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And McIntire chooses his battles well. The battle of Chattanooga is widely know for its gaffs and heroics (on both sides) as well as its strategic importance. The North had the opportunity to completely strangle the South, and the South desperately needed to bounce back after devastating losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.
As someone who does not read textbook history well, I was pleased to find that McIntire writes both knowledgably and comfortably. The battle scenes are realistic and most characters are developed very well. Simply put, it is a good blend of history and the author's imagination, and that makes for a good read.
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Well, I was not disappointed in the least. The style is the same as the Grant volume, and the format is the same. None the less, it reads very well and is very informative, although not as entertaining as I would have liked, thus the 4 stars. One thing for sure, you'll get to know Lee very well reading this book. And there are many lessons to be had from the reading, possibly one on every page, if you feel so inclined.
As with the Grant volume, Mr. Holton takes one area of leadership and reports how Lee acted in regards to that item (Patriot Voice, Duty are 2 examples). Each discussion is contained on one page! A very good use of words by the writer makes this work. Then it's on to the next, then the next, the next, and so on. One can read one page and think about it, or take a couple of hours and polish off the whole book!! I perferred the slower method.
However you choose to read this bbok, make sure that you do read it, and the Grant volume also. You'll get a good look at 2 very important military minds of our short history. You'll also learn some important lessons on how to deal with people and situations, in both business and personal life. Well done Mr. Holton. Thank you!
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I began collecting quotes and anecdotes from the life of Lee many years ago and started dreaming about a book in 1999. This book is the result of that dream. The book is specifically directed to "young gentlemen," or those who aspire to be, but I believe the book can be enjoyed by everyone. It is full of some of the better quotes culled from reliabile biographies and Lee's personal letters. Some were Lee's "personal maxims" that were found after his death in a worn military satchel by CSA chaplian, William Jones. The book also contains some little known anecdotes from the life of Lee that illustrate his sterling Christian character and humility. Many that have reviewed the book have been complimentary:
"The Maxims of Robert E. Lee for Young Gentlemen is inspiring and full of anecdotes and quotes, some long forgotten, that will guide men of all ages towards the lost art of being a 'gentleman.' " ~ Joe Farah, Editor in Chief and CEO of WorldNetDaily.com.
"I can think of no better guide for young men embarking on the adventure of life than the maxims of Robert E. Lee." ~ From the Foreword by Harry W. Crocker, III, author of Lee on Leadership and Executive Editor at Regnery Publishing.
"The example of Robert E. Lee illustrates in stark colors what it means to be a man - a model essential for all of us who are products of this distinctly unmanly age. Rick Williams has placed us all in his debt with this wonderful anthology of Lee's wisdom and grace. Must reading for all fathers and sons." ~ Pastor J. Steven Wilkins, author of Call of Duty: The Sterling Nobility of Robert E. Lee.
"This riveting collection of Lee's own stirring words and personal thoughts give amplified insight into the life of a rare and much-needed role model. Imagine for a moment the impact just one hundred young men could have on our land should they develop Lee's passion for personal purity and selfless pursuit of Christian honor. My prayer is that many will read these words not as antiquated or romantic philosophy, but rather as a challenge to humbly follow - and then boldly lead." ~ James McDonald, Publisher, Homeschooling Today® Magazine
The English historian Paul Johnson had this to say about Lee: "General Lee has accomplished in both life and death what few, indeed, hardly any have ever accomplished in all of the annals of history: ubiquitous respect, renown, and acclaim."
In this concise and handy little book of Maxims, Richard Williams Jr. has provided us a window into the man who accomplished ubiquitous respect, renown, and acclaim. In a generation dearth of real heroes it is vital that we put before our children men of valor, duty, and courage. One need look no further than to the example of Robert Edward Lee to see these principles brilliantly exemplified. This is a book that can be read in one sitting, but you will not want to read it just once. If you are like myself you will use this book over and over again. My copy is already marked up and the pages ruffled from where I keep drinking from the wonderful wisdom of the man.
It's my hope that with the publication of books like this one, we may yet again see a generation of leaders who embody the principles of Robert E. Lee.
