' (228) He concludes that although he was not vital militarily to the day to day running of the war, the emperor was a central figure in the 'processes by which some of the most central policy issues of the war years were resolved.' (244)

This is a great, short study for the student and buff.

I just finished this book, and found it very interesting and useful. It is not intended as a "life" of the Kaiser, but only as an analysis of his rule. I was looking for this kind of focus, so was happy with the book. The author's main thesis is that under the German constitution in effect at the time, the Kaiser had little actual power. While able to influence events, he could not control them. Only in the German shipbuilding plan did the Kaiser play a leading role. The author feels that Wilhelm sincerely wanted to avoid war in 1914. Actually, most of the book is not about the war years, giving the reader a more balanced overview of the reign. It is suggested that Wilhelm was one of the first "media" personalities, partly because of his penchant of making off-the-cuff remarks that continually got him bad publicity. The author discusses these various remarks based on the context in which they were made and the audience they were intended for, in a partially sucessful attempt to show they were not so outrageous as usually presented. While the book is not a whitewash of the Kaiser, the author does try to show he was not the arch-fiend of Allied propaganda. Since this is my personal view, I was in sympathy with the author's approach.

Another superb publication by Fedorowicz, this one a translation of the unit histories of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Well translated and very readable, this book covers some of the most interesting battles of World War II: Russia in early 1944, Normandy, Arnhem, the Ardennes, and the final battles on the eastern front in Hungary and Pomerania. There is also a section covering the 502nd SS Heavy Panzer Batallion in the battles in and around Berlin. Highly recommended for those interested in German WWII history and/or tank warfare.

I found this book in the villa library, the last evening of my recent Italian vacation. The historical and anecdotical account of Italian partisans actions isn't covered in other WWII books as in this one. Numerous accounts of courageous partisan acts are documented. Especially gripping are accounts of the brave children of Naples "scunizzi" assisting partisans at the resistance barricades, rooftops and alleys. Many of the stories are from the partisans themselves or family accounts. The book style is a straight forward report of the period and politics from the rise and fall of Mussolini, to the Nazi occupation force activities and final retreat, that all fueled the partisan movement. A fine book!

For a German history junkie, these volumes are a good 'fix'. The text is written humorously and yet fairly, without the usual bias one sees when "the victor writes the history". The analysis of the last Kaiser's life is placed in the context of the monarchical attitude of 19th century Europe, as well as the influence that his relatives in the British Empire had on his outlook. I've read the books twice. Without understanding at least some german it would be difficult to get the complete gist of what the author is trying to convey without it.

One of the most critically acclaimed studies of Wilhelm II is Lamar Cecil's two-volume biography (1989, 1996 ), deemed by one reviewer as 'the best-available English treatment of the waning years of the last Kaiser' available. Cecil's portrait of Wilhelm is largely critical: the emperor ruled 'maladroitly,' throughout a 'barren career that was without virtue or accomplishment' (ix); 'bluster, rhetoric, and natural swagger cloaked a profound emptiness, for ignorance and self-indulgence were his primary characteristics.' (1). Cecil's assessment of the Kaiser's war role is no less disapproving. 'Domestic issues rarely interested Wilhelm II,' he notes (191), and emphasizes that the Kaiser was far more enamored by foreign policy and military minutiae. Despite this martial enthusiasm, Wilhelm was 'by nature peaceful,' (194) and opposed war in 1914, afraid that a European conflict would distract Germany from the internal threat of socialism.
Once the war began, Cecil shows, Wilhelm's function was symbolic and superficial, at least as far as the imperial army was concerned. He often resided close to the front, was occasionally exposed to hostile fire, and relished hearing the roar of the guns. Cecil makes it clear that the Kaiser's duties were limited to sending telegrams, war zone tours, medal presentations and other purely ceremonial tasks''it was as empty an existence as he had had in peacetime.' Cecil flatly asserts that Wilhelm's 'part in the war, especially as it concerned the army, took a secondary place behind the role of his officers.' (210). He was for the most part shielded by his ubiquitous military entourage, fearful that his inability to 'withstand the strains of warfare' would break him. 'The Kaiser's ignorance of the true nature of the struggle in which Germany was engaged,' Cecil frankly summarizes, 'was profound and his utility to his military leaders quite limited.' He was in essence a figurehead, 'content merely to hear and endorse' the opinions of his generals. Soon after the war began, Cecil concludes, Wilhelm became 'a 'shadow Kaiser' (schattenkaiser), out of sight, neglected, and relegated to the sidelines in imperial Germany's hour of trial.' (212)

This is the gold standard of Kaiser Wilhelm II biographies.

