Nozick's important papers are all here, from the ones that made his reputation thirty years ago to some insightful pieces from the mid '90s. The range is broad, as anyone who's read much of his work would expect; long-time Nozick readers will also recognize the unfortunately flip note in a few papers. On balance, though, there's a lot worth reading in this book, most of it thought-provoking.

Nozick made his reputation in the '60s with some really spectacular papers in decision theory. Those papers (Coercion; Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice, and Moral Complications and Moral Structures) are all here, which is helpful since the originals can be hard to dig up--I needed the Newcomb paper for my senior thesis way back when and had to wait like a month before the library located it.

These papers are dense, but deeply rewarding. Newcomb's Problem, which introduced this puzzle, is a good introduction to the field, technically rigorous but readable, though I don't really agree with his answer. Coercion has some stuff about rights that prefigures the claims in Anarchy, State and Utopia. Moral Complications is an amazing paper, really rich but still intelligible. I don't buy everything he says, and I think Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel have both come closer to describing how moral thought really works, but anyone interested in moral philosophy should study this paper.

The pieces on Socrates, Quine and the theory of explanation focus on various areas of philosophical method and choice of subject matter. Most of his suggestions here seem right or at least plausible, though he says an awful lot about reductionism without actually saying whether he believes in it or not.

The short pieces on various issues in value theory are mostly insightful, though a few are just clever. The doggerel on universal gravitation seems to show that Goodman's notion of aesthetic merit in insufficient, not flat-out wrong; his claim the the percentage of Israelis living on kibbutzim is a serious measure of how many people would choose socialism seems a stretch. The Characteristic Features of Extremism is sharp but disapointingly short. The review of Regan's Case for Animal Rights raises a serious challenge to hard-line animal rights ethics and proposes a solution to the problem of animals' ethical standing, though I'm not completely happy with his suggestion.

The final selection of short stories on philosophical themes includes twin gems, Testament and Teleology, which would be great on an introductory philosophy syllabus but don't really offer new insight. Oddly, his most famous story, "G-d", isn't here, probably because the published version was edited in a way he didn't like. It's too bad--that story has more bite than the ones here. The stories are all cute, though they're more clever than deep.

Hyland does a first-class job of articulating a middle ground between the philosophic business-as-usual dichotomies, especially with regard to the question of the relation between eros, logos and phusis in Plato's dialogues. He calls this middle ground the 'interrogative stance', the 'stance of wonder' and, most suggestively, 'responsive openness'. Hyland argues that Socrates avoids both the 'stance of mastery' and the 'stance of submission' with a very detailed and persuasive account of his interrogation of Charmides and Critias, therein articulating a 'mode of being' that is appropriate to human finitude. Hyland draws a few parallels to Heidegger which are quite instructive.

I like this book better than the game hungry hungry hippos. Catch all the marbles as fast as you can, beat your opponents with a slight of the hand!

Derrida has stated that one of the main purposes of his decontructive readings, writing, and ruthless re-contextualization of various philosophical ideas is to minimize the "violence" of various philosophical practices- those ways of speaking, writing, which silently privilege various terms, and ideas and, perhaps unknowingly repress others. Given the other "esoteric" reviews here, its my duty to minimize the "violence" for those people who really want to know about the book, and not about namedropping, three lines of praise.

The Postcard is a "collection" of various love-letters, supposedly burned in a fire, which has left pieces of text missing. Derrida has also included a few essays which he believes continues the analysis begun in the loveletters [envois]. The content of the loveletters covers a broad range of philosophical and personal questions - from philosophy of language - to the relation b/w Socrates and Plato - to personal encounters in (I suppose) Derrida's life as a philosopher. But the over all effect of this - this "re-contextualization" or in other words, this casting of philosophical questions in a format not usually considered "serious" -> love letters... the profundity, the importance, the dissemination of the questions take on a wholly different feel and effect. The feel and effect, of course, is hard to describe, but it is a way of playing with "philosophical sensibilities" -- what is "real" philosophy? What is "serious" philosophy? And what is the meaning of such questions in the most private of all communications - love letters between two intimate lovers.

Of course, in typical Derridean style, he puns, and jokes his way, throwing punchlines out of every page. The envois are not an easy read. They can be tough, and confusing, especially with the 'missing text" which link ideas. The other essays included in The Postcard are equally a tough read, with a very interesting, but treacherous deconstruction of Lacan's analysis of Poe's "The Purloined Letter".

