I picked up a copy for two reasons: I enjoy alternate history, and I'm a Chattanooga native. The more I read, the closer it brought me to the actual battlesites-which I haven't visited in over a decade. The characters were well written and seemed alive; I thoroughly enjoyed the details. A Sidewise Award Nominee for 2002. For Civil War fans I also recommend Ward Moore's Bring the Jubilee and Harry Harrison's Stars and Stripes Trilogy.

Somewhat of a historical novel buff, I picked up McIntire's book on a whim. While the subject matter looked promising, I later wondered if I'd picked up some kind of southern "yeah, well if Lee had been at Chattanooga . . ." sour grapes drivel (even being a southerner myself doesn't make me want to read THAT). It didn't take but a few moments - his prologue in fact - to realize that what I was reading was an impartial "what if", one which just happened to pick a Civil War battle as its subject.

And McIntire chooses his battles well. The battle of Chattanooga is widely know for its gaffs and heroics (on both sides) as well as its strategic importance. The North had the opportunity to completely strangle the South, and the South desperately needed to bounce back after devastating losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

As someone who does not read textbook history well, I was pleased to find that McIntire writes both knowledgably and comfortably. The battle scenes are realistic and most characters are developed very well. Simply put, it is a good blend of history and the author's imagination, and that makes for a good read.

Civil War expert Dennis McIntire's Lee At Chattanooga: A Novel Of What Might Have Been is a fascinating "what if" alternate history novel about Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg. Lee At Chattanooga is an intriguing and imaginative exploration of the perennial question: what if it had been Lee who was involved in the Chattanooga campaign? A heavily researched and fascinatingly explored scenario unfolds in the resulting intricate chronicle, Lee at Chattanooga. Dennis McIntire's makes his characters come alive and this unusual story unfold with such compelling realism that he has created a work of historical fiction which totally engages the reader from first page to last -- and makes Lee At Chattanooga a "must read" for all dedicated Civil War buffs.

The first book I read by Mr. Holton was a similar book, just about U. S. Grant. I liked that one a lot (I have a review here also), so much so that I went ahead and got this one too. I figured that I'd give both sides a fair chance...

Well, I was not disappointed in the least. The style is the same as the Grant volume, and the format is the same. None the less, it reads very well and is very informative, although not as entertaining as I would have liked, thus the 4 stars. One thing for sure, you'll get to know Lee very well reading this book. And there are many lessons to be had from the reading, possibly one on every page, if you feel so inclined.

As with the Grant volume, Mr. Holton takes one area of leadership and reports how Lee acted in regards to that item (Patriot Voice, Duty are 2 examples). Each discussion is contained on one page! A very good use of words by the writer makes this work. Then it's on to the next, then the next, the next, and so on. One can read one page and think about it, or take a couple of hours and polish off the whole book!! I perferred the slower method.

However you choose to read this bbok, make sure that you do read it, and the Grant volume also. You'll get a good look at 2 very important military minds of our short history. You'll also learn some important lessons on how to deal with people and situations, in both business and personal life. Well done Mr. Holton. Thank you!

i bought this book for a $... at another retailer one day not thinking too much about it. read it and thought it was one of the better books i picked up in a while. quality ideas to follow and good reasons to self-reflect on your own management styles

"Leadership Lessons of Robert E. Lee" is a well written, thought provoking book. Lee was a man of outstanding character and moral values. Any manager can learn a tremendous amout from reading and placing the principles contained in this wonderful book into his daily life. An excellant book that I most highly recommend to any one who manages or leads people

Robert E. Lee's daughters are the subject of this beautiful and poignant book. So touching is the correspondence between the General, his wife and daughters that you feel like an interloper. The lost art of letter writing as praticed by the Lee family gives a vivid picture of Antebellum, Civil War, and Recontruction-era social history.

The Lee Girls by biographer Mary P. Coulling is the informed and informative story of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's four daughters: Mary Custis Lee; Eleanor Agnes Lee; Mildred Childe Lee; and Anne Carter Lee. Diaries, letters, paintings, and other contemporary records were utilized as primary source materials upon which to base an bibliographically historically accurate narrative of these women's lives through girlhood, the horror of war, and the era of reconciliation and rebuilding. A truly excellent and well balanced chronicle, The Lee Girls is a welcome and highly recommended addition to American Regional History, Civil War Studies, and Reconstruction Era Studies collections and supplemental reading lists.

