I picked up a copy for two reasons: I enjoy alternate history, and I'm a Chattanooga native. The more I read, the closer it brought me to the actual battlesites-which I haven't visited in over a decade. The characters were well written and seemed alive; I thoroughly enjoyed the details. A Sidewise Award Nominee for 2002. For Civil War fans I also recommend Ward Moore's Bring the Jubilee and Harry Harrison's Stars and Stripes Trilogy.

Somewhat of a historical novel buff, I picked up McIntire's book on a whim. While the subject matter looked promising, I later wondered if I'd picked up some kind of southern "yeah, well if Lee had been at Chattanooga . . ." sour grapes drivel (even being a southerner myself doesn't make me want to read THAT). It didn't take but a few moments - his prologue in fact - to realize that what I was reading was an impartial "what if", one which just happened to pick a Civil War battle as its subject.

And McIntire chooses his battles well. The battle of Chattanooga is widely know for its gaffs and heroics (on both sides) as well as its strategic importance. The North had the opportunity to completely strangle the South, and the South desperately needed to bounce back after devastating losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

As someone who does not read textbook history well, I was pleased to find that McIntire writes both knowledgably and comfortably. The battle scenes are realistic and most characters are developed very well. Simply put, it is a good blend of history and the author's imagination, and that makes for a good read.

Civil War expert Dennis McIntire's Lee At Chattanooga: A Novel Of What Might Have Been is a fascinating "what if" alternate history novel about Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg. Lee At Chattanooga is an intriguing and imaginative exploration of the perennial question: what if it had been Lee who was involved in the Chattanooga campaign? A heavily researched and fascinatingly explored scenario unfolds in the resulting intricate chronicle, Lee at Chattanooga. Dennis McIntire's makes his characters come alive and this unusual story unfold with such compelling realism that he has created a work of historical fiction which totally engages the reader from first page to last -- and makes Lee At Chattanooga a "must read" for all dedicated Civil War buffs.

The first book I read by Mr. Holton was a similar book, just about U. S. Grant. I liked that one a lot (I have a review here also), so much so that I went ahead and got this one too. I figured that I'd give both sides a fair chance...

Well, I was not disappointed in the least. The style is the same as the Grant volume, and the format is the same. None the less, it reads very well and is very informative, although not as entertaining as I would have liked, thus the 4 stars. One thing for sure, you'll get to know Lee very well reading this book. And there are many lessons to be had from the reading, possibly one on every page, if you feel so inclined.

As with the Grant volume, Mr. Holton takes one area of leadership and reports how Lee acted in regards to that item (Patriot Voice, Duty are 2 examples). Each discussion is contained on one page! A very good use of words by the writer makes this work. Then it's on to the next, then the next, the next, and so on. One can read one page and think about it, or take a couple of hours and polish off the whole book!! I perferred the slower method.

However you choose to read this bbok, make sure that you do read it, and the Grant volume also. You'll get a good look at 2 very important military minds of our short history. You'll also learn some important lessons on how to deal with people and situations, in both business and personal life. Well done Mr. Holton. Thank you!

i bought this book for a $... at another retailer one day not thinking too much about it. read it and thought it was one of the better books i picked up in a while. quality ideas to follow and good reasons to self-reflect on your own management styles

"Leadership Lessons of Robert E. Lee" is a well written, thought provoking book. Lee was a man of outstanding character and moral values. Any manager can learn a tremendous amout from reading and placing the principles contained in this wonderful book into his daily life. An excellant book that I most highly recommend to any one who manages or leads people

Robert E. Lee's daughters are the subject of this beautiful and poignant book. So touching is the correspondence between the General, his wife and daughters that you feel like an interloper. The lost art of letter writing as praticed by the Lee family gives a vivid picture of Antebellum, Civil War, and Recontruction-era social history.

