While this dictionary is very useful for those already asociated with the military or Department of Defense, it won't be as helpful for those who are not familiar with the Armed Services. This dictionary contains listings of acronym and spells out what they stand for, and what service it applies to. This is useful for those already associated with the military who may know what the term means, but want to spell out exactly what each letter or symbol in the acronym stand for. For example, it may tell you that AMC stand for Air Mobility Command, but it won't say what that is or what it does. Thus, it's useful if you know what AMC does, and need to what the letters stand for. If you're trying to learn what these organizations and programs actually do, then pass this dictionary by. Again, if you have experience in the military, then you will probably be able to use this dictionary with no difficulty and find it quite useful.

The book might have been more appropriately titled, "A careless criticism of Hyman Rickover". For a careless criticism it is. The authors, unfairly in my view, portray Rickover as a man with great power and a narrow view. But worse, the theme that runs through the book is an implicit accusation that Rickover has long exploited other people and the "other Navy" to further his personal goals. The theme is supported with innuendo, but not facts.
Why the authors wanted to do this is not hinted at, except, perhaps, an admission that while Rickover granted other authors rights to his autobiography, he would not even discuss it with the authors of this book. Rickover simply told them, " I don't want a book written about me".

Having worked for Admiral Rickover for 30 years, I know much about his policies. And I understand why his policies were what they were. Rickover's whole thrust was to insure safety on nuclear submarines. The authors failed to understand this, perhaps because neither of them has experience in the Navy nuclear power division, and from a reading of the book, neither appears to have technical training.

The US Congress and the "other Navy" understood very well how important a contribution Rickover was making to America's strategic weapons arsenal. Both understood very well that an immaculate safety record on US nuclear submarines was the primary reason the public supported ship born nuclear power. But the authors did not grasp this.

It is important to note that, while Rickover had a lock on all aspects of nuclear power use on US Navy ships, and hundreds of reactors were used, the first land based reactor not under Rickover's control (Three Mile Island) had a melt down, and killed land based nuclear power generation in the minds of the public. Had Three Mile Island been Rickover's responsibility, we might to this day be getting significant electric power from nuclear reactors.

An example of the blatantly false claims made by the authors in an apparent effort to discredit Rickover, they claimed that the submarine Thresher sank because the reactor scrammed. The Congressional Investigating Committee and the Navy found that the probable cause was a failed pipe joint in a system subject to submergence pressure. That the Committee and the Navy thought the root cause lie outside the nuclear power plant is best seen by looking at the corrective action taken. The corrective action was to establish what came to be known as the Subsafe Program. The Subsafe Program changed the way all parts of the submarine that affect safety, starting the pressure hull itself, were manufactured, inspected, certified, and maintained. Notably, the nuclear power plant procedures were not changed because Rickover's policies were considered sufficient. The authors do not mention the Subsafe Program in this book.

The authors even attacked the personal life of Rickover's wife after she passed on.

The book is also poorly written. The two authors appear to have written different chapters without comparing notes, because much of the chapters rehash the same material. Many of Rickover's quotes are stated two times. This makes for tiresome reading.

The book might have been more appropriately titled, "A careless criticism of Hyman Rickover". For a careless criticism it is. The authors, unfairly in my view, portray Rickover as a man with great power and a narrow view. But worse, the theme that runs through the book is an implicit accusation that Rickover has long exploited other people and the "other Navy" to further his personal goals. The theme is supported with innuendo, but not facts.
Why the authors wanted to do this is not hinted at, except, perhaps, an admission that while Rickover granted other authors rights to his autobiography, he would not even discuss it with the authors of this book. Rickover simply told them, " I don't want a book written about me".

Having worked for Admiral Rickover for 30 years, I know much about his policies. And I understand why his policies were what they were. Rickover's whole thrust was to insure safety on nuclear submarines. The authors failed to understand this, perhaps because neither of them has experience in the Navy nuclear power division, and from a reading of the book, neither appears to have technical training.

The US Congress and the "other Navy" understood very well how important a contribution Rickover was making to America's strategic weapons arsenal. Both understood very well that an immaculate safety record on US nuclear submarines was the primary reason the public supported ship born nuclear power. But the authors did not grasp this.

It is important to note that, while Rickover had a lock on all aspects of nuclear power use on US Navy ships, and hundreds of reactors were used, the first land based reactor not under Rickover's control (Three Mile Island) had a melt down, and killed land based nuclear power generation in the minds of the public. Had Three Mile Island been Rickover's responsibility, we might to this day be getting significant electric power from nuclear reactors.

