this book had every information that i needed to make a report on douglas macarthur. this book was very useful for ww2 and on his biography. i urge you pick this book up for your next biography report!

This is another in a long line of dispise MacArthur books.
Here are a few of its misconceptions:
1. Mac Arthur was a great hero of World War I - virtually the only general officer who actually led his his troops into action on the Western front. His personal courage was unquestionable, and should not have been called into question during the battle for the Philippines.
2. At that time (1941/42)he was the Commanding General of the allied forces in the Philippines, just as Eisenhower was in Europe in 1944/45. How much time did Ike spend on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944 or in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge? Yet MacArthur was called "Dugout Doug" for not managing the defense of the Philippines from a fox hole on Bataan. This has always been utter nonsense!
3. In December 1941 MacArthur was as bereft of intelligence information from the War Department as were his counterparts in Hawaii.
4. His defensive operations were dictated by "War Plan Orange," - originally developed by the War Department during the 1920's and still in effect in 1941/42 - which required a retreat into the Bataan Peninsula until the Philippine defense forces could be relieved by reinforcements from the U.S., following a victory over the Japanese Navy in the mid Pacific. Pearl Harbor forclosed such a naval victory for six months and thereby doomed the defense of the Philippines.
5. In spite of their mutual dislike President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur out of the Philippines to command allied forces in Australia. He, at least, recognized MacArthur's inestimable value as a military commander.
6. Against all odds the Philippines held out for six months, until May 6, 1942 - the day of the Battle of the Coral Sea, and one month before the great American naval victory at Midway, which was the turning point of the war in the Pacific. The British surrendered Singapore in February 1942, within two months of the Japanese invasion of Malaya.
7. Ultimately the criticisms of MacArthur come down, as usual, to the claim that he was "arrogant." Well, so what? Was not Alexander the Great arrogant? Was not Julius Caesar arrogant? How about Napoleon? Wellington? Field Marshall Montgomery? George S. Patton? Even Washington was accused by his enemies of being aloof and arrogant. Only U.S. Grant is remembered as a humble soldier. There is no particular military virtue in humility. Douglas Mac Arthur was one of the four or five truly great strategic geniuses in American military history. He desreved his pride. What's more, his self confidence was, without doubt, an essential element in his military genius. It's time to stop criticising him for being who he was.

I found this work on McArthur the best objective opinion of this military "icon" written to date. It was appropriate and necessary for such a work to be written by an academic historian who was not an American in order to obtain an objective view of such a controversial man in American history. I would like to see the author write a similar analysis of McArthur's generalship in the Korean conflict. I think the author could have gained a more complete understand of the reduction of the Air Corps forces if he had reviewed the fine article by Richard Slater found in the November 1987 issue of Airpower Magazine.

This book makes an excellent contribution to a chapter of history that has been overlooked. Connaughton shows that the seeds of a possible US-Japan confrontation in the Philippines were sown decades earlier. Could it have been anticipated? MacArthur's career has many examples of his military brilliance and personal bravery which are at odds with his dismal performance in the Philippines between December 1941 and April 1942. MacArthur had five years to prepare for the defense of the Philippines and his strategic plan called for Japan to land troops at Lingayen, exactly where they did. Yet lack of co-ordination among his senior military commanders and the US Navy, together with sudden changes to long developed defense plans allowed the Japanese to land virtually unopposed, making defeat inevitable.

It is intriguing to speculate how a successful defense, which should have been possible given the fact that the Japanese landed exactly where MacArthur expected them to, might have changed the course of World War II.

MacArthur is fortunate that widespread US setbacks early in the war neccesitated a national hero and allowed him the opportunity to restore his reputation. Even today there are many people who cannot accept the idea that MacArthur made any mistakes, as other reviews of this book make clear. Perhaps another writer will one day tell us why MacArthur was so convinced that the Chinese would not attack across the Yalu during the Korean war. This mistake resulted in a massive setback for the UN forces and added years to that war.

Nathan Prefer's book on General Douglas MacArthur's "hopping" campaigns in Western New Guinea in 1944 is a well-crafted and detailed account of the twin difficulties encountered by U.S. Army combat units in carrying out MacArthur's strategic directives: The appalling New Guinea jungle terrain and the highly audacious tactics and tenacity of the Imperial Japanese Army. I found Prefer's portraits of MacArthur and one of his subordinates, Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, very revealing. Prefer details MacArthur's penchant for regularly issuing communiques announcing the successful completion of battles while they were still being hotly contested. MacArthur is also portrayed as being largely indifferent to the physical hardships endured by U.S. Army infantrymen in New Guinea (MacArthur never visited the front lines in order to gain a feel for the combat conditions and only visited secured battlefields and islands once the fighting was "officially" over). MacArthur's subordinate, Eichelberger, is portrayed by Prefer as the consummate general - a tough, no-nonsense officer who regularly visited the front lines and also kept his soldiers' ("my lads," as Eichelberger called them) best interests at heart. Nathan Prefer also reveals that MacArthur's treatment of the Australian Army soldiers under his command was no better, despite the fact that at the outset of the New Guinea campaign in 1942 it was Australian Army militia and regular Australian Army soldiers who fought the Imperial Japanese Army on New Guinea's Kokoda Trail and eventually pushed them back over the Owen Stanley mountain range, thereby saving New Guinea and allowing MacArthur to begin his "hopping" campaigns in Western New Guinea. MacArthur's New Guinea campaign was as bloody as any campaign in the Pacific - despite MacArthur's claim that he was economical with his soldiers' lives. Prefer's excellent work pays a long-overdue tribute to the valor, courage and tenacity of the U.S. Army officers and men under MacArthur's command who fought in, and won, the New Guinea campaign.

