McWhiney and Jamieson use Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage to effectively stage a war between the American Englishman of the North and the American Celts of the South. The authors engulf themselves in the heritage and culture of the South and its ties to its Celtic ancestry. Their viewpoints on how and why the Confederacy lost so many men are saturated throughout the book. Their exposition on Civil War tactics and how they were altered or rendered ineffective by technology allows the reader to examine the challenges faced by the Confederate commanders and soldiers in a war being fought solely with spirit and ambition.

McWhiney's thesis is much more of a stretch. He examines the disastrous Southern military tactics which cost the Confederacy its independence and argues that the reason the South stuck to these tactics for so long had to do with the Celtic ancestry and folkways of Southerners and of Southern culture. He contends that "the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war making costly attacks more often than did the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used so successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860's because an improved weapon, the rifle, had vastly increased the strength of defenders. The Confederates could have offset their numerical disadvantage by remaining on the defensive and forcing the Federals to attack; one man in a trench armed with a rifle was equal to several outside it. But Southerners, imprisoned in a culture that rejected careful calculation and patience, often refused to learn from their mistakes. They continued to fight, despite mounting casualties, with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic ancestors for two thousand years. The Confederates favored offensive warfare because the Celtic charge was and integral part of their heritage....There was no glory to be gained from fighting out of a hole in the ground."

Attack and Die : Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson is a good compliment to other more complete histories of the Civil War. In and of itself the book is too focused on its central thesis - that the South lost due to the compulsion of its generals to be on the offensive and the resulting high casualty rate. While these tactics certainly had a dramatic effect on the outcome, the authors fail to put them in to the proper context of other causes.

The strength of the book is in its description of the reasons for the Confederate strategy, and the failure of almost all Civil War generals to come to grips with the effect that the introduction of the rifle had on the upcoming battles. The authors trace the introduction of the rifle and the displacement of the musket as well as how the tactics that were used being generally premised on the musket. What was missing was any refrence to General Longstreet's plan for the strategic offense combined with tactical defense. This is exactly what Longstreet suggested to Lee before the second day of Gettysburg.

The most interesting part of the book is the last two chapters. The second to last discusses how the Mexican War experiences of the generals predisposed the participants to take the offensive, since that is how the Mexican War was won. The increased accuracy and killing power of the rifle made those tactics obsolete.

The last chapter is the most interesting, although the authors may have taken their conclusions too far. Their conclusion is that given the Celtic roots of the Confederate Generals that they were culturally programmed to take the offensive. While the cultural antecedents of the generals cannot be dismissed as a factor, the Celtic battles that the authors discuss took place generations before the Civil War.

This is a worthwhile read for someone who already has a good Civil War background.

Probably better suited for more serious students of the Civil War, "Attack and Die" by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, provides an excellent expose' about how the Confederates "bled themselves nearly to death..." by attacking with greater frequency than their Northern counterparts. The book also presents a very compelling argument about how the use of outdated offensive tactics, learned during the Mexican War, and antiquated in the face of major technological improvements to muskets and cannon, had a devastating effect on the South.

Another interesting, and controversial, aspect of the book is the authors' conclusion that the tendency for offensive warfare was deeply rooted in Southern culture, and Celtic heritage. While the authors lacked sufficient evidence to be convincing on this point, they were far more convincing about how the advent of the rifle made bayonet attacks obsolete, the offensive use of cavalry ineffective, and entrenchments and fieldworks highly prized by Northern commanders.

Although, as the authors point out that there were good reasons for the South to adopt a defensive strategy, they elected to pursue the offensive to the detriment of their cause. Certainly, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the South lost 175,000 men during the first 27 months of the war due to their propensity for offensive action, or how they lost 97,000 men vs. 77,000 men for the North during the first twelve major battles of the war, or how Pickett's famous charge resulted in the loss of 62% of his command at Gettysburg.

It's no wonder that these tactics prompted D.H. Hill to respond with, "it was not war, it was murder," in reference to the losses the Confederates took after repeated attacks against heavily entrenched Union troops on Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862.

This book is an insightful and worthy addition to the study of Civil War strategy and tactics.