In the incoherence of the culture wars the many incarnations of the same basic debate, over and over, can be traced to nearly incohate beginnings, in the revolving alternations of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This selection of essays traces the dragon to the broken shells of the dragon's egg, and we find much ado primordially sourcing in the Pre-Socratics, yet again powerfully in the dilemmas of Kantianism and Hegelianism, the first thuderclap of so much later sound and fury.

This is a cogent short work on the central place of Hegel in modern philosophy, containing a crisp account of the transition between the era of Kant and his successors. So this book is also most usefully about the 'before and after' of Kant. The interest of this transition springs from the decisive character, almost a spell, of the Hegelian influence, in the wake of the crisis of critical thinking and the unsettled questions of foundationalism precipated by the reaction to the seminal work of Kant. Following the swift passage from Kant's system, through to the alternate universe of Hegelian logic and phenomenology, leaves a spellbinding enigma, whose outcome is never certain, witness the cascade of dialectical reversals of all the basic questions. From the critique of metaphysics to the Hegelian absolute science is a whitewater of dangerous currents, and this book tells its tale beautifully, for those who will follow the trail in the devout wish of being a philosopher.

This work is an illuminating exposition of the sources and legacy of G. Lukacs whose History and Class Consciousness appeared like a kind of red alert on the reds at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. As Marxism began to crystallize as an incoherent dogma called 'dialectical materialism' one the few great works of Marxist philosophy appeared, and then sank from view, living an underground existence and giving birth to so-called Western Marxism.
One need not be a Marxist to profit from seeing a truly slick mind at work, and from Rockmore's history of the ideas coursing through Lukacs brain as he produced this almost enigmatic work that almost cunningly blends Neo-Kantianism, Hegelianism, and a non-Engelsian historical materialism. The tactics are so brilliant, standard debunkers of Marx have seldom bothered to critique the argument, which is no doubt beset with its own problems. What I found interesting was the connection with the Neo-Kantians (and the influence of figures such as Lask and Rikert on Lukacs, this being invisible behind his reputation for "Hegelian Marxism". If nothing else it is a reminder the legacy of German philosophy is so tricky that to build a revolution on it is a recipe for disaster, nobody will know what they are talking about.

The emphasis in MARX AFTER MARXISM is on Karl Marx as a philosopher, rather than as an author with a profane point of view, attempting to describe reality with due attention to political and economic aspects of life. Hegel is recognized as a philosophical giant who set the context in which thinking was being evaluated in Marx's lifetime. Tom Rockmore, with the views of a conventional philosophy professor who is an expert in this field, thinks "Marx's critical effort to deal with Hegel, in itself a wonderful example of the conceptual clash of two of the most powerful minds of the nineteenth century, commenced as soon as he began to write." (p. xv). Almost as much attention in the early part of the book is given to Engels, who collaborated with Marx on THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO and other works, who claimed the ability to distinguish "between philosophy and the science of social reality." (p. 8). Marx lived a life that was close to poverty in London, and some consideration of the poor is still part of the picture in this book. "By poverty I have in mind the fact that a country like India is still unable to assure a reliable source of clean water, that in a distressing number of countries the life expectancy is still less than 60, that famine continues to occur although in fact there is enough food to prevent starvation, and so on." (p. 204). I have corrected a typographical error, "although in in fact," though someone speaking might actually utter an extra word occasionally. My favorite correction is in the last sentence of Chapter 6, "Marx the Hegelian," in which I use the word "continue" twice, and I defy anyone to guess what word appeared in place of `continue' early in this sentence: "After Hegel and certainly after Marxism, Marx's theories remain and will continue to remain relevant for as long as money is in short supply, and as long as problems intrinsic to the modern industrial world, such as poverty, differences in real opportunity between the rich and poor, and similar economic difficulties, continue to endure." (p. 205).

Nietzsche shows up late in this book, right after "Kierkegaard, who criticizes Hegel, is a right-wing Hegelian, more interested in God than man, more concerned with returning to God than with understanding man other than through God. Very much like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is interested in surpassing such ordinary boundaries as ethical rules. Unlike his Danish contemporary, Nietzsche is not concerned with people in general, but rather with exceptional human beings, those who are beyond any rules other than those of their own devising." (p. 198). This makes being a philosopher sound pretty simple, like the mindless fans who are spending the sums of money which make people successful in a thoroughly comic society, where value typically means entertainment value, as in the commercials which are constantly being run by the networks. People with jobs are increasingly irrelevant to economic concerns, as Nietzsche thought the average person would have to reduce their self to a lowly clerk to have a job, or in his case, to retain the esteem of the college professors who dominated philology in the 1870s, when Nietzsche was a college professor. As Rockmore sees it, after discussing the conception of ideology, "For Friedrich Nietzsche, we are led astray by the tendency of the views of the weak to dominate the discussion." (p. 200).

