Policy-makers in the developing countries are confronted with a primary dilemma. On the one hand, they want high prices for food to stimulate agricultural production. On the other hand, they want low prices to protect (at least in the short run) the poor buyers of food. However, adequate supply of food is not enough to eliminate malnutrition. Poor people must also have appropriate incomes, access to complementary goods and services, and the distribution of food within the household must meet the nutritional requirements of all its members.
It is often said that a secondary dilemma is that between the role of the agricultural sector as a producer of food and its role as a provider of resources for the rest of the economy. The resources may be savings for industrialization, foreign exchange or tax revenue.
The first dilemma has three origins, each presenting an obstacle to reform.
The ultimate objective of policy-makers can be described as growth with equity. But there are at least five proximate objectives and three constraints of food-price policies which are listed below: 1) Allocational efficiency, i.e., the objective is to raise food production and productivity at the lowest cost. 2) Acceleration of aggregate economic growth through the balanced expansion of agriculture, manufacture and services. 3) National food security in the face of international uncertainties. Price stabilization for both consumers and producers. 4) Social objectives (some of which may be in conflict with one another) including undernutrition elimination, poverty alleviation and income redistribution, reduction in rural- urban income differentials and migration. 5) Political objectives such as the desire for political stability, which is important for investment and economic growth, or the desire of a particular government to stay in power through the support from urban consumer groups.
The constraints are the budget, the balance of payments and the administrative capacity. The budgetary constraint consists in minimizing the burden on the budget and on scarce administrative skills. The balance of payments constraint consists in keeping within foreign exchange resources.
The second origin of the dilemma is historical. Policy-makers find themselves with the heritage of a complex structure of interventions relating not only to explicit and implicit measures for output prices, but also with input subsidies attempting to offset the deterrent effects of low output prices, and the high costs of some inputs due to protection, explicit and implicit taxes on the consumption goods bought by farmers, various direct controls and ''ad hoc'' measures to meet specific pressures.
The political constraints call for analysis of the problem of how to built a political base for the desirable reforms. What is needed is an analysis of the reformist coalitions that would provide the constituency for reform.
So as to resolve the dilemma three things are necessary: first, an awareness of the set of objectives and their conflict or consistency; second, an economic analysis and an empirical estimate of the impact of existing measures and of any proposed reforms; and, third, a political analysis of how interests and support can be mobilized for these reforms.
An integrated nutrition policy must embrace much more than ensuring supply of, demand for, and access to food. It must aim at appropriate health standards, particularly the elimination and prevention of intestinal and parasitic diseases, so that the food is properly absorbed by the body; at adequate education, particularly of women, so that people know what food to eat, how to prepare it and how to keep themselves healthy through hygienic practices; and at equitable household food distribution, so that vulnerable groups, such as pre-school age children or pregnant and lactating mothers, get enough to eat.
The benchmark for producer prices is world prices, for they represent the opportunity costs of domestic resources. In countries where producer prices have been pushed below this benchmark, discrimination against agricultural producers should be removed. However, not current world prices but the trend of future prices should be used as the guideline. Using the trend also eliminates the need to pay attention to temporary price fluctuations, which are a disincentive to agricultural investment and hurt consumers. Around 15-20 per cent should be added to the estimated future price trend as an insurance against world prices rising steeply, developed countries reversing their protectionist policies or food becoming unavailable in the world market.
It is important to ensure that higher prices are not absorbed in marketing margins, either by monopolistic private middlemen or by inefficient or corrupt state marketing boards.
The announcement of these prices has to be timely, i.e., before the planting season, so that farmers can incorporate them in their decisions.
Policy must also ensure that agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, machinery and transport are available.
For each of these purposes, namely, 1) ensuring demand and access to markets, 2) not discriminating against agricultural production, and 3) ensuring inputs, macroeconomic policies relating to exchange rates are at least as important as microeconomic policies for specific crops. An overvalued exchange rate can harm food production for domestic consumption and foreign exchange earnings for imported agricultural inputs, though adjustments in the exchange rate are frequently insufficient.