For the past several years Ihave been a student of late 19th and early 20th century Europe. A starting place had to be found, which is much easier said than done. My readings kept leading me back to Germany, i.e., Prussia. I only wish I had discovered Professor Cecil earlier. His two-part biography of Wilhelm II has proved indispensable. I can't fathom reading one volume without the other, but since this review speaks to Volume II, "Wilhelm II,Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941,we'll have a go. The best way to read Volume II is to read the last sentence of the book first, where Professor Cecil applies a paraphrase from the Duke of Wellington who was describing the late George IV. Cecil thusly applies it to Wilhelm: "a sovereign who lived and died without having been able to assert so much as a single claim on the gratitude of posterity." The joy of the book is getting to that last sentence. It's all in there: feuding with his uncle, King Edward VII of England; the "Mad Hare" Telegraph article; the absolute idiocy of the naval arms race with England;his ill-fated dependence on the rotting Habsburg Empire; his hatred of any form of parlimentary government; and finally his almost tragic descent when he had lost the confidence of German Military Command, members of his own family, and millions of the German people. Good books on Wilhelm are hard to find. This one, especially when taken with Volume I, is outstanding.

This is a first-hand account of the search for, capture and trial of one of the most prominent Nazi war criminals. Adolf Eichmann played a key role in transporting millions of Jews to the extermination camps. After he vanished at the end of the war, Zvi Aharoni, an experienced Mossad operative, led the search for him.

Eichmann, along with at least 300 other leading Nazis escaped from Austria to Italy and then to Argentina via the 'convent route', assisted by the Roman Catholic Church and the Red Cross. However, after Aharoni located and identified Eichmann, the Israeli Government made no attempt to get him extradited from Argentina. It ordered Aharoni to kidnap Eichmann and smuggle him to Israel. The kidnapping, in May 1960, broke Argentina's laws, as Israel's Prime Minister David Ben Gurion later admitted. The United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution condemning the abduction as a violation of Argentina's sovereignty.

The Israeli Government put Eichmann on trial in 1961. He famously claimed that he was only obeying orders, but was found guilty of instigating the killing of millions of Jews. He was executed on 1 June 1962.

The whole enterprise showed the Israeli Government's cavalier attitude to other countries' sovereignty. Its technical success was used to warrant later repeated attacks on other nations' sovereignty. These aggressions damaged the countries attacked: they also degraded Israel itself. Aharoni laments that after he retired 'the rules changed and the ideals of his past no longer applied; with the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel had become a different country.' (A key indicator of this change was that, appallingly, confessions obtained by force became admissible evidence in court.) But he cannot see that his career's most triumphant moment - the forcible abduction of Eichmann - contributed to this moral degradation.

This book, first published in English in 1996, was the most recent of 3 eyewitness accounts of the Eichmann operation Although fairly consistent in details with the other two books written by task force members ('The House on Garibaldi Street,' by Isser Harrel and 'Eichmann in My Hands' by Peter Z. Malkin -- see my reviews of these books), there remains one question to be answered.

Zvi Aharoni and Peter Malkin seem to have a mutual animosity towards each other, a point that is illustrated many times in this book. Of historical importance, however, is Aharoni's claim that Mr. Malkin's discussions with Eichmann while in the former's captivity could not have taken place, both because it was against orders, and also that Malkin and Eichmann did not share a common language. Aharoni claims that Malkin spoke Yiddish and Hebrew, the former sufficently similar to German to communicate simple commands and needs, but certainly insufficient to discuss the fine points of the Holocost. I recently sent a letter to Mr. Malkin asking to clarify his language skills, especially inquiring whether he was fluent in German. It would make sense, since Malkin did extensive undercover work in Germany prior to the Eichmann operation. As of this writing, he has not responded.