The Lee Girls by biographer Mary P. Coulling is the informed and informative story of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's four daughters: Mary Custis Lee; Eleanor Agnes Lee; Mildred Childe Lee; and Anne Carter Lee. Diaries, letters, paintings, and other contemporary records were utilized as primary source materials upon which to base an bibliographically historically accurate narrative of these women's lives through girlhood, the horror of war, and the era of reconciliation and rebuilding. A truly excellent and well balanced chronicle, The Lee Girls is a welcome and highly recommended addition to American Regional History, Civil War Studies, and Reconstruction Era Studies collections and supplemental reading lists.

Enjoyed the time frame of the book. It was not just the girls during the civil war period but also gave attention to the sons as well. The black and white photos were a plus but I wish the author had featured photos of the two surviving daughters in later life. This is an excellent well researched book into the lives of four charming girls of American history.

I found this book to be one of the best books about command decisions and relationships between Politicians and generals during the Civil War I have ever read. It covers the battles and the leaders of the Confederacy, both great and flawed. I found it hard to believe that some Southern leaders/generals fought harder against their own side in stupid little infights and disputes. The book goes a long way in explaining Lee's strategy and that of Davis and how they were different and the results of that difference. This book concentrates on the Eastern Theatre, the author's other book 'Jefferson Davis and his Generals' covers the Western Theatre of operations and is brillant in its examination of this area. Both books are well worth reading.

It was ok but if your doing a report then it could get a little boring but it is great information!

This book is a collection of Gallagher's essays published elsewhere. In this format however, they take on an added dimension and explaination of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and its commander, Robert E Lee.
Gallagher begins by examining Lee's Maryland campaign, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg and the army's campaigns in 1864. His conclusions on the Battle of Gettysburg and its effects on the Confederate home front are particularly interesting. He concludes that the battle was not the overwhelming defeat to the Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederate home front that it would later be portayed as by historians. He makes the argument that the loss of Vicksburg was seen as a vastly bigger loss and Gettysburg was more seen as a small defeat or even a victory because of Meade's failure to chase the Confederates in retreat.
Gallagher also includes an interesting essay evaluating the claims of some historians that Lee was not fighting a modern war with modern tactics and if he had done so, the Confederacy would have been better off. He ably demonstrates that indeed Lee did understand the difference in technology such as the minie ball and its impact on strategy and tactics.
However, the best essay is Gallagher's essay on the Lost Cause "myth". Gallagher explains that many of the claims that were later associated only with Lost Cause historians such as Jubal Early or Douglass Southall Freeman, were actually developed during the war and immediately following the war prior to any claims made by Early and others. Thus some of the "myths" such as the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Union as part of the central cause of the Confederacy's defeat, is actually true. He draws the wonderful and correct conclusion that to dismiss the Lost Cause myths in their entirety does a major disservice to the historical profession and that discussing those Lost Cause claims that do have a basis in fact is not in fact giving any legitimacy to any neo-Confederate point of view concerning the centrality of slavery to the origin of the Civil War.
The one quibble, and the reason I gave this book four stars instead of five concerns Gallagher's essay "Fighting the Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church." I really couldn't find a point as to why this essay was included in the book, unless it was to demonstrate a hard and fast friendship link between Early and Lee that Gallagher does build upon in his essay on the Lost Cause. However, I still think the essay about Fredericksburg really doesn't belong in this format.

