This book is a superb example of comparative philosophy. It is both an excellent introduction to Indian philosophies of knowledge, albeit at a somewhat advanced level, and as a review of some of the problems germane to contemporary western epistemology. Anyone interested in the realism-antirealism debate, direct and indirect realism, conceptualism, the relationship between perception and language, as well as a defence of realism in general, will find himself equipped with a new set of intellectual tools; and perhaps the book will open debates about topics usually thought closed, such as the KK-thesis in epistemic logic. The Nyaya-Buddhist debate of classical India which this book chronicles is not entirely the same as that familiar to western-educated philosophers, but it is clearly a close cousin, as Matilal, in this as well as in his other books, makes clear. My only complaint would be that Matilal tends to ignore aspects of the doctrines of the Indian realists that might be troublesome to an analytical thinker today, such as their views on time and space, and the belief in an eternal soul. Their epistemology was intended, among other things, to buttress such theories. However, anyone familiar with the similar attempts of analytic philosophers to rescue Medieval philosophy from obscurity and in this century, as well as with the limitations of doing so, will be sympathetic with Matilal's attempts to understand an equally rich, but still as yet generally misunderstood philosophic tradition.

This book provides a good introduction to Indian logic, though it is suited for a rather small audience. Knowledge of both 20th cent. logic and Indian Pramana theory is needed for a full understanding of the issues Matilal confronts in the book. Because this book was published after Matilal's death but before he was finished putting the book together, many aspects of the editing are quite rough. Beyond numerous typographical errors, there is little flow between the chapters (as different chapters of the book come from essays that were written over a period of many years), and several logical concepts are treated in vastly different ways from one chapter to another. On the whole, my view is that the editors did not put enough of their own effort into making Matilal's views publishable in book form. These deficiencies aside, Matilal is still presently unrivaled in his combined understanding of both Indian philosophy and Anglo-American Analytic philosophy, and so this book will be an important addition to scholarship on Indian logic for some time to come.