Whether one believes Robert E. Lee fought on the right side of the War Between the States or not, his life is a great example of self-sacrifice, devotion to duty and always acting in a manner so as to do the right and honorable thing. Not by today's modern selfish, materialistic standards, but by standards that were the foundation of all that is good about Western Civilization.
This book contains a treasure trove of maxims by Lee that he used to guide his own life and to influence the lives of his children as well as those who served under him in the military and were under his care while they attended Washington College (later Washington and Lee University). It is not a cumbersom tomb, but a simple, straight forward book that is broken down into sections that lend itself to being a quick reference book as well as a wonderful insight into a man whose life is truly an example to all.
If more people followed R.E. Lee's maxims, this would definitely be a better world. I highly recommend this book for anyone looking to buy a special graduation gift for that special person graduating from high school or college. This is something that will last a lifetime.
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We start where "The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse" left off with both armies entrenched before the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. Rhea discusses the thinking of both Generals Lee and Grant as each labors to decide what to do next. Another unsuccessful attack at the salient is orchestrated by Grant before he makes the first move by deciding to disengage and manuever Lee out of his trenches. He advances Winfield Hancock to the southeast with the idea of using him as bait to get Lee to follow. This strategy works as Lee starts his army southward toward the North Anna river. Troop movements and lost opportunities dominate this portion of the book as Grant and Lee engage on the next portion of the campaign. Cavalry battles also are covered at this point as Union General Philip Sheridan drives the Federal cavalry on a threatening movement towards the Confederate capital at Richmond. Rhea then discusses how this movement, although somewhat successful, ultimately hurt the Union cause.
Lee then wins the race to the North Anna by taking advantage of Grant's lack of intelligence that Sheridan's cavalry would have provided. He (Lee) then entrenches south of the river as he waits to see what Grant will do. The battles at Henagan's Redoubt and Jericho Mills (both Union victories in the maneuver to the North Anna) set the stage for the highlight of the book which is the defensive posture that Lee now incorporates. Rhea shows how Confederate chief field engineer Martin Smith "proposes an ingenious solution" that results in the famous inverted "V" entrenchment below the river. This fortification has the added advantage of splitting Grant's army below the river and (if Grant attacks) would give Lee a stunning victory. Grant initiates offensive probes and becomes increasingly concerned that his troops are trapped. The little known battle at Ox Ford on the North Anna is the final proof that he needs. Lee meanwhile becomes ill and fails to delegate to his subordinates his instinctive thought to attack and the opportunity is lost. Rhea ties all this together with some of his best writing to date: "Lee had slept little in the twenty harrowing days since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. He often worked after midnight and was generally awake by 3:00 A.M. Dysentery was endemic in the Army of Norhtern Virginia, and Lee had contracted the illness by the time he had reached the North Anna. Normally even-tempered and robust, he was now irritable and rode in a carriage. On the afternoon of May 24 Lee was seized with violent intestinal distress and his aide pronounced him 'quite unwell'. The Confederate commander lay confined to his tent, 'prostrated by his sickness' with a single thought dominating his mind 'We must strike a blow'. But the Army of Northern Virginia could not strike a blow. It required a firm hand to coordinate so complex an undertaking. In better times, when Jackson and Longstreet commanded the wings of the Confederate army, Lee had liberally delegated responsibility. But Jackson was dead and Longstreet disabled and Lee lacked confidence in their successors." Grant then realizes the danger of his position and extricates his forces to the Northern side of the river. His decision to maneuver again "by the left flank" to the southeast closes out the text portion of the book.
Rhea then ends the book with an excellent Epilogue section in which he discusses the heretofore unknown battle at Wilson's Wharf on the James River showing for the first time the fighting tenacity of the Federal's black troops and also whereby he draws conclusions that differ somewhat with the contemporary standard: "Historians have considered Lee's inability to attack on the afternoon of May 24 a lost opportunity of major proportions. In retrospect, it is doubtful that even a healthy Lee could have dealt a decisive blow. He would most certainly have wrecked much of Hancock's corps, but he would have lacked the strength and time to exploit the localized victory. Nightfall would likely have prevented him from crossing the North Anna. Grant could take severe casualties in stride. Terrible subtractions in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House did not deter him, nor did severe losses at Cold Harbor in the coming weeks. It is difficult to imagine Hancock's defeat inducing him to abandon his campaign. Sickness doubtless cost Lee a superb opportunity to damage an isolated portion of Grant's army at the North Anna River, but the lost opportunity should not be exaggerated. Judging from Grant's reaction to earlier and later setbacks, he likely would have treated defeat at the North Anna as a tactical reverse and gone on with his campaign."
