I'm not sure what the purpose of this book is. It is way too sketchy to be a biography & too chear-leaderish to be taken seriously.

Written by one of the foremost authorities on the life and times of General George S. Patton, Jr. This book is a must read for anyone interested in the true Patton, both family man and soldier. Add it to your library and treasure it always.

First a disclaimer; yes I admire Patton. And so does Province. He wrote a most interesting book with many little known facts about the man and the legend. It includes seperate chapters about his early years, service in Mexico, the true version and background on his famous address which was made immortal by George C. Scott in the movie, his personal side arms, Eisenhower's three major errors (the Falaise Gap, halting Patton for the 'Bridge too Far' operation in Holland and allowing the Battle of the Bulge to happen), some misconceptions, the slapping incidents, his philosophy, etc. Also an easy to read chapter on famous quotations by Patton, showing both his humor and insight. This book is a must for anyone who wants to know more about Patton, and should be seen as an addition to other works like the Patton Papers I and II, War as I Knew It and Patton, A Genius for War.

My father served with the 10th Armored Division from Nov 43 until it was inactivated. I recently purchased Prefer's book hoping to learn more about the 10th AD. I only started researching the 10th two months ago, but was able to find several substantial errors in Prefer's book. First, on page 180, he has Lt. Col. James O'Hara being killed in action. However, I recalled O'Hara in a video about the 10th (made circa late 50's) and was prompted to check an old 10th Veteran's Association Directory from 1972. The directory has Col. James O'Hara alive at that time. In addition, he is not listed on the 10th AD KIA list, which should be adequate documentation that the author has committed the cardinal sin for a journalist or historian -- an error in fact.

In an earlier portion of the book, Prefer has the 10th AD Combat Command A at Bastogne to assist the 101st Airborne Division. Actually, Combat Command B (not A) was sent to Bastogne a full day before the 101st arrived at Bastogne. As I recall, Combat Command A was sent to defend north and east of Luxembourg.

These errors may be minor, however, they caused me to question the author's credibility, and left me wondering with each new account if he was making similar errors while deailing events of which I had no knowledge.

While this book is promoted as being mainly about the 94th, perhaps the author should have named it accordingly instead of leading people to believe it's about the XX Corps (which it is clearly not). Other than brief mention of the 10th AD and some attached units, no discussion is provided about XX Corps.

I was further amazed to find that the author in his reference material has not cited the work of Corps Commander Walton Walker, XX Corps Through Hell and High Water. One would think such a source would have added to research for a book about XX Corps.

Overall, I found Ghost Corps (which until this time I had only heard of the 10th AD being referred to the Ghost Division, and no such nickname bestowed on XX Corps) account to be disjointed, inaccurate, and a very poor attempt to document the gallant efforts of XX Corps.

The author's stated reasons for adding to the plethora of existing accounts of World War II battles and battlefield units was twofold. First, Nathan Prefer felt too much had been written about the highly publicized engagements "where the might of the Allied, usually American, forces overwhelmed a stubborn defense or defeated a massive counterattack". He wanted to present an account of a battle "where American soldiers fought on relatively equal terms with their opponents and prevailed". His treatise therefore provides a round by round analysis of one such face to face fight - the Saar-Moselle Triangle campaign (January 13th to March 24th, 1945). (Prefer actually combined two campaigns into one: The Saar-Moselle Triangle [January 13th to February 23rd] and the Saar-Palatine Triangle [February 24th to March 25th]).

Eisenhower in his "Crusade in Europe" devoted just two lines to the Saar-Moselle Triangle: "The XX Corps, under General Walker, eliminated resistance in the Saar-Moselle triangle by February 23, and a bridge-head was established over the Saar. The Siegfried defenses were penetrated and Trier was captured March 2". Although Eisenhower acknowledges the outstanding qualities of the individual American soldier, his book addresses the "big picture" and wasn't about to present the fire-and-movement tactics of platoon, company and battalion size units - a necessary element of face to face combat. Prefer however needed these detailed accounts to make his point about a fight "on equal terms".

The second reason Prefer wrote "Patton's Ghost Corps" was to honor the men of the XX Corps, especially the 94th Infantry Division and the many other units which took part in the engagement.* Lieutenant Colonel Keith E. Bonn, in his foreword to the book, makes this point for the author.

Military tomes and monographs have a common problem, providing foldout maps. These allow readers to follow the thrusts and parries that are the substance of every battle. It is a distinct distraction to constantly refer back to page 40 (the location of the map) as the reader moves from page 41 to page 78. Even more important, would be the inclusion of a general situation map that allows a reader to see the "details" as part of a "bigger picture". Prefer failed to furnish such a map forcing me to locate one of my own.

All in all, Prefer did accomplish his two goals. After reading the book, one is likely to accept his thesis (at least for this battle) that American troops did prevail when the odds were even. And he certainly did succeed in honoring the men of the XX Corps.

