The authors do a very good job in detailing out all of the research they did to come to their conclusions. It looks like they read every book on the subject and talked to about 90% of the key players in the event. They give us all the instances where the statements that Dean made were just not completely correct and detail the many instances where Dean was completely wrong in many of his statements. They also have an interesting dup in the form of Woodward, which was an interesting tidbit. Overall it is hard to completely take all responsibility away from Nixon. The statements he made on tape and the full range of dirty tricks and abuse of power items that Nixon did just went too far to think that the issues around a Watergate cover up would be beyond him. The book is very interesting and is full of great insight into the administration. If you are interested at all in Watergate then you will really enjoy this book
As distasteful as it may be to some readers, the work generally supports the long-held claims of the G. Gordon Liddy camp, i.e. that Woodward & Bernstein's accounts in "The Washington Post" and their following books were merely an extension of John Dean's version of Watergate, wherein Dean is innocent and everyone else is guilty. However, while the book vindicates Liddy's testimony as to fact, it does not paint much of a flattering picture of the convicted felon otherwise.
Colodny & Gettlin expose Dean's supposed role of "fall guy" for what it is: self-serving lies, and lies that were (or should have been) known to the Watergate prosecutors who used his perjured testimony, given in exchange for leniency, to bring down the Nixon Administration. A carefully researched and meticulously documented thesis is posited by the authors, namely that Dean essentially sent the White House up the river in order to save his own neck and conceal his own critical involvement in literally every aspect of the Watergate crimes and cover-ups.
Specifically, an overwhelming case is made that Dean, in order to squash his own involvement in a seperate legal matter pertaining to the surreptitious use of DNC headquarters in Washington as a front for a high-class call-girl service, and in which his own future wife Mo was complicit, instigated the burglaries at the DNC in hopes of removing evidence belying his association therein. The DNC burglaries were conveniently tucked into the overall dirty tricks program against the advice of most of the operative conspirators, who, as Liddy has stated, saw no value in hitting the DNC. The value of the break-in, the authors show, was to Dean and Dean alone.
The other primary bombshell dropped in "Silent Coup" is the very under-reported fact that journalist Bob Woodward was, astonishingly, a former Naval Officer involved in extremely sensitive communications intelligence, and that Woodward almost certainly briefed Alexander Haig and others in the Nixon White House in an official capacity prior to his departure from the Navy and rapid rise to the unlikely position of star reporter for the Post, and, conveniently, the lead newsbreaker in the Watergate matter! This direct link between Woodward and the Nixon White House should have disqualified Woodward from reporting on the matter. It did not disqualify him, because those who should have known about the link apparently either didn't know, or didn't care.
This fine history of the Watergate era covers many other pertinent related topics, including the establishment of a top-secret communications "back channel", which Nixon instituted in order to sidestep the State Department and Pentagon in sensitive dealings with the former USSR, Red China, and in the prosecution and settlement of the Vietnam War. The evidence shows that the back channel was illegally compromised by Haig and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The implications with respect to the larger Watergate scandal are addressed in detail by the authors.
The work also touches many historical issues exposed by the Watergate investigations, not the least of which is the implication that Nixon may have known the truth behind the Kennedy Assassination, and that some those connected to Watergate may have been directly involved, namely E. Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, and perhaps some of the Cuban "Plumbers". Again, this history encompasses more than just Watergate by virtue of the enormous amount of studious research that was necessary to document the central arguments contained within.
The importance of this book is further magnified by the fact that a large number of the players in the Watergate affair are deceased; fortunately for history, the authors had the opportunity to interview most of the now-dead key players prior to their passing.
This book is must reading for anyone interested in Watergate. The book's radical rethinking of the common wisdom of Watergate is both refreshing and disturbing, not only in its treatment of the facts of the case, but as an expose' of the secret agenda of Bob Woodward.
Unlike ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN, this is not told from the viewpoint of the two authors. Through interviews and other methods, the two journalists have reconstructed what they believe those last few months to have been like. The result is an amazing and richly detailed look at the aftermath of one of the most important scandals in recent US history.