Enjoyed the time frame of the book. It was not just the girls during the civil war period but also gave attention to the sons as well. The black and white photos were a plus but I wish the author had featured photos of the two surviving daughters in later life. This is an excellent well researched book into the lives of four charming girls of American history.

An intriguing interlude in the Overland Campaign of 1864 between the battles of Spotsylvania Courthouse and Cold Harbor, Gordon Rhea continues his impressive study of this period with "To the North Anna River". Manuever, as opposed to carnage, dominate this work and shows Rhea's continued evolvement as a writer as well as an historian.

We start where "The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse" left off with both armies entrenched before the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. Rhea discusses the thinking of both Generals Lee and Grant as each labors to decide what to do next. Another unsuccessful attack at the salient is orchestrated by Grant before he makes the first move by deciding to disengage and manuever Lee out of his trenches. He advances Winfield Hancock to the southeast with the idea of using him as bait to get Lee to follow. This strategy works as Lee starts his army southward toward the North Anna river. Troop movements and lost opportunities dominate this portion of the book as Grant and Lee engage on the next portion of the campaign. Cavalry battles also are covered at this point as Union General Philip Sheridan drives the Federal cavalry on a threatening movement towards the Confederate capital at Richmond. Rhea then discusses how this movement, although somewhat successful, ultimately hurt the Union cause.

Lee then wins the race to the North Anna by taking advantage of Grant's lack of intelligence that Sheridan's cavalry would have provided. He (Lee) then entrenches south of the river as he waits to see what Grant will do. The battles at Henagan's Redoubt and Jericho Mills (both Union victories in the maneuver to the North Anna) set the stage for the highlight of the book which is the defensive posture that Lee now incorporates. Rhea shows how Confederate chief field engineer Martin Smith "proposes an ingenious solution" that results in the famous inverted "V" entrenchment below the river. This fortification has the added advantage of splitting Grant's army below the river and (if Grant attacks) would give Lee a stunning victory. Grant initiates offensive probes and becomes increasingly concerned that his troops are trapped. The little known battle at Ox Ford on the North Anna is the final proof that he needs. Lee meanwhile becomes ill and fails to delegate to his subordinates his instinctive thought to attack and the opportunity is lost. Rhea ties all this together with some of his best writing to date: "Lee had slept little in the twenty harrowing days since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. He often worked after midnight and was generally awake by 3:00 A.M. Dysentery was endemic in the Army of Norhtern Virginia, and Lee had contracted the illness by the time he had reached the North Anna. Normally even-tempered and robust, he was now irritable and rode in a carriage. On the afternoon of May 24 Lee was seized with violent intestinal distress and his aide pronounced him 'quite unwell'. The Confederate commander lay confined to his tent, 'prostrated by his sickness' with a single thought dominating his mind 'We must strike a blow'. But the Army of Northern Virginia could not strike a blow. It required a firm hand to coordinate so complex an undertaking. In better times, when Jackson and Longstreet commanded the wings of the Confederate army, Lee had liberally delegated responsibility. But Jackson was dead and Longstreet disabled and Lee lacked confidence in their successors." Grant then realizes the danger of his position and extricates his forces to the Northern side of the river. His decision to maneuver again "by the left flank" to the southeast closes out the text portion of the book.

Rhea then ends the book with an excellent Epilogue section in which he discusses the heretofore unknown battle at Wilson's Wharf on the James River showing for the first time the fighting tenacity of the Federal's black troops and also whereby he draws conclusions that differ somewhat with the contemporary standard: "Historians have considered Lee's inability to attack on the afternoon of May 24 a lost opportunity of major proportions. In retrospect, it is doubtful that even a healthy Lee could have dealt a decisive blow. He would most certainly have wrecked much of Hancock's corps, but he would have lacked the strength and time to exploit the localized victory. Nightfall would likely have prevented him from crossing the North Anna. Grant could take severe casualties in stride. Terrible subtractions in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House did not deter him, nor did severe losses at Cold Harbor in the coming weeks. It is difficult to imagine Hancock's defeat inducing him to abandon his campaign. Sickness doubtless cost Lee a superb opportunity to damage an isolated portion of Grant's army at the North Anna River, but the lost opportunity should not be exaggerated. Judging from Grant's reaction to earlier and later setbacks, he likely would have treated defeat at the North Anna as a tactical reverse and gone on with his campaign."

