This book is a lucid and painstaking study of the contribution of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to philosophy, on questions of human freedom, necessity and determinism. As a prerequisite to the understanding of this contribution, the thought, on these issues, of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and of Louis Molina (1535-1600), both of whom influenced Leibniz, is brought forward and is discussed. The author also focuses on the following aspects of the philosophy of Leibniz: (i) the concept of freedom itself, (ii) the distinction of truths into necessary and contingent, (iii) the concept of freedom as pure indifference, and (iv) freedom and divine foreknowledge.

The author draws a sharp distinction between the concept of necessity, as understood by previous thinkers, e.g., by Thomas Hobbes, and as understood by Leibniz. Previous thinkers confused causation with necessity (a fallacy still in force to-day). The author presents a remarkably clear exposition of Leibniz's conception of necessity and contingency (see also the Amazon review on the book: "A selection of philosophical texts of Leibniz"). A distinction is made between absolute and hypothetical necessity, a distinction which, the author tells us, originates from the Scholastics and ultimately from Aristotle: a distinction identical with "necessity of the consequence and necessity of the consequent". The author mentions that "Leibniz's interest in the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is due to the fact that he wanted to distinguish logical from causal or physical necessity". In this way the outstanding contribution of Leibniz to the question of free will vs determinism, is highlighted by the author in a remarkably clear and unambiguous manner. Leibniz is thus shown to be a pioneer thinker on this perennial question, to this present time.

This is an erudite work, lucidly presented. An outstanding work of scholarship.

There is no better discussion of this topic available --not only that, but the book itself is excellent, concise, and lucid.

The first half or so of this book is what makes it worthwhile. There we find Heidegger's best sustained discussion of Leibniz. To be sure, there are other discussions of Leibniz scattered throughout Heidegger's work (most notably in "The Principle of Reason") but here we find him attempting to elucidate Leibniz's metaphysics, not discuss aspects of Leibniz's work in connection with a broader theme. Heidegger's style of reading makes for excellent introductions to the thinkers he discusses. It's ironic that a writer who has a reputation for obtuseness and impenetrability can produce vividly clear discussions of other thinkers. It should be noted that Heidegger's "Die Frage nach dem Ding" (the English translation, long and sadly out of print, went by the name "What is a Thing?") is one of the best introductory books on Kant in any language. But Heidegger's approach: cut straight to the "question of Being" and show how the rest of a philosopher's work fits in with his basic metaphysical position, makes for a clear and striking interpretation, even if Leibniz scholars might find it a little over-aggressive in some details.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a par excellence rational thinker, i.e., one who accomplished his intellectual pursuits primarily by means of logically rigorous argumentation rather than by intuition. (It could be argued that both Descartes and Spinoza allowed themselves to be moved by feeling more than Leibniz ever did, in fact, Spinoza himself conceptualized this very tendency and named it the "third kind of knowledge" or the "intuitive knowledge of God" - cognitio Dei intuitiva). The outcome of this ruthlessly logical conception of the world is Leibniz's "Monadology". I believe it will serve best to focus on the main metaphysical thesis of this great work, by referring to the views, not of a professional philosopher but of a 20th century eminent man of science, the physicist Erwin Schroedinger (1887-1961, Nobel Prize for Physics, 1933). Schroedinger, in his book: "Mind and Matter" (Cambridge University Press, 1958) writes (Chapter 4: "The arithmtical paradox: the oneness of mind):

"The reason why our sentient, percipient and thinking ego is met nowhere within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated in seven words: because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it. But of course here we knock agaist the arithmetical paradox; there appears to be a great multitude of these conscious egos, the world however is only one. ... There are two ways out of the number paradox, both appearing rather lunatic from the point of view of present scientific thought (based on ancient Greek thought and thus thoroughly "Western"). One way out is the multiplication of the world in Leibniz's fearful doctrine of monads: every monad to be a world in itself, no communication between them; the monad "has no windows", it is "incommunicado". That none the less they all agree with each other is called "pre-established harmony". I think there are few to whom this suggestion appeals, nay who would consider it as a mitigation alone of the numerical antinomy. There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of the minds or consciousness. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth there is only one mind". We observe that, both Leibniz and Schroedinger, in this juxtaposition of views, help us towards an awareness of the ultimate limits of the knowable.

A very authoritative book. Will be of interest to Leibniz scholars, historians of philosophy, and philosophers. Definitely worth the money!

Here is a very good hard-edged book on Leibniz's metaphysics. This volume would never serve as an introduction to Leibniz: it is much too difficult. But it is accessible to graduate students in history of philosophy, especially in the modern period. The authors try to situate Leibniz's philosophy of individuation into some medieval context, in the early chapters, and return to those refrains through the rest of the book. But the rest of the book is one of the most careful and rigorous attempts to get at the bottom of the metaphysical topics relevant to the old issue of individuation and substance. It isn't an easy read, but one sure can learn a lot about Leibniz, and perhaps even more about philosophy, from it. These two guys just get down to business, and it's a real ride if you hang on. I recommend it for people interested in straight metaphysics, who doubt that historical texts can teach them anything useful.