With the skill of a surgeon, Gary W. Gallagher dissects the myths and legends surrounding Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia, past and current, to reveal a fascinating new look at the "marble man". Positioning himself squarely between the Lost Cause proponents and the current pack of revisionists, Gallagher relies on primary sources (newspapers, diaries and letters of civilians and soldiers, official correspondence) and careful, well-reasoned analysis to discover the real truth surrounding Robert E. Lee, and in the process lands an effective blow worthy of the general himself upon both sides. Gallagher's claims that Robert E. Lee was indeed an able proponent of modern warfare (though I would dispute the term modern) and also a capable administrator fully capable of being as strict or lenient with his subordinates as the case required breathes new life into the continuing quest to discover this fascinating man and effectively destroys the myths held by both sides (ironically enough, both sides often seem to wind up arguing both sides of the same coin) that Lee was first of all a member of the landed Virginia gentry far too short-sighted and stuck in the past for command of the Confederacy's main eastern army as well as being far too gentlemanly to deal strictly with subordinates. In fact, Gallagher presents Lee, through his own words and letters, as a man fully aware of the forces arrayed against him and as one who from the beginning knew full well that the Confederacy needed to marshall all of its resources in order to win the war and gain independence and that tough decisions and hard sacrifices would be required, and that a strong government would be required to take charge in order to ensure this was done and coordinate everyone's effort. Also, the idea that Lee "bled" his army to death (the fact that Lee's army at the beginning of the 1864 Overland Campaign was basically the same size as it ever was seems to have escaped the notice of many) also comes across as rather weak thanks to Gallagher's fine research. The weakest argument Gallagher refutes is that Lee's myth was wholly created after the war, and he does this by proving most emphatically that Lee and his army were indeed the primary source Confederates looked to for hope as well as the national symbol of the Confederacy (much like Washington's Continentals) worldwide. The fact that the main part of Grant's thrust against the South hit here against Lee proves this as well. However, do not mistake Gallagher as a Lost Cause proponent in disguise; though he defends the points Lost Cause proponents make that are actually rooted in fact, he spares them not his swift, sharp sword in pointing out the concerted effort to preserve and protect the memory of the Confederate armies, and Lee in particular, by shaping history through their own eyes. Also, he cuts like a knife through as many of their arguments as those of the revisionists, who, in their zeal to cut through the myth of the Lost Cause (and rightfully so, since we must be as objective as possible) often go too far and wind up rejecting legitimate conclusions and research in favor of their own modern myth. In conclusion, Gallagher, the good professor has taught us all a valuable lesson; look not through the lens of your own eyes to view history, but search ever more diligently for the real facts and take nothing for granted. Though I'm sure we all carry our own biases (I fully admit my admiration for Lee, and I fail to see how anyone can remain truly and completely aloof), we can all separate ourselves, at least partially, from our opinions in order to get at the facts and reach reasonable conclusions, as Gallagher has so beautifully done. Good job, Professor Gallagher.

I am a student of the civil war, and I've made most of my studies from Actual Memoirs of the event. I figured that I'd rather take the word of the people who were actually there than 3rd person commentary. I've read Grant, Sheridan, J.B. Gordon, E.P. Alexander, and of course, Sam Watkins, Frank Wilkeson, and Berry Benson, to name some of the best. Regrettably, Robert Lee died before he could record his own personal reminiscences. Through my desire to read about him in the same way I'd read about other participants of the war, I found this book-and I figured that Fitzhugh Lee's biography would be as near as I could get to the famed General, for Fitzhugh Lee was not only a Relative of the famed General's, but a General himself in the War of the Rebellion. Half way through the book, I felt thoroughly betrayed. After the first 70 pages, the book becomes the most average of monologues about the movements of troops during the civil war. The only difference between this book and the memoirs of certain other officers engaged in the same battles is the Fitzhugh Starts his recitations with, "General Lee's Order were that...", and has less maps, that usually ease the strain of describing obscure movements.
I will say, though, that the author does spend at least a quarter of the book On the life of R.E. Lee outside of the civil war- the first 70 pages focusing on his Lineage, his training at West point, and his engagements in Mexico, and the Last 20 on his Presidency at Washington-Lee College. Also, sparsely placed throughout the book, Fitzhugh makes use of General Lee's personal correspondance with his wife and family. I would have appreciated seeing more of that, but people 150 years late to the party can't be choosers. Of the Author's style, it is mostly factual, highly romantic(though nothing like Gordon's memoir), and at times he makes allusions and references that let you know he's highly intelligent. This Book doesn't make any in-depth study of General Lee, and mostly considers his character to be untouchable....

As a the great-great-great-great grandson of Robert W. Lee and his slave/mistress Ophelia, I thought this book provided a profound insight into the life of the man who led the Army of Northen Virginia to so many improbable victories.

...read and enjoyed this book. Being the recently acknowledged illegitimate child of General Lee, I agree that it is a worthy book.