Judiciously written and masterfully researched (Rhea discloses in the Introduction that little of any substance has been written on this period due to the confusing state of exisiting material), Gordon Rhea has created (in my opinion) another masterpiece, further fortifying his standing as one of the outstanding contemporary Civil War historians. I give this book a very high recommendation.

Gordon Rhea continues his study of Ulysses S. Grant's grinding Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third volume continues where his the first two volumes left off. Like the first two books, the tone is lively and interesting. Rhea does an excellent job conveying the thought process and difficulties involved in the major decisions made by both Lee and Grant. Rhea makes clear the reasons Lee was losing faith in Hill and Ewell. He continues an excellent analysis of the fractured Union command structure from the first two volumes expanding on the rift between Meade and Grant and the lack of talent among the corps commanders.

Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.

For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.

Gordon C. Rhea's account of the Civil War in Northern Virginia covering the period after the Wilderness Battle through the fighting south of the North Anna River in late May 1864 is well written. During this period, Lee and Grant took measure of each other. Grant had only experienced Confederate generals in the West and probably had limited respect for Lee's generalship. The general officers of the Army of the Potomac, having fought Lee since June 1862, had few reservations regarding Lee's ability prompting Grant to remark to his staff on May 6 to "Think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." Lee lacked direct experience with Grant but there is no indication that he questioned Grant's ability. Lee's problem was he didn't know how Grant thinks, reacts, etc. In many respects this book is an account of how Grant and Lee got to know each others abilities.

Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.

The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.

The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."

Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.

Ever try to look up a word in a 600 page dictionary that isn't in any order known to you? Unless you know this book's secret you'll have to look through the entire book to find your weed, if it's in the book at all. There is a key on page 603 but no instructions on how to use it and the author apparently doesn't return email inquiries. This book is full of great pictures but if you want a book to help you identify a weed in your garden look somewhere else.

A must-have book for gardeners, hikers, rural residences. 100% color photos make it great to ID weeds about the house. Categorized by family so pretty easy to find. Books that have art renderings of plants just don't ID a plant for me, and I'm an artist!
Any negative about the book would be that it could use more descriptive type about the plant.

This book isn't for everyone, but it really fills a gaping hole in the reference library of any gardener interested in the use of native plants, xeriscape gardening, wildflower cultivation, etc. For anyone who has ever let a yard go to seed "just to see what happens" (or dreamed of doing so) this book helps you determine what weeds are really weeds and what weeds are hidden treasures. The book is amply illustrated with photos of both mature plants and seedlings, which helps you determine what to get rid of after monsoon rains have done their part. The descriptions are clear and the index functions fine. Plus I just love the idea of having an entire book on weeds!

Fantastic! What a great read from a Bishop who can recognize a man of character and faith. Unlike most Episcopal bishops today who chase after the wind, Bishop Brown has written an interesting short tome on the greatest man produced by the 19th Century. Bishop Brown's intertwining of C.S. Lewis, Dorothy Sayers, and T.S. Elliot makes it all the more interesting. This book will bless you during devotional time.

A well-researched book on the religious beliefs of Robert E. Lee. A most instructive study on how these beliefs developed and impacted the man. The book is detailed on just what these beliefs were and how they were at the very core of who Robert E. Lee was.