Judiciously written and masterfully researched (Rhea discloses in the Introduction that little of any substance has been written on this period due to the confusing state of exisiting material), Gordon Rhea has created (in my opinion) another masterpiece, further fortifying his standing as one of the outstanding contemporary Civil War historians. I give this book a very high recommendation.
Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.
For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.
Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.
The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.
The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."
Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.
Any negative about the book would be that it could use more descriptive type about the plant.
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This book came out of the seperation into three books of a manuscript he wrote on Gen. Lee and the campaign just prior to the Maryland campaign and then the Maryland campaign itself. This book is immensely readable and quite detailed. Dr. Harsh is quite blunt when there is a lack of clear evidence on a subject and the reasons for his judgment are well reasoned and sound. My opinion of Confederate strategy and the role of Jefferson Davis in the formation of that strategy changed a great deal after reading Confederate Tide Rising. While he is not the subject of this book, my view of Gen. Jackson also changed as the result of reading this book. Due to his performance in many of the battles and lead up to the battles discussed in this book, it's obvious to me that Jackson has been overrated by historians and could have been much more criticized by Gen. Lee than he was. That he did not do so postwar and only midly criticized Jackson in the action discussed in this book says a lot about Gen. Lee the man.
There are only a few drawbacks to this book. The first is that Dr. Harsh sometimes I think assumes knowledge of minor engagements and also political developments which were important but not directly germaine to his discussion that the reader may not possess. He would have been better served to not just mention these engagements and political developments and leave the reader wondering but to further discuss these developments and their importance, such as the Trent affair which he mentions twice before discussing what it was.
My second gripe with this book has been noted by a previous reviewer. There is a woeful lack of maps, which I think is simply unforgivable in any military history book. As Dr. Harsh clearly demonstrates, terrain and locations are particularly important in civil war battles and helped determine the tactics and strategy employed by Gen. Lee, Gen. McClellan and Gen. Pope. I have a working knowledge of some of the places discussed in the book because I live near many of them, however many readers in other parts of the country who do not have an extensive knowledge of the Civil War yet, may not. The lack of maps would really hamper their understanding of Dr. Harsh's points.
However, one thing that helps this book despite all that is Dr. Harsh's discussion of several terms and their uses in books on the the Civil War as well as how the Civil War generals themselves would have understood those terms such as strategy and tactics. This sort of a discussion is absent in most works on the war and I believe really hampers the understanding of many who look to gain knowledge on the war.
Overall, this book is essential for any Civil War bookshelf and should be accompanied by Dr. Harsh's other two books, Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows.
The text notes that statistically the South could not win. To overcome the odds, the Confederacy needed to conserve its resources while inflicting unacceptable casualties on the North. The text explains the doctrines of the Swiss military theorist Jomini, the probable basis for Jefferson Davis's doctrine of the "offensive-defense." Davis's doctrine provided a firm strategic framework within which Confederate generals in the field could work. By October 1861, pursuing the offensive-defense considerable progress toward achieving Confederate war aims was made; followed next by reversals of Southern fortunes resulting in part from the failure to continue the policies/strategies that yielded early successes.
On June 1, 1862 Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, when Joseph Johnson was wounded. The offensive-defensive policy was already in practice and was not initiated by Lee as some contend. By "late May 1862, the South had nearly lost the war. Lee knew that Jefferson Davis expected him to go on the offensive to save Richmond and to reclaim Virginia. Harsh also notes "Lee chose the offensive because he wanted to win the war, and he thought it offered the only chance. He believed the defensive was the sure path to defeat." His first response was the Seven Days Battle, whose strategy/execution contained errors, but nevertheless relieved the pressure on Richmond.
