When I bought this book I was looking for serious military/historical chronology of what happened at the Little Big Horn that hot Sunday of July in 1876. This book spends exactly 12 pages explaining the battle. The rest of the book is broken into sections describing how the event affected the American Psyche. Paintings of The Last Stand, poerty describing The Last Stand, novels, movies and jokes related to The Last Stand are all examined in depth here. There is a 12 page section of photos and illustrations. The defeat of an American army in the field by Indians on the 100th birthday of The United States sent shock waves through the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition where the visiting people were studying the wonders of modern technology, convinced that nothing could stop the progress of science and thus this country's western expansion. The different views of Custer and indeed our very government can be seen by how differently the event has been portrayed by various forms of the media. As an example of this think of any movies you may have seen about the battle, the older ones are very sympathtic towards the 7th Calvalry, showing the Indians as blood thirsty savages while the newer crop of films has reversed the roles of who was the blood thirsty savage. If you are looking for a hard core military examination of the battle pass on the book, if you are interested in an unusual study of the American response to an event no one ever expected, one which continues to fascinate us to this day, this book is for you.

I read this book over the summer, and enjoyed it thoroughly. I may be biased (I have had classes under Dr. Dippie) but I found the book to be well thought out and a very fascinating look at a branch of American history that a lot of people forget about when they get concerned with who did what when. This book deals with the development of the American mythology, and is a delight to read. I highly recommend it.

This is a very readable book with interviews and stories by many of the participants of the 76 campaign. As Brian Pohanka (foreword) adeptly informs the reader, Brninstool did tremendous research and interviewed and corresponded with a number of the survivors of the LBH. However, as Pohanka hits the nail on the head, Brininstool lacks objectivity when it comes to Reno and Benteen. He supports their versions 100%. In Benteen's statements, he repeatedly denies that Custer had any plan. And in his testimony and letters he constantly states that he was to just ride to infinity to the left, which is totally absurd. In Gray's time motion studies and in Darlings "Benteen's Scout to the Left", Benteen only went one mile further than Custer by the time their trails intersect. Brininstool constant reminds the reader that Custer through his adjutant stated that Reno "would be supported by the whole regiment". If that statement was true then obviously he meant for Benteen to join the attack. If you tour the site of the first separation, it made logical sense for Custer to have flankers on the left where the ground rose and could have hid attacking Indians on his flank. In addition, Brininstool supports Reno and his "charge" that was actually a rout. Later in the excellent recounting of the Lt. Kidder massacre in 1867 about the young Lieutenant and his platoon that ran into a Sioux war party the author states "Running away from Indians was, in the opinion of experienced Indian fighters, poor policy." Well, he seems to forget this when applauding Reno for his abrupt run from the cottonwoods leaving 21 men behind who didn't get the word and somehow survived but Reno still lost 1/3 of his command in his run. The survivors particularly Lt. Hare continuously state that they would have not lived other wise. Brininstool also over estimates the number of Indians. Brininstool also has a section on Theodore Goldin and the famous water detail, which is very interesting except that Goldin has historically been proven to fabricate the truth including his own service period.

The best parts of the book are the story of Lt. DeRudio and Sgt. O'Neil's exciting two
days surrounded by Indians while abandoned and hiding in the cottonwoods after Reno suddenly bugged, the retelling of the 1867 Lt. Kidder massacre and the exciting story of Lt. Sibley's escape from a large Sioux war party while scouting for Crook. After being surrounded, Sibley led by famous scouts Grouard and Baptise Pourier abandon their horses at night and travel days in broken country to return to Crooks base camp. The book also includes a mini-bio on Lonesome Charlie Reynolds, one of the greatest scouts of the west who died turning Reno's bug out. Although not mentioned by the author, another great Scout Herendeen testified that he and Reynolds discussed that the worst thing that one could do is try to outrun Indians which was supposedly said not long before Reno abruptly hauled freight.

Lots of great testimony in spite of Benteen's self serving interview which is valuable to read since his extreme defensiveness is obvious along with his distaste for Custer, his argument is so absurd that it is irrational to believe. Besides Brininstool's lack of objectivity, I was disappointed that he didn't have more interviews with the surviving
Troopers such as Peter Thompson who was with Custer until just before Medicine Trail Coulee where his horse broke down with a few other troopers who walked back to join Reno. Those interviews with these only technical survivors would have been fascinating.

This is actually a good book to add to your collection. In contrast, I like Walter Camp's book "Custer in 76" edited by Ken Hammer better. It appears more objective with lots of nuggets of information such as references to Peter Thompson. Brininstool like Camp met a lot of the participants, reading both is a pleasure.