Garber and Ariew did us a great service in pulling these materials together in a single inexpensive volume in English. Their choices for inclusion are terrific. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for their translations. Especially in the translations from French there are dozens of errors, many of them fairly serious. If you would like a list of them - or of the ones I have noticed

The greatness of Leibniz is undermined by the vastness of his oeuvre. It stands of no single definitive works. Like the monads that he espoused, Leibniz's writings are here, there and everywhere, each bit mirroring the whole--the universe that Leibniz envisioned. Short of an encyclopedia of Leibniz's oeuvre, this book can serve as a nearly-comprehensive collection of the 'goods.' The major pieces are kept in their entirety. Included with the likes of 'Discourse on Metaphysics,' 'New System,' 'Specimen of Dynamics,' and 'The Monadology' are formidable chunks of Leibniz's letters and occasional pieces.

To do justice to Leibniz is to immerse oneself in this great labrynth of thought. Perhaps one day a Renaissance of Leibnizian studies will flourish on the account of this collection.

I agree with the earlier reviewer who indicated that the fault here lies with the translator and not with Deleuze's book. I wish to add a point, however, to emphasize the inappropriateness of having a literature professor, with an obvious lack of knowledge of the thinkers in question (Deleuze and Leibniz, in this case), undertake a translation of this kind. In addition to the misapprehensions of the French pointed out by the earlier reviewer, there is a whole area of vocabulary that was entirely lost on the poor translator - namely, that of mathematics. Deleuze is in agreement with Michel Serres that an interpretation of Leibniz's system is impossible without reference to his mathematical work. In Serres's formulation, the mathematics provides the models that illustrate the system. What flummoxed professor Conley is that many French mathematical terms are also ordinary French words, that have common, non-technical usages. (The same is true of English, think of words like root, field, power, etc.) Whenever such mathematical terms are used, Conley is oblivious to the fact that mathematics is even being discussed and renders the words with their everyday meanings. Whole passages are rendered completely incomprehensible when, to pick just one example, he translates "corps" as "body." A "corps", in algebra, is what is called a "field" by English-speaking mathematicians. The book abounds in such instances.

Deleuze's sojourns into the history of philosophy, as everyone knows by now, paint a stark contrast to his "independent" works; the former being wonders of concision and clarity, each one like a diamond cutter, and the latter being drawn-out, often tedious, and in general more difficult to pentrate.
The Fold falls somewhere in between the two as he wrote it so late in his life when most assumed he was done with history. We should be thankful that he wasn't. In order to get through this book, I'll just offer my opinion for those who it may affect: when I first picked it up, I read the first two chapters and almnost threw it across the room. I didn't pick the book up again because--presumptuous me--I thought the whole book was going to be like that. WRONG! As I said, Deleuze mixes it up here, and while you may not get every chapter, there will be those, like the short, almost curt, "What is an Event?" that will, um, blow your mind.
As for this being a discourse on Leibniz. Hard to say when we've read so little Leibniz, but Deleuze is willing to stick with his "compossible" world throughout all of the book until the end, which is pretty amazing---you know, since for Deleuze's world one of the first requirements is the reality of incompossibles. But it will give you a passion for Leibniz regardless, as the last reviewer made clear.
Finally, I think Deleuze here tries to answer some of the most difficult questions that faced him after years of expanding and 'deterritorializing' D&R and LofS. If you read the latter, for instance, did you have a sort of empty feeling when he got to the "Dynamic Genesis" and afterwards, as if his tying the incorporeals to the corporeals from the point of view of bodies wasn't as solid as from the point of view of sense? Deleuze will repay you here with interest, giving one of the most fascinating and detailed accounts of a body and its connection to monads I've ever read. It may not solve all of the problems for his materialism, but then again, it might. That's a judgment call and regardless of how you judge, this book will have riches for you.
10 stars.

Deleuze's book is, at least for no other reason, a worthwhile read for its sheer imagination. Secondly, it is worth reading as it shows just what is so wonderfully interesting about Leibniz. If you know Leibniz, read this book, even just a single section, and then you will understand why there do exist, in small obscure places, Leibnitians. If you are looking for a splendidly imaginative perspective, read up.

It's actually two books by two different authors. The last 100 pages consists of extracts from various articles, letters, and journal entries by Leibniz that Bertrand Russell put together to form a coherent statement (since Leibniz never actually wrote a whole book himself). The first 200 pages consists of Russell's analysis of the 100 pages of Leibniz's philosophy.

The Leibniz section is pretty straightforward and interesting. I read the book because I was curious about "monads", which are the metaphysical analog of mathematical points (well, sort of). Before Leibniz gets around to monads, he goes into his theory of predicates (every element of the universe is a predicate that goes toward describing ME), which I found pretty interesting. There's also some discussion of space and time that I liked. The last part of the Leibniz section contains some arguments for the existence of God, which is probably the weakest and least interesting part of his philosophy -- as Russell gleefully and exhaustively points out.

I didn't like the Russell section (2/3 of the book) much partly because he brings other philosophers like Hegel and Kant into the discussion (I'm not very familiar with either); and partly because he goes into such depth critiquing fine points in the Leibniz writings, that I completely lost interest in anything Russell has to say.