I've had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Harsh for several years after taking a class on the Civil War with him at George Mason University.

This book came out of the seperation into three books of a manuscript he wrote on Gen. Lee and the campaign just prior to the Maryland campaign and then the Maryland campaign itself. This book is immensely readable and quite detailed. Dr. Harsh is quite blunt when there is a lack of clear evidence on a subject and the reasons for his judgment are well reasoned and sound. My opinion of Confederate strategy and the role of Jefferson Davis in the formation of that strategy changed a great deal after reading Confederate Tide Rising. While he is not the subject of this book, my view of Gen. Jackson also changed as the result of reading this book. Due to his performance in many of the battles and lead up to the battles discussed in this book, it's obvious to me that Jackson has been overrated by historians and could have been much more criticized by Gen. Lee than he was. That he did not do so postwar and only midly criticized Jackson in the action discussed in this book says a lot about Gen. Lee the man.

There are only a few drawbacks to this book. The first is that Dr. Harsh sometimes I think assumes knowledge of minor engagements and also political developments which were important but not directly germaine to his discussion that the reader may not possess. He would have been better served to not just mention these engagements and political developments and leave the reader wondering but to further discuss these developments and their importance, such as the Trent affair which he mentions twice before discussing what it was.
My second gripe with this book has been noted by a previous reviewer. There is a woeful lack of maps, which I think is simply unforgivable in any military history book. As Dr. Harsh clearly demonstrates, terrain and locations are particularly important in civil war battles and helped determine the tactics and strategy employed by Gen. Lee, Gen. McClellan and Gen. Pope. I have a working knowledge of some of the places discussed in the book because I live near many of them, however many readers in other parts of the country who do not have an extensive knowledge of the Civil War yet, may not. The lack of maps would really hamper their understanding of Dr. Harsh's points.

However, one thing that helps this book despite all that is Dr. Harsh's discussion of several terms and their uses in books on the the Civil War as well as how the Civil War generals themselves would have understood those terms such as strategy and tactics. This sort of a discussion is absent in most works on the war and I believe really hampers the understanding of many who look to gain knowledge on the war.

Overall, this book is essential for any Civil War bookshelf and should be accompanied by Dr. Harsh's other two books, Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows.

An overview of the war to the summer of 62. The ideas presented are well grounded and provoke real thought. Not a book that will sit well with many readers but a worthwhile addition to any Civil War Library. Read this and than read "Taken at the Flood".

Joseph Harsh, the author, analyzes Confederate war strategy from Fort Sumter through the Battle of Second Manassas stating that it was not true that the all the South wanted was "to be left alone." Declaring independence did not guarantee independence, and the author states the South thus "pursued three closely related but distinct war aims: independence, territorial integrity and the union of all the slave states."

The text notes that statistically the South could not win. To overcome the odds, the Confederacy needed to conserve its resources while inflicting unacceptable casualties on the North. The text explains the doctrines of the Swiss military theorist Jomini, the probable basis for Jefferson Davis's doctrine of the "offensive-defense." Davis's doctrine provided a firm strategic framework within which Confederate generals in the field could work. By October 1861, pursuing the offensive-defense considerable progress toward achieving Confederate war aims was made; followed next by reversals of Southern fortunes resulting in part from the failure to continue the policies/strategies that yielded early successes.

On June 1, 1862 Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, when Joseph Johnson was wounded. The offensive-defensive policy was already in practice and was not initiated by Lee as some contend. By "late May 1862, the South had nearly lost the war. Lee knew that Jefferson Davis expected him to go on the offensive to save Richmond and to reclaim Virginia. Harsh also notes "Lee chose the offensive because he wanted to win the war, and he thought it offered the only chance. He believed the defensive was the sure path to defeat." His first response was the Seven Days Battle, whose strategy/execution contained errors, but nevertheless relieved the pressure on Richmond.

