If you sell ANY product or ANY service and your competition reads this book before you do, watch out! You absolutely MUST get and read this book. It's LOADED with solid, meaty real world techniques that can really help you. You will probably find this book a real eye opener. It will help you make wise pricing decisions and show you unexpected ways to save your business from what could otherwise be failure. Don't let the price tag keep you from getting this book. It's worth many times its modest price. Get it, read it, and profit from it.

For anyone involved in business this book gives very practical advice on not only the methodology for pricing new products but also changing the strategy of one's existing pricing policy.

Look for a sustainable competitive advantage, maximise contribution margin, concentrate on value and profitability and then market share will follow are some of the key philosophies contained in the text. Concerning the value of this book, it is worth the price alone just for the chapter on costings and formula for calculating what level of sales a company can afford to lose/must gain after a price increase/decrease in order to break even.

A common complaint about business books is that they are all OK in theeory but contain little in the way of explanations of how to implement - this book however offers not only theory and case study examples but also practical instructions on what needs to be done to improve pricing strategy. Overall very, very impressive and a must read for anyone involved in finance, sales or marketing functions. As someone has already said these guys really know their stuff and it works!!

Written with great clarity, "The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing" is a phenomenal book. It begins with an explanation of strategic pricing, and proceeds to cover competition in the market place, segmentation of buyers, pricing and the marketing mix for industrial and consumer goods, as well as the psychology of pricing. Also covered are models for determining price sensitivity, implications of sales staff price setting and negotiation, and finally, legal aspects of pricing.

After reading this book, you will understand the pitfalls of pursuing market share at all costs and common mistakes businesses and sales people make when setting or negotiating price. You will view your current pricing structure and strategy in a new light, and be able to spot the weak spots. You'll have a better picture of how to attract the right buyers, those that can be served profitably.

The book indirectly touches on topics covered in Co-opetition, and Thinking Strategically, as well as elements of the Theory of Constraints (see Eli Goldratt's "The Goal" and "It's Not Luck" or "Management Dilemmas" by Eli Schragenheim)

I can't recommend this book highly enough. As for the other reader who states:

"After reading this book, I was able to talk circles around the $20,000 "marketing consultant" we were considering."

believe it, it's that valuable!

Can't wait to see this one. Lilla and Dworkin is like a collaboration between Ken Vandermark and Wynton Marsalis.

Nagel's article is essential for serious students of military ethics. It is a thoughtful essay that takes on kant, utilitarianism, moral rationalization, and moral decision making. The conclusion is Kantian: right actions, and not deliberating consequences.

You would think an introduction to philosophy would mention the history, people, and methods of philosophy. Instead, Thomas Nagel takes a different approach, and introduces the reader to a few big questions that philosophers have tackled, without referring to philosophers of the past or present other than himself.

He says at the beginning that his book is "for people who don't know the first thing about the subject" and "before learning a lot of philosophical theories it is better to get puzzled about the philosophical questions which those theories try to answer." The questions are ones that you have probably wondered about already, if only for a moment, and Nagel presents them and discusses each of them, adding more and more questions while leaving the reader to ponder them.

It's a short read, but too short. Obviously, this was Nagel's intention. But though this book might be good for high school students, I was left feeling as if what I had read was more of an introduction to an introduction to philosophy.

I've fought for several years now against the implications that this book brings to light. No one could tell me there wasn't more to life than the meager conclusion Thomas Nagel provides here.

It wasn't just that I wanted more, but I desperately needed there to be more. I felt I could not live if there wasn't more.

But there's not more.

Now I begin from this new starting point. Yes, this book is a very good beginning. And it's a beginning you can return to again and again when needed. Year after year.

I wouldn't make a move now without a copy of this book nearby.

I am a doctoral candidate in philosophy, and I still enjoyed reading this book. Never before have I seen such a brief, lucid introduction to some of the key problems of philosophy: Is there really an external world? Are there other minds? How does the mind relate to the brain? Is there such a thing as free will? What is the nature of morality and justice? How do words manage to refer to things? How should one feel about death? What is the meaning of life? Nagel offers short, engaging discussions of each.

