Twenty-five years after the fall of Saigon, The Center For National Security Law of the University of Virginia Law School hosted a seminar designed to determine the "real" lessons of the Vietnam War. In doing so they assembled a distinguished team of twenty-one scholars, each an acknowledged expert in his field. The results were then compiled and published in this work. The conclusions reached included, but were not limited to the following:

Vietnam was a small "hot-spot" in a global "cold war" It was important because the great powers of the day chose to contest it, if for no other reason.

Ho Chi Minh was a dedicated agent of international Communism, not a Vietnamese Nationalist fighting for his people.

While the "Peace Movement" greatly aided the Communist efforts, they did not lose the war. Our flawed, "no-win" strategy did.

American forces were not given a free license to rape, kill, pillage and burn at will. Soldiers and Marines were indicted and vigorously prosecuted for war crimes in Vietnam.

Our involvement in Vietnam WAS necessary. Had we meekly capitulated when the Russian bear growled, we could not have remained credible as an ally.

The war was NOT unwinnable. In effect we DID win. Only Congress' refusal to provide the support promised our allies caused South Vietnam's capitulation and the subsequent blood bath that left millions dead.

The authors authenticate their findings with well-researched data. These facts will be contested by some and ridiculed by others. However, mere hype cannot refute their research. Facts are facts. The carefully prepared and skillfully perpetuated myths by some in government and many in the media cannot change them although they can be fully expected to try.

In the preface, editors Moore and Turner say that, "Obviously, this small volume is not intended to be the final word on the Vietnam War." Inevitably, more facts will emerge from such diverse places as Hanoi, Washington, Moscow and/or Beijing. However, until more facts emerge, this work is the most complete review of the conflict available. It deserves a place on the bookshelf of every serious student of the war for that reason.

Since Vietnam the world situation has changed completely. State sponsored terrorism has replaced Communism as our major threat. Knowing when and how to use force are more critical today than ever. Being too eager and too reluctant to use force when necessary are equal evils. This work provides valuable insights on the when and how of using force. It is an invaluable tool for today's national security planners for that reason.

I was privileged to attend the Conference that inspired this work and eagerly awaited publication of this book for two years. It was well worth the wait. I am much better informed for having read it. You will be as well.