Many modern philosophers have debated exactly what "virtue" is, and how one becomes or is virtuous. Protagoras and Socrates, two ancient Greek philosophers actively debate this issue in this book. A warning: THE TEXT IS VERY CONFUSING, AND WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE READ MORE THAN ONCE. If you don't dig philosophy, I recommend you avoid this book, as reading it will give you a big headache. But for those out there who love philosophy, this book is definitely for you. I gave this book an 8 because it does an excellent job of explaining two different views on this subject, and will obviously attract philosophy buffs.

In this Protagoras dialogue, the conversation is about virtue--what it is and if it can be taught. The text consists of several speeches in conjunction with the familiar Socratic method of dialogue. Protagoras, whom Socrates does treat with a good bit of respect, declares that he teaches the art of politics and makes of his students better citizens. Socrates voices his opinion that virtue cannot in fact be taught. The conversation basically revolves around these two questions. In the middle of the debate, Socrates declares his intention to leave for an appointment if Protagoras does not stop answering his questions with long speeches, and a compromise must be struck before the debate continues. Socrates himself, though, often makes long speeches of his own, one example being a lengthy discussion of his interpretation of a poem. I found this to be a rather difficult text to understand, and its effectiveness is further hampered by the fact that too many lengthy speeches constantly upset the balance and blur the focus of the debate. There is also little sense of accomplishment at the conclusion because no conclusive truths are agreed upon by the two adversaries.

Several core Socratic ideas are incorporated into his arguments--e.g., no man does evil willingly but only out of ignorance. Protagoras contends that all men have a share in justice and virtue, for these qualities were given to man by the gods in order that man might live communally for self-protection against nature; all but the thoroughly unredeemable thus have the right and ability to speak of virtue, and all men are actually teachers of virtue--punishment itself is intended as a means for correcting the evil in an individual. Still, the natural ability of each individual in this regard determines his ability to act justly--this is how Protagoras explains the fact that the sons of good men sometimes turn out bad. Socrates doesn't buy this argument. In the argument's "second round," he tries to determine whether virtue is one thing in itself or if there are distinct parts to it such as piety, self-control, justice, wisdom, and courage. This question was never sufficiently dealt with in my mind. Basically, we end the debate back where we started, with Socrates stating that virtue cannot be taught and that human nature dictates that the individual chooses what he believes to be good and/or what he believes to be the lesser of two evils.

My 1956 Library of Liberal Arts edition contains a lengthy introduction by Gretory Vlastos. This introduction may be appreciated by individuals with some formal knowledge about philosophy, but I found it a dense jungle of words that often required a number of machete hacks of effort to get through. It is far more complicated than Plato's dialogue itself. Vlastos does seek to show some of the methodological problems of Socrates' method, but I found his discussion of this enticing subject very hard to follow. He also reminds me of Socrates in that he seems to take some joy in saying other academic writers have been dead wrong about certain things and then concludes by saying that the individuals he criticizes so forthrightly are actually good men whom he has learned a great deal from.

If you are unfamiliar with Plato's philosophy, you certainly do not want to start your study with this particular dialogue. As someone with very little philosophical training, I found myself confused on more than one occasion, despite the fact that I have only recently read again a number of Plato's more reader-friendly writings. When I picked this particular edition of the book up, I was unsure if I should read the lengthy introduction before or after the dialogue itself, and I now can say that the introduction is so dense that I would be no worse off had I not read it at all.