One will not find in this book all of the major problems one is typically introduced to in a philosophy class - notably absent is the problem of induction and, except for a side note or two, the question of whether or not there is a god. However, one will find more than enough to stimulate much deep thought and many restless nights. Heartily recommended to all.

In this engaging and well-written volume, Thomas Nagel squeezes a good deal of political mileage out of his perpetual distinction between the personal and impersonal points of view. Here he finds a difficulty striking the right balance between -- as his title suggests -- equality and partiality.

His contention is that when I abstract from my pursuit of my own values, I am able to see myself as just one person among others and recognize that -- in an absolute, view-from-nowhere sense -- other persons are just as "important" as I am. Thus arises a conflict within myself between the "personal" and "impersonal" points of view -- or between partiality toward my own values and interests, on the one hand, and impartiality, on the other.

Nagel is careful to note that he is _not_ arguing against personality/partiality altogether. On the contrary, he thinks there is an important place in the world for purely agent-relative values. He just doesn't think that's all there are.

Nor is he primarily interested in drawing conclusions; his main concern is to try to set out the issues clearly. And at any rate, his main (tentative) conclusion is the comparatively tame one that it is possible and desirable to establish social institutions which provide a guaranteed minimal level of well-being to everyone. (I entirely agree that this would be a Good Thing, assuming that I am allowed to construe "social institutions" in the broadest possible fashion. But it is a long leap from "not, strictly speaking, morally optional" to "properly mandated by the positive law of the State," and I do not see that Nagel makes that leap any more effectively than Alan Gewirth.)

And although he follows Parfit in giving the greatest weight to improvements for the worst off, he is not in favor of forcibly "equalizing" everyody in a Harrison-Bergeron sort of way. (But don't worry; libertarians will find plenty to disagree with all the same.)

The heart of his case is the alleged conflict between personal and impersonal viewpoints. I take it that he thinks some, but not all, of our "personal" values will survive the transition to the "impersonal" point of view. The ones that survive this transition are, roughly, the ones it might be okay to tax people in support of.

Now, frankly, Nagel's perceived difficulty seems to arise from a miscasting of the problem. On the one hand, surely all values are "agent-relative" in the minimal sense that (a) every value depends (as Nagel himself admits) on the existence of at least one valuing agent, and (b) every intrinsic value is realized or actualized in someone's experience. (I am not sure whether Nagel follows W.D. Ross, as I do, in holding that all intrinsic goods are states of mind or relations between them.)

On the other hand, surely there is also an "impartial" point of view from which we can see, and say, that (other things equal) the fulfillment of agent-relative values is simply _good_, period. In this sense, even the most irreducibly personal (and otherwise unproblematic) value is _also_ an "impersonal" value which any rational agent can see to be, _ceteris paribus_, worth fulfilling for its own sake -- i.e., an intrinsic good. In that case the "personal-ness" of a value is strictly a matter of degree; its "impersonal-ness" is not; and the two are not even contraries, let alone mutually exclusive.

If that is right, then the real problem Nagel is addressing is not a conflict between agent-relative and agent-neutral values at all (his distinction between which Christine Korsgaard has criticized on other grounds in "The Reasons We Can Share," reprinted in _Creating the Kingdom of Ends_). It is the arguably more manageable problem of how individual agents are to set priorities among their values (including those they ideally should have).

Which raises the corollary question of how far individual agents become _responsible_ for one another's well-being simply through the rational insight that such well-being is "good, period." For _ceteris_ is seldom _paribus_, and it is just not the case that insight into an intrinsic good necessarily imposes an obligation on the possessor of the insight.

It is obviously possible to recognize the intrinsic goodness of a past event without thereby becoming obliged to bring about what has, after all, already occurred. It is also possible to recognize the intrinsic goodness (or otherwise) of a possible future event without thereby obliging oneself to make it happen (or prevent it); even if this is a _prima facie_ duty, it is easily overruled. Your trip to the dentist will no doubt produce some pain (an intrinsic evil), but you are not therefore obliged to refrain from going; still less am I obliged to prevent you. And without sorting through the messy matter of personal responsibility, we cannot simply conclude that the "impersonal" point of view imposes any particular obligations on particular persons.