The Postcard can only be understood as continuation of previously examined (Of Grammatology), argued (Limited Inc.), and illustrated (Glas) philosophical strategies employed by Derrida. And yes, Richard Rorty (an american post-enlightenment philosopher) totally misses the boat on this one. While, i believe Derrida is attempting to "play" with various aspects of the philosophical tradition (Derrida is by far the funniest philosopher, since, Nietzsche), The Postcard is merely an new way of asserting those same ideas Derrida laid out in Limited Inc and other books, that conceptual meaning is not fixed but disseminated and deferred [differance] to all possible contextual usages and instantiations.

I know, this is merely one small aspect of Derrida's enterprise. But it is, I believe, the main purpose of The Postcard: to see how the meaning of philosophical questions regarding language, history, and the sequence of events, take on new meanings in the context of lost love lettes-- the same way a Post Card, which never reaches its destination-- takes on new meanings for the unintended third reader.

It took me a long time to crack the Derrida nut. But when I did, I did it with this book. Thus it will always be my favorite philosophical novel by Derrida. When I finished this book I picked up Badiou's book on Deleuze and he said I got everything right, only he said it better than I would have.

So far, all the other readers seem to have missed the point. First, this book is not about anything so feminine and smacking of vulgar Christianity as love and cushy feelings. Derrida says it's a poison pen letter. It's about hate. It may be "between lovers," but it's published for the whole world to admire and appraise, a radically different context than the relationship of husband and wife. Which the careful Derrida-phile will note was handled very carefully, almost cynically, in the Derrida "documentary." (Has there ever been a greater and more hilarious take on oral sex?)

One wag commented that the book is only good for beach-reading. But that misses the serious side of Derrida, which is also the point. Rhetoric can be philosophy. Derrida is one hundred percent hilarious. But he's always pushing the philosophical envelope with his puns. To resort to a distinction that has a pragmatic value even though it utterly lacks any philosophical foundation, the use-mention distinction, when Derrida uses the word 'this,' he also means _that_. (Why does the use-mention distinction make no sense? Because when you say 'horse,' a _horse_ comes out of your mouth. As per Wittgenstein and the Stoics.) It's up to us lesser mortals to tease out the strands and levels until we can produce something as thoroughly competent. And simultaneously beautiful and ugly. Like orgasm.

Which brings us to Lacan. Some say he's a charlatan. And you have to be suspicious of anyone who declares that they're not interested in truth, but falsity. But when the postmodernists say this what they mean is that the truth, which can potentially be known, is in being aware that you actually don't know. The idea goes back to Plato and his early Socratic dialogues. Stated like that, it isn't too far from Kant, who also believed that we can't actually know much, other than that there are stars above and some sort of moral rules within. (Nobody has ever agreed with him on his rules, including his great heir John Rawls.) Derrida doesn't differ much from Lacan. He abandons Oedipus for the same reasons as Deleuze (it's a self-fulfilling prophecy and alienated from real life). But the argument on the postal system only looks different from Lacan's account because Derrida says it is. That he got Lacan to agree with him says something about Derrida's prestige, so there must be something there. (Though Lacan's submission looks suspiciously like he doesn't submit--republishing the Ecrits in an edited down version where the offensive passages have been actively forgotten.) But when Lacan says that a letter always gets to its destination he means that it always misses its destination, because the person it's intended for is going to sometime pass away. ("The living is a species of the dead." Nietzsche.) Which is also Derrida's point. I haven't read Derrida's latest writings on Lacan but apparently there's a whole lot of a rapprochement. In his interviews with Roudinescu, A Quoi Demain, he considers his style to be Lacanian and a lot of his conclusions to be similarly disposed.

Here's hoping the most consistently amusing of the post-Heideggerians remains a liberal individualist. Though it's probably going to be tough for him, given that the Straussists of the Whitehouse talk a similar talk and walk a similar walk. ("Jewgreek is Greekjew.") I believe the fact that Derrida is explicitly against the death penalty is the deciding difference. QED.

