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In accordance with standard Osprey Campaign series format, Bannockburn 1314 begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign (8 pages), a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies and opposing plans. The section on armies details the infantry and cavalry formations of both sides and the author stresses that while the English had superior cavalry, their failure to employ combined arms tactics utilizing both infantry and cavalry was a fundamental flaw in their numerically superior army. Certainly combined arms tactics are sound advice in any period, but while the author points out the English failure in this regard, he fails to point out how the Scottish were any different. If the English were overly reliant on their cavalry, the Scots were certainly overly reliant on spear-armed infantry. The Scots had no answer to the English superior quality and quantity in archers, and this had led to the defeat at Falkirk 16 years before. The section on plans notes that the English King Edward II was well provided with intelligence about the enemy as well as supplies, but had no real plan of campaign other than to relieve the siege of Stirling Castle. Edward's lack of combat experience and his assumption that the Scots would disperse in the face of a major English invasion are cited as primary causes of his negligent planning. Again, while the author's assessment of deficient English planning appears correct, it is hard to see that the Scottish King Robert the Bruce had any serious plan of campaign either. Until the second day of battle, the Scots kept their options open to fight or flee and their victory was the result of opportunity, rather than planning.
The campaign narrative itself is 38 pages long and is enhanced by five 2-D maps (Scotland in 1314, Edward II's invasion, the flight of the English army, Scottish raids in northern England, Bannockburn then and now) and three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (the fighting on 23 June 1314, the Scottish attack and the collapse of the English army). There are also three excellent battle scenes: the encounter between Robert the Bruce and Henry de Bohun, the attack of the Earl of Gloucester's cavalry on a Scottish schiltron and Edward II's flight). A somewhat longer than usual 20-page section on the battle's aftermath covers casualties, reasons for the English defeat, results of the battle, the continuation of the English-Scot war and changes in military tactics because of the battle. Indeed, the author should be applauded for finding space for some analysis of the battle. Essentially, the author blames most of the defeat upon Edward II's atrocious lack of leadership and faulty decisions, which was certainly a key ingredient in the disaster. Coupled to Edward's poor leadership, Robert the Bruce's ability to boldly seize opportunity presented by English indecision and confusion resulted in a successful Scottish counterattack on the second day. Rather than merely blaming one individual, I think it might be fairer to say that English arrogance was to blame for the defeat, since this same kind of arrogance figured in other battles where professional English armies opposed irregulars (e.g. the American Revolution, the Zulus, the Boers). Inexperienced as he was, Edward II probably would have entered battle more cautiously if opposing a professional continental foe like the French or Spanish. The author does conclude that the English eventually learned at great cost to deal with Scottish tactics and that they put this to good use against the French in the Hundred Years War.
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Stirling Bridge & Falkirk 1297-1298 begins with a nine-page introduction that explains how Scotland's dynastic problems led to English intervention. The sections on opposing commanders and opposing armies are decent, but perhaps not as informative as they could have been (a diagram of tactical unit dispositions might have been helpful). The maps are a bit skimpy in this volume, as there are only four 2-D maps instead of the typical 7-8; they are: Edward I's invasion in 1296, the campaign of 1297, the campaign of Falkirk and the campaigns of 1300-1307. There are also three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps - two of Stirling Bridge and one of Falkirk. The three battle scenes by Angus McBride depict William Wallace at Stirling, the Scottish attack at Stirling and the English cavalry at Falkirk.
One aspect of this book that is particularly welcome for military historians is the attention that the author devotes to issues such as the terrain over which the battles were fought. Clearly, the restrictive terrain at Stirling Bridge contributed significantly to the English defeat on that battlefield. Similarly, the lack of suitable defensive terrain at Falkirk led to the Scottish defeat. It is also clear that both sides were plagued by logistic problems and the lack of intelligence about enemy movements.
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Orléans 1429 is written in the standard Osprey campaign series format and begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign as well as opposing commanders, armies and plans. A single 2-D map depicts the confusing French political boundaries in 1429. The section on opposing commanders is quite detailed, and highlights the role of professional soldiers like the Gascon La Hire, who was just as necessary to the campaign as Joan. Interestingly, the composition of the armies of both sides had changed significantly since Agincourt fourteen years before; noblemen had largely been replaced by mercenaries, non-knight professionals, foreigners and assorted roughnecks. Evidently, the war was no longer the game of kings by 1429. It is also interesting that both sides employed artillery to great effect in this campaign - a distinct change from earlier campaigns in the war.
The campaign summary itself consists of 56 pages, divided into sections on the beginning of the English siege, the arrival of Joan, the storming of Les Tourelles, the abandonment of the siege and the Battle of Patay. Three 3-D maps depict various phases of the siege, while there are five 2-D maps that cover initial campaign movements, the layout of the town's defenses, the French relief effort, the French recapture of the Loire castles and the Battle of Patay. There are also three battle scenes that depict Joan's crossing of the Loire, Sir William Glasdale taunting Joan from the battlements and the Battle of Patay. The Battle of Patay is particularly interesting since it was one of the few occasions that the vaunted French cavalry actually showed what it was capable of doing on a battlefield; in about one hour the English army retreating from Orléans was thoroughly smashed by a vigorous French pursuit. Although there are numerous photographs and illustrations, many are only slightly relevant to the campaign; this is partly due to the paucity of medieval supporting material and partly due to the author's preference for including material of dubious relevance. Nevertheless, the campaign summary is lucid and interesting, if a bit devoid of intensity. This is both a strength and a weakness in Dr. Nicolle's work; he has the scholarly ability to thoroughly research medieval military history but as in his previous Constantinople 1453, he lacks the literary ability to bring out the drama and passion in history. The Orléans campaign was a moment of high drama in French history that not only reversed a losing war, but also resuscitated the nearly defunct monarchy.