The author gives an excellent account of the strategic/tactical problems during the Seven Days Campaign and the events leading to the Battle of Second Manassas. Richmond was a major railroad center, banking center, manufacturing center, milling center and its lost would have been serious. It was important that the city is not captured and that Virginia is reclaimed. After the Seven Days Campaign Lee lost the initiative and was in a strategic stalemate that didn't end until Union General McClellan's Army of the Potomac was ordered back to Washington thereby ending the threat to Richmond.

The text gives an excellent account of the development of Lee's field strategies before and throughout the Battle of Second Manassas. The author notes as the battle neared its climax "Lee desperately wanted to finish the task at hand by destroying the army of.... Pope." However a frontal assault was the only option; and Lee couldn't afford the losses a frontal assault would incur. Nonetheless the author notes following the Second Manassas "Through chance, risk and much bloodshed, he and the Army of Northern Virginia were cobbling together the series of rapid victories that might lead to Northern demoralization and Confederate independence." The text ends with the Battle of Second Manassas and closes with six appendixes that discuss strategy questions.

While this an excellent work, my major criticism is an almost total lack of suitable maps. I read the chapters on the Battle of Second Manassas with a copy of Hennessy's book on Second Manassas at hand for its maps. While much can be gained from this book without prior study of the first eighteen months of the Civil War, prior reading of history about the period covered by this book will greatly aid the reader in comprehending Harsh's text.

This is a serviceable account of the 1862 Peninsular campaign. Despite all the huge amont of literature on the Civil War (a lot of it redundant), there is surprisingly little on this pivotal aspect of the conflict. Mr. Dowdey writes in the talkative style of the old school historian. The supposed strength of this book is its attention to geographical detail. At times I found that the authors attention to roads and trails did not match the attention that should have been payed to the battles described. Like most Civil War historians Dowdey does not get into much detail about the tactics employed by either side. We never learn in what formations (or lack thereof) any of the troops were fighting in. The battles themselves are frequently described in rather muddled fashion. Dowdey frequently digresses in his descriptions, which further confuses the narrative flow. As a Southener Dowdey pays most attention to Southern activities. Thus we get all sorts of mini-bios on Confederate generals, but little on their Union counterparts. The chronology of events is also a bit confused. What Dowdey does well is provide a good overall description of the campaign, and he provides good insight into MacClellan's vague plans for his capture of Richmond. Dowdey is a bit hard on Joe Johnston's style of command before Lee takes over. Also the book points out well the complete lack of staff work on the part of Civil War armies in this period. European observers oftern laughed at the slip-shod attempts to provide this esstential service. None of the so-called great Civil War commanders ever appreciated this vital aspect of command. Hence the reason why armies often blundered into each other, and why the battles of the 7 Days lacked any decisive results. Dowdey's work is perhaps a bit dated, but is well written, and worth a casual read.

Clifford Dowdey's work, "The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee," is a well-written, detailed and informative record of the series of clashes between Union and Confederate forces known as the Seven Days Battles that occurred near the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia in late June 1862.

Dowdey describes, in rich detail, the initial Union planning and preparations for the amphibious landing on the York Peninsula (between the James and York Rivers). He details the Union Army of the Potomac's successful landing on the York Peninsula in May 1862 and its methodical advance up the peninsula towards Richmond led by its commanding officer, Major General George B. McClellan. The Confederate forces, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, are seen by Dowdey as ill-led as they continually retreated in successive fashion towards the outskirts of the Confederate capital and prepared themselves for a siege. Finally, with the Union Army divided north and south of the Chickahominy River, Dowdey chronicles Johnston's decision to turn on the Union forces at Seven Pines on May 31, only to fight an inconclusive battle. Johnston himself was wounded in the late hours of the battle, and his replacement was General Robert E. Lee, until that moment the military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Upon assuming command, Lee immediately devised a series of offensive strikes against the still-divided Union forces, but Dowdey argues that Lee's ultimate failure to crush the Union Army was due to a combination of many factors. Poor Confederate staff planning was in clear evidence from the beginning to the end of the Seven Days Battles. General Lee failed time and again to assume direct operational control of ever-changing battle situations where his subordinates failed to drive forward against the enemy (for example, "Stonewall" Jackson's failure to push forward his drive on the Confederate northern and left flank at the Battle of Mechaniscville). Lee was also hampered by the uneven quality of his subordinate commanders, particularly the deaf and old Theophilus Holmes, the inept Benjamin Huger and the mentally exhausted Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson (who suffered, according to Dowdey, from stress fatigue). Last, but certainly not least, the surprisingly well disciplined, hard-fighting and well-led (at the brigade, divisional and corps levels) Union troops frustrated Lee's strategic and tactical battle plans at virtually every turn.