The author clearly shows how emotionally-charged and irrational pro-abortion arguments really are when they are held up to the truth-penetrating light of logic and natural reason, which Professor Kreeft, using his brilliant wit in the role of Socrates, masterfully applies. The charge in a previous review that the author did not accurately present the women's perspective on abortion because all the characters in the book were male is somewhat puzzling--the characters are fictional to begin with; and besides, I can think of no argument that only a woman would be able to use to justify abortion that was not triumphantly refuted. Anyone who has argued himself or herself blue in the face with someone who is pro-abortion knows how discomfittingly illogical--oftentimes downright silly--and motivated by selfishness the arguments employed are. To the Christian this volume demonstrates that one does not need to rely solely upon Church teaching to argue that abortion is morally wrong--a strategy which will rarely succeed against a non-believer. Instead, it reveals the power that logic and reason alone can have in critically examining issues of social morality, which when used properly, can greatly bolster religious arguments. To the non-believer, this little book plainly shows that abortion is not exclusively a religious issue, as many people in today's society assume. I enthusiastically recommend this book to any pro-life person who wants to be successful in arguing against abortion as well as to persons who, being instinctively pro-choice, honestly desire to understand how anyone could be against this apparent woman's right.

This book is an excellent introduction for the person who is just getting started in the abortion debate. Kreeft's clear logic and concise thinking will keep the reader entertained and convey the true issues behind the abortion debate.

If the book is considered as such, this book should get five stars. Its staged conversations are a great way to keep the readers attention. Kreeft also shows how many of the pro-abortion arguments beg the question, and that the pro-life side has a lot to say on this topic. However, I would stop there. Because Kreeft authored the book, one might get the impression that Kreeft is going to give a complete analysis of the abortion debate. Like is generally his style of doing with other topics. But this is not the case nor do I think that is what Kreeft intended to do. Given this books short size, and pages, I think Kreeft just wanted to give a good overview of the principles behind the abortion debate. In this regard, Kreeft did an excellent job and I would recommend the book to any person looking for that. So just keep in mind that there are some strong arguments for abortion that are left out in this book. Such as "unplugging the violinist" argument by Judith Jarvis Thomson.

If anybody gets more interested in the abortion debate, and would like to have a book that is guaranteed to convince even the most ardent pro-abortionist, I would strongly recommend, "Politically Correct Death : Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights" by Francis J. Beckwith. This book is sure to shake the ground of any sincere pro-abortionist out there. It includes all arguments in the abortion debate and clearly shows the logical power on the pro-life side.

Peter Kreeft, who is famous for his religious/philosophical dialogues, has another witty materpiece here. As the title suggests, Socrates is playing the role of the questioner against those who might defend abortion on demand. Socrates engages a doctor, lawyer and philosopher who argue for the pro-abortion position. The great thing about this book on the abortion issue is that Kreeft forces the reader to see what is at stake in this issue. He strips away emotionally loaded cases and bad arguments for abortion. This is a must read for anyone who isn't sure where they stand with abortion. If you don't get why pro-lifers are so uptight about about abortion, you need to read this book. The dialogue is easy to read, and it is unapologetically honest about where the truth leads.

Contrary to what one of the reviewers below contends, little knowledge of the figures under discussion is required on the part of the reader. This is owing to Alexander Nehamas's skill in lucidly and masterfully conveying the key ideas of the philosophers he brings under analysis. Although "The Art of Living" is not an explicit demand for a reorientation of philosophy, and a call for its rechannelling towards abandoning the realm of pure theory in favour of a more practical end, it nevertheless attempts to draw attention to an alternative style of philosophising which enjoins that philosophy ought to make itself subservient to the practicalities of life. This trend flourished mainly in ancient Greece, particularly in the enigma of Socrates, (the preeminent exemplum of the "art of living") until it was eclipsed by the now dominant tradition that emphasises theoretical knowledge, later to be revived by such figures as Montaigne, Nietzsche and Foucault, whose aesthicist stance Nehamas chooses as a point of departure. He evaluates, in the first book of his study, the figure of Socrates, as presented in the dialogues of Plato, and how he, in his philosophical endeavour, succeeded in fashioning a work of art out of himself or, in Nehamas's words, creating himself as a unique personality. Nehamas also explains how Montaigne, Nietzsche and Foucault, sought and, succeeded in realising, similar projects for themselves, absorbing Socrates's ironic silence about himself as well as reacting against it, in their bid for "self-creation" via the medium of their texts. It is by this aestheticist turn that Nehamas designates the "art of living", a uniquely particularlist and individualist praxis of philosophising, enabling a subordination of theoretical knowledge to actual experience. Knowledge, as Nehamas seems to imply, must be lived in order to be truly understood. The major shortcoming of the book, I felt, was the chapter on Montaigne, which was extremely tedious, though, on the whole, an outstanding and fulfilling treatise.

Socrates is the personification of philosophy. Who loves this way needs to make the effort of trying to understand the enigma that is Socrates and the problematic knowledge of ethics values he's questionning.
Nehamas makes a excelent book on that matter. Interesting and not too academic. Writting books of philosophy is already a way of living and it seems that he's good in that!