Aside from this point, this book probably is the most complete in recounting the research and operational details that went into the making of the capture of Eichmann.

Zvi Aharoni knows from personal experience the inside story of Eichmann's capture and has given us the definitive insight. The description of the trial, however, is less detailed. A lot of myths are laid to rest. For example the SS criminal on the run never tried to disguise his identity after capture contrary to other accounts and movies. Nor did he speak the Hebrew language as has sometimes been claimed by apologists. But the over-riding lesson of this spy story is how it all very nearly went wrong. The undercover agents made the mistake of pretending to be estate agents when visiting Eichmann's neighbor and their cover was very nearly blown. Eichmann himself was surprisingly careless about his personal security in Buenos Aires even though he knew the Israelis were planning to capture him. It is an interesting sidelight that he and his family lived poorly in a house without electricity or fresh water supplies. If organizations such as Odessa had plenty of nazi gold in South America, Eichmann certainly never saw much of it after his arrival there. Apparently, he was the only man executed in Israel since 1947. In the worst sense of the term, Eichmann was indeed a special case.

Do not expect to read much about Kaiser Wilhelm II in this book. The title is quite misleading---it is about the era of Wilhelm, but few details about him are included here, esp. his role in WWI.

Professor John Röhl of the University of Sussex has written extensively on Wilhelmine Germany, including his collection of essay entitled The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany (1994). Röhl asserts that Wilhelm has for many years "been marginalized by professional German historians," who viewed the Kaiser as one "who played no part in shaping the policies of the Kaiserrreich." Other scholars have depicted him as "an aggressive autocrat who must bear a large degree of responsibility for plunging Old Europe into war and catastrophe." (xi) Regarding Wilhelm and the Great War, Röhl implies that his influence was negligible. The Kaiser was never a "full-scale" autocrat, and while he perhaps "dreamed of establishing absolute rule for himself...it remained no more than a dream." Röhl contends that this was particularly true in terms of military power, of which the emperor had very little. (3) However, Röhl shows that the Kaiser was not uninvolved in Germany's diplomatic and military decision-making process, notably at the start of the war. He cites Wilhelm's influence in the rejection of Britain's generous peace proposal in 1912, a move supported by his chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, and one which might have forestalled war altogether. (6)
For Röhl, the Kaiser's involvement in the Great War was heavily influenced by his personality. Wilhelm "never matured," and was seen as a child-like figure at army headquarters. This trait was coupled with a "notorious overestimation of his own abilities, and a refusal to accept constructive criticism. To emphasize the emperor's requirement that he be at center stage at all times, Röhl repeats the apposite bon mot that Wilhelm "insisted on being the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding and the corpse at every funeral." (11-13) These qualities did little to endear himself to senior military officers and worked to push the Kaiser to the sidelines of decision making as the war intensified. Röhl holds that Wilhelm's public and private antics brought much scorn down upon himself and the German monarchy as a whole. He opines that
the history of the last hundred years," he opines, "has shown that a monarchy in a modern state can only hope to survive if it restricts itself firmly to its purely representational functions and avoids making any political comment and exerting any influence. That Wilhelm II did precisely the opposite is a matter of embarrassing record. (104)

Röhl concludes that Wilhelm's role in the formation of Germany policies was not insignificant before the war, particularly with regard to the turn-of-the-century naval armaments race with Great Britain, and in the domestic arena-though he was "vulnerable to manipulation by his generals and his military entourage." (166) By late 1914, Röhl declares, Wilhelm's influence began to wane, though the awareness by military leaders of which plans, people or policies the emperor would and would not support acted as "a blocking mechanism," a fact which indicates that the Kaiser could not be completely ignored. (116) Indeed, Röhl reminds his readers that "not a single appointment to an official position, and no political measure, could be undertaken without the express consent of the Kaiser." (117)

This book is a very interesting look into the theory and practice of government under Wilhelm II - particularly in those years of "personal rule" after the dismissal of Bismarck from the chancellorship. The book is essentially a collection of essays devoted to various issues involving the Kaiser and his government. So while it is not structured like a conventional history of this era, or a biography of the Kaiser, an abundance of historical and biographical information is presented.

I enjoyed this book very much - it is very well-written and was a pleasure to read. I think anyone interested in this period of German/European history will find reading this book well worth the effort.