*In addition to Eisenhower, Omar Bradley in "A Soldier's Story" and Martin Blumenson (Patton's Biographer) in "Patton" also gave short shrift to the XX Corp and its accomplishments. These slights, plus the total absence of any mention of units or personnel of the 94th Division in Stephen Ambrose's 1997 best seller "Citizen Soldiers" would have been more than enough to motivate Nathan Prefer to write "Patton's Ghost Corps".

When the German Army launched its counteroffensive against the Allies in the Battle of the Bulge, Lieutenant General George S. Patton turned two of his three corps north to pierce the attack, leaving one corps, the XX, to hold an area previously held by three. But the XX Corps didn't defend, it attacked. Despite harsh weather, depleted strength and stiff German resistance, the XX Corps achieved remarkable success in the lesser known battles of the Saar-Mosell Triangle and the Saar Campaign. The story of the XX Corps in these campaigns is really the story of the 94th Infantry Division which attacked and fought off counterattacks by veteran German units until, assisted by the 10th Armored Division, they captured Trier, a key city to Germany's defenses. Nathan N. Prefer's Patton's Ghost Corps does an excellent job of following the action of these forgotten battles. Using archive records, interviews and other unpublished sources, Prefer fleshes out the less glamorous work of the Third Army and the German forces. In the process, he gives a clear picture of what the fight into Germany was like for the American infantryman. The XX Corps, commanded by Major General Walton Walker, earned the name 'Ghost Corps' because it moved so fast and so often, the Germans couldn't keep track of it. The 94th Division under Major General Harry J. Maloy, did Walker's bidding as it kept pressure on the German's opposing them. The book is at its best describing platoon-level action. Prefer paints well the scenes of wounded soldiers lying in an inch of freezing water on the floors of captured bunkers; men who actually feel lucky they are not in the trenches where the chances of death are greater. American infantrymen battle tanks with bazookas and set up machine gun posts on the only dominating feature on the landscape: giant piles of horse manure. The action see-saws back and fourth as each side generates temporary momentum before being forced back to their starting positions. After three months of frustrating battle the 10th Armored Division joins the XX Corps and exploits the hard work of the 94th Division. Here is where the book takes off. As the 10th rolls forward, the Germans, already weak from their bloody slugfest with the 94th, simply crumble. From February 21 to March 24, the two divisions smashed the German lines, crossed the Saar, took the strategically important town of Trier and established the XX Corps firmly on the Rhine River. The capture of Trier became famous in Patton folklore. On March 2, General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Patton to bypass Trier, believing only four divisions could capture the city. Patton sent a message to Eisenhower stating "Have taken Trier with two divisions. What do you want me to do? Give it back?" Patton's Ghost Corps is an excellent story of a forgotten front in the ground war of Europe. It can be enjoyed by both the serious researcher or anyone interested in the U.S. Army's ability to overcome adversity. Kevin M. Hymel

I am apalled at the tone that this book sets. While admittedly well researched, the author has gone to utmost lengths to disparge the memory of one of the greatest ever combat generals on all fronts.
The ultimate accolade is when one's enemy admits to your greatness. In this "Georgie" was fortuanete. The German Army High Command thought him dangerous, Stalin was impressed, Eisenhower and Marshall repeatedly "saved" him for greater things, but Professor Hirshon is not impressed.
Prior to D-Day, his presence in pretended planning tied up German divisions that could have been used in D-Day. His breakout and pursuit post D-Day was beyond compare. Turning the Third Army around and getting onto the offensive during the Battle of the Bulge even today is considered the ultimate in handling and Army at War. But that doesn't cut ice with Professor Hirshon either.
One presumes that the decision to install his statue at west Point was made by a committee of morons.
We are indeed luck that Patton's nanny and her closest blood relations to whom some form of oral history could have been passed on are long dead or not accessible to Professor Hirshon, or else he might have raked up something about how Patton didn't eat his food when he was three or maybe wet his bed.
Whether Professor Hirshon likes it or not, George Smith Patton Jr., General, USA was and will remain a military icon, one of the best combat generals that the world has ever seen. A master in exploiting and executing the expanding torrent theory.
The only reason this bok gets one star is because of it's subject. PATTON

Hirshson's Patton: A Soldier's Life is the only book I have read on the life of Gen. George Patton. Hirshson's book is a result of massive research and for that alone the author is to be commended. If the subject of the book were someone other than the colorful Patton, this would be a very arduous read.

Like many who are drawn to the character of Patton, I think most would give credit to the movie in which Patton was wonderfully portrayed by the late George C. Scott. I can not intelligently say whether this book uncovers any new ground-breaking information on Patton, but the book is still worth reading.

