Hans Joas's book on Mead, despite have been written almost twenty years, is still the very best of its kind. If one wishes to discuss Mead's social thought has to have in mind Joas' interpretation. The depth, accuracy and scope of his analysis are truly impressive. By the way, Joas' Pragmatism and Social Theory is another important book for readers interested in Mead's influence on contemporary social theory. However, Joas' reading is just one possible, even if cogently argued, interpretation. For instance, I would suggest that someone approaching these topics for the first time, or even an expert on symbolic interactionism or pragmatism, to bear in mind Jurgen Habermas' Theory of the Communicative Action (1981) and PostMetaphysical Thinking (1989). It's a very much different interpretation, but it also deserves some credit. In a word, if you are going to read G. H. Mead for the first time you cannot miss Joas' book. It will be a invaluable source of information for years to come.

Mead, unhappy had never written a book, but this book is him ideas, and is the only phylosopher that makes a way between nature science and culture science. he makes the link between concrete & abstract

I would not have found this book but for the fact that the author (Gary Cook) is my advisor, professor, and friend here at Beloit College. He introduced me to the works of Mead, as well as the other great American pragmatists (C.S. Peirce, William James, etc). A better professor than writer, but for any who interested in the life of Mead, this book is a must.

In this book, Mitchell Aboulafia compares Mead's philosophy of self with the thought of Arendt, Habermas, and Levinas (and to a lesser degree, Derrida, Kant, and Smith). Very roughly, Mead's theory of the development of the social self starts with the development of mutually understood gestures, turned into "symbols" (words and grammatical structures in language) used to play "roles" in communities of "generalized others". In other words, people learn how to speak and act by learning or guessing the expectations and potential reactions of relevant others.

What sets Mead's idea of the generalized other apart from that of Habermas' is the idea that such generalized others may be the basis of universal judgments, even if the actual community/universe/generalized other is quite small, whereas Habermas seems to think of "universalism" only in the context of mankind at large -- Habermas' idea of universalism has a quasitranscendental foundation, whereas Mead posits a contextual universalism grounded in the community's inherent reason. In general, Mead the pragmatist has greater faith in the rationality of habits and nonreflective practices than most philosophers seem to have (one is thus reminded of much more conservative thinkers, such as Burke or Oakeshott).

On the other hand, Habermas and Mead seem to agree that it is reasonable to expect to find "truth" in politics, in other words, they think it possible to find some policies better than others from a quasi-objective point of view. They differ in that Habermas seeks truth through rational discussion leading to consensus, whereas Mead appears to have thought such consensus would be reached automatically if only people were educated enough (Rousseau, anyone?). Hannah Arendt dismissed the idea of truth in politics altogether, and very sensibly concluded that politics consists of balancing varying interests and irreconcilable differences. Aboulafia does not recognize this offensively totalitarian strain in Mead's political theory, perhaps he has not heard about the "re-education" programs in countries where only one truth is allowed in politics. In general, I would say that Aboulafia's treatment of Mead's politics is shallow. He mentions Mead's claim that nationalism is founded on insecurity, but leaves it at that, as if such simplistic phrases could even begin to explain an ideology which is a major building-block in every modern state. He further mentions that Mead did not fully trust free markets, "he was, after all, a progressive". Once again, no explanation or elucidation. This is intellectual sloppiness at its worst, the author taking for granted that the foundations of modern society can be dismissed out of hand as longs as his readers share his own perspective. Such failures to take political realities seriously contribute to the image of contemporary philosophy as detached from and disinterested in the real world.

Nor does the lengthy presentation of Levinas' thought do much to improve this image. Not only are the quoted passages from Levinas obscure to the point of being virtually meaningless, the actual theory is so bereft of any understanding of human nature and the times we live in that it is impossible to convey it in a short review. In brief: every self-assertion is a form of violence, and self-denial is the only road to justice. Two of the book's five chapters are dominated by this strange thinker, and the book is all the worse off for it.

All in all, I think the editorial review exaggerates the contribution made by this work.

Oyangen, who wrote a terribly negative review, also wrote another review on completely different book that reads "I admit that I only finished this book so I could comment on it with a total view of its looming inadequacies." Now do you really want to trust a man that will finish a poor book just to hear himself speak, or in this case, see his words on a screen? For gosh sakes, he's not even getting paid.