But I don't think Nagel quite comes to grips with the question of personal responsibility/duty, and I suspect this is because, as Korsgaard notes, he is really a "consequentialist" rather than a Kantian: he thinks ethics is for the sole purpose of _bringing about some overall result_. If this view is denied, and especially if his distinction between "personal" and "impersonal" values is also found wanting, then his argument is an extended _ignoratio elenchi_.

There are other difficulties: for example, his Rawlsian contention that people do not "deserve" their talents, the difficulty or impossibility of meaningfully measuring equality of outcome, and the fact that so much of his discussion takes place at the level of the "collective." But space will not permit discussion of those.

In any case, though, I agree with reviewer Chris Cathcart (below) that Nagel's work should be read by political theorists of all stripes. The problems he raises are real, whether his formulation of them is ultimately satisfactory or not. And frankly, few volumes from the libertarian camp display Nagel's intellectual honesty, clarity, and nuance.

Speaking as a libertarian, I disagree with Nagel's thesis. But the book is a very good, *clear* exposition of the moral underpinnings of a defense of equality. Nagel takes the view that their are certain impartial values that call us to action, that the personal view entails a partiality toward one's own goals that does not adequately constitute a moral point of view. Nagel clearly sets the terms of debate between an individualist or libertarian who only affirms agent-relative values and an egalitarian who affirms agent-neutral or impartial values. A definite must-read for anyone interested in political philosophy.

Nagel, professor of Islamic theology at Göttingen, writes from outside Islam and in the rationalist-historical tradition to explicate what Muslims have believed, using a style often found in western theological studies of Christianity that are based in history rather than faith. He has intentionally refrained "from rashly pointing out parallels or similarities between Islam and Christianity, because this tends to be misleading.... It is more important and helpful to recognize-and accept-the different nature of the other faith." He methodically examines the nature and meaning of the Qur'an; the nature of faith; concepts of salvation; the literary traditions of hadith and kalam; the role of rationalism in the major schools of Islamic thought; revelation, philosophy, gnosis, orthodoxy and, as he moves from the classical to the modern era, ideology. The book concludes with a relatively brief annotated list of further readings. Useful for the serious non-specialist reader.

The History Of Islamic Theology: From Muhammad To The Present is a thoughtful, informative, careflly presented and scholarly tracing of the evolution of Islamic doctrine from its origins down to the present day. Written by Islamic theology and history expert Tilman Nagel (University of Gottingen, Germany), The History Of Islamic Theology has been superbly translated from the original German into English by Thomas Thornton. While the primary focus is on the early development of Islam in the ninth through twelfth centuries, Nagel also reveals the many ways in which Muslims from around the world have carried the precepts and doctrines of Islam into contemporary times. A strongly recommended addition to Islamic Studies supplemental reading lists and academic reference collections, The History Of Islamic Theology is also available in a hard cover edition (1558762027,).

Although this book is very interesting and readable, it is ultimately a collection of largely unrelated essays by Nagel, most of which were written in the 1970's. For the Nagel enthusiast, it is a must. For the beginner, I would HIGHLY recomend Nagel's "The View From Nowhere". For one, "Nowhere" is shorter and therefore, I think, more accessable to the general reader. Like "Mortal Questions", it is also a collection of essays on various topics in philosophy, but with a much broader subject area. While Nagel's topics in "Mortal Questions" include war, disobediance, gender equality and the politics of preference (all matters of immanent concern in 1970's America), "Nowhere" tackles free will, personal identity and the pursuit of objectivity in a lucid and straightforward manner.