I tend to agree with the author's thesis of the need of a multipronged attack in regards to the problem of hunger. He seems to have an historical basis to substantiate his argument that getting the prices right by itself, without complementary action by the public sector (on technology, roads, health, extension services, etc.), can be ineffective or counterproductive.
This book makes an interesting read. I just hope that, in the ten years since its publication, some progress could have been made in the 17 issues that the author identifies as in need of further research (e.g., innovation).
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Griffey's 89 Donruss over his 89 Upper Deck. At the time the book was written the Donruss sold for $4 and the Upper Deck for $12. The Donruss now goes for $12 and the Upper Deck for $150... and has been mentioned as possibly one of the best of the Modern Cards.
81 Fleer Graig Nettles card(error) $12 card should be worth $25 in 2 years... It's now worth $10
75 Topps Robin Yount
83 Topps Wade Boggs
84 Fleer Update Dwight Gooden I love this one, $75 card now worth $14
69Topps Reggie Jackson
72 Topps Carlton Fisk. Sell your children, sell your vintage T-Bird, buy this card. Was $50 now $55
86 Donruss Rookies Bo Jackson
86 Donruss Jose Canseco
Just to name a few. I did appreciate a couple of their calls. 79 Topps Ozzie Smith,86 Sportflics Canseco/Greenwell/Tartabull Error. I thought the 89 Star Co. Bob Hamelin was a good call. He did only have one good year and then fizzled but the call did show insight. I gave the book 2 stars because the reading was enjoyable and informative. The picks were just terrible. In their defense I would like to say that most of these cards are from the "era of mass production" and as we all no scarcity as well as popularity drive a cards price. I didn't have time to price out all the cards in the book and then compare them to todays values, but maybe that would be a good rainey day project. If I do I will update this.
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For the user who want to get more out of Access 2002 or the user who wants to prepare for a MOUS certification, this book is fine. Keep in mind it is not Microsoft MOUS Official Cirriculum so the Certification Objectives are not identified in the text.
SAMS Publishing drops the ball once again in the editing area. Please note that you will have to go to the website to get the Chapter 2 exercises. The omission of the Chapter Two files can almost be forgiven due to the fact that the files are small in size and easily downloadable.
I have about 5-6 of their books and they are all buggy, lots of typographical errors. This one falls about average for SAMS in that area, not their worst, not their best. I would have given 4 stars if they didn't have so may typos, otherwise the non-VBA content was good.
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The author of this book or more correctly the author of a series of documents in 1953 which were made into a book is a former Luftwaffe Lieutenant General.
The book is a rather dry discussion of a number of aspects of using aircraft in support of an army. Most of the book is devoted to talking about reconnaissance planes and is rather dry. The rest of the book looks at the use of aircraft for the direct support of army operations. The author indicates a number of things about the tactics of the Luftwaffe in the war. He indicates that the biggest success of the German Air force in the war was the use of planes to prevent movement of troops to and away from the battlefield. The use of places to attack infantry positions in general was not as successful and he is critical of the use of larger aircraft in this role. The editor of the book in fact makes an interesting point about allied operations in Western Europe after the Normandy invasion. By that time the allies had complete control of the skies and "tank killer" aircraft roamed far and wide. It seems that although during the war claims were made that vast numbers of German tanks were destroyed by aircraft the reality is that very few were. This strengthens the authors view that the main role of aircraft was to prevent the supply of troops and their movement.
Towards the end of the book the author bemoans the fact that Germany created an air force that was designed to support its army. In Britain and the United States a strategic air forces of heavy bombers was created with the role of destroying the productive capability of the enemy. The author argues that to destroy a factory will destroy far more tanks than can be done by an equivalent use of force on the battlefield. This view was something which was echoed by other Luftwaffe generals including Galland. The reality is however that the Germans had created a strategic air force they would not have defeated France in 1940