While there is no doubt that Joan of Arc helped the French army to rekindle its morale, Dr. Nicolle also points out that doctrinal and technological changes also helped to overcome mistakes made in the past. The French embraced artillery wholeheartedly, and even killed the first English commander in the siege with a lucky shot. Doctrinally, the French shifted from a predilection for large, decisive battles to smaller, attritional battles where the English could be worn down over time. Previous defeats had also made the French more cautious and they made efforts to avoid well-defended English positions. Without the overweening arrogance of nobles eager for martial glory that had led to defeats like Crecy and Agincourt, the French army became more adept at exploiting English vulnerabilities. Joan was the vital moral spark that helped the French to achieve a critical mass, but Dr. Nicolle's Orléans 1429 effectively points out that other military factors were at work as well.
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In standard Osprey campaign series format, Marston Moor 1644 begins with short sections on the background to the campaign and opposing commanders. The section on opposing armies is unusually long at 22 pages (plus two more pages for the actual order of battle), and includes subsections on deployment and fighting tactics. Unfortunately, much of this space devoted to opposing armies is spent discussing and comparing various modern theories about unknown or controversial aspects of the campaign. Most readers will probably find this section tedious and distracting from the campaign narrative. The author then spends 14 pages on the early stages of the campaign, particularly the relief of York, and then covers the battle itself in 26 pages. The campaign narrative is supported by five 2-D maps (the opening campaigns of 1644, the siege of York, Rupert's march north, the relief of York, and the aftermath of Marston Moor) as well as three 3-D Birds Eye View maps of the battle itself. The three battle scenes by Graham Turner (probably Osprey's best contract artist) are excellent: the relief of York, Cromwell's Ironsides charging and the last stand of the Whitecoats.
Most of the military actions of the English Civil War appear confusing to modern American readers and herein lies the value of studying such conflicts. Unlike our own Civil War, which was fairly linear in nature, the English Civil War was set in a more fluid and non-linear environment. From the King's perspective, the enemy lay in the southeast, southwest and northeast. This non-linear combat environment and low force density resulted in very mobile operational methods and control of population centers (with attendant tax resources) became the decisive terrain. One such piece of decisive terrain was the city of York in the northeast; the Parliamentarians besieged it and the King sent Prince Rupert's army to lift the siege. Rupert's relief of York is probably the best part of this volume and should be studied carefully by military professionals. The Parliamentarian army occupied a favorable blocking position on key terrain overlooking the most obvious direct route into the city and awaited Rupert's advance. Boldly, Rupert fixed the enemy's attention with a small feint and then marched the bulk of his army across an undefended bridge far to the north and then slipped into York without firing a shot.
As for the Battle of Marston Moor, Tincey does a decent job describing the battle, although it is not always clear from his account why one side or the other prevailed in certain engagements. Clearly, the fact that Rupert's army did not expect battle to begin so late in the day and was surprised by the enemy's sudden attack was a major factor (similar to the Roman disaster at Adrianople in 378). Tincey argues that discipline was also a factor, in that the superior Royalist cavalry was difficult to reign in after one charge, while Cromwell's Ironsides were capable of reforming quickly. However, one could argue that it really was an issue of managing reserves, and both armies suffered from poor command and control after the initial action began at Marston Moor. Although both sides had light cannon at Marston Moor, there is virtually no mention of their participation. Tincey is also vague on casualties, relying instead only on a 17th Century source (no mention of modern diggings on the battlefield).
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Towton 1461 has a rather lengthy 9-page introduction, followed by somewhat brief sections on opposing commanders and forces. The campaign and battle narratives are adequately covered in 34 pages, supported by three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (all of the Battle of Towton in various phases) and five 2-D maps (England in 1460-1, the march to Towton, skirmish at Ferrybridge, final positions before battle and England after Towton). The volume also has four battle scenes by the talented artist, Graham Turner: the fight at Ferrybridge, the melee at Towton, the rout and the opening barrage. The final section, on the battle's aftermath in overly long at ten pages and includes and unusual discussion of modern examination of a gravesite on the battlefield. The section on the Battlefield Today and bibliography are decent.
Although any work on the Wars of the Roses is hindered by a paucity of detailed information, the author works through this deficiency rather well. He is somewhat less effective in explaining the complicated politics behind the campaign, and this subject virtually demands an appendix with capsule biographies on the major participants. The author's background as an authority on medieval arms and armor enables him to add considerable insight into his discussion of what 15th Century close combat was like at Towton. Furthermore, the Battle of Towton was rather unique in being a large-scale engagement fought amidst snow squalls.
In terms of military history, a study of Towton has relatively little to offer, since it was essentially a straight-up infantry on infantry fight until one side cracked. The leadership example of the young King Edward IV, who raced to join his troops in bucking up a crumbling flank, is interesting. Neither side made any egregious errors or did anything overly innovative, although each side employed a ruse or deceptive effort. Unlike many other battles of this period, cavalry only played a role in the pursuit phase, but the main battle was a pure infantry fight. While exact numbers are contentious, the author argues that about 45,000 troops from both sides fought in the battle and about 13,000 were killed in the space of a 6-hour battle, making Towton a very bloody day indeed.
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