The author gives an excellent account of the strategic/tactical problems during the Seven Days Campaign and the events leading to the Battle of Second Manassas. Richmond was a major railroad center, banking center, manufacturing center, milling center and its lost would have been serious. It was important that the city is not captured and that Virginia is reclaimed. After the Seven Days Campaign Lee lost the initiative and was in a strategic stalemate that didn't end until Union General McClellan's Army of the Potomac was ordered back to Washington thereby ending the threat to Richmond.
The text gives an excellent account of the development of Lee's field strategies before and throughout the Battle of Second Manassas. The author notes as the battle neared its climax "Lee desperately wanted to finish the task at hand by destroying the army of.... Pope." However a frontal assault was the only option; and Lee couldn't afford the losses a frontal assault would incur. Nonetheless the author notes following the Second Manassas "Through chance, risk and much bloodshed, he and the Army of Northern Virginia were cobbling together the series of rapid victories that might lead to Northern demoralization and Confederate independence." The text ends with the Battle of Second Manassas and closes with six appendixes that discuss strategy questions.
While this an excellent work, my major criticism is an almost total lack of suitable maps. I read the chapters on the Battle of Second Manassas with a copy of Hennessy's book on Second Manassas at hand for its maps. While much can be gained from this book without prior study of the first eighteen months of the Civil War, prior reading of history about the period covered by this book will greatly aid the reader in comprehending Harsh's text.
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Dowdey describes, in rich detail, the initial Union planning and preparations for the amphibious landing on the York Peninsula (between the James and York Rivers). He details the Union Army of the Potomac's successful landing on the York Peninsula in May 1862 and its methodical advance up the peninsula towards Richmond led by its commanding officer, Major General George B. McClellan. The Confederate forces, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, are seen by Dowdey as ill-led as they continually retreated in successive fashion towards the outskirts of the Confederate capital and prepared themselves for a siege. Finally, with the Union Army divided north and south of the Chickahominy River, Dowdey chronicles Johnston's decision to turn on the Union forces at Seven Pines on May 31, only to fight an inconclusive battle. Johnston himself was wounded in the late hours of the battle, and his replacement was General Robert E. Lee, until that moment the military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Upon assuming command, Lee immediately devised a series of offensive strikes against the still-divided Union forces, but Dowdey argues that Lee's ultimate failure to crush the Union Army was due to a combination of many factors. Poor Confederate staff planning was in clear evidence from the beginning to the end of the Seven Days Battles. General Lee failed time and again to assume direct operational control of ever-changing battle situations where his subordinates failed to drive forward against the enemy (for example, "Stonewall" Jackson's failure to push forward his drive on the Confederate northern and left flank at the Battle of Mechaniscville). Lee was also hampered by the uneven quality of his subordinate commanders, particularly the deaf and old Theophilus Holmes, the inept Benjamin Huger and the mentally exhausted Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson (who suffered, according to Dowdey, from stress fatigue). Last, but certainly not least, the surprisingly well disciplined, hard-fighting and well-led (at the brigade, divisional and corps levels) Union troops frustrated Lee's strategic and tactical battle plans at virtually every turn.
Dowdey's work provides wonderfully detailed descriptions of all of the major battles: Seven Pines, Fair Oaks Station, Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Savage's Station and Malvern Hill. In addition, he also aids the reader by providing a series of detailed maps and descriptions of the complex web of major and minor roads and country lanes that were fundamental to the movement of the armies - Union and Confederate - during the Seven Days Battles. I found, however, one very annoying aspect about the work. I strongly disagreed with Dowdey's one-sided and dismissive view of Confederate General Joseph Johnston as a defeatist general who possessed no redeeming personal or military abilities. Johnston was clearly one of the most effective of all the Confederate generals, one whose primary concern was the care and welfare of the men under his command. He never took unnecessary risks in battle, for he knew that the Confederacy had a limited pool of available manpower with which to fight the Union.
Despite this one point of disagreement, I found Dowdey's work to be an excellent study of the Seven Days Battles. His insistence on "visual history" - that a historian must visit the battlefield that he is studying in order to more effectively understand the movements of the opposing armies, thereby aiding him in writing a work that the reader will follow clearly - is very much in evidence in this book.