Dowdey's work provides wonderfully detailed descriptions of all of the major battles: Seven Pines, Fair Oaks Station, Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Savage's Station and Malvern Hill. In addition, he also aids the reader by providing a series of detailed maps and descriptions of the complex web of major and minor roads and country lanes that were fundamental to the movement of the armies - Union and Confederate - during the Seven Days Battles. I found, however, one very annoying aspect about the work. I strongly disagreed with Dowdey's one-sided and dismissive view of Confederate General Joseph Johnston as a defeatist general who possessed no redeeming personal or military abilities. Johnston was clearly one of the most effective of all the Confederate generals, one whose primary concern was the care and welfare of the men under his command. He never took unnecessary risks in battle, for he knew that the Confederacy had a limited pool of available manpower with which to fight the Union.

Despite this one point of disagreement, I found Dowdey's work to be an excellent study of the Seven Days Battles. His insistence on "visual history" - that a historian must visit the battlefield that he is studying in order to more effectively understand the movements of the opposing armies, thereby aiding him in writing a work that the reader will follow clearly - is very much in evidence in this book.

A wonderful break from the usual, with Dowdey displaying an absolute mastery of the material. McClellan (heroically) dominates the early parts, with Johnston and Magruder as fools and Lincoln and Stanton as MacBeth's witches. The author's appreciation of the North's and South's politics is outstanding and adds a livid dimension to this oft-told tale. His single failure is in the matter of comparative (numerical) strengths. Don't miss it.

Study the Overland/Petersburg campaign and you'll note that Lee whipped Grant three times (the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, and various assaults on Petersburg), fought him to a bloody draw once (Spotsylvania), and only lost when the Army of Northern Virginia was crumbling from starvation and attrition. Stuck in an impossible situation, Lee forced Grant to take nearly a year longer than he had planned to take Richmond, despite Grant having all the advantages (better supplies, far more men, not having Richmond to defend, etc.). I doubt Grant would have done as well in such a position.

Grant was by no means an incompetant general, but his main attribute was tenacity; he won through stubborness more times than anything else. He nearly let the garrison of Ft. Donaldson get away (and would have if anyone had listened to Forrest), he came within a hair's breadth of losing his entire army at Shiloh, he was frustrated time and again at Vicksburg by an inferior general, his plan to defeat Bragg at Chattanooga was convoluted and shouldn't have worked, and Lee out-generaled him on multiple occasions. What made Grant superior to any other Union general (save perhaps Thomas) was his refusal to give up. Grant understood the advantages he worked with and knew how to use them to win. Put him on equal footing with Lee and the story may well have been different.