Patton believed he was destined to play some integral part in a major war. You get that sense from the book and the movie. It is hard to comprehend that someone could actually wish for war, but Patton probably more than anyone fits this description.

Reading from letters written by Patton are all very informative as they would be about any figure in history. I especially was interested in what he thought of other generals. I knew he had some disdain for Gen. Montgomery, but he apparently was not too impressed with Eisenhower either. He even considered Gen. Bradley of the higher caliber of mediocrity.

While this book likes to deal with Patton's faults and controversies, as any good book should, even Hirshson admits Patton was probably the greatest tactician of the allied commanders.

Patton was clearly not a beloved general like a Washington or a Lee, but he was feared and respected. Patton had attributes that are worthy of rebuke, but he knew how to fight and strike fear into the hearts of the enemy.

The author did an unusual amount of research for this book. It took 12 years to research and write the book. I think it must have been researched as well as it could have been but then the author simply makes a dry listing of facts. The book comes out very large, with maybe a few minor details that were not common knowledge before. It is much less interesting than it should be. I think the author should have spent the extra time in the writing instead of pure research. The few personal ideas the author puts out are questionable in my opinion. For instance, he claims that the two massacres attributed to American troops in Italy were caused by Patton’s fiery speeches before battles. Personally, I don’t believe that would be sufficient cause for such an event. It’s apparent that the author doesn’t like Patton. Maybe I don’t either, but he was the right man for the job he had in the war. I don’t think combat generals should be required to be likable. Patton’s use of tanks in the lightning fast attacks reminiscent of German blitzkrieg was a necessary tactic and only a few American generals realized that need. I thought that a few of the other generals looked worse than Patton in this listing and less competent. Even in this book, Patton is recognized as a tactical genius.

I found the book to be an exercise in academic deconstructionism. For example, the author assumed a lack of strategic flexibility on the part of Patton to deal with the static battle line. An interesting assumption but confusing tactics with strategy, especially grand strategy, is always a problematic tendency of academics. A career military professional will see through the rather weak argument and see the authors attempt to lable the Lorraine campaign as a "defeat". The author predicates his argument of the assumption that the Ruhr was more important than it turned out to be, that Patton was wrong concerning his belief that, if supplies had not been redirected, he could have pressed the Rhine and misses the opportunity to see the creative flexibility of the 3rd Army as it relieved Bastogne, a feat which no other allied commander believed could be done in less than 30 days. When viewed against the exploits of the 1st, 9th, and 5th Armies, it seems that the author is simply looking to write a book that will cause a stir about an American icon. Patton was rude, crude and certainly a primodona. He was wisely never choosen as a group commander, in my opinion. However,Patton, unlike Napolean, never lost and that is sometimes hard for "fair" minded American academics to take in light of his anti-academic approach to killing the enemy. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradely, who were overjoyed at the taking of territory, Patton, in his and his subordinates writtings, knew that to win wars you must engage and destroy the enemy not hold territory.

This is one of the only books I've ever read that critique General Patton. This book, to me the layman seems extremely well researched, and worthy of academic exaltations. The author is brave to look at the Lorraine Campaign with such a critical eye, not always welcome on American icons of war.

Bearing none of the high diction of the best of military poetry, Patton is artistically unimpressive, especially when compared with the verse of his British contemporaries. He employs mostly sing-song, schoolboy-ish rhyme schemes. Of course this criticism must bear the caveat regarding differing cultures -- British and American, while considering the fact that America at large produced little quality poetry about the First World War (American soldier and airman-poets were much better concerning the Second War). Patton offers little of poignant or imagistic power, and no visceral sense of elegy, emotional resonance, nor prosaic beauty. It is difficult to see the man's poetry ever being quotable. Overall, there is too much 'war as glory' stuff, and I often wonder if Patton ever considered war a necessary evil, something that should be resorted to as a last resort, an event to be concluded as quickly as possible. Eisenhower said that the most horrible sight he ever saw in his life was the aftermath of the fighting in the Falaise pocket. One ponders how Eisenhower would have responded to the lines from a 1918 Patton poem about 'Knowing once more the whitehot joy / Of taking human life.'... Indeed, how could a combat veteran of one of history's most cataclysmic decimations of human life ever pen such lines?

Is there anything good or redeemable in his poetry? There are a few good things to say. First, he does speak to war's ugly brutality and terrible grandeur. Despite his bellicose lines it is ambiguous at best regarding whether he enjoyed killing people. He confessed his own depravity, and could make fun of himself. He amply quoted great men of the past, and he loved the classics and imaginative literature (something missing among many leaders today). He did acknowledge and respect the element of fear when anticipating battle, and in 1920 wrote a poem entitled, 'Fear', in order to help him confront that ubiquitous enemy. He made no claim to being a great poet; and, moreover perhaps, he gave the American public as well as his auditors what they wanted through those simple rhyme schemes.