Professor Crane combines scholarly insights with an easy, narrative style and wit to make "Killed Strangely" a wonderful bridge between the academic world and that of the casual reader of historical novels. In this she joins the likes of David McCullough and Joanne Freeman to prove that history can be serious without having to be dull.
Like a good crime scene investigator, Professor Crane unravels the details surrounding the death in February, 1673 of the elderly Rebecca Cornell, very possibly (but not necessarily)at the hands of her son, Thomas. But more than investigate the elements of a crime, she uses the skelton of Cornell's death and of Thomas' indictment and trial to create an understanding of the psychology and legal processes as well as the social and familial relationships of New England's Puritans and Quakers. We especially learn a lot about women, particulary elderly women, in the seventeenth century.
At least part of an historian's role is to link the threads of history pointing out to us similarities and differences between eras. Crane traces one of those threads through the Cornell family into the nineteenth century. That raises all kinds of questions that extend beyond the scope of history into the realms of psychology, sociology and even genetics. Crane, thereby, points a flashlight into dark corners where we sometimes do not want to look. In this, she is reminiscent of "All God's Children," the account of New York's juvenile killer, Willie Bosket, and his ancestry by Fox Butterfield.
Because we are of an era that believes in guilt "beyond a shadow of a doubt," we can be left unsatisfied by Thomas' conviction and execution as were, in fact, many of his contemporaries unfortunately for, his sake, posthumously. Crane addresses this in the chapter "Doubting Thomas: Or Considering the Alternatives." Unlike a tv show, history frequently cannot be neatly wrapped up in an hour and the plot sometimes does not end satisfactorily.
But "Killed Strangely" is an easily recomended work whether you are a fan of the History Channel or Court TV --- or simply of Law and Order and CSI.

"Killed Strangely" is a thoroughly engrossing tale of the extraordinary crime of matricide in 17th century New England. Crane's skills as an historian give the reader a vivid sense of the texture of everyday life in the Rhode Island colony as well as the legal standards and practices that determined the community's judgment. Although this is a work of non-fiction, the reader becomes involved with the characters' lives and the uncertainties surrounding the event in much the same way one does with a good novel. Highly recommended for anyone curious about the ways in which the country's past and present interconnect.

I found this book to be quite a good and fun read. Of course it's hard to read this book against today's social back-drop but Elaine Forman Crane really took me back to the time period.
Although the evidence is a bit scant - as is any from this time -Crane's conclusions are sound and well founded. I recommend this book with out reservation to all those interested in early American history and gender related history.

Wow, I thought this would be another dry, boring treatise on international relations but it got me hooked early with its trenchant analysis and clear writing style. Thomas, a notable young star in his field, has written the essential guide to norms of force in international relations. Highly relevant to today's body politic, this wonderfully-titled work is in my personal top ten.

There are few works of international relations that have kept me up until 1 a.m., but Ward Thomas's excellent and immensely readable book is one of them. It provides both a general overview of the role of norms in international affairs, and detailed case-studies of norms governing assassinations of international leaders and aerial bombing of civilians. For undergraduate students, the first two chapters constitute an ideal introduction to the recent but very vigorous debate in I.R. over norms. To what extent do traditional "realist" formulations of power and influence need to be recast in the light of the norms literature? Thomas suggests that a fundamental rethinking is warranted, but he is careful to integrate the contributions of the realist and institutionalist schools, while offering his own novel "take" on some of the issues at hand. The two chapters exploring norms against aerial bombing of civilians (pre- and post-1945) are very well done, though the analysis of U.S. bombing in Indochina could have been expanded beyond the somewhat limited case of attacks against North Vietnam. Overall, "The Ethics of Destruction" makes an important contribution to one of the most vibrant discussions in I.R. today.

A refreshing treatment of alternative economic organization. In a casual and conversational manner the author saves us the sugar coated reviews of the all-but magical Kerala development story and dives right into the reality of an industrial cooperative in an Indian state that is breaking all of the capitalist rules and still winning the game! A must read for anyone interested in the struggle to transform exploitation into cooperation and voluntary participation. This book is a breath of fresh air in the sometimes stale realm of economic literature. Includes detailed analysis of organizational structure of Kerala Dinesh Beedi.