This book is unique in fulfilling two criteria that are very important to me. It is i) a work of twentieth-century analytic philosophy full of carefully-developed and rigorous arguments for controversial conclusions, of the sort that could be expected to generate lively and subtle debate amongst some of the greatest thinkers of the present age, and ii) it's the sort of thing that my mom would enjoy. Semi-educated media pundits often like to blather about how contemporary philosophy fails to 'tackle' the most important issues that every human being has to deal with - the fear of death, the attractions of sex, the influence of luck upon personality - failing to realize that the main point of the discipline is surely to draw our attention from these often rather dreary topics of diurnal reflection to more worthy subjects. But there will always be room for one more book like Nagel's.

I did dock him one star, though, because some of the claims that he makes in the essay "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" really are pretty goofy.

Interesting and perceptive viewpoints on many subjects

Nagel is out to defend reason against all forms of subjectivism, pragmatism, postmodernism, relativism, etc. The basic idea is that attacks against reason are self-defeating, but this is coupled with a generous dose of diatribe against "what passes for argument in the lower reaches of the humanities." Kant is also repeatedly attacked, although Nagel does not bother looking at how contemporary Kant scholars address the issues he raises. In general, this is a book written with much indignation but little attention to the writings of those about whom Nagel is so indignant. The best part of the book is the section on religion, where he admits that his atheism is not as firmly grounded in reason as he would like it to be.

In this volume, Thomas Nagel mounts his case for rationalism against the onslaught of several varieties of subjectivism and relativism.

The kernel of his case is his more-or-less-Kantian claim that there is a "category of thoughts that we cannot get outside of," which in some way provide a basic structure that we have ultimately no choice but to regard as objective. Once we recognize this category of thoughts, he maintains, "the range of examples turns out to be quite wide."

He proceeds to demonstrate his point in the areas of language, logic, science, and ethics (to each of which he devotes a chapter). His arguments are intended to show, essentially, that meaning, logical necessity, the demand for order in objective reality, and normativity are not reducible to matters of pure subjectivity, and for the most part they are fairly successful.

His closing chapter -- "Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion" -- is remarkable for several reasons, not least of which is its stunning candor. Nagel is an atheist who nevertheless recognizes that his somewhat Platonic commitment to reason, and in particular to a Peircian belief in an objective "order of . . . logical relations among propositions," raises the question "what world picture to associate it with." He cannot avoid the "suspicion that the picture will be religious, or quasi-religious," and notes that rationalism "has always had a more religious flavor than empiricism."

And -- here comes the candor -- he attributes at least some anti-rationalism to a "fear of religion" which he confesses himself to share: "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that."

He finds, though, that he must acknowledge the distinct possibility that "the capacity of the universe to generate organisms with minds capable of understanding the universe is itself somehow a fundamental feature of the universe." He adds at once that this view need not amount to "anything that should count literally as religious belief" -- though, honestly, it is hard to see why not.

At any rate, whatever the implications for religion, Nagel's arguments in this volume are delivered with his usual clarity and flair and will be of interest to anyone seeking a philosophical defense of reason. As Nagel himself notes not far from the outset of his book, the knowledge that subjectivism is self-refuting may be as "old as the hills," but it seems that it cannot be too often repeated.

This is classic Nagel. He is one of the most important philosophers in America today. And his philosophical prose style clearly demonstrates why that is the case: it is clear, direct, and straightforward. This text (along with Mortal Questions and A View From Nowhere) would be a great Intro. to Philosophy text; it is a superb example of how analytic philosophy should be written. There are actually arguments here. Imagine that.

Yes, the text bashes various forms of relativism and subjectivism (in favor of "objective facts" and "objective values"). But possibly the most important chapter is titled, "Logic." Read this chapter. I won't ruin the sunset ending for you.

I highly recommend this text. As well as: Searle, Mind, Language, Society; and Nozick, Invariances.

Nagel can always be counted on for clarity and lucidity, and this collection of articles and reviews is no exception. This is mainly a collection of book reviews. Two articles have been reprinted elsewhere.