This book isn't about MacArthur. It is about the men and the battles for dominance of the Papua New Guinean northern coastline. The author's anti-MacArthur's bias really shows through in this book and he takes pains to show that MacArthur did not contribute significantly to winning this campaign. The Marines did. The MacArthurian legend has been clearly dented here as well as in other books. I found such a stance unwarranted as clearly, another title for the book could have well been chosen.

This is a three star book if you are looking for exciting action in heraldic William Manchester prose; it is at the same time a five star military account of the New Guinea campaign as directed by General MacArthur from behind the scenes. - The author provides a good account of the military action that occured in New Guinea. He provides a division-by-division, batallion-by-batallion, company-by-company account of the American forces as well as the same sort of detailed account of the Japanese forces (the Japanese in italics, which is very helpful). This is a well written military account and sticks to the subject. The author tends to stay away from individual G.I. stories, and creates instead within the reader the feelings of the entire batallion, company, or other combat group, American or Japanese. When the author decides to stray from his account, he tends to put little "boxes" off to the side with such periferal information. Photos are good. Maps are adequate. As for being biased against MacArthur, the author criticizes MacArthur, but does not really criticize any more so than other contemporary military history authors. Prefer answers the questions you may have had of the New Guinea campaign. To be absolutely thorough, Prefer also provides an Orders of Battle section in great depth. A good readable book and good reference material.

as a 30 minute read you'll get an overview of one of the most impressive leaders of the 20th century but you'll be left wanting to know more. the writing style feels heavily edited and the book leaves you with more questions than it answers. in fact for an overview you'd be better off watching gregory peck in the movie of macarthur. if you're a high school student and you need a quick read then this might be useful, but if you want to understand what drove mac arthur, why he did what he did, and get under the skin of this man - look elsewhere.

I thought that this book was very good but not very long and had few details lacking thouroghness . This book was a book that got it's point across very well with few words some people expect different things in a good book (there deffenition of a good book is different)some people like long books some people like short books but overall I think a good book can be the smae and different at the same time and thats how this book was and I recomend it to any action loving kid like me

This Book did not grab me, but it did not bore me to death either. I found some parts in the book unnecessary while I found some parts were left out. I read this book for a school project and we had to anwser some specific questions about our"biography person" and this book did not anwser most of them. For example, one question was " What were some of Douglas's major contributions to society?" I read the book over twice- maybe even three times- and still could not find an anwser to my question. This predicament left me very dissatisfied and displeased.

This book has good information and great quotes, but it ... andis aimed for younger readers.

This work may contain elements of racism and ignorance of the Japanese people but this can be forgiven given its age. Gunther keeps his speculations within the realm of reason rather than telling the fairy tales of a "possessed" MacAthur often protrayed by other authors. Much of this work is no longer releveant but remains interesting as a comparison of American views of the Japanese and how events actually unfolded. The book 's strongest asset is its protrayal of MacAthurs liberal social views.

I am a Korean War vet, although I did not see combat. I was aware during the war of the comments about "Dugout Dug," and there were episodes when Korea was not MacArthur at his best; but there were also many when he was brilliant. But Weintrab's book is a miserably unbalanced hatchet job. The purpose of the book is not to present an unbiased reporting of MacArthur and Korea, but rather a somewhat lawerly like case to establish that he was nothing more than an egotistical,incompetent publicity hound waited on and served by fawning sycophants. It is unfortunate that a recognized author such as Weintraub has not presented a measured and reasoned report. For much more balanced journalism I suggest "Old Soldiers Never Die" by Geoffrey Perret or "American Ceasar" by William Manchester.

I am a fan of MacArthur. I am interested in his life. I am interested in his faults and his successes. If Inchon was his best, the rest of Korea was probably his worst. The author does a great job of detailing the faults in generalship and character of this man. Weintraub does a fantastic job of intertwining the story of the generals and the politicians with the stories of how the "forgotten war" plays itself out for the American GI. The book was very well researched and documented. I am still a fan of the general. I understand more, however, what perhaps his private ambitions truly were and what motivated him. While Truman was a great president and thought MacArthur's speeches were a bunch of bull----; I think they are inspiring. For further reference on Korea and MacArthur, Geoffrey Peret's "Old Soldiers Never Die" does a fairly good job describing the challenges at the end of the general's life. Without Marshall, Truman clearly wouldn't have faired as well as he did. As a history teacher, I find that George C. Marshall is not given his just due in the history texts of our time. Weintraub tries to credit him and brings him into the picture well. Overall, the author does a fine job to bring this often skipped-over piece of American History to life. I would like to thank him for that and for reminding us that there was a war before vietnam, because a lot of students do not.