DR. THOMAS HAS HIT ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES THAT ARE CRITICAL IN TODAY'S CLASSROOM. THE DIVERSITY IN TODAY'S SCHOOLS DEMANDS THAT THE EDUCATORS BE UP- TO-DATE IN THE MAKEUP OF THE STUDENTS. THE AUTHOR HAS GIVEN MANY EXAMPLES AND STATICS THAT REFLECT THE MAKEUP OF SOME OF THE STUDENTS. EDUCATORS CANNOT AFFORD TO IGNORE THE BACKGROUNDS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL STUDENT. DR. THOMAS HAS GIVEN SOME INSIGHT ON WHAT TEACHERS SHOULD KNOW. HE HAS ALSO GIVEN A SCENERIO ABOUT A YOUNG MAN WITH TWO OPTIONS. HIS OPTIONS WERE BASED ON EDUCATION THAT WAS GIVEN TO HIM SOMETIME DURING HIS SCHOOL DAYS. TEACHERS DEFINITELY IMPACT A YOUNG PERSON'S LIFE WHETHER THEY LIKE IT OR NOT. THE STORY CAN MAKE A TEACHER THINK ABOUT INSTRUCTION METHODS.

Born in 1951, I was a child of the JFK generation. The Peace Corps, the growing Asian war, the idealism of a few good politicians, protests in the streets greatly influenced my upbringing. All of this was a jumble until I met Dorothy Day and then read A PENNY A COPY. My encounter with Miss Day was very brief, but I do remember the intensity of her eyes. And that intensity flowed into her writings from the Catholic Worker which are contained in this book. The desire to be Christian was burned into every page. Because of this book, my great heros became and still are Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day. In great part I became a Catholic Priest because of A Penny A Copy. Voluntary poverty, Community, and communicating the Good News is what I have sought now throughout my life. Since reading the original, I haven't missed an Issue of the Catholic Worker, which still sells for A Penny a Copy. I am buying an extra copy of the book to give to a friend.

What constitutes success and failures in military intelligence (M.I.), and why do military intelligence agencies succeed and why fail? These questions come to light in the public most often when there are apparently blatant intelligence failures, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the nuclear programs of India or Pakistan, and most recently and painfully, the terrorist attacks of September 11th.

"Uncovering Ways of War" addresses these and other questions by using the context of the interwar period (generally considered the twenty-year stretch, 1919 to 1939. between the two world wars) and builds a series of case studies that describe U.S. military intelligence efforts to study and learn from Japanese, German and British military experimentation and innovation.

The case study approach that the book uses is a wonderful device for demonstrating both the good and sometimes poor performances of the U.S. military intelligence system. It highlights the adept work of a number of military attaches (who collectively were the strength of U.S. intelligence capabilities at that time) whose professionalism provided the United States with insights that contributed significantly to some of the concepts of operation that helped win the war (e.g., learning from Japanese amphibious operations shaped USMC concepts.) "Uncovering Ways of War" also highlights how institutional deficiencies can limit the effectiveness of military intelligence activities. For example, there was little institutional impetus for the United States regarding Germany's ballistic missile development, British use of radar and Japanese night time naval surface warfare concepts. The case study approach highlighting these "intelligence failures" gets the point across behind the old intelligence addage: "I can't tell you about things that you don't ask about," meaning that institutional preferences for certain things lead to other things being overlooked.

Subtly, the book describes for the reader how the military intelligence process works. Some of it is detective work - what you don't see is sometimes more important that what you do see. Another important task is sleuthing: piecing together the information that you have and don't have and assessing the possible outcomes. Some of it is flat-out spying; others is just "networking" amongst peers while abroad. The hardest part of learning about M.I. is how some activities fail and others succeed comes through to the reader in discussion of how the U.S. military institutionally processed the information received. In some areas, the U.S. had an inclination to learn and adapt based on what foreign militaries were doing because those areas tended to be ones in which the United States believed to be important to future warfare. In areas in which the U.S. tended to have limited success or perhaps outright failure, these areas were deemed of lesser importance. Mahnken correctly avoids addressing the question that naturally follows, which is "how do or should militaries determine which attempts at innovation are important and which are not?", but instead highlights the crux of the matter: the determinant of success or failure depends on the ability of the perceiving institution to adapt to changes in warfare.