There are a number of places in this book where the unpopularity of having a job is obvious, for people who have other things to do. A theologian, David Friedrich Strauss, who had an amazing ability to come up with distinctions which became prime factors in deciding who was suitable for college professorships, is mentioned by Rockmore early in this book. The first two paragraphs on page 17 relate "a theological conflict. David F. Strauss, the author of the influential work, THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED, published in 1835-6, inferred from his reading of Hegel that the incarnation did not take place in a single person but in the entire human race." This tended to make religion primarily a concern of people, rather than doctrine, and for a group in Germany, "as the young Hegelians, consisted in spreading democratic ideas and in awakening the intellectual consciousness of Germany. Prior to Marx, who was also a young Hegelian, they were, however, unsuccessful in transforming their philosophical ideas into a political movement." (pp. 17-18). This book tries to keep up with what is going on, but as it has no means of considering the non-job economics which currently dominates the political structure of global enterprises, in which wages are the factor that is cut to a minimum in areas that might be expected to have a growing economy, the book is mainly just a summary of political economics as understood a few centuries ago.

Rockmore's first move is to seperate Marx from Engels. He follows the somewhat standard argument that Engels is a philosophical weakling while Marx is a giant. Historically Engels has been considered the philosopher of the two. He does admit that Marx and Engels were in agreement about politics. Whether or not you agree with his assessment of Engels his study of Marx as a philosopher is very illuminating. Rockmore argues against one-sided materialism and argues that Marx's dialectic like Hegel's include materialism and idealism. Rockmore pays special attention to the Grundrisse to establish continuity between the 1844 Manuscripts and Capital that is between the "old" and "young" Marx.He locates Marx as the inheritor of the German idealist tradition. Rockmore is an erudite philosopher and I have gotten much from everything that I read by him. He is concerned exclusively with philosophy he doesn't really consider Marx as an active revolutionary and if you are inclined taht way you will have to think about the implications of Marx's philosophy for practice without the help of Rockmore. Occassionally Rockmore reminds us that he leans to teh left and throws in a couple of sentences denouncing extreme poverty but for the most part he remains a left liberal.Finally, Rockmore doesn't seem to find it necessary to prove his inteligence by being incomprehensible like Jameson, Zizek,and other postmodern Marxists.

This well written and closely argued book is a stringent criticism of Heidegger's philosophy and its relation to his notorious embrace of Nazism. Rockmore argues that Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis was hardly the result of personal quirks or coercion but rather a product of his philosophical preoccupations. Rockmore bases his conclusions on a careful reading of the relevant texts, analysis of the main features of Heidegger's thought, and relevant historical background. For example, while Heidegger liked to present his thought as a recovery of the insights of pre-Socratic Greek thinkers, Rockmore shows that Heidegger was influenced by the racist and anti-rationalist Volkish ideologies prevalent in Germany. Rockmore's case is well argued and others, notably Heidegger's recent biographer, Rudiger Safranski, reach identical conclusions. It is clear as well that Heidegger abandoned overt Nazism not because of any real ethical concerns but rather because the Nazis would not accomodate Heidegger's ideas for how German society and education should be run. This book also contains damning criticism of the individuals who have defended Heidegger; including members of Heidegger's family who have apparently restricted access to potentially damaging documents; Heidegger's disciples, some of whom have attempted remarkable ways to explain away Heidegger's Nazism; and a number of other philosophers who seem to be unable to stomach the fact that the person they trumpet as the great thinker of the 20th century was a Nazi. Heidegger emerges as a brilliant and remarkably egotistical man inhumanly dedicated to the pursuit of a small set of ideas, some of which may be great insights, but literally careless of human rights, human dignity, and the physical suffering of the great majority of humanity. One criticism of Rockmore's book is that Rockmore, though usually very careful with terminology, is sloppy about use of the term Nazi. Rockmore argues that Heidegger, after his withdrawal from overt Nazism, remained dedicated to an "ideal Nazism". It would be better to restrict the use of term Nazism to the actual acts and (often contradictory) programs of the Nazis. As Rockmore shows clearly, Heidegger was preoccupied throughout his life with ideas that were anti-humanist, anti-democratic, and Volkish in character. This puts Heidegger in the same general category as the Nazis but referring to "ideal Nazism" is a bit confusing.

Tom Rockmore has radically overturned 20th century philosophy models by challenging Martin Heidegger head-on.

Most famous writers of 20th century philosophy imitate Heidegger's terms, 'in-the-world,' and 'them' and other aspects of his existentialism. Heidegger's Nazi affiliations are most often swept under the rug and even today many of his writings are kept secret by his Estate.

Tom Rockmore courageously joins the battle to expose Heidegger as a Nazi thinker -- and not as an unwilling Nazi participant as his followers like to soft-soap these issues. But Dr. Rockmore is not seeking sensationalism or merely political battles, rather, he is an erudite philosopher himself with some penetrating insights into the origins and weaknesses of Heidegger's positions on the issues.

The 20th century is filled with defenses of Heidegger the man and the writer. His nakedness is praised as beautiful attire by some of the key writers of the past century. Tom Rockmore has performed a revolutionary act by exposing this nakedness and hypocrisy, not only politically but in the realm of theory.

This is one of the most interesting books available on 20th century philosophy.