The review written in a vain attempt to slash at the character of such a paragon of virtue is ridiculous and only shows the strength of Lee's character and the weakness of any who would care to even attempt such damage to it. Lee freed all his slaves by 1863 only because that was the time period set within his father-in-law's will, he would have preferred to release them earlier since he viewed slavery as a vile and impractical institution although he was not in favor of complete and immediate abolition, preferring gradual abolition for their "education as a race"-- in other words, to fit them with abilities worthy of employment and adequate pay once freed. The comment about protocol was ridiculous and incomprehensible. Lee specificially told his younger officers, who suggested that he lead the army into what would be a devastating round of "bushwhacking"- guerrilla warfare in the countryside, that he would not because the only honorable thing was to surrender to Grant, and thus saved the country from years of devastating warfare. To say that Lee prolonged the war, then, is pointless, for it was he who surrendered when davis, his superior, would have continued to fight. The quote which suggests bigorty and prejudice of Lee shall not even be repeated here due to the fact that it was a misinterpretation of his meaning. Lee, in fact, showed by personal example the best way to unite the country. He attended an Episcopalian church in which the congregation was white, until one day a black man entered the church and proceeded to the rail to take communion. there was a oause in the church, for no man dared sit beside this "colored" man- except Lee, who immediate took his seat beside the man and showed that he was in no way prejudiced.

I've had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Harsh for several years after taking a class on the Civil War with him at George Mason University.

This book came out of the seperation into three books of a manuscript he wrote on Gen. Lee and the campaign just prior to the Maryland campaign and then the Maryland campaign itself. This book is immensely readable and quite detailed. Dr. Harsh is quite blunt when there is a lack of clear evidence on a subject and the reasons for his judgment are well reasoned and sound. My opinion of Confederate strategy and the role of Jefferson Davis in the formation of that strategy changed a great deal after reading Confederate Tide Rising. While he is not the subject of this book, my view of Gen. Jackson also changed as the result of reading this book. Due to his performance in many of the battles and lead up to the battles discussed in this book, it's obvious to me that Jackson has been overrated by historians and could have been much more criticized by Gen. Lee than he was. That he did not do so postwar and only midly criticized Jackson in the action discussed in this book says a lot about Gen. Lee the man.

There are only a few drawbacks to this book. The first is that Dr. Harsh sometimes I think assumes knowledge of minor engagements and also political developments which were important but not directly germaine to his discussion that the reader may not possess. He would have been better served to not just mention these engagements and political developments and leave the reader wondering but to further discuss these developments and their importance, such as the Trent affair which he mentions twice before discussing what it was.
My second gripe with this book has been noted by a previous reviewer. There is a woeful lack of maps, which I think is simply unforgivable in any military history book. As Dr. Harsh clearly demonstrates, terrain and locations are particularly important in civil war battles and helped determine the tactics and strategy employed by Gen. Lee, Gen. McClellan and Gen. Pope. I have a working knowledge of some of the places discussed in the book because I live near many of them, however many readers in other parts of the country who do not have an extensive knowledge of the Civil War yet, may not. The lack of maps would really hamper their understanding of Dr. Harsh's points.

However, one thing that helps this book despite all that is Dr. Harsh's discussion of several terms and their uses in books on the the Civil War as well as how the Civil War generals themselves would have understood those terms such as strategy and tactics. This sort of a discussion is absent in most works on the war and I believe really hampers the understanding of many who look to gain knowledge on the war.

Overall, this book is essential for any Civil War bookshelf and should be accompanied by Dr. Harsh's other two books, Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows.

An overview of the war to the summer of 62. The ideas presented are well grounded and provoke real thought. Not a book that will sit well with many readers but a worthwhile addition to any Civil War Library. Read this and than read "Taken at the Flood".

Joseph Harsh, the author, analyzes Confederate war strategy from Fort Sumter through the Battle of Second Manassas stating that it was not true that the all the South wanted was "to be left alone." Declaring independence did not guarantee independence, and the author states the South thus "pursued three closely related but distinct war aims: independence, territorial integrity and the union of all the slave states."

The text notes that statistically the South could not win. To overcome the odds, the Confederacy needed to conserve its resources while inflicting unacceptable casualties on the North. The text explains the doctrines of the Swiss military theorist Jomini, the probable basis for Jefferson Davis's doctrine of the "offensive-defense." Davis's doctrine provided a firm strategic framework within which Confederate generals in the field could work. By October 1861, pursuing the offensive-defense considerable progress toward achieving Confederate war aims was made; followed next by reversals of Southern fortunes resulting in part from the failure to continue the policies/strategies that yielded early successes.

