I have studied Nixon far more than he will ever study me, but we may both have a Lon Fuller problem, if either of of ever tries to play the part of a scholar. On page 12 of BEYOND PEACE, I find:

In his book THE MORALITY OF LAW, Lon Fuller drew an eloquent distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, a distinction that applies to nations as well as to individuals. In times of war, a premium is placed on the morality of duty, the absolute necessity of doing what is required, of doing right in the limited sense of not doing what is wrong. (p. 12).

Most people function pretty well without having a war on their minds, but for people like Nixon, it seems to be the main move capable of convincing the world that his country is doing anything. This book was written after Russia had ceased to be an enemy in a real sense, but he still treats it as a major example of what politics is all about.

It is also important that we never put our chips on just one man, even one as powerful and able as Yeltsin. Our concern should be not the man but rather what he stands for. We stuck too long with Gorbachev. As long as Yeltsin has a foreign policy that serves the interests of peace and a domestic policy that serves the intersts of the Russian people, he deserves our support. (p. 47).

Nixon helped make Henry Kissinger great by entering into diplomacy with America's enemies, recognizing that if certain enemies could maintain a policy which serves the interest of peace, Nixon was willing to deal with those enemies openly, regardless of how many millions of their own people some leaders like Mao might be responsible for killing. I didn't find anything in this book which describes any American president's acts of war as bad, but the policy of American presidents since Nixon has deteriorated to the point that any nation's embassy might be struck by an American bomb, as the French embassy in Libya was struck during reprisals for something while Ronald Reagan was president, without causing a great clash of civilizations. Generalities such as this book contains don't capture the context which allows ideas to become authentic when they become a basis for a real action.

If people who hate America read this book, they are sure to see that America doesn't recognize other nations as sovereign powers, but only allows them to have leaders who serve American interests. If George W. Bush's words in response to the attacks on America on September 11, 2001, are used to promote the utter devastation of every nation that is harboring some killers, we are in danger of having a philosophy that has all the problems associated with the riddle responsible for the death of Homer. For what the great philospher of war thought about that, see THE ART AND THOUGHT OF HERACLITUS, An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary by Charles H. Kahn, Page 39 and pages 111-2.

Nixon, having been well educated and well traveled relays to the reader what he thinks about America's domestic issues and it's place in international affairs. Subdivided into major, relevant topics concerning our everyday lives. An elightening read to say the least

the fact that this book was published in 1997 from work done earlier does not excuse its failure to address material dealing with the panoply of imperatives for security either then or now. while the economy and the environment are mentioned as items to be addressed in the new security syllabus no attention is given to cyberterrorism, asymmetrical warfare, catastrophic terrorism, or even biological warfare. the works cited tend to be parochial and, generally, naive. the book does reveal the thinking of some of the people who occasionally advise our government on such matters as security. zut, alors! some of the chapters include syllabi that provide insight into what is, perhaps, being purveyed as secuity studies across the country and, heaven forefend, around the world. the book provides no web addresses.

This book is actually a guide for professors, with chapters presenting specific courses in security studies complete with fifteen-week outlines and all recommended readings. It is in my view a very fine structured reading program for the adult policy maker who is well beyond the need for going back to school, but much in need a fast means of coming to grips with the dramatic changes that have occurred in our international security environment. Early on it addresses the competing approaches to security studies-from the traditionalist national, international, and regional security approaches to the emerging transstate (non-state actors acknowledged as major sources of conflict and instability) to the global (to include human rights, environmental protection, economic prosperity, and social development as fundamental security issues). It's iteration of the weaknesses of 20th century security studies reads like a list of current biases inherent in those prescribing defense reform today: overemphasis on theory (or worst-case scenarios); insufficient attention to non-combat missions for military forces in peacetime; excessive focus on the US, Europe, and Russia to the exclusion of the rest of the world; too little attention to culture and the relationship of culture to conflict deterrence and resolution; insufficient attention to history prior to World War II; and finally, a neglect of non-military instruments of power and their interaction with the military. Intelligence in particular is singled out as being a relatively recent open topic for discussion, meriting more study. The chapters on Transstate Security by Roy Godson (on non-state actors and the growing prevalence of "global ungovernability") and on Nontraditional Uses of Military Force by George H. Quester, as well as the introduction and conclusion by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., are each, alone, worth the price of the book. Each chapter, with its course outline, discussion, and recommended references, is worthy of careful examination by any serving or aspiring policymaker. However distinguished one's pedigree, we are all students today, and Graham E. Fuller is correct when he notes on page 124 that "most policymakers do not even fully realize the dynamics of the new world we live in."

