The title of Truman and Pendergast implys that there is some meaningful and new knowledge regarding the relationship between these two men. This is simply not the case. There is very little about that relationship but rather a rehash of frequently publish information in other bios. This book, while it may be well written, adds nothing to the pile of information already out there. Three-percent of this very short book explored the relationship and ninety-seven percent was about the difficulties experienced by Truman because of the stigma of the relationship. Nothing new. If you want to read some great bios on Truman read TRUMAN by McCullough or MAN OF THE PEOPLE by Hamby.

Robert H. Ferrell's "Truman and Pendergast" is a fine addition to the ever increasing pantheon of written history of our 33rd (32nd) president. Ferrell focuses on a period which, until now, has not been the main focus of any Truman biography. The author paints a vivid picture of the necessary evils one faces when choosing a life in public service while maintaining one's own countenance. Ferrell centralizes his work on several main points, beginning with the initial years of Truman's political career when it was necessary for the backing of Pendergast (especially in the political machine controlled era of the earlier part of the century) and culminating with Truman's Senate re-election campaign of 1940. These main points bookend a gradual separation of Truman and Pendergast, as Truman ascends in stature and Pendergast descends into a downward spiral culminating in his incarceration in a federal penitentiary. Throughout the course of the book Ferrell maintains an anecdotal style of storytelling, which allows the reader to gain deeper insight into a very different period of political history then we find in today's day and age. "Truman and Pendergast" is a must-have for any student of Truman, as well as an excellent addition to the history of politics of the early 1900s.

While the author heaps truckloads of eulogies about "honor, integrity and deep moral convictions" on a man whom Gen. Douglas MacArthur should have hanged as a traitor, the fact is, it was Truman's flagrant disregard for the U.S. Constitution that gave him the "fortitude" to support the invasion of a foreign nation. The 1st Amendment, as we all know, clearly states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion..." While everyone is at liberty to endorse and support whatever religious cause or organization they choose, our government is supposed to remain neutral on such matters. As was the case with Harry "atomic bomb" Truman, left wingers always refer to the first amendment when it serves their purpose to subvert our institutions but always flagrantly violate it when it is convenient for them to do so. To refer to Harry Truman, who was directly responsible for the systematic slaughter of American soldiers during the Korean War, the Massacre at Hiroshima, the betrayal of China to his Communist friends, the communising of Europe, as a man motivated by deep moral conviction, humanitarianism, etc, is enough to make anyone puke.

Everyone knows that Harry Truman provided help to the Zionists because he could count votes, and there were few Arab votes in 1948. That, anyway, is the thesis developed by John Snetsinger in 1974 and since repeated ad nauseum. Well, it turns out not to be true. In a masterful and exciting presentation, Benson proves that Truman's policies resulted not from nose-counting but from deeply-held beliefs. His pro-Israel outlook 'was based primarily on humanitarian, moral, and sentimental grounds, many of which were an outgrowth of the president's religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible.' Extensive research into Truman's biography and earlier career shows his impressive consistency. Benson, of the University of Utah, establishes Truman as a studious child and deeply religious young man who, when he unexpectedly found himself in the Oval Office, lived faithfully by his precepts. In the case at hand, he expressed sympathy for Zionism as early as 1939 and reiterated his views many times subsequently. Truman's determination had great importance; of the many momentous issues in his presidency, he personally involved himself most directly with what he called the 'puzzle of Palestine.' In Benson's words, these personal interventions against the entirety of the American foreign policy establishment 'constantly rescued' the Jews from defeat. The author concludes that the standard account of Truman risking U.S. security interests for cheap political advantage is deeply unfair to this most moral and honorable of American presidents.

Middle East Quarterly, September 1998

Most of us in America presume that religious convictions are checked at the doors of our governmental offices. Benson's book articulates exactly how Truman's deep religious convictions guided--even determined--the U.S. policy toward Isral, leading to the official recognition of its independence. Without that recognition, the Nation of Israel might not have lasted a week--let alone 50 years.

This book is a slightly modified version of Benson's Oxford University Ph.D. dissertation. There he studied Modern Middle Eastern History.

As an academic work, the research is absolutely unmatched, with dozens of references and footnotes for each chapter. The author interviewed several prominent people who knew Truman and participated in the development of the policy toward Isreal.

More importantly, however, the book is accessible to any well-read student of American History. Anyone who is a fan of Truman will love the book; those not already enthusiastic supporters of the! late President, will likely become such after reading Benson's account.

In a country where well over 90% of the population awows a faith in God, it should be reassuring to know that a leader's faith influences his politics and policy-making.

This book is right out of the KGB's disinformation file. It is the line they peddled for 40 years, until the whole corrupt system collapsed around their ears. Apparently there are still true believers living as free men in the USA (thanks to the likes of Harry Truman & Ronald Reagan) where they are able to diseminate the tired old, and now defunct, party line without fear of censorship.
Has this guy read none of the voluminous material that has been made available during the 1990's by both the Russian government (ie. KGB archives - published by Yale UP) and that of the US (ie. the Venona transcripts)? Or does he think, as many of the comrades do, that they are all forgeries?
Had this author been a Soviet academic living under the Communist regime who wrote a book accusing Stalin of being responsible for the Cold War not only would his work not have been published, but he would have found himself in the GULAG.
Such are the blessings of American Democracy and the American Capitalist system that even someone who has nothing intelligent to say can do so without fear of govenment reprisals, and find a publisher willing to publish his nonsense in the hope of making a few bucks.
Stanford UP should have more sense than to publish such rubbish.
There are plenty of Marxist/Maoist publishing houses around where this kind of book could find a more appropriate outlet. What's more the History Book Club should be ashamed of itself for diseminating it.