On June 1, 1862 Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, when Joseph Johnson was wounded. The offensive-defensive policy was already in practice and was not initiated by Lee as some contend. By "late May 1862, the South had nearly lost the war. Lee knew that Jefferson Davis expected him to go on the offensive to save Richmond and to reclaim Virginia. Harsh also notes "Lee chose the offensive because he wanted to win the war, and he thought it offered the only chance. He believed the defensive was the sure path to defeat." His first response was the Seven Days Battle, whose strategy/execution contained errors, but nevertheless relieved the pressure on Richmond.

The author gives an excellent account of the strategic/tactical problems during the Seven Days Campaign and the events leading to the Battle of Second Manassas. Richmond was a major railroad center, banking center, manufacturing center, milling center and its lost would have been serious. It was important that the city is not captured and that Virginia is reclaimed. After the Seven Days Campaign Lee lost the initiative and was in a strategic stalemate that didn't end until Union General McClellan's Army of the Potomac was ordered back to Washington thereby ending the threat to Richmond.

The text gives an excellent account of the development of Lee's field strategies before and throughout the Battle of Second Manassas. The author notes as the battle neared its climax "Lee desperately wanted to finish the task at hand by destroying the army of.... Pope." However a frontal assault was the only option; and Lee couldn't afford the losses a frontal assault would incur. Nonetheless the author notes following the Second Manassas "Through chance, risk and much bloodshed, he and the Army of Northern Virginia were cobbling together the series of rapid victories that might lead to Northern demoralization and Confederate independence." The text ends with the Battle of Second Manassas and closes with six appendixes that discuss strategy questions.

While this an excellent work, my major criticism is an almost total lack of suitable maps. I read the chapters on the Battle of Second Manassas with a copy of Hennessy's book on Second Manassas at hand for its maps. While much can be gained from this book without prior study of the first eighteen months of the Civil War, prior reading of history about the period covered by this book will greatly aid the reader in comprehending Harsh's text.

Gene Smith's Lee And Grant was a well-written documentation of the lives of these Civil War generals. The way the book was set up kept it interesting and almost fun to read. The format was such that consecutive chapters paralleled each man's life. For instance the first chapter pertained to Lee's father and his childhood while the second chapter was about Grant's Father and childhood. One warning I have to potential readers: this is a great book for those interested in the Civil War and these two men. If one doesn't have any interest in the topic, then this book is not for them. There aren't and underlying driving plots or surprises that make the book suspenseful. This is a historical piece highlighting two great men in our country's history. It's a great book for those who want to read specifically about these two men, not for a reader just looking for a book to read.

I enjoyed this book very much. The contrast between Grant (who led a hard scrabble life, even resorting to selling firewood by the side of the road to make a living) and Lee (perhaps the greatest man of the South) and Grant's triumph was a great story. You get a great introduction to the Civil War, even though there is a focus on the Virginia campaign because this is a biography of these two men, not an overall history of the Civil War. Highly recommended.

I was enthralled by the unique view that this book afforded. I have read many histories of the Civil War from many perspectives. This is the first time that I was introduced to these two pivotal historical figures from the human side. The juxtaposition of each of them to the other was very helpful to put the time and sequences of the war into perspective and give true scale to all that happened.