Richard Griswold Del Castillo's work is beneficial for a probing and well rounded study into the Mexican War and the Treaty that followed. This book has great content. Castillo knows the Treaty and the debates surrounding the Treaty inside and out. Also, he is able to inform the reader of unresolved issues still relevant today for a treaty that was signed over 150 years ago. Nevertheless, he is looking for a specific outcome for his analysis. Castillo condemns the United States for it's unfair treatment of Mexico and former Mexicans. However, much of his argument is based on Article X of the Treaty and the Protocol of Queretaro. Neither document was endorsed, nor supported, by the United States. He aknowledges that, yet still attacks the United States for not abiding by both of them. It's an angry look at the United States which portrays Mexico as an innocent victim in the conflict in 1846, and the United States as a selfish, evil empire forever after.

This useful book offers more than its title implies. Instead of being a dry legal analysis of a treaty, it offers a different way of looking at the history of Mexican-American relations. The author provides a compact review of events before, during, and after the Mexican-American war. In addition, the book provides a capsule review of attempts by Chicanos to seek the reversal of past injustices through the courts and by means of political action. The clearly written text is supplemented with five maps and four figures. Michael Michaud, Vienna, Austria

As a student of Buddhism, I found much of the content in this book to be diluted Buddhism. Basically, it's Buddhist teachings without the Buddhism in it. I'm sure it helps many people, but for me it was diappointing - lacking in depth and substance.

It really is a "WORK" book. It takes alot of thinking and quiet time to answer the questions and to go back and analyze what you have written down. Too much work for me. I guess this book would be good for someone who has alot of extra time on their hands to ponder their life. I do not have that time.

The workbook is actually better than the book itself. The workbook has all the same information in it that the corresponding book has plus exercises and quizzes you can take to help improve your life. If you are disciplined enough to do the exercises in the workbook you will benefit by taking what you've learned and actually apply it towards your life. If you just read the book without doing any workbook exercises, the learning is much more passive and less fun.

Bowie and Immerman posit that "credit for shaping ... strategy (of Cold War) belongs to President Dwight D. Eisenhower." By the end of the Truman Administration, the initial confrontational phase of the Cold War was reaching a steady-state. The Truman Administration set up the basic framework for the American side, but due to crises (foreign and domestic) had not had the time to set longer-term goals. Eisenhower, a man used to a more bureaucratic, organized approach, followed Truman and institutionalized much of what the Truman Administration had begun. Bowie and Immerman continually suggest how Eisenhower personally oversaw what (rhetorically) comes across as a kind of revolutionary retooling of America's Cold War response. But their own thorough use of documentation continually shows what took place under Ike was a bureaucratic evolution, one building upon the Truman Administration's somewhat sparse initial outline. The authors' penchant for "Ike cheerleading" (and to a lesser extent, "Truman diminishing")is a continuous distraction, and is a direct outgrowth of the overblown thesis (or maybe its the other way around.) It is unfortunate that Cold War historiography often gets caught up in this sort of "partisan" behavior, particularly concerning Eisenhower. Ike was unjustly considered to be mediocre for so many years that a large number of historians felt it necessary to resurrect his image. The resurrection has succeeded; Ike certainly had a very good grasp on foreign policy issues and deserves to be ranked among the more effective Presidents ever. But there simply isn't the discontinuity between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations that is suggested here. An example: the authors go to great detail in showing how the Eisenhower Administration reexamined the goals of the Cold War struggle; they are impressed by the thoroughness and awareness of Ike and his people. What is the result? Containment, the same exact guideline devised under Truman and carried forward to the end of the struggle. NSC-68, which did temporarily occupy the Truman Administration, had mostly been abandoned by Truman by the end of his second term, as seen by the downward revisions of projected military budgets. (If Truman actually believed that 1954 would be the "time of maximum danger," would he have been more concerned with budgetary matters than defense?) The authors point out these things, and yet continue to claim extraordinary achievements under Eisenhower. Ike deserves his due as Cold Warrior (mainly for organizing the bureaucracy and pushing foreign aid), but he was not radically different than what came before him. The authors' research suggests this -- its unfortunate that they seemingly didn't realize what their own research suggested.

I wish I had payed more attention when I ordered this book and noticed that it was written by Richard Carlson's Editors instead of himself. The advice in this book is no different than you read in any magazine on any given month from the grocery store.

I really like Richard Carlson's books from earlier days. I guess he has made to money now to write them himself.