The oft-repeated view, especially from Confederate defenders, is that Grant won though he was a drunken butcher indifferent to high casualties whose triumph was inevitable because of superior manpower and supplies. John Frederick Charles Fuller, the British Major General, and along with Liddel Hart one of the top military strategists of the 20th century, provides overwhelming evidence to lay this view to rest. Grant practiced maneuver warfare when he could, and his Vicksburg campaign (not just a siege, rather a series of five battles), along with Jackson's valley campaign, are the two greatest campaigns of the war. In his final Overland campaign, Grant could not maneuver much because Lincoln required that he keep substantial forces between Lee's army and Washington. By a thorough analysis of Grant's and Lee's battles throughout the war, Fuller makes the case that Grant was among the best generals ever, and greater than Lee, who was also great but had his limitations (after Order 191 was lost and recovered by McClellan's troops before Antietam, Lee would only issue oral orders, and his subordinates were often confused by them; Grant was known for crystal clear written orders, following the example of Zachary Taylor under whom Grant (and Lee) had served in the Mexican War). Rating Grant so highly will of course be heresy for neo-Confederates, but there is no question Grant has received unfair treatment even among historians. Another Fuller book, "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" adds more details to the defense of the claim that Grant was an excellent general. In assessing the relative greatness of Grant and Lee, one should keep in mind their age difference and the difference in upward mobility on the two sides during the war. Lee was 14 years older than Grant, Lee was already a Colonel when the war started and still serving on active duty, whereas Grant had left the army as a captain after the Mexican War. At the start of the war, Winfield Scott, who had served in the War of 1812 and masterminded in the Mexican War the amazing defeat of a country of 20 million people with 12,000 invading troops, was the greatest soldier on either side. However he was old and so fat he could no longer ride a horse; his campaigning days were over. After Scott, Lee was the best soldier on either side at the start of the war--and Lee was offered command of the Union army but turned it down. However Grant rose through the ranks because he learned quickly from his mistakes at Belmont, Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Holly Springs. By the end of the war Fuller's analysis shows Grant was clearly the superior general, and not just because he had superior numbers. Even the oft-cited mistake at Cold Harbor, according to Fuller, is exagerrated. Fuller summarizes the overall casualy numbers during the war: the ratio of killed and wounded to total forces engaged for Grant was 10%; for the whole Federal army it was 11%; for the whole Confederate army it was 12%; and for Lee, it was 16%. One must be fair to Lee and not lose sight of the fact that he was an exemplary, even a saintly individual who must always be acknowledged as among the great American generals. But the simplistic, grossly unfair judgment of Ulysses S. Grant is revealed here as a sham which must stop. Under the razor-sharp and penetrating analysis of Fuller, one of the greatest military historians of all time, the conventional, common opinion of Grant is shown to be balderdash. Ulysses S. Grant was one of the greatest generals the U.S. has ever produced. Though written many years ago, Fuller's book is still relevant to this ongoing national discussion, and is a must read for anyone who wants to compare Union and Confederate generalship. Regarding Grant's drinking, Fuller doesn't discuss this, but this too is greatly exaggerated. He was indeed a binge drinker. When I asked the renowned Civil War historian Ed Bearss about this, he said Grant got drunk about four to six times during the war, always when he was away from his wife (she was with or lived near him during some campaigns and he was always lonely without her). Moreover, in the Civil War one could usually tell when battle was near, and there was usually inactivity during the winter months. The circumstances are not comparable to a modern general's always being on call in the nuclear age. Grant's occasional binge drinking never once affected his generalship, in public functions he usually would not drink at all, being a semi-recovered alcoholic except for the occasional binge. The stereotype is that Grant was constantly drunk during the war. This too is an unfair assessment not based on historical fact. Read this book and will see just how wrong the stereotype of Grant's generalship is, and how good a general he was.

I have to disagree totally with the previous reviewer. While the relative merits of both generals have been argued since the conclusion of the war and will be into the future, the interesting point about this book is that General Fuller began with the assumption that Grant was the butcher of legend who bludgeoned with numbers and that Lee was the battlefield genius. His studies lead him to conclude otherwise (in an intersting appendix he shows that througout their respective careers, Lee lost a higher proportion of his men than Grant).

The main point Fuller makes is that Grant was the first general to understand the totality of warfare in the modern age, including the role of political expectations. He also was a superior strategist and campaigner to Lee, although Lee was probably the better battlefield tactitian. Lee had the advantage in the Overland campaign of fighting on the defensive, and Grant was aware of the approaching elections and the need to produce a result, rather than the traditional Army of the Potomac stalemate, or worse. He additionally had responsibilities for overseeing the Western and Valley battlefronts.

The main point to remember when considering the careers of the two men is that, if my memory is correct, of the three armies that surrendered during the War, Grant received two of them.