Being a relative of E.A. Brininstool, I know first hand what length of detail and accurateness went into this product. Earl spent many months/years on interviews, pictures, and fact finding on this compilation. I would recommend this to anyone looking for accurate information on the Custer Battle.

This is a virtual 40 page mini-thesis on the mistakes Custer made from the Crows Nest to his final rest. Darling raises good points that Custer's continuous fractionalizing of his force; leaving the pack train, sending Benteen to a left scout at the divide, sending Reno forward at Lone Teepee, Custer's turn to the north all led to his demise in the face of a concentrated enemy. The main premise is that Custer did a wonderful job of proceeding cautiously and professionally in his search for the Sioux until he got within 15 miles. The most damaging charge against Custer is that Darling states that Custer never fully believed his scouts that a large village actually existed on the LBH. The other charge is that Custer ordered Reno to attack only the small village refugees at Lone Teepee (Reno Creek) which was a small collection of 70 - 90 indians with families. And the most serious charge, Custer turned north perhaps only guessing that Reno would go north to chase the Lone Teepee village escapees.

Issues that could be argued against these theories, Custer's Chief of Scouts saw the smoke from the large village at the Crow's nest and the Crow scouts said they could see a large pony herd on the LBH. In effect, it would be hard to argue that Custer totally disregarded the village being on the LBH and that his turn to the left along the bluffs was a calculated guess. Benteen was told to scout on the left but not go indefinitely in that direction to infinity as Benteen later charged. Darling fails to mention that Custer sent Benteen two messengers to keep abreast of Benteen's progress and he was expected to rejoin the main column after his scout. Reno's alledged order to only attack just the Lone Teepee village seems hard to swallow since Custer said he would support Reno with the whole outfit which would be a greater need than chasing 70 - 90 Indians. Besides Scout Gerard, riding with Reno, came back to Custer's adjutant Cook to report the LBH village size and that the Sioux and Cheyene stopped running and were fighting. Custer certianly knew this after Cook reported. Also, Darling fails to mention that Boston Custer, the civilian younger brother, passed Benteen watering his horses on his liesurely pursuit of Custer's trail and that Boston reported and died with Custer . Thinking that Benteen would soon catch up with his battalion, most likely impactd Custer's decisions perhaps causing a delay. Finally, Custer had four Crow Scouts and Mitch Boyer with him that knew the territory and most of which were at the Crows Nest. They knew the terrian and probably offered alternatives to attack the Sioux and Cheyenne using the geography of the land. In Darlings great book "A Terrible and Sad Blunder" Darling offers that Reno strayed from his ordered reconnaissance to determine the direction of the Sioux but also because the scout Mitch Boyer offered an alternative trail to follow. Why isn't it reasonable to presume that Boyer did the same for Custer? If Boyer did the same for Custer providing an alternative attack approach and Reno held and Benteen rejoined the command perhaps the outcome would have been different, perhaps not a Custer victory but survival of much more of his command. Darling invokes a good argument but leaves out some critical points but it is a good read and at times a relatively reasonable argument. Perhaps if Custer had the advantage of hindsight, he wouldn't have made the decisions that he had but in the midst of fast moving action he did so with the information and history that he had at present.

Ridgway's essay on McClellan suffers from two serious deficiencies that are unrelated to its theme. First, it is poorly written and edited. Second, it is in form neither fish nor fowl, trying on the the one hand to avoid academic formalism by not utilizing footnotes and giving incomplete references, while on the other hand "lowballing" its intended audience -- presumably avid amateurs and professional military historians -- by oversimplifying the conventional view of McClellan it seeks to debunk. The combined effects of slangy prose and loosely constructed narrative combine to give the book a panegyric tone that weakens the merits of the case -- there are merits -- that Ridgway is trying to make. He would have been better served carefully studying (and emulating) Thomas Connelly's de-bunking of the Lee myth in the latter's estimable "The Marble Man", a passionately argued piece that nonetheless observes form and respects the sophistication of its audience.