Douglas MacArthur will forever be remembered as one of America's outstanding generals. Nonetheless, every great warlord, if he survives long enough, has his twilight, and MACARTHUR'S WAR documents his - that period from June 1950 until April 1952 when his career and reputation became mired in the Korean War, the first of America's post-W.W.II Asian debacles.

Author Stanley Weintraub's volume is a well researched, albeit dry, history of the general's last campaign. Within its pages, we encounter a wealth of players, both major and minor. MacArthur himself, America's aging postwar proconsul of a defeated Japan, sometimes brilliant, too often insubordinate, but always egotistical, self-aggrandizing, and militantly anticommunist. The staff toadies who surrounded him and sustained his narrow view of the universe, at the center of which was always Douglas himself: generals Wright, Willoughby and Whitney. His combat commanders: the hapless Gen. Walker (8th Army) and the self-important flunky Gen. Almond (X Corps). The wretched South Korean dictator, Syngman Rhee. General Peng Dehuai, the capable Chinese commander who infiltrated 200,000 of his troops into North Korea right under MacArthur's very nose. The plucky female war correspondent, Marguerite Higgins, who defied the clubbish, men-only mindset of her peers to go out and bring back the story. The home-front military and ex-military, in particular JCS Chairman Bradley and Defense Secretary Marshall, both so in awe of Douglas as to be rendered virtually ineffectual. Truman, the politically beleaguered Commander-In-Chief, who finally brought MacArthur to heel in a fit of righteous pique. And finally, MacArthur's eventual replacement as Supreme Commander, the humorlessly efficient Gen. Ridgeway.

If your previous exposure to the Korean "police action" has been nothing more than "MASH" reruns, then you'll find this book to be a valuable introduction. It includes a center section of about 30 photos. Woefully, it includes only one map - a single page rendering of the entire Korean peninsula, which, more often than otherwise, doesn't even show the places where the action takes place. (The map is so extraordinarily useless, I wonder why the author bothered at all.)

In the end, MacArthur was a victim of his own Weltanschauung, which became increasingly outmoded and dysfunctional as the Cold War swiftly monopolized the world stage. Had it not been for Korea, MacArthur's place on Mt. Olympus would certainly been assured. Instead, he died in relative obscurity in 1964 in the Waldorf-Astoria.

The author warns you up front that this is not intented to be a scholarly work and it certainly isn't.

The plot: on the night of March 15, 1944 at Milne Bay, New Guinea, two couples decided to venture into an off limits area for what is presumed to be an intimate encounter, or at least privacy. While in the area the are accosted by a party of 5 African American soldiers who, according to the two couples, demand sex from the women in return for their lives being spared. Once this is passed another party of 2 African American soldiers encountered the couple, one of whom demands sex despite the protestations of his companion who flees the scene. The culprits are quickly apprehended, are warned of their right against self-incrimination (this being 20 years prior to Miranda and under military law) but produce statements saying that they merely asked for sex and the two women voluntarily complied (wish my dating life had been this easy). Needless to say they were court-martialed for rape and executed on October 2, 1944. The author commanded the disciplinary facility where they were executed and presumably witnessed the event, though this isn't stated.

The author believes they were the victims of a miscarriage of justice because, incredibly, the court did not take into consideration the sexual privation they men had undergone and the poor judgment shown by the two couples in being in an off-limits area. He does make a valid point in that only four of the men actually took part in the gang rape but all six participants were condemned.

Why MacArthur is mentioned, other than as a hook to sell the book, is not clear. He approved the death sentences, but he also approved others. There is no treatment of the deliberations by MacArthur, nor to we know if they ever happened. The author engages in extensive psychobabble on MacArthur's upbringing, relations with his mother, and attitudes towards sex. How they bear on the story, again, is unclear.

The author reproduces portions of the trial transcript, which either show the ineptness of counsel (his opinion) or a competent counsel trying to convince a court-martial panel that one woman volunteered to service four men she didn't know while she was on a date with another man (my opinion); the orders affirming the sentence; and, the last letters home written by the men.

The book is an interesting memoir of an obscure part of WWII history. The practice of capital punishment in the military has been poorly covered both in quantity and quality. The lack of footnotes in this book will not help the scholar in replicating the work, but it does provide some insights.

I consider two stars to be an act of charity.

MacArthur was a military genius and a charismatic leader with a fascinating life retold by many a historian. This work fouses on a single aspect of his life and while doing so thoroughly, does so rather boringly. It is analagous to writing a work about Mark Twain and focusing on how he dressed.