I had read a review in Newsweek of Crab Walk (the story of the Geman Titanic) by Gunter Grass. Crab Walk is not yet available in English and I didn't want to wait until his book came out in English to learn more about the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff.
I read Sellwood's book in a few hours. It was a good appetizer, primarily focusing on 4 of the passengers.

I will definitely be looking for other books that further detail this fascinating story.

Issac Newton's third law states: For every action, there is an equal, but opposite reaction. This is the hidden theme within David Johnson's _Righteous Deception_. Johnson's "action" is the Allies' D-Day deception plan FORTITUDE and its tributary plan QUICKSILVER, the counter-intelligence effort to convince the Germans of the existence of the fictional First United States Army Group (FUSTAG), and that the real invasion would be aimed at the Pas de Calais. The German "reaction" centers around the activities of two key individuals: Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Hitler's Chief of German Military Intelligence (Abwehr) and Colonel Alexis von Roenne, Chief of Fremde Heere West (FHW). Johnson provides a readable account of the better known machinations of Canaris; his counter-espionage activities providing vital intelligence to the British and his key role in the General's conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, Swarze Kapelle (Black Orchestra). It was when Canaris swayed the brilliant intelligence officer von Roenne to join the ranks of the conspirator's network, argues Johnson, that a critical partnership developed between the two men.Johnson places quite a bit of emphasis upon the role of von Roenne. Other authors (Fargo, _The Game of the Foxes_, and Cave Brown, _Bodyguard of Lies_) have documented von Roenne's official duties at FHW. Their consensus, however, is that Roenne was hoodwinked by the FORTITUDE deception, credited only with purposely inflating the Allied order of battle in order to get Hitler to reinforce the Normandy area. Johnson presents an opposing thesis. Johnson argues that Roenne was well aware that the FORTITUDE/QUICKSILVER deception to invade the Pas de Calais was bogus, but instead, led Hitler on to its validity in order that the Fuhrer keep the German 15th Army right where it was not needed for as long as possible. Johnson states that Canaris and Roenne were the flip-side of the FORTITUDE/QUICKSILVER coin. Johnson concludes had it not been for the duel-role of these two men, Canaris feeding valuable informaton to the Allies, and Roenne feeding Hitler false intelligence, Operation FORTITUDE, the D-Day landings and subsequent Normandy campaign would most likely have ended in failure.This book is timely, given the criticism levelled at America's current military intelligence community. Johnson places a feather in the cap of Allied deception during Word War II, however, he also creates a strange dichotomy in the process. One the one hand, Johnson shows how the Allies were successful in pulling off the deception and eventual victory in Normandy. On the other hand, he has Canaris and Roenne portrayed as willing accomplices whispering under their cloak and dagger: "You did not win on your own, we let you win." Whether or not one agrees with Johnson's conclusions, this book is an easy read and the author maintains his argument solidly throughout. For those wishing to delve deeper into his sources, however, Johnson does not make it easy. He relies primarily on secondary sources, biographies and memoirs of all the key players on both sides. He lists documentary evidence housed both here at the Eisenhower Library and the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Germany. Unfortunately he does not cite these sources specifically in the text. Fans of World War II counter-espionage and intelligence may want to add this book to their collection for its different take and readability.

This book is written in standard outline form, and although the information is 50 years old, it gives the reader a sense of how our own cryptographic researchers investigate foreign cryptographic capabilities. There are specific descriptions of Russian code books and code systems, and references to the methods of cryptanalysis used against the system, and some general remarks as to weakness' within those systems.

This is an excellent read for history buffs, as the material contains many specific dates and events, with an overall analysis aimed at appraising the Russian crypto program during WWII. The text is the content of a NSA report, that was once classified as TOP SECRET, but is now unclassified, thanks probably, to the Freedom of Information Act. The only negative thing to be said about this book, is it's brevity, as it is only 50 printed pages.

This is a great book. A compilation of memoirs and first hand accounts from German Soldiers who were there. It doesn't get any better than that. In the second half of the book maps are widely used and incredibly helpful. However in the beginning of the book there are no maps. This portion of the book was dealing with where the German commanders believed the invasion would come. It would have been very helpful to have a map showing where each officer believed the invasion would come and where it actually did. I am interested to know how close their estimates were.