He was charismatic, a natural born leader graduating second in his class at West Point, and at the height of his fame during this countries darkest moment. So why is George B. McClellan so poorly regarded today? After all, as author James M. Ridgway, Jr. conveys in his newest book, Little Mac: Demise of an American Hero, McClellan was extremely well educated, superbly trained, experienced, and absolutely revered officer. It was common knowledge that McClellan was adored by his troops, a known steadfast patriot, and after the war remained so popular as to be decisively elected governor of New Jersey. Nonetheless, most historians have chosen to regard such a man with sarcastic disdain; so much so, that, as Ridgway points out in his Introduction, that at the end of the twentieth century, McClellan is often defined by a few choice Lincoln phrases - "he has the slows," and "he will not fight." What Ridgway offers in this revisionist study is a fresh landscape of facts from which the reader can make his own interpretation of George McCellan's worth as a military leader. Author Jim Ridgway, a Civil War Round Table veteran whose passionate interest in the Civil War narrates a powerful a story that shreds the radical Republican view of the general as propagated by such renowned writers as Stephen W. Sears. Ridgway's work illustrates how McClellan's stalwart reputation was crushed by a unique combination of circumstances. He bases his conflicting premise on the actions of a conniving political enemy in Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and McClellan's refusal to play the political game of the time. The actions of radical Republicans like Stanton coupled with the ascension of Lincoln as America's principal political icon, is what Ridgway proclaims conspired to insure the historical demise of one of America's greatest generals. George McClellan was an undeniably clever young general who believed that the easiest way to the Confederate capital of Richmond was from the east. However, his approach would take his army out of a position to protect Washington and many senior Union officials, to include Stanton, began to wonder if McClellan meant to give the Rebels the capital. In fact, Ridgway correctly points out that McClellan was in no position to act bold or rash for many reasons. For instance, his confederate nemesis, Robert E. Lee, had the advantage of studying northern newspapers where McClellan movements and intentions were brandished by the general's opponents and any act out of the norm would have easily given the South the edge. Another argument Ridgway convincingly makes is that if McClellan had received the necessary backing from the Republican radicals hat Lee had with his government, then he would have had the required resources to decisively defeat the confederates in Richmond, leaving no doubt to his allegiance. More importantly, his so-called demise would not have occurred. Less than a year after offensive campaign to the confederate capital McClellan was labeled as timid and slow and was subsequently pulled from the Peninsula battles. Subsequently, the Union inability to prevent a confederate escape after the bloody Battle of Antietam causing Lincoln to lose faith in the general. In the end, Ridgway's conclusion is that the Republican propaganda machine of the 1860s spun discredit on McClellan. Only a handful of books have dared to buck the massive anti-McClellan tide and to tell the general's side of the story. McClellan himself tried to clear his name, but the account he wrote was fatefully destroyed in an 1881 fire and then any further attempt was thwarted by his unexpected death in 1885. While General George McClellan's reputation stands the scrutiny of time, Ridgway's Little Mac: Demise of an American Hero provides a contradictory glimpse of the general and his worth as a military leader.

This is a radical break from current ACW historiography, going beyond the standard lip service that McClellan was a great organizer, popular with the troops, etc. Ridgway presents the case (once better known in America) that McClellan mattered profoundly and that his dismissal by the Lincoln Administration was a national tragedy. This is the McClellan as millions knew him during the war, the Little Mac that the historical record continues to validate. The style of the book is easy, even popular; the writing is very good; and both general and specialist readers will have trouble laying the book down. For those new to the ACW, this is a great place to meet one of America's outstanding personalities. Older ACW buffs will recognize strains of the great Warren Hassler in Ridgway's project. Very exciting, highly recommended.

Classic account by Graham who appraises the LBH battle objectively in one sense but clearly seems to favor Reno's and Benteen's actions over Custer. The Reno Court of Inquiry testimony which Graham obtained in the 1920s in a limited release fueled much of the book.What was most interesting was a lengthy letter from a member of General Terry's staff officer who wrote the letter just after Terry's death. The letter is a defense of Terry who is characterized as a kind man who did not want to criticize Custer after death too harshly. The letter details how in the opinion of the staff officer, how Custer disobeyed orders particularly in the lack of use of scouts that were suppose to contact Colonel Gibbon's column prior to attacking. Fuels more fire in the controversy. The Custer Myth is the better of the two Graham books.

This is one of the classic books on the Little Big Horn fight. The author, W.A. Graham, was a retired Army lawyer who spent his retirement in the study of the 1876 Sioux Campaigns. Graham is almost unique within the tightly knit universe of Little Big Horn scholarship. His training and career as a lawyer made him attempt to be as objective as possible in his gathering and assessment of the evidence he presents. Graham indulges in little, if any, of the polemics and special pleading which seems to characterize much writing about Little Big Horn. For that reason alone, this volume is recommended highly. While somewhat dated by more recent scholarship (this is a reprint of the 1941 Second Edition) it is a "must have" in the library of anyone interested in this famous battle of the Plains Indian Wars.