An example of the blatantly false claims made by the authors in an apparent effort to discredit Rickover, they claimed that the submarine Thresher sank because the reactor scrammed. The Congressional Investigating Committee and the Navy found that the probable cause was a failed pipe joint in a system subject to submergence pressure. That the Committee and the Navy thought the root cause lie outside the nuclear power plant is best seen by looking at the corrective action taken. The corrective action was to establish what came to be known as the Subsafe Program. The Subsafe Program changed the way all parts of the submarine that affect safety, starting the pressure hull itself, were manufactured, inspected, certified, and maintained. Notably, the nuclear power plant procedures were not changed because Rickover's policies were considered sufficient. The authors do not mention the Subsafe Program in this book.

The authors even attacked the personal life of Rickover's wife after she passed on.

The book is also poorly written. The two authors appear to have written different chapters without comparing notes, because much of the chapters rehash the same material. Many of Rickover's quotes are stated two times. This makes for tiresome reading.

As a biography, this book covers everything that anyone would want to know about ADM Rickover, and then some. Anyone wondering how someone who despised (and was despised by) his own service could still flourish in it should read this book. It provides a readable description of how Rickover picked his friends and enemies wisely through much of his career. If there is one chapter that is a MUST read, it's "A Fascinating Experience," which describes the infamous Rickover interview process that reduced many a young navy officer to a quivering bag of nerves.

Less would have probably been better for this book, however, as the last 200 pages seem to drag with an increasingly vindictive assessment of Rickover's impact through the 1970s. Not that Rickover didn't turn from "yesterday's visionary" to "today's conservative," and eventually "tomorrow's reactionary." He did. It's just that the point is hammered home relentlessly.

Many have said that Rickover advanced the Navy by 20 years, while others claim he set it back 20 years. You'll see why by reading this book.

This rehashing by Norman Polmar of his 1964 publication has improved little with the passage of time and revision. The book offers little in the way of new insights- little was known about what transpired that tragic morning then, and little is known now. Neither the quality of the 1964 book nor any new information provide a compelling reason for a new edition.

Most of the book has a superficial feel to it and deteriorates the further Polmar strays from the world he knows. He obviously never served on submarines and would have benefitted from having his book read prior to publication by someone who has. Speculation is obviouly necessary when examing what occurred on the Thresher that morning, but reading his explanations of submarine systems, I find it hard to believe Polmar has any engineering background at all.

When talking about life and work aboard submarines, Polmar is at his weakest. His vignettes ring false and his understanding of the motivations, inner thoughts and daily life of submarine sailors is speculative and uninformed. Many left me rolling my eyes and physically uncomfortable they were so bad (nearly as much as the movie Crimson Tide.)

The loss of the Thresher was a major event by any measure (one felt well into the 1980s when I served as a Reactor Operator on an SSN.) It had a major impact on submarine construction, training and operations (similar to the impact Three Mile Island had on the way the commercial nuclear industry trained and operated.) Far from dying in vain, Thresher's crew made future submarines safer. The event also touched the national psyche so deeply at the time that Phil Ochs wrote a song about it ("The Thresher" on "All the News That's Fit to Sing"-1964.) The sense of loss expressed by the public was similar to that felt later upon the loss of Apollo 1 or shuttles Challenger or Columbia. Sadly Polmar fails to conveys a sense of a historic, defining event unfolding.

Perhaps it is impossible to construct a satisfying narrative with the information we know about Thresher, but there is no excuse for the poor quality of this one. This weakly constructed story is best avoided.

Unlike the previous reviewer, I found this book a good read for those interested in submarine life. There were some typos in the book, but the reader could figure out what Polmar is trying to say. This book was originally written in the sixties, and was brought up to date with other submarine accidents. What is covered is one of the most tragic U.S. Navy accidents. Polmar covers the short life of this nuclear submarine, and why she may have went down.
By now, most people have heard about the Russian submarine Kursk and her fate. The U.S. Navy suffered a similar tragedy in 1963 with the loss of 129 men and the U.S.S. Thresher. What is interesting is the way Admiral Rickover (Jimmy Carter's mentor) is pictured in this book. It seems Rickover tried to cover up for any failure of the nuclear powerplant in the Thresher. Polmar does an alright job in making the technical data interesting.

I served on a submarine in the Thresher class (renamed Permit class after the Thresher was lost). We had mandatory annual training on the causes of the Thresher accident and what we learned from it. I was surprised to find that Polmar was aware of a very large number of accurate facts about this accident, including much of what I had thought was classified. There are, as another reviewer notes, some minor errors, but they are unimportant to the overall story. I found this book to be very well-written and well-researched. Reading it took me back to my "Thresher training" and reminded me of all the drills and actual problems on my own boat. I recommend this book highly.