Not to mention that some of these little French villages are a bit obscure, and a map would be helpful. Don't get me wrong the second half of the book has a lot of maps and is a pleasure to read. A very good addition to any library concerning tactical defense of the Normandy Coast in WW II.

This volume seeks to show, from the viewpoint of the German Army, one of the most decisive events of the Second World War: the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June, 1944 and the events leading up to it and those flowing from it. It consists of parts of the military studies written for the US Army by senior (lt. colonel and above) German Army officers post-war and have been used as source material in all subsequent writing on Normandy. They represent, together; the most detailed German account of the fighting.

As has often been pointed out, these documents all have to be used with caution. The earlier ones were done when the authors were prisoners of war, the later ones when they were paid employees of the US Army. Most of them - especially the earlier reports -- were done largely without reference to war diaries, war maps or official papers. While written by participants - many of whom never wrote their memoirs or other accounts in any language - while their memories were still fresh, their immediacy is not matched by attention to detail - dates and places are sometimes wrong or inconsistent - or their impartiality.

In some cases, the threat of prosecution for war crimes obviously influenced the writing. Some ended up doing hard time or the high jump. Blumentritt's admiration of his boss, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was doubtlessly genuine. But it comes across as "my boss was a wonderful old gentlemen, a natural aristocrat, and ignorant of any atrocities. I can say this because I burned all the incriminating evidence myself". The authors also do not spend much ink on introspection and self-revelation, but self-justification and pointing the finger at others is always in order when former generals are let near a typewriter, as the recent round of Gulf War memoirs show.

A Rashomon-like quality pervades, with the same events being described by multiple writers while - even more frustrating - more significant events are ignored. The quality of the writing and the translation varies greatly.

This book certainly does not tell the complete German side of D-Day. But the documents included in this volume remain a valid part of that picture.

Fighting the Invasion is how the German Army experienced D-Day. It brings together accounts by those who saw it from the front-line positions and those who saw it from higher headquarters. These narratives cover D-Day: the initial Allied airborne landings that so disrupted the German defenses, the fighting on the beachheads, the start of the Allied advance inland, and, finally, the failed German counterattacks. It also covers the preparation for the invasion: the building of the Atlantic Wall, the disputes over strategy between Rommel and von Rundstedt, and the improvisation of the fighting divisions the Allies would attack on D-Day.

Since the authors are all, I believe, now dead, I have tried to pull together these accounts with minimal editorial intrusions from the accounts they originally compiled for the US Army's historians. These accounts have been a major source for all historians writing about on the German side of D-Day since then, as a check of the bibliography of any of the better books on Normandy will show. I think if it's worth while for the historians to use them, then there is value in brining access to these accounts to a wider audience.

These accounts discuss both the fighting on D-Day itself and the strategy and tactics that shaped them. The authors include members of the high command, such as General Jodl and Admiral Donitz and their respective chiefs of staff. It also includes army, corps, division and regimental commanders and chiefs of staff. General Geyr gives his estimate of the quality of each of his panzer divisions, explaining the factors that would make each one a threat on the battlefield. Baron von der Heydte describes organizing and training his Luftwaffe parachute regiment and then leading into battle against the US 101st Airborne Division in the confused and bitter fighting around Ste. Mere-Eglise on D-Day. Generals Spiedel and Blumentritt provide their unique insights, as chiefs of staff, into the generalship and personality of Rommel and von Rundstedt. Oberstleutnant Fritz Ziegelmann, assistant chief of staff of the German 352nd Infantry Division, is in my opinion the most useful source. His D-Day communications log is included in this volume along with his account of how his division ended up behind Omaha Beach on D-Day and how they managed to make it a "near run thing".

This book is aimed at those with a deep interest in the Normandy campaign. It helps to have a good idea of the general course of D-Day going in, as the authors are not all that helpful about explaining things. German generals were not used to explaining. Nor is the latest and most insightful account of the Germans on D-Day. There has been 55 years of historians' work devoted to that. But it does give you the views - self-exculpatory, buck-passing, complaining though it may often be - of some very important fighting men you are not likely to hear from elsewhere.

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