Part One: Private and Public.
Ch 1: Nagel discusses topics that one can also find in Sam Scheffler's (Cal) excellent book, Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford UP) on privacy and public life. Nagel delves into sex, secrecy, deception, mendacity and politeness, taboo, adultery/Lewinsky case, scandal/Clarence Thomas, and the language of cocktail parties. I laughed out loud when I read Nagel's footnote on Paul Grice (implicature): "Let's have lunch" means "I never want to see you again in my life." Excellent.
Ch 2: Loss of Public Privacy. More on C. Thomas, Lewinsky, Clinton, and conventions of civility.
Ch 3: Personal Rights and Public Space. N. discusses normative ethics and the 'paradox of rights'--intrinsic vs. instrumental, highlighting the work of the late R. Nozick, Thomson, S. Scheffler, Kamm, and the late W. Quinn.
Ch. 4: Chastity. On Wendy Shalit's Return to Modesty. 2 pps.
Ch. 5: Nussbaum on Sexual Injustice.
Ch. 6: On Ray Monk's biography of Bertrand Russell, which talks about Russell's views on rationality and sexual freedom. N. notes that Monk's bio. is not an intellectual bio--doesn't engage R's philosophy, per se.

Part II:
Ch 7: On Rawls--a summary of some of Rawls's views, part iv and v is on T of J, and part vi is briefly on Law of the Peoples.
Ch 8: Rawls on Liberalism: on inequality of the classes, egalitarianism, taxation; part ii and iii is on R's Political Liberalism; part v is on T of J.
Ch 9: On G.A. Cohen's book, "If You're an Egalitarian..."
Ch 10: Justice and Nature. N. discusses deontology and inequity--part ii and iii is on rawls.
Ch 11: Raz on Liberty and Law
Ch 12: On Waldron's Dignity of Legislation
Ch 13: On Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other--on contractualism and utilitarianism, in part discusses scanlon's 'relativism.'
Ch 14: On Rorty's Truth and Progress.
Ch 15: On Sokal's Fashionable Nonsense.
Ch 16: "Davidson's New Cogito," which is reprinted in the Hahn/Schlipp papers--Living Philosophers Series (open court).
Ch 17: Review of Barry Stroud's Quest for Reality (which is an excellent book)
Ch 18: "Psychophysical Nexus," which is reprinted in Boghossian and Peacocke: New Essays on the Apriori (Oxford UP). This is an excellent article on the mind-body problem since Kripke's functionalism (NN).

I am more interested in the last couple of articles in the book; however, Rawls and political philosophy enthusiasts would find more interest in the previous sections.

Published in 1978, this sturdy little volume by Thomas Nagel is a defense of the claim that there is an objective moral requirement on all rational agents to behave altruistically.

Nagel makes clear that "[b]y altruism I mean not abject self-sacrifice but merely a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives." The primary problem to which he devotes his attention is not what sorts of behavior we are thus committed to, but the more fundamental one of how it is possible for such considerations to motivate us _at all_.

I shall not try to summarize his arguments here; this work was published long enough ago that critical evaluations of them are available elsewhere (e.g. in Christine Korsgaard's _The Kingdom of Ends_). Suffice it to say that they involve Nagel's usual tension between the personal and impersonal points of view -- that is, between subjectivity and objectivity -- and the attempt to find some resolution or balance between them (a theme which runs through much of his work and indeed which he seems to have staked out as his own philosophical territory).

At any rate his conclusion is that it is entirely rational for us to be thus motivated and that "rational altruism" is a genuine possibility.

And perhaps most importantly of all, Nagel has stated the _problem_ correctly. I realize this may not be a big deal to some of Nagel's readers. But personally I find it a blessed relief, as I spend a good deal of time reading and criticizing the works of Ayn Rand and her followers; it is a pleasure to read an argument about altruism that gets the issue straight and recognizes that other-regard is simply not reducible to prudence.

Which it isn't, and Nagel's mostly lucid work on this topic has the merit of making this point utterly clear. Readers of David Kelley's _Unrugged Individualism_ and Tibor Machan's _Generosity_ should probably attempt, at some point, to come to terms with the arguments in this volume.