This is a serviceable account of the 1862 Peninsular campaign. Despite all the huge amont of literature on the Civil War (a lot of it redundant), there is surprisingly little on this pivotal aspect of the conflict. Mr. Dowdey writes in the talkative style of the old school historian. The supposed strength of this book is its attention to geographical detail. At times I found that the authors attention to roads and trails did not match the attention that should have been payed to the battles described. Like most Civil War historians Dowdey does not get into much detail about the tactics employed by either side. We never learn in what formations (or lack thereof) any of the troops were fighting in. The battles themselves are frequently described in rather muddled fashion. Dowdey frequently digresses in his descriptions, which further confuses the narrative flow. As a Southener Dowdey pays most attention to Southern activities. Thus we get all sorts of mini-bios on Confederate generals, but little on their Union counterparts. The chronology of events is also a bit confused. What Dowdey does well is provide a good overall description of the campaign, and he provides good insight into MacClellan's vague plans for his capture of Richmond. Dowdey is a bit hard on Joe Johnston's style of command before Lee takes over. Also the book points out well the complete lack of staff work on the part of Civil War armies in this period. European observers oftern laughed at the slip-shod attempts to provide this esstential service. None of the so-called great Civil War commanders ever appreciated this vital aspect of command. Hence the reason why armies often blundered into each other, and why the battles of the 7 Days lacked any decisive results. Dowdey's work is perhaps a bit dated, but is well written, and worth a casual read.

Clifford Dowdey's work, "The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee," is a well-written, detailed and informative record of the series of clashes between Union and Confederate forces known as the Seven Days Battles that occurred near the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia in late June 1862.

Dowdey describes, in rich detail, the initial Union planning and preparations for the amphibious landing on the York Peninsula (between the James and York Rivers). He details the Union Army of the Potomac's successful landing on the York Peninsula in May 1862 and its methodical advance up the peninsula towards Richmond led by its commanding officer, Major General George B. McClellan. The Confederate forces, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, are seen by Dowdey as ill-led as they continually retreated in successive fashion towards the outskirts of the Confederate capital and prepared themselves for a siege. Finally, with the Union Army divided north and south of the Chickahominy River, Dowdey chronicles Johnston's decision to turn on the Union forces at Seven Pines on May 31, only to fight an inconclusive battle. Johnston himself was wounded in the late hours of the battle, and his replacement was General Robert E. Lee, until that moment the military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Upon assuming command, Lee immediately devised a series of offensive strikes against the still-divided Union forces, but Dowdey argues that Lee's ultimate failure to crush the Union Army was due to a combination of many factors. Poor Confederate staff planning was in clear evidence from the beginning to the end of the Seven Days Battles. General Lee failed time and again to assume direct operational control of ever-changing battle situations where his subordinates failed to drive forward against the enemy (for example, "Stonewall" Jackson's failure to push forward his drive on the Confederate northern and left flank at the Battle of Mechaniscville). Lee was also hampered by the uneven quality of his subordinate commanders, particularly the deaf and old Theophilus Holmes, the inept Benjamin Huger and the mentally exhausted Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson (who suffered, according to Dowdey, from stress fatigue). Last, but certainly not least, the surprisingly well disciplined, hard-fighting and well-led (at the brigade, divisional and corps levels) Union troops frustrated Lee's strategic and tactical battle plans at virtually every turn.

Dowdey's work provides wonderfully detailed descriptions of all of the major battles: Seven Pines, Fair Oaks Station, Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Savage's Station and Malvern Hill. In addition, he also aids the reader by providing a series of detailed maps and descriptions of the complex web of major and minor roads and country lanes that were fundamental to the movement of the armies - Union and Confederate - during the Seven Days Battles. I found, however, one very annoying aspect about the work. I strongly disagreed with Dowdey's one-sided and dismissive view of Confederate General Joseph Johnston as a defeatist general who possessed no redeeming personal or military abilities. Johnston was clearly one of the most effective of all the Confederate generals, one whose primary concern was the care and welfare of the men under his command. He never took unnecessary risks in battle, for he knew that the Confederacy had a limited pool of available manpower with which to fight the Union.

Despite this one point of disagreement, I found Dowdey's work to be an excellent study of the Seven Days Battles. His insistence on "visual history" - that a historian must visit the battlefield that he is studying in order to more effectively understand the movements of the opposing armies, thereby aiding him in writing a work that the reader will follow clearly - is very much in evidence in this book.

A wonderful break from the usual, with Dowdey displaying an absolute mastery of the material. McClellan (heroically) dominates the early parts, with Johnston and Magruder as fools and Lincoln and Stanton as MacBeth's witches. The author's appreciation of the North's and South's politics is outstanding and adds a livid dimension to this oft-told tale. His single failure is in the matter of comparative (numerical) strengths. Don't miss it.