This is an interesting book, with its own eccentricities. When Truman left office he was one of the most unpopular presidents in American history. But his fundamental decency and frankness only endeared people after the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon, and his academic reputation only increased after the first clash with the cold war revisionists in the early seventies. Whereas his next five successors were all tarred by the Vietnam debacle, Truman's confrontation with Stalin and the formation of the western alliance appears to be the hallmark of responsible realism. Offner's critical account, by contrast, is the lengthiest denunciation of his foreign policy since Gabriel and Joyce Kolko's The Limits of Power, published thirty years ago.

The greatest weakness of this book is how little new there is in it. Although this book has 98 pages of notes to 474 pages of text, the most common primary source are the documents published in the foreign relations series, most of which were published two decades ago. Although Offner cites more than 30 sets of private papers, most have been readily available for years. Indeed, this book is not all that different from Melvyn Leffler's A Preponderance of Power (1992). The most important difference is that whereas both books provided a large amount of damning criticism of Truman, Leffler's overall verdict was somewhat softer than Offner's. Offner's book is also more focused on Truman's own personal role. Offner does provide more on the creation of Israel, and the partition of Germany, though he says little about the cold war's consequences in Latin America, where the confrontational atmosphere helped cut short a brief liberal interlude. There are a few errors: Thomas Dewey won 189, not 89, electoral votes in 1948 and Klement Gottwald in 1947 was Czechoslovakia's prime minister, not its president. Somewhat more discouragingly, Offner, in his criticism of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, does not discuss the counter-arguments of Richard Frank in his book Downfall. And many scholars would vigorously disagree with his assertion that half the Palestinian refugees in 1948 left voluntarily or at the instigation of their leaders.

With these caveats in mind, Offner provides a compelling case. It may not be new, but it is based on strong evidence. Truman was a parochial man, giving to making blandly prejudicial comments about blacks, Asians and Jews. The history he read was uncritically patriotic, didactic and melodramatic and this encouraged unhelpful tendencies in Truman's diplomacy. Offner does not say the cold war was Truman's fault, but clearly he did many things to make things worse. He accused the Soviet Union of clearly breaking treaty committments when the language was ambiguous, simplied complex problems in Korea and Greece to Soviet agression, and wrongly viewed Mao as a Soviet puppet.

Truman's positions usually had considerable support from the other members of his adminstration. But it is also true that Truman ignored Harriman's advice to be more accommodating towards the Soviet Union in Japan. He failed to support Byrnes' suggestion of demanding Chiang Kai-Shek's support for a coalition government as a quid pro quo for transporting Nationalist troops to Manchuria, and in doing so lost his best chance to stop a civil war, that Chiang would almost certainly lose. He ignored Kennan's and Elsey's belief that the Truman Doctrine was overstated, and he believed that the Russians were about to attack Turkey when even the Turks knew that was not going to happen. Truman ignored General Clay's and General Marshall's calls for compromise in Germany, which lead to partition. He ignored Acheson and Lillienthal's proposals for sharing atomic energy and by choosing Bernard Baruch to head the plan, guaranteed that the Soviet Union would never support it. Truman ignored the consensus of most State Department experts that recognition of Mao was inevitable. Truman never dealt with Enrico Fermi's opposition to making an H-bomb, and he and Acheson ignored George Kennan's belief that they should at least try to negotiate in good faith with Stalin over the latter's offer to reunify Germany in 1952.

One should point out that Truman's bombing of Nagasaki, if not Hiroshima, showed a horrifying moral blindness and indifference. Truman and Acheson did not even try to discuss Mao's offers of a relationship in 1949. Truman and his advisers also ensured that the Marshall Plan would only offer aid to the Soviet Union on terms that they knew it would reject. In the Korean war Truman unwisely supported MacArthur's expansive plans, ignored clear Chinese warnings, supported elements of MacArthur's dangerous policy even after firing him, and probably extended the war two years because he did not recognize that "voluntary repatriation" of POWS violated the Geneva Convention and under South Korean and Taiwanese police was often a farce. Even in Poland, where Stalin's conduct was most unforgivable, the United States could have conceded the Oder-Neisse border, which it eventually did. If one had to point out the fundamental flaw of Truman's foreign policy, it was that it sought to rehabilitate Germany economically without doing the same for the Soviet Union it had so viciously ravaged. Ultimately, Offner provides a clear case against the limitations of Truman's foreign policy.

This has to be the stupidest book I've ever read. It is so completely infantile, it could only have been written by a leftist academic. I am very glad I got this out of the library instead of paying for it.

Fantastic survey on the industrial and political conditions of the arms race of the 50's and the 60's. At the end, US and the Allies dictated the way the Soviets armed themselves, at the expense of world security and peace.

I read this book for a history class, it was ok.

I ordered this book because I am interested in the person of president Truman, and the years of his presidency. I expected to get more insight about the decision of dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, his dealings with Churchill and Stalin, and the korean war and his relationship with Douglas MacArthur. This book has tells nothing about those subjects, and is overall very sketchy.