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Pemberton wrote the document in the late 1870's before his death in 1881, to respond to Johnston's autobiographical NARRATIVE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. Even after 120 years, the anger and hurt comes through. Johnston had essentially placed the blame for the loss of Vicksburg on Pemberton, citing his incompetence and disobedience of orders. Pemberton takes each of Johnston's eight charges, and argues his side of the case. Smith has made this more understandable for the reader by inserting (in easily distinguishable font and italics) the specific exerpts from the Johnston book to which Pemberton was referring; many of Pemberton's points would have been lost to me without those insertions.
Another specific contribution which Smith made to the manuscript itself was his description of a visit by Davis and Johnston to Pemberton and Vicksburg in December, 1862 (before the Vicksburg Campaign would escalate in the spring and culminate on July 4th). Given the fact that Davis, Johnston, and Pemberton seemed only a few weeks later to have no agreement or common thinking on their strategy, one wonders what they talked about during their several days together. Certainly, they MUST have talked about whether Vicksburg must be held at all costs....but in the spring, Johnston seemed to think not while Davis and Pemberton certainly thought it must. Perhaps they never considered what to do in a siege....but, if not, what were they really expecting Grant to do? He certainly had given no indication of giving up easily! This lost opportunity for strategic alignment echoes through the Pemberton manuscript, as I read it.
For me, Pemberton presents his case in a compelling, convincing, and interesting manner. To my (amateur) reading, he does not often imply that he knew in 1863 everything that he would know when writing in the late 1870's. However, on one occasion, he did allow himself to refer to Johnston as "the great master of retreat", taking advantage of the reputation Johnston would get during his portion of the Atlanta Campaign in 1864.
Johnston does not come out of this book in very good shape. In fact, the picture of Johnston is very reminiscent of that in Jeffrey Lash's DESTROYER OF THE IRON HORSE. In fact, one of Lash's primary examples of Johnston's misuse of the railroads occurred during the Vicksburg Campaign, when he lost of large quantity of Confederate rolling stock and engines by waiting too long to order their movement to safer locations. Smith summarizes Johnston's failure to take any action to relieve Pemberton in Vicksburg by saying that he "either had no intention of acting or was incapable of mustering the courage and energy to face the situation". Personally, it seems to me to have been the latter. The puzzling, frustrating impact of Johnston's inertia comes through clearly in the Pemberton manuscript.
This is an excellent book, very readable and quite interesting. Smith's background chapter will assist the reader who is not familiar with the Vicksburg Campaign to understand it well enough to follow Pemberton's discussion. That understanding is aided by several simple, clear, excellent maps. One does not need to be a military history scholar to appreciate this book. However, as Ed Bearss' introduction makes clear, even the elite class of military history scholars will likely also find this book worth their while.
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Hume's political, historical, and ethical ideas are also interesting and I was surprised to learn how much Hume's ideas on the separation of powers in government had influenced James Madison.
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