One of the real strengths of this book is that it allows the reader to see how the scandal affected many of the different people that were close to the President -- his aides, his family, the lawyers defending him, congressmen, fellow Republican leaders, etc. We see how his team tried (and eventually failed) to fight the accusations made at President and how his staff continued to get the work done even as he retreated farther and farther into himself.
Before I read ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN and THE FINAL DAYS, I really didn't know too many particulars about the whole Watergate scandal. I highly recommend this pair of books to anyone looking for detailed, yet highly readable sources of information.
"The Final Days" is marked departure from "All the President's Men", the first Woodward/Bernstein book and obviously the one that put them on the map. Whereas "President's" was the inside story of two journalists chasing down a story that led higher into the U.S. government than they ever dreamed imaginable, "Final Days" is a step back, since neither Woodward nor Bernstein (nor Deep Throat, for that matter) appear as characters. The focus turns to Nixon's family and close political advisers. Many of the oft-mentioned names remain relevant today: Pat Buchanan, Diane Sawyer, Henry Kissinger. It's also about twice as long as the earlier book, but reads just as quickly.
"Final Days" is divided into two parts. First is a general overview of the first two years of the Watergate Crisis, this time told from the view of all the President's men rather than from the Washington Post. Next is a dizzying chapter-a-day sequence of the final 17 days of the Nixon administration.
In the midst of the research are some surprisingly interesting detours. Nixon's final foreign journey as President is to the Middle East. A funny aside details how the White House press office had to avoid mentioning Israel on the same page of press releases naming other countries in the region, to avoid offending Islamic governments. Also amusing is the lengthy description of Nixon son-in-law David Eisenhower's obsession with fantasy baseball.
25 years, numerous Presidential scandals, and a war or two later, the undoing of Richard Nixon remains riveting and required reading. The Woodward/Bernstein books blaze with a you-are-there immediacy, and even the overuse of passive voice doesn't slow down the narrative. Every hour of mind-numbing research underpinning the book has paid off, because the story told is seamless. There's dramatic tension to every decision Nixon makes in his final month in office: to resign or stay in office? To surrender his private tapes, or continue the legal battle? Nixon himself even becomes a sympathetic figure, as the debilitating nature of his phlebitis is explored.
Perhaps you're busying reading Woodward's latest effort now. Perhaps you're numbed by his almost annual hardcover tomes about the private lives of American presidents, each less relevant than the last. At any rate, "The Final Days" is a detour well worth your time, whether you're on the left, the right, or above all that. It's surely no coincidence that Barbara Olson's excoriation of the Clinton White House bears the same title.
"This action by Mrs. Douglas," Nixon explained, "... came just two weeks after [U.S. Communist Party leader] William Z. Foster transmitted his instructions from the Kremlin to the Communist national committee.... [Thus] this [Communist] demand found its way into the Congress" (Mitchell (1998), p. 209).
Later on Nixon campaign manager Murray Chotiner would try to erase--or perhaps forget his role in?--history, claiming that the Nixon campaign of 1950 "had never accused Douglas of 'sympathizing' or 'being in league with' the Communists." Nixon himself claimed that he "never questioned her patriotism" and that he had been smeared by her. Nixon biographers like Jonathan Aitken would refer to Nixon's relatively clean hands in the 1950 Senate campaign.
But the most important thing was that Nixon won the 1950 California Senate race. Because he won the 1950 California Senate race he went on to become Vice President in 1953, and President in 1969. But perhaps more important, the way he won the 1950 Senate race--the fact that his tactics then worked--warped American politics for nearly half a century.
How was it warped? Into a pattern of "lie whenever you can" and "demonize your political opponents." Thus later on Nixon speechwriter William Safire would paint a picture of a President Nixon threatened by:
...a lynch mob, no cause or ideology involved, only an orgy of generalized hate.... The hall [where Nixon was speaking] was actually, not figuratively, besieged.... The Secret Servicemen, who always had seemed too numerous and too officious before, now seemed to us like a too-small band of too-mortal men... (William Safire, Before the Fall).