What is philosophy? Most people today assume that its primary task is to offer convincing answers to a set of well-known questions. But many philosophers, from the fifth century onwards, have felt that thinking well is only a secondary task, always in the service of *living* well; and living well may not be something for which there is a single helpful definition. Taking Socrates as their paradoxical model--a model, precisely, of how to do without models--these philosophers thus set about forging a life which is both coherent and unique, often considering their own views as simply raw material for that fashioned life. They do not tell others what to believe or even how to behave, but provide instead an *example* of a compelling mode of existence.

This, argues Alexander Nehamas in his brilliant new book, is the tradition Socrates began, and which Montaigne, Nietzsche and Foucault--perhaps Plato too, in some respects--have continued. That it is still alive today is evident in the fact that Nehamas himself practices what he preaches: not content with a presentation of the theory, Nehamas exemplifies it by bringing together, in this one work, the various strands of his intellectual life. A veritable tour de force, and one which may have lasting consequences on the world of philosophy.

The book is not meant to be like Plato's major philosophical works. It is about the nature of love, discussed with a frankness about homosexuality not seen until thousands of years later. For anyone interested in what the Greeks thought of love, it's all there. I found them interesting, also revealing the nature of Plato's writing that is more artistic than technical. Socrate's talk of love being a divine madness or the myth of man and woman once being one are beautiful. The Greeks had a tendency to discuss everything in rational terms or in relation to their mythology, so that some of their ideas seem nonsensical or naive, but that is just from the perspective of someone living centuries later.

The Symposium was a great book but it was a little hard to understand. I like the way opinions were expressed of the topic of "love!" It makes a person think about "love" in general. What it really is and what it really means. There are many opinions of "love" and not one person has the same idea of love in the book. There are creative ideas expressed in the book about what a person thinks "love" is. It is hard to agree with just one person in the book because all their ideas are great and they all make sense in one way or another. A person may agree or disagree with a speaker in the book because they may not agree with the speaker or they may like the idea of a speaker and agree with him. A person may also agree or disagree with some parts of the idea from a speaker because they may think that the idea starts off great but does not end. A reader may compare and contrast ideas of all the speakers and they may come up with another idea of what "love" is or how it is felt. The Symposium was great to read and it makes you think about what everyone else in the world thinks about "love!"

Symposium, Plato's most dramatic dialogue, skilfully interweaves six voices together in a discussion of love. More than any other dialogue, this work creates effective characters and provides insight into the Athenian culture's view of love while blending humor into the text. Phaedrus, a later dialogue, is less dramatic in nature but continues the inquiry into the nature of love. Juxtaposing the two in the same text gives the reader a sense of how Plato's style evolved over time

Kennedy fans beware! This book will make you angry. Saying Jackie let Aristotle Onassis murder her husband and the father of her children is preposterous. January Jones is living in a fantasy world.

When I bought this book I was looking forward to spending my time in a productiv and relaxing way. Unfortunately, this book came as a big dissapointment to me, because of its superficiality and amount of trivial details. I expected much more from the author and from the book itself. Enjoy reading, anyways.

The book was okay. I always enjoy the different theories on the
the Kennedy saga of sadness. I personally do not put much faith in the theory of Ms. Jones, however, some of the facts she has stated in the book seem very truthful. I look forward to reading more of her books.

I've read the book entirely. And it is written at very simplistic level. I found the book anything but logical, with many common falacies ("straw man", "ad homenem" , "appeal to authority" etc..). But even if we assume that the book is logical, that is beliving in a dictatorial deity is a neccessary path to salvation, I doubt Socrates will find this "slave logic" as ethical.

So Socrates, Nietzsche and other great philosophers a

Socratic Philosophy + Christian Fundamentalism = NONSENSE

I could not understand what logic Christians follow when they claim that such great philosophers as Socrates and Nietzsche are in any ways sympathizers of delusional Christian fundamentalism. If anything Socrates if present today will be a naturalistic freethinker, questioning the authority of the church and of the God himself. Such renowed Socratic phrase: "Is it moral because the God says so, or God say so because it is moral" clearly shows that morality and religion aren't identical. I am wondering, for example, how Socrates can feel anything but disgust after reading the old testament, where God commands to do such "moral things" as killing babies happily: "O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." (Psalm 137:8-9)

Even in the New Testament, Socrates would find Jesus' arrogant remarks and ultimatums in no better light than he saw many Olympic gods. I don't see how, for example, after encountering such phrase as spoken by Jesus: "If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned." (John 15:6) Socrates would not arise with other feelings that resentment against such a dictatorial God.