This is one of the most important works in the secondary literature on Habermas. Rockmore's book avoids the shameless apologetics we find inside the covers of a number of "critical" introductions to this complex and evolving philosophical project. Rockmore's approach is what we might wish to call meta-methodological -- its purpose is to try to show how and why Habermas moves from various strategies to reconstruct historical materialism in the 70's, to the strategy of theory replacement in the 80's (normative foundations through weak transcendental arguments). Given that Habermas's work since the Theory of Communicative Action remains controversial evan among long-time fellow travelers, this detective story is still timely and warranted. Although it sometimes seems that Rockmore could have used a stronger editor, in that distinctions are often drawn with too fine a brush, the book has much to recommend it, and rewards the patient reader.

These 18 selections, by 17 professors and one Research Director (in the Hegel Archives at the University of Bochum, Germany), while within the realm of thoughts "On Philosophy and Politics," offer an education in Heidegger far broader than how his unique place in philosophy and support for the NSDAP (you should know who I really mean) are now topics subject to debate. I have read far more on Nietzsche than about Heidegger, and tend to be disappointed that the thought of Nietzsche looms like an already settled metaphysics of will to power in some of these selections, but the evaluation of either individual thinker seems to require an openness to how other philosophers are making their interpretations. Since this book was published in 1992, the overwhelmingly negative consensus about Heidegger's embrace of what is German, as an inner truth about some level of greatness in his esteem, has been the major objection to anything which he thought.

As a consideration of alternatives, philosophy offers thinkers the opportunity to discuss ideas in a manner which does not commit the speaker to an absolute commitment, one way or the other. I find this particularly true of the use which this book makes of the comments of Rudolf Bultmann, who was about five years older than Heidegger, studied and taught at Marburg, and who gets mentioned in this book more often than the listings in the index:

31, 106, 128, 317, 265; Heidegger's correspondence with, 15-16.

The correspondence had not been published when this book was written. The first page listed, 31, mentions a conversation between Bultmann and Heidegger after World War II, not a time when Heidegger was open to suggestions about what other people thought he ought to do. The source of this information was a biography of Martin Heidegger by Hugo Ott, published in 1988. This book, THE HEIDEGGER CASE, also contains an article by Hugo Ott, "Biographical Bases for Heidegger's `Mentality of Disunity,' " which starts with a description by Heidegger of an inquisition, "in December 1945, when I was brought before the faculty in the inquisition's cross-examination to answer the twenty-three questions and I broke down completely, Dean Beringer of the Medical School (who had seen through the whole charade and the intentions of the accusers) came to me and simply took me away . . ." (p. 93). Ott explains that "Martin Heidegger was in need of very intensive medical care" (p. 95), which I tend to see as politically motivated, but "the medical care came from Professor Beringer himself, who was then the director of the University Psychiatric Clinic: Heidegger was placed in the sanatorium Schloss Hausbaden . . . from February to the end of May 1946. After that time, the psychotherapeutic treatment continued with Gebsattel." (p. 95). Even Archbishop Conrad Groeber was interested in his care, and sent a report to a priest in Rome. Ott is interested in the religious connection, even including a few lines in latin of famous Bible verses. "We should bear in mind the Twenty-third Psalm in discussing Heidegger." (p. 96). But Heidegger found more salvation in Luther than in the system which he considered "the essence of Catholic faith." (p. 106). Having seen the choice that Luther made, "After this, Heidegger came to be considered the Protestant who had come from Catholicism, . . . as Rudolf Bultmann wrote at the end of 1923 after participating in the St. Paul seminar that Heidegger offered following his call to Marburg." (p. 106).

The following selection, "Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Politics" by Otto Poeggeler, includes a portion of the letter from Bultmann, dated December 23, 1923, about his seminar on the ethics of St. Paul. "This time the seminar is especially instructive for me, due to the participation of our new philosopher, Heidegger, a student of Husserl. He comes from Catholicism, but is entirely Protestant. . . . The older generation is unable to participate, as its members no longer even understand the problem to which we are lending our efforts." (p. 122). Though the title for this subsection is "Decline and Destruction," the scientific advances of the century "which vastly lengthened the time of the origin of the universe," (p. 122) seemed to bring philosophy to a new consideration of time.

As an example of reading philosophy, the tenth selection, "A Comment on Heidegger's Comment on Nietzsche's Alleged Comment on Hegel's Comment on the Power of Negativity" by Leszek Kolakowski, checks out a comment in "Der Siegel" just after Heidegger's death, in which "Heidegger asserted that whoever had ears to hear knew that he had criticized the Nazi regime in his Nietzsche lectures." (p. 255). On the contrary, this selection is intended "to suggest, on one small point, that Heidegger employed his peculiar reading of Nietzsche to express--obliquely but clearly--his commitment to German imperialism." (p. 255). At this point, people who have been hearing anything about the Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago, might not be surprised that Leszek Kolakowski is listed in this book as a Professor there. The questions that are considered tend to be murky, even before Heidegger, and the philosophical attempt to come up with something positive, in spite of it all, ends with the conclusion that Heidegger "was not the only thinker whose work could have been employed for evil purposes without distortion, while at the same time it actually advanced in a seminal way the work of civilization." (p. 262).