But Nixon's chief of staff would have a different view of the same situation. As H.R. Haldeman expressed it in his diary:
...we wanted some confrontation and there were no hecklers in the hall, so we stalled departure a little so they could zero in.... Before getting in car, P[resident Nixon] stood up and gave the V signs, which made them mad. They threw rocks, flags, candles, etc. as we drove out.... Bus windows smashed, etc. Made a huge incident and we worked hard to crank it up, should make really major story and might be effective. (H.R. Haldeman)
And Nixon would demand that his top aides--H.R. Haldeman, Henry Kissinger--"use any means" to defeat the "enemy... conspiracy" of his domestic political adversaries. What did Nixon think of as "any means"? We know from his immediate subsequent demand:
Was the Brookings Institute raided last night? No? Get it done. I want the Brookings Institute's safe cleaned out and have it cleaned out in a way that makes somebody else responsible... (Stanley Kutler)
that in 1971 the "any means" included burglary, theft, the planting of false evidence, conspiracy to frame innocent parties. We don't know how much further "any means" went, or would have gone.
Thus there is a sense in which the Nixon-Douglas campaign of 1950 was key to shaping America not just because of the character of the politician (Nixon) whom it elevated to prominence, but because, as Greg Mitchell writes in his preface:
[The race] set a divisive and rigid agenda for forty years of election campaigns. Until 1950, candidates [who]... campaigned primarily on an anti-Communist platform... usually lost.... [Republican presidential candidate] in 1948 Thomas E. Dewey... criticized fellow Republicans who called for repressive new measures to control subversives.... Republican and Democratic leaders alike interpreted the outcome [of the 1950 election] as a victory for McCarthyisam and a call for a dramatic surge in military spending.... Red-baiting would haunt America for years, the so-called national security state would evolve and endure, and candidates would run and win on anti-Sovietism for decades..." (p. xix).
Now Greg Mitchell has done an excellent job of taking us back to the campaign of 1950--legitimate fears, the backdrop of American apparent defeat in the Korean War, blacklists, loyalty oaths, and the general belief that a woman's place was in the kitchen, not in the Senate. It is a very, very readable book, and very much worth reading--for what happened in the 1950 Senate race played a remarkably large part in determining what America was to be in the second half of the twentieth century.
Far from flying with the angels, both Nixon and Kissinger bloodied their hands by instituting policies that resulted a dramatic increase in both American and Vietnamese casualties, instituting policies that continued the escalation of the war and its extension to new areas such as Laos and Cambodia. Using the conflict in Vietnam as a key element to engage both the Soviet Union and Communist China, Nixon seemed to lose sight of the need to deal with the specific factors propelling the war even as he became increasingly engaged with it, thinking he could simply "bomb" the North Vietnamese into capitulating regardless of the mounting evidence to the contrary. At times his conduct of the war was not only irrational and extremely counter-productive, but also criminal and unnecessary, as with the incursions into Cambodia in 1970, which spurred an avalanche of student protest and increasing political resistance at home.
Nixon's presidency is a study in contrasts, a reflection of the internal contradictions propelling the President himself. Nixon is truly one of the most fascinating of our modern presidents, a remarkable amalgam of his genius, daring, and all-too human flaws, a man so haunted and tortured by his interior demons that he spent the balance of his post=presidency years attempting to reconstruct the truth about his conduct of the presidency and the war in Vietnam. Here is revealed a man so anxious to gain the presidency that he outrageously influenced the President of South Vietnam during the 1968 presidential campaign to disengage from an effort by sitting President Lyndon Johnson to end the war. How can we expect a man capable of such perverted motives to do "the right thing" to save life and treasure by bringing the war to an "honorable" conclusion?
Instead, we find the same irrational, pseduo-macho tendencies as led to the debacle of Watergate perpetrated onto the war in Vietnam, resulting in thousands of additional deaths and casualties. This is a wonderful book, one that lays bare the truth about the self-serving efforts by Nixon, Kissinger, and a number of over-eager neo-conservatives to reconstruct the truth about the conduct of the war in Vietnam in order to salve their structure of beliefs and also lay blame for the war at the doorsteps of sixties liberals. I found myself engaged and excited by the author's interesting approach, and was quite impressed by the interviews, documents, and research used to present the evidence included in the book. This is one I can heartily recommend, and enthusiastically give a full five star rating to. Enjoy!