In summary the "conclusions" seemed to be drawn from the premises were in much part through a fallacious way. And any person familiar with logic can easily see that. To claim that the real Socrates could ever drawn such fallacies is too insult this great philosopher.

I have read many popular logic, philosophy, and religious books and Peter Kreeft uniquely combines the clearest and best of these items. If you have a mind and you want to think, then I would suggest you read books by Kreeft (especially this one!). If you are a know-it-all, or can't think, or are just mean spirited, then write a review without reading Kreeft's books.

This is a book by a professor which was written for professors. More to the point, this is a book by a disciple of Gregory Vlastos for those who take the Vlastos/Irwin mode of reading Plato to be paradigmatic. The text purports to be a reading of Plato's early dialogues (eg. Charmides, Crito, Apology, Euthyphro, etc.) with an eye towards articulating what "theory of knowledge" is articulated by Socrates within these dialogues. Ultimately, the author arrives at the conclusion that "Socratic knowledge...is a strong and complete grasp of distinct F-nesses...[t]his grasp of the respective F-ness produces correct judgements involving F-ness that yield true cognitive states consistent with the knower's other cognitives states involving F-ness as well as the ability to answer the Socratic 'What is F-ness' question in a way consistent with those other cognitive states" (p.211).

The considerable vagueness of the previous phrase, coupled with the abstract character of the language reveals the general tone of this work. It is also worth noting that the author's description of knowledge is little more than a tautology. We know what we know when we can recognize it and articulate what it is that we know. Sure. "My cat's breath smells like cat food" said Ralph of "The Simpsons." Generally speaking, Benson tends to overemphasize the discursive character of knowledge and ignore the necessary, noetic component. After all, how do we know if our articulation of "F-ness" is correct save by looking at "F?" This is one of the overarching problems in the Hippias Major: we can see what is beautiful but when we attempt to articulate why it is so we find ourselves in all sorts of trouble. The main point here being that we can recognize that something is beautiful without needing a definition of beauty (kalos). Once we couple this with his general lack of interest in the dramatic context or dialogical content of the Platonic corpus we have discovered that the author has written 260 pages but said very little.

There are other problems with Benson's reading; far more than would be productive to detail here but I will take one to illustrate my point. Benson leans very hard upon the Apology to justify his contention that Socrates' self-appointed task was in conformity with the wishes of the god of the Delphic oracle. The only problem with this assertion is that it is utterly against the text. The oracle told Socrates (via Chaerephon) that he was the wisest man in Athens. What was Socrates' response? He refused to believe the oracle's pronouncement and set out to disprove the oracle! Now, this may simply be naivete on my part but questioning the gods is not particularly pious behavior. More to the point, Socrates' self-appointed role as gadfly is taken up *against the oracle.* John Sallis makes this point quite nicely in his chapter on the Apology in "Being and Logos." Of course, this is another place where Benson stumbles: his bibliography. Though heavily footnoted (there are literally hundreds) the book contains no reference to works on the early socratic dialogues by Sallis, Tom Pangle, Christopher Bruell, H.G. Gadamer, and numerous others who read Plato with an ear tuned towards the dramatic nuances of the text. The title of this review was taken from a sentence by the literary critic, R.P. Blackmur, who spoke of the early socratic dialogues as full of "imaginative skepticism and dramatic irony." There is almost *no* recognition from Benson that any of this exists within the works. It is, quite simply, a book for a small group of like-minded individuals who are uninterested in letting the dialogues speak for themselves. Needless to say, I cannot recommend its purchase. Put your money towards Diskin Clay's "Platonic Questions" or Newell's "Ruling Passion" which will tell you far more about Plato.

ever since Gregory Vlastos Stated that Socrtes was no epistemologist the mainstream thought seemed to agree. this however did not sit well with Hugh Benson, who takes a look at this topic and comes to the conclusion that, yes, socrates is an epistemologist.

Huh huh! Play Doh! Ah ha ha ha ha! No, but seriously, this was a very well written tale. I especially enjoyed the details surrounding the controversy about Socrates' teachings. I reccomend this book to anyone who has a laptop and is planning to sit on the john all day. And if you don't have a laptop,TRY METAMUCIL - never fails! Well, I'm SKATE, and that's my TAKE!