The second virtue of this study is the evidence from the minutes of meetings and the deliberate exclusion of Cabinet opponents from meetings and from knowledge of military and diplomatic orders in their sphere of responsibility. In short, Kimball's well documented account explores two dimensions of American foreign policy that have long needed to be made known to the American public and understood by the American public for this terrible ordeal. One was that America's credibility was at stake in a war that was actually destroying our reputation. The other was the fact that Russia and China were bitter enemies, neither really stood to gain by a nationalist victory by Hanoi.
This excellelnt book is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the Vietnam War.
Looking deeper into how Nixon and his White House staff could so seriously misjudge the situation, Wilson cites lack of executive experience among the critical decision makers - including and especially the President - who nevertheless were given extraordinary latitude in exercising public responsibilities. In this regard, Wilson reaffirms in spades what other commentators have noted - that Nixon's White House was utterly unable to make the distinction between public and private agendas, between political ends and public policy.
And no wonder. H. R. Haldeman, the "custodian of the body", vaulted to his position as chief gatekeeper from a career as an advertising executive. John Ehrlichman, the other corner of the "Berlin Wall", was promoted from 18 years of quiet law practice with his father, mostly limited to real estate condemnation. John Mitchell was a municipal bond lawyer. Each of them was impressively successful in his own speciality, but specialists they were, with no experience in trying to balance or mediate competing political interests of equal merit, which is the heart and soul of the process over which they were empowered with stewardship. Nixon chose them not for their statesmanship, but for their fanatical loyalty to Nixon.
Of the characters in this familiar drama, Wilson was closest personally to John Mitchell, Henry Petersen and Richard Kleindienst. Wilson provides a friend's sympathetic explanation, if not a defense, for Mitchell's series of mistakes in handling a matter outside his experience. God knows, Mitchell could use a friend in the historical record.
And Nixon's own executive experience? It is surprising to reflect on how little he actually had. Wilson notes that Nixon is best known even among his friends as a tireless political campaigner, not as a policy wonk or a project ramrod. He never really "ran" anything while in public office. Indeed, he hated bureaucracy and bureaucrats. Wilson reminds us that several times President Eisenhower expressed reservations about Nixon's ability to follow him as President, saying that he had "watched Dick a long time, and he just hasn't grown. So, I just haven't honestly been able to believe that he is Presidential timber."
Why didn't Ike say it louder?
What struck me the most was just how desperate Nixon kept getting. I almost started to think that maybe he even believed the lies he was telling. It was so fascinating to see how he would formulate a "cover" story and then keep presenting it to staff to see if they would replace their understanding of the events with his. What is sad is the amount of denial that Nixon was sliding into at the end. He was justifying his actions so hard, I started to think that he was trying to change reality with his force of will.
Many of the conversations are very revealing and interesting. I wonder if at times Nixon forgot he was being taped? Why would anyone think that what he was up to would stand the test of time and be thought of as acceptable behavior. You get a good understanding of why Nixon and his family fought so hard to keep the tapes private. In my opinion, these tapes have set back all the work Nixon did after leaving office to rebuild his reputation. My only warring would be that this should not be the first or only book on Watergate that you read. It will help you if have read something else to give you some back ground on the conversations. Overall the book is interesting and a good addition to your Nixon collection.
What struck me the most about the book was just how desperate Nixon kept getting. I almost started to think that maybe he even believed the lies he was telling. It was so fascinating to see how he would come up with a "cover" story and then keep presenting it to his staff to see if they would replace their understanding of the events with his. What is sad is the amount of denial that Nixon encountered at the end. He was trying so hard to justify his actions; I started to think that he was trying to change reality with his force of will.
Many of the conversations are very revealing and interesting. It makes me wonder, if at times, Nixon forgot he was being taped? I got a good understanding of why Nixon and his family fought so hard to keep the tapes private. In my opinion, these tapes have set back all the work Nixon did after leaving office to rebuild his reputation. It will help you if have read something else to give you some background on the conversations. Hopefully, this will not be the only book on the Watergate scandal that you read. Overall, the book is interesting and well written.
There are much more interesting and plausible theories as to what the burglars were looking for--but we